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1 
Introduction 
 
1.1. OUTLINE OF THE PROBLEM  
 
A cursory look at the worldwide distribution of politically motivated violence suggests that 
democracy and peace tend to go hand in hand, while nondemocratic countries are those 
that experience the most severe forms of conflict. Consider, for example, Iraq. Between 
1950 and 2008, Iraq experienced at least 11 coup attempts (Powell and Thyne 2011), and 9 
intrastate armed conflict broke out in the same period according to the UCDP/PRIO Armed 
Conflict Dataset. Between 1946 and 2008, Iraq initiated 25 militarized interstate disputes 
reaching at least Level 4 on the Correlates of War coding scheme,1 and was involved in 
such disputes during two thirds of its existence (41 years out of 63). During the same 
period, the country experienced 27 years of military dictatorship (Cheibub, Gandhi and 
Vreeland 2010). From 1981 to 2006, it repeatedly reached the lowest score on the CIRI 
physical integrity rights index2 (20 years out of 26) and never received a score higher than 
3. Needless to say, it did not experience one single year of democratic government since 
1946.  
By contrast, Switzerland only experienced democracy and peace from 1946 onwards. 
Since 1946, no coup was attempted and no civil war broke out in Switzerland. The country 
never initiated a militarized interstate dispute involving the actual use of force and never 
received a score below 7 on the CIRI physical integrity rights index.  
Why, then, are some countries – like Switzerland – so peaceful while others – like Iraq – 
                                                 
1 Militarized interstate disputes are coded 1 if they involve no militarized action, 2 if one of the parties issues 
a threat to use force, 3 if the dispute results in a display of force, 4 if it involves the actual use of military 
force, and 5 if it results in full-scale war. 
2 The CIRI physical integrity rights index ranges from 0 to 8, higher scores indicating good practices and 
lower score indicating widespread violations of human rights. 
2 
are conflict-ridden? One way of making sense of the situation is to focus on the 
institutional roots of political violence: The view of institutions as conflict-resolution 
devices has been prevalent since at least Hobbes’ Leviathan. While Hobbes called for 
political centralization, the Federalist No. 9 (Hamilton 1787) called for the creation of a 
large confederacy of states and a republican government with strong institutional checks 
and balances as means to deal with the risk of popular insurrection and civil war. Some 
200 years later, Popper (1963) famously argued that democracy, by providing the 
possibility to vote governments out of office, was the only system allowing voters to get 
rid of bad rulers without bloodshed. This idea was further developed by Przeworski 
(1999): minimal – Schumpeterian – democracy fosters peace if only because there is a 
regular procedure for changing governments. More generally, the idea that democracy 
fosters domestic and international peace has long been widespread among scholars and 
policy makers. According to this view, it is unsurprising that Switzerland and Iraq differ so 
strikingly in their conflict behavior: while the former belongs since decades to the world’s 
most democratic countries, the latter has so far only experienced an explosive cocktail of 
military dictatorship and personal rule. Contrary to the dictators who succeeded each other 
in Iraq, the Swiss Federal Council, being democratically elected, never needed to imprison 
or torture its citizens to maintain itself in power, and never had to rely on its military to 
maintain order at the risk of leaving itself exposed to military intervention in politics.   
The “democratic peace” proposition is an influential theme and has inspired much of the 
American and European democracy promotion efforts abroad (see Mansfield and Snyder 
2005). Likewise, the series of political changes that unfolded during the last quarter of the 
20th century – the fall of the Southern European and Latin American dictatorships in the 
1970s and 1980s, the trend towards democratization in Asia shortly thereafter, the collapse 
of communist regimes at the beginning of the 1990s, and the spread of democracy in sub-
Saharan Africa during the same period – has given rise to hope and enthusiasm. Yet, the 
“third wave” of democracy (Huntington 1993) did not live up to expectations: instead of 
bringing about global peace, democratization has coincided with a resurgence of both 
domestic and international conflicts in many parts of the world (see, e.g., Mansfield and 
Snyder 2005; Collier 2009). Some forty years after the beginning of the third wave, the 
consensus among scholars is now that democracy generally did not fulfill its promise: 
3 
although the interstate democratic peace is still a well-established proposition in the 
international relations literature, it has become increasingly challenged in recent years (see, 
e.g., Thompson 1996; Rosato 2003; Gibler 2007). Furthermore, the empirical evidence in 
favor of the domestic variant of the democratic peace theory is meager at best: a recent 
review (Hegre 2014) indicates that very few studies so far have confirmed the existence of 
a monotonic relationship between democracy and the risk of intrastate armed conflict. 
There are several possible reasons why cross-national research has failed so far to uncover 
any clear relationship between democracy and peace. One of these explanations is that 
dictatorship, war, and domestic conflict are only symptoms of a generalized disease whose 
roots can be located in political culture, economic backwardness, or country-specific 
historical legacies. If this view is correct, political institutions are only epiphenomena of 
deeper conflicts, and democracy – provided that it can emerge and survive in such 
unfavorable environments in the first place – is clearly not sufficient to bring about peace. 
A more nuanced view holds that democracy alone is not sufficient to prevent conflicts, 
because it can have detrimental effects on political stability in poor or severely divided 
societies (Horowitz 1993; Collier 2009; Hegre and Nome 2010). Finally, it could be the 
case that only some democratic institutions, or some forms of democracy, are conducive to 
social peace (Reynal-Querol 2002a, 2005; Schneider and Wiesehomeier 2008).  
But maybe there is a simpler explanation: comparing democracies and nondemocracies is 
bound to fail because it is too simplistic and ignores the huge diversity of authoritarian 
regimes (traditionally treated as a residual category encompassing all systems that are not 
democratic). As recent research suggests, there are perhaps as many differences between 
two “types” of nondemocracies as there are between democracies and dictatorships: 
authoritarian regimes vary with regard to their degree of openness, the way rulers access, 
maintain, exercise and leave power, the type of organization on which they rely, and the 
institutions they create (see, e.g., Geddes 1999; Hadenius and Teorell 2007a; Gandhi 
2008a; Goemans 2008; Cheibub et al. 2010; Svolik 2012). While there is still no consensus 
as to which of these aspects matters the most – research on authoritarianism is still a young 
field – there are good reasons to believe that at least some of these are relevant to predict 
states’ conflict behavior.  
Authoritarian regimes have regained attention during the last two decades, and the 
4 
proliferation of cross-national datasets on authoritarian institutions has enabled researchers 
to examine their effect on a wide range of outcomes. A non-negligible part of these 
empirical investigations deals with political conflicts involving the use of physical 
violence: are violent conflicts unrelated to authoritarian regime type, or are they more 
prevalent in some dictatorships3 than in others? After some fifteen years, it seems that 
comparative cross-national research has already succeeded in identifying the “culprits:” 
military regimes have been found to be more unstable (Geddes 1999; Hadenius and Teorell 
2007a), to engage more often in physical integrity rights violations than other types of 
dictatorships (Poe, Tate and Keith 1999; Davenport 2007b), to initiate more international 
conflicts (Sechser 2004; Lai and Slater 2006; Weeks 2012), to experience more domestic 
and transnational terrorism (Wilson and Piazza 2013) and to be more prone to coups 
(Geddes 1999; Geddes et al. 2014) and civil wars (Fjelde 2010; Wilson 2014). Regimes 
labeled as “personalist” (Geddes 1999) do not fare much better, since they are also more 
likely to experience civil war (Gurses and Mason 2010) and to pursue aggressive foreign 
policies (Peceny, Beer and Sanchez-Terry 2002; Peceny and Beer 2003; Peceny and Butler 
2004). By contrast, party regimes display a superior intra-elite cohesion and last longer 
(Geddes 1999), are less likely to experience internal violence (Gurses and Mason 2010; 
Fjelde 2010; Wilson and Piazza 2013) and also less likely to initiate external conflicts 
(Peceny et al. 2002; Peceny and Beer 2003; Peceny and Butler 2004). Finally, while 
monarchies have been comparatively neglected by cross-national research so far, they are 
clearly among the most stable (Hadenius and Teorell 2007a) and seem to be among the 
most internally peaceful (e.g., Gurses and Mason 2010).  
At first glance, this accumulation of findings is impressive. Yet, researchers have often 
tended to investigate these outcomes individually, in isolation. Doing so, they have ignored 
two crucial aspects of the problem. First, regimes do not emerge in a vacuum. They are 
embedded in specific contexts and shaped by the very security issues they have to face. To 
give the most obvious example, researchers have repeatedly noted that military regimes 
most frequently emerge in periods of serious domestic crises (e.g. Finer 1962; Nordlinger 
1977; and, more recently, Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni 2008): it is thus likely that the 
                                                 
3 The terms “dictatorship”, “authoritarian regime” and “autocracy” will be used interchangeably throughout 
the dissertation and refer to all nondemocratic regimes (including monarchies and so-called “hybrid” or 
“anocratic” regimes). 
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context in which these regimes emerge significantly affects their subsequent behavior. 
Second, investigating civil wars, military coups, diversionary wars, or repression 
separately is tantamount to assuming that these forms of political violence are independent 
from each other, and ignoring that they actually often tend to go hand in hand. For 
example, as recent research has demonstrated, experiencing internal armed conflict makes 
regime more repressive (Davenport 2007a), more likely to get involved in an interstate war 
(Gleditsch, Salehyan and Schultz 2008), and more vulnerable to military coups (Piplani 
and Talmadge 2015). In turn, coup risk affects states’ propensity to initiate conflicts abroad 
(Powell 2014b), the involvement in an interstate conflict affects repression (Davenport 
2007b), and so on. To further complicate matters, these forms of violence might be 
theoretically distinct, but difficult to differentiate empirically: for example, most 
operational definitions of civil war rely on some threshold of violence, but this criterion 
might result in the inclusion of other types of phenomena (e.g., state-sponsored killings, or 
military coups) in civil war databases (see Sambanis 2004, 2008). Finally, some 
researchers have raised the question of whether manifestations of political violence that are 
usually considered in isolation really are inherently different phenomena – the most 
obvious example being the differentiation of civil wars and domestic terrorism (see, e.g., 
de la Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca 2012; Sambanis 2008). Thus, one is left to wonder if what 
appears to be an impressive sum of findings cannot be, in fact, traced back to a small 
number of ambiguous events, or does not result from the fact that researchers so far have 
drawn arbitrary boundaries between phenomena that are actually similar in their nature and 
consequences.  
To phrase the problem in a more technical way, works devoted to the relationship between 
political institutions and political violence face a number of issues: 
(1) The problem of measurement error: do operational definitions of theoretical 
constructs and coding issues result in measurement bias? 
(2) The problem of spuriousness: are political regimes simply epiphenomena of 
deeper factors that might simultaneously affect political institutions and political 
conflicts? 
(3) The problem of endogeneity: does regime type affect violence, or is it the other 
way around? 
6 
(4) The problem of the disentanglement of direct and indirect causal relationships: 
does regime type cause violence directly or only through unobserved, intervening 
factors? 
While the first problem – measurement error – is methodological in essence, the three 
others call for a unified approach to political regimes and violent conflict: because 
identifying how forms of political violence influence each other and how they shape 
political structures is a theory-driven process, it requires having a broad overview of the 
mutual relationships between political institutions and conflicts. Of course, such an 
approach is not without limitations: such an analysis cannot be exhaustive – some aspects 
of the problem will necessarily be left out of the picture – and at the same time, given its 
broad scope, the argumentation might become somewhat abstract (some would say 
oversimplistic). Yet, precisely because of its general, abstract character, such an approach 
is well-suited to isolate institutional causes of political violence, rule out alternative 
explanations, and avoid some of the potential pitfalls mentioned above: it can therefore 
allow for a more thorough understanding of the complex relationships between institutions 
and violence.  
The aim of the dissertation will therefore be to provide a theoretical and empirical 
contribution to the growing literature that examines the impact of political regime type on 
the outbreak of political violence. It will lay down a theoretical framework that will be 
applicable to a wide range of cases and will thus facilitate cross-country comparisons and 
help anticipate risks in particular cases. It will then reexamine some of the causal 
relationships uncovered by previous research, and explore new ones. It will, finally, bridge 
some gaps between different research fields – particularly comparative politics and 
international relations – that often tend to evolve in relative isolation from each other.  
Next sections specify the subject of investigation and provide some details on the approach 
adopted throughout the dissertation.  
 
1.2. AIM OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
Broadly speaking, the explanandum of the dissertation is the actual or threatened use of 
armed violence for solving politically motivated conflicts. This rather broad definition 
7 
encompasses a wide range of outcomes: It includes forms of violence perpetrated by state 
actors (e.g., purges, genocides or politicides) or against state actors (e.g., assassinations or 
coups d’état) as well as violence initiated by, or targeting foreign actors (e.g., interstate 
wars). Theoretically speaking, most of these aspects of political violence are somehow 
related to extant political institutions. In practice, however, the scope of the empirical 
analysis will be restricted to following outcomes:4 
(1) The outbreak of intrastate armed conflict (Chapters 5, 6, and 7). 
(2) Military coups d’état (Chapters 4, 5 and 8) 
(3) State repression, conceived as physical integrity rights violations perpetrated by 
state actors (Chapter 8). 
(4) The initiation of interstate armed conflicts for diversion purposes (Chapter 9).  
These outcomes correspond to several possible manifestations of conflicts taking place 
between three main groups of actors, namely the incumbent and his allies, the military, and 
opposition groups. State repression and intrastate armed conflict are, for example, two 
possible outcomes of conflicts between the government and opposition groups. Military 
coups are conceived either as direct conflicts between the government and the military (in 
which case the military is the initiator of the conflict) or as the outcome of an agency 
problem arising from conflicts between government and opposition (in which case the 
government is conceived as the principal and the military as an agent). Finally, 
diversionary wars are attempts by the incumbent to avoid open conflicts with the military.  
The central assumption of the dissertation is that the behavior of these actors and their 
mutual relationships (and, in turn, the way conflicts between them will manifest 
themselves) are shaped by the political environment in which they operate. This political 
environment, in turn, consists of two main features: 1) the identity of incumbents and of 
the political coalition supporting them; and 2) the formal rules that regulate access to, and 
exit from political office. These two features constitute the explanans of the thesis, that is, 
political regimes.  
Political regimes are sorted into five broadly defined types. The first two types – 
democracies and monarchies – are part of a broader category I will refer to as the group of 
“institutionalized regimes.” Although democracies and monarchies differ in every respect, 
                                                 
4 Details on the definition of these variables will be provided in the corresponding chapters. 
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what they have in common is the existence of binding, agreed-upon rules that prescribe 
how the effective leader is selected, removed, and replaced. Regimes that lack such rules 
are referred to as “non-institutionalized regimes”: this category encompasses all regimes in 
which, for example, the leader has attained power by irregular means, or in which 
succession in office involves unregulated power struggles at the elite level. Theoretically 
speaking, there are institutional ways of filling political offices other than competitive 
elections and hereditary succession; yet, in practice – since the analysis is restricted to the 
post-World War II period – only democracies and monarchies are considered 
institutionalized regimes, and the category of non-institutionalized regimes encompasses 
all regimes that are neither monarchies nor democracies.  
Non-institutionalized regimes, in turn, are sorted into three subtypes, namely party 
regimes, military dictatorships, and civilian autocracies. This approach speaks directly to 
the “new generation” of studies on authoritarianism (see, e.g., Geddes 1999; Magaloni 
2008; Cheibub et al. 2010) which main focus lies on the autocrat and on the political 
alliances that support him – variously referred to as “launching organizations” (Haber 
2006), “ruling elites” (Cheibub et al. 2010) or “ruling coalitions” (Magaloni 2008, Svolik 
2012). Following this approach, authoritarian regimes are differentiated according to the 
identity of the individuals who are part of this ruling coalition (one of the most common 
distinctions being the civilian vs. military dichotomy). As we shall see in Chapter 2, there 
are alternative ways of conceptualizing authoritarian regimes. The main reason why I opt 
for this approach instead of another is that it was precisely designed to predict the stability 
of political regimes: most studies mentioned above implicitly or explicitly convey 
expectations about the form political conflicts are most likely to take in each regime. This 
conflict potential, in turn, helps predict how long autocrats will be able to stay in power 
and how long regimes will last. Thus, this approach fits perfectly to the general research 
question of the dissertation, since conflicts investigated here broadly correspond to the 
many ways in which autocrats can lose power (e.g., coups, rebellions or foreign 
interventions; see Goemans et al. 2009a, Svolik 2012). At the same time, the present work 
has the potential to contribute to extant research on the stability of authoritarian regimes in 
a meaningful way, to the extent that it will address a weakness of this research agenda: so 
far, most studies on the stability of authoritarian regimes have precisely focused on most 
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extreme forms of political instability – or ultimate consequences of conflicts – such as 
regime transitions or irregular leadership changes (for typical examples, see Hadenius and 
Teorell 2007a; Gandhi 2008a; Magaloni 2008; Svolik 2012). This narrow focus on 
political survival can potentially mask relevant empirical relationships (because, for 
example, countries that experience many civil wars the incumbent always wins are treated 
in the same way as countries that never experience civil war) and rely on a rather broad 
conception of stability: to take an extreme example, although Bashar al-Assad is (as of 
May 2015) still in power, nobody would claim that Syria is as stable as, say, Saudi Arabia. 
To put it otherwise, political violence can either be viewed as a cause or as a symptom of 
instability (or, alternatively, as a failure to solve conflicts in a peaceful way). Either way, 
restricting the analysis to “positive” cases (i.e., cases in which a violent conflict has taken 
place between the autocrat and someone else, and the autocrat has lost) can result in a 
distorted view of the effect of political institutions.  
 
1.3. THE APPROACH 
 
1.3.1. Theoretical approach 
 
The dissertation adopts a rational choice approach. Rational choice theories begin with 
three key assumptions (see Riker 1995): 
(1) Actors have well-defined preferences and are able to rank these in a transitive 
order; 
(2) They hold specific beliefs about the consequences of their actions;  
(3) They act purposively, depending on their ordering of preferences: given the 
choice between several actions, they will choose the one they believe will achieve 
their goals. 
Several important caveats are in order. First, the third assumption does not require that 
individuals be able to take perfectly informed decisions, never make mistakes, or never 
choose ineffective strategies: it merely states that they are able to act according to their 
own goals and that means are related to ends in a non-random way (Riker 1995; see also 
Quackenbush 2004 for a distinction between procedural and instrumental rationality). 
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Second, the term of rationality only applies to the process through which individuals 
choose an action: that is, rationality only implies that individuals will choose the strategy 
they believe will lead to their preferred outcome, and says absolutely nothing about what 
this outcome precisely is. To put it differently, rational choice approaches usually do not 
specify any particular goal as universal, and no preference can be described as inherently 
rational or irrational (see Green 2002 for a discussion about Humean – instrumental – and 
Kantian rationality; see also Riker 1995, Quackenbush 2004). Third, the term “rational 
choice” only pertains to decisions about specific actions: neither desires nor beliefs are 
freely chosen.  
To illustrate these points, the rationality assumption – narrowly defined as it is – is 
perfectly compatible with all possible journalistic accounts of dictators’ eccentricities. 
Examples of the latter abound: Turkmen President Niyazov was famous for renaming days 
and months after himself and his relatives, replacing the Turkmen word for bread after his 
mother’s name,5 and outlawing beards and opera.6 The Nationality Law issued by Mobutu 
in Zaire required citizens with a foreign-sounding name to change it to a Zairian one 
(Nordlinger 1977, 132). During his official visit to France, Libyan ruler Qaddafi received 
his guests in a Bedouin tent he erected in the garden of the official residence for visiting 
dignitaries.7 General Ne Win of Burma, following a recommendation of his astronomer, 
ordered the withdrawal of several Burmese banknotes and issued two new 
denominations—forty-five and ninety—that are divisible by nine and whose numerals add 
up to nine (which resulted in people’s life savings being wiped out overnight).8 The list 
goes on. But, as long as we do not have any information about the ultimate goals 
underlying Niyazov’s or Qaddafi’s actions, none of these examples constitute a rebuttal of 
the rationality assumption.  
                                                 
5 Osborne, Andrew. 2006. “Saparmurat Niyazov: President of Turkmenistan.” Independent, December 22, 
2006, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries/saparmurat-niyazov-429556.html 
(accessed March 25, 2015). 
6 Whitlock, Monica. 2004. “Young Turkmen face beard ban.” BBC, February 25, 2004, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3486776.stm (accessed March 25, 2015). 
7 Sciolino, Elaine. 2007. “Divided, France welcomes and condemns Qaddafi.” New York Times, December 
11, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/11/world/europe/11france.html?_r=0 (accessed 
March 25, 2015). 
8 Packer, George. 2008. “Drowning: Can the Burmese people rescue themselves?” New Yorker, August 25, 
2008, available at http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2008/08/25/drowning?currentPage=all (accessed 
March 30, 2015). 
11 
Thus, the rationality assumption is taken here as given: actors want to achieve specific 
goals and will choose the course of action that they believe is the most likely to lead to the 
preferred outcome. But then again, the main problem is that this assumption says nothing 
about preferences themselves. A necessary first step therefore consists in identifying these 
preferences. 
A first way of gathering information about what motivates actors is to ask them. But there 
are reasons to think that, given the sensitiveness of the subjects investigated here, this 
approach is not the most appropriate. In the context of political struggles that involve the 
use of violence, the public discourse tends to be plagued by self-serving explanations that 
have little to do with actors’ real motivations: dictators want to lead their country to 
democracy and development, rebel leaders want to fight injustice, and coup plotters want 
to save their countries from social turmoil or from the influence of incompetent and 
corrupt politicians. While these self-justifications can be really informative about the 
political or cultural context in which they are uttered,9 they say little about the primary 
motivations of actors. For example, here is how the then warlord Charles Taylor justified 
the bloody armed struggle he initiated against Liberian dictator Samuel Doe:10 
 
Did [Doe] ever do anything for the people? Did he ever respect human rights? He destroyed 
everything, the economy, private property, social and political life. (...) I do not want to establish a 
military government in Liberia, but a civilian, democratic regime, with a social and economic 
program to develop the country and bring back children who fled to neighboring countries and 
elsewhere. I want to guarantee free talk and press freedom, an independent judiciary, and lead the 
Liberian people to progress while respecting human rights. (...) Furthermore, I will not ban any 
opposition party. The Liberian people can trust me. 
 
Whether or not Taylor believed in his own propaganda is beside the point (even though the 
way he behaved once in power makes this statement hardly credible in retrospect):11 the 
                                                 
9 See, for example, Luttwak’s (1979) comments on post-coups announcements, pp. 159-162. 
10 For the complete interview (in French), see Diallo, Miriam C. 2013 [1990]. “Liberia: Charles Taylor, 
itinéraire d'un tueur (#3): ‛Seul Houphouët-Boigny m'a aidé’.” Jeune Afrique 1542, July 18, 1990, 
available at http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Articles/Dossier/ARTJAWEB20120422125832/libye-liberia-
charles-taylor-samuel-doecharles-taylor-seul-houphouet-boigny-m-a-aide-3.html (accessed August 31, 
2014). 
11 In 2012, Taylor was charged for war crimes and crimes against humanity, and sentenced to 50 years in 
prison by the Special Court for Sierra Leone, thus becoming the only former head of state to be convicted 
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real problem is that it is hard – to say the least – to derive any clear predictions from such 
appeals to vague ideological principles. But how, then, can preferences be identified? An 
alternative solution to the problem is proposed by Riker (1995):  
 
The simple identification of goals is the crux of the problem. The theorist can neither believe what 
actors say are their goals nor trust his or her own attributions of them. Many people hide 
aggrandizement under the cloak of self-proclaimed altruism. The theorist may be gullible or cynical 
or both. (…) So it is necessary to work back and forth among outcomes, actions, and intentions to 
discover goals people actually have. The procedure runs as follows: The scientist assumes goals for 
relevant subjects and then predicts choices and outcomes on basis of assumed goals. If the scientist 
then observes that predicted actions and outcomes occur, he or she has in fact explained the 
outcomes and the research is complete. If, however, the scientist fails to observe the predicted 
outcomes and actions, then he or she must reconsider the attribution of goals. With a new attribution, 
a new prediction, if observed, completes the research (Riker 1995, 25-6).  
 
Therefore, the first step of the analysis will consist in specifying some underlying 
assumptions about who the relevant actors are, what their preferences are, and how the 
environment in which they operate shapes and constrains their behavior. This will be the 
objective of Chapter 3. As noted above, relevant actors are the incumbents and their ruling 
coalition, opposition leaders, and military commanders: all violent political struggles 
analyzed here result from conflicts between these groups of actors. Political regimes 
constitute the immediate environment in which these actors operate, and are expected to 
shape the interactions between them and thus, ultimately, the nature of political conflicts. 
In addition, Chapter 3 will specify the preferences of each of these groups. The 
assumptions I will make are not inherently provocative: in short, incumbents want to stay 
in office; higher regime officials would like to replace the current incumbent but what they 
want above all is to avoid being removed from their current position; military commanders 
likewise want to keep their jobs; the only ones who have a strong preference against the 
status quo are opposition leaders, who want the incumbent and his ruling coalition out of 
office and want to maximize their own political influence. Yet, although these assumptions 
                                                                                                                                                   
for war crimes by an international court since World War II. See Bowcott, Owen. 2013. “War criminal 
Charles Taylor to serve 50-year sentence in British prison.” Guardian, October 10, 2013, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/10/former-liberian-president-charles-taylor-british-prison 
(accessed May 15, 2015). 
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seem self-evident, they entail some crucial implications about the role of political 
institutions in mitigating conflicts.  
While Chapter 3 is essentially theoretical, the remainder of the thesis will be devoted to the 
testing of hypotheses which are derived from this theoretical framework. The results of the 
empirical analysis, in turn, will provide indications about the validity of the assumptions 
made in Chapter 3: assumptions about actors’ preferences will allow for the deduction of 
empirically testable expectations about the relationships between certain causes and 
outcomes. If outcomes follow some regular empirical pattern, this implies that preferences 
are not randomly distributed among actors and that their behavior is at least partly 
predictable.12 
Next section gives an overview of the methodological approach and the empirical strategy. 
 
1.3.2. Methodological approach 
 
Given that the aim of the dissertation is to provide a general explanation for the outcomes 
investigated here, the testing will rely on statistical analysis. Differences between 
qualitative and quantitative research are increasingly viewed as purely technical, as recent 
calls for the integration of statistical and qualitative methods (see, e.g., Lieberman 2005; 
Brady et al. 2006; Fearon and Laitin 2008) and the development of mixed methods designs 
attest. Yet, qualitative and quantitative methods are not merely interchangeable “tools,” for 
the choice of a methodology is rooted in specific ontological and epistemological 
                                                 
12 Cross-national research on assassinations (i.e., politically motivated killings) provides a nice illustration of 
this logic of inquiry. Assassinations of political leaders are a particularly telling case because they have 
long been treated as highly idiosyncratic, random events, which have to be traced back to the psychology 
of perpetrators (for a review of prior works on assassinations, see Iqbal and Zorn 2006, 489-90). In their 
dataset of political leaders, Goemans, Gleditsch and Chiozza (2009b) treat assassinations as a distinct 
category instead of merging them with, e.g., coups, arguing that it is difficult to assert whether 
assassinations have a clear political motive. Yet, a recent wave of comparative studies on assassinations 
of political leaders have demonstrated that these events do not occur randomly and they cannot be 
analyzed in isolation from the political context: There is, for example, growing evidence that constraints 
on the chief executive’s power and the extent to which succession in power is regulated impact both the 
frequency of assassinations and their consequences for the long-term stability of the regime (Iqbal and 
Zorn 2006, 2008; Jones and Olken 2009; Torgler and Frey 2013). The main lesson that can be drawn from 
these findings is that, although it may indeed be difficult to identify the ultimate cause of individual 
assassinations by simply observing the perpetrators, the overall pattern in the distribution of 
assassinations implies that these are indeed politically motivated. This conclusion, in turn, makes it 
possible to generate further predictions about which politicians run a high risk of being assassinated and 
what institutional designs are conducive to more stability. 
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positions. 
The causal ontology that underlies the empirical analysis that will be undertaken in this 
dissertation is “Humean,” that is, empiricist and regularist: the basic idea is that scientific 
explanations (whether or not they explicitly involve a statement about causation) always 
somehow imply law-like relationships (see Hempel 1965). Even singular causal 
explanations (e.g., the 1991 civil war in Algeria broke out because the legislative elections 
were canceled) imply the existence of (or are a single instance of) a corresponding 
regularity linking cause to effect (e.g., canceling elections leads to rebellion). In turn, the 
existence of the law-like relationships that underlie singular causal explanations can only 
be assessed to the extent that these relationships occur with a certain degree of regularity: 
in other words, empirical covariations are not sufficient for scientific explanation, but they 
are necessary.13 The choice of a statistical analysis instead of, for example, case study-
based qualitative methods follows from these epistemological positions. Inferential 
statistics are well-suited to uncovering empirical regularities for two reasons: first, 
identifying regularities across cases makes it possible to distinguish between general 
empirical associations and accidental co-occurrences. Second and relatedly, multiple 
regression analysis can deal with the simultaneous occurrence of several empirical 
regularities and makes it possible to isolate individual causes and to identify the ones 
responsible for the occurrence of the outcome of interest (Aneshensel 2013, Chap. 1).  
The empirical analysis will be based on a cross-national time-series dataset, with the 
country-year as the unit of analysis. Data on the independent variables – that is, political 
regime types – are available for 199 countries for the period from 1946 to 2008. Yet, the 
sample size as well as the coverage will vary substantially depending on the availability of 
the dependent and control variables (details will be provided in each chapter). In particular, 
data on variables such as GDP per capita or population is especially sparse in the poorest 
and most closed dictatorships – particularly in earlier years – and generally unavailable for 
countries with fewer than one million inhabitants.  
The empirical analysis will predominantly rely on logistic regression, which is used to 
predict the odds of a case being a positive case based on the value of the predictors. Odds 
                                                 
13 It is obviously a very crude and incomplete way of summarizing this approach. For an overview of current 
discussions about the logic of scientific explanation, see Woodward 2011. 
15 
give the probability that an observation is a positive case divided by the probability that it 
is a negative case, and range from 0 to positive infinity. Odds ratios, in turn, are defined as 
the ratio of the odds that an outcome will occur given an exposure to a certain predictor 
variable, compared to the odds of the outcome occurring in the absence of that exposure 
(that is, how the odds that the event occurs change with a one-unit change in the predictor 
when all other predictors are held constant). Odds ratios also range from 0 to positive 
infinity, values comprised between 0 and 1 indicating that the predictor variable has a 
negative effect on the probability of the event occurring, while values higher than 1 
indicate a positive effect of the predictor variable.  
Thus, the aim of logistic regression is to estimate the probability of an event occurring 
given the values of the independent variables: the whole empirical analysis is aimed at 
observing how political institutions affect the probabilities of a violent conflict breaking 
out. For example, Chapter 4 will investigate whether the risk of interstate conflict increases 
or decreases the probability of a military coup; likewise, Chapter 8 will investigate 
whether military governments are more or less likely to violate physical integrity rights 
than civilian governments. In spite of this reliance on probabilities, it should be noted that I 
do not make any assumption as to whether the uncovered empirical relationships are 
deterministic or probabilistic in nature: a deterministic “law” can appear to be probabilistic 
simply because there is a large number of conditioning or intervening variables (which can 
be related to the outcome of interest in a deterministic way as well) that can alter the 
observed relationship between cause and effects but cannot be modeled properly (either 
because they are unknown or because there is a limit to the number of variables a 
statistical model can include); alternatively, the “real world” can be stochastic for a large 
part. I am agnostic as to which of these interpretations is correct.14 
Some important caveats are in order. Many of the outcomes analyzed here – such as civil 
wars, coups, or interstate wars – are comparatively rare events. Yet, rare events are 
notoriously difficult to explain and predict: logistic regression tends to underestimate the 
                                                 
14 To take the example of the Algerian civil war, let us assume that cancelled elections lead to civil war (with 
a 100% probability) if these elections are the first competitive elections the country has yet experienced 
and if per capita income does not exceed a certain threshold. If only 50% of the cases of cancelled 
elections satisfy these two conditions, testing the relationship between cancelled elections and civil war 
without taking both conditioning variables into account will yield the result that cancelled elections lead 
to civil war with a 50% probability. This does not mean, however, that the relationship is not 
deterministic. 
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probability of positive outcomes when these occur with a low (absolute) frequency (King 
and Zeng 2001). Relatedly, the rate of correctly classified cases tends to decrease as the 
events to non-events imbalance ratio gets larger, since logistic regression tends to classify 
observations into the larger outcome group (O’Connell and Amico 2010).15 Conversely, 
when rare-event data are analyzed over a short period of time, models can easily become 
overfit, i.e., fit too closely to the idiosyncrasies of the sample at hand and generalize poorly 
to new data (for a detailed and nontechnical overview on overfitting, see Silver 2012, 
Chap. 3). Related to these two problems – that is, the risk of both Type I and Type II errors 
– are several model specification issues – e.g., the fact that, in logistic regression, the 
maximal number of control variables that can be included in the model without distorting 
the results depends on the number of observations in the smaller response group 
(O’Connell and Amico 2010).16 Added to the difficulties related to the sample size are 
more general issues related to the analysis of time-series cross-sectional data (e.g., possible 
measurement error and nonrandomly missing data). Given these potential sources of error, 
all empirical findings presented throughout the dissertation should be taken as preliminary. 
This does not mean that they are worthless: taken as a whole, the results point to some 
clear tendencies. Yet, individual estimates have to be considered with a reasonable amount 
of caution. 
Finally, it should be kept in mind that the empirical analysis is not aimed at predicting 
conflicts with accuracy;17 neither do I seek to offer a comprehensive explanation of the 
outcomes investigated.18 The analysis will be restricted to the goals that have been 
specified above, namely the examination of empirical relationships between political 
regimes and violent conflicts. Political institutions and regimes – which are the main focus 
of this dissertation – are only one among possibly hundreds of determinants of political 
                                                 
15 These are different problems since the first one is related to the count, and the second one to the percentage 
of positive cases 
16 Unfortunately, there is no consensus about what exactly this maximal number of control variables is: a rule 
of thumb is that at least ten positive outcomes per predictor variable are necessary, but this rule is by no 
means consensual (see, e.g., Achen 2002; Spicer 2004; Vittinghoff and McCuloch 2007). 
17 It is not aimed at prediction whatsoever. 
18 There is a practical implication for the empirical analysis. If the purpose of the statistical test is to assess 
the validity of a hypothesis by ruling out alternative explanations and verifying that the relationship is not 
spurious, it makes little sense to include as control any variable possibly related to the outcome of 
interest. Control variables should only be included if there is a (theoretical) reason to believe that their 
omission could bias the analysis of the relationship between main predictors and outcome variable (see 
Ray 2003). 
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violence. They can even plausibly be expected to exert only a marginal influence on the 
dependent variables. Yet, to the extent that institutions – contrary to, say, culture or 
historical legacies – can be modified by human agency, they are still worth being analyzed.  
 
 
1.4. ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
The remainder of the dissertation begins with Chapter 2, in which I will clarify what I 
mean by “political institution” and “authoritarian regime type.” In addition, Chapter 2 
operates a synthesis of prior research on authoritarianism and proposes a classification of 
democratic and nondemocratic regimes, from which two main arguments are derived. 
First, only democracies – which rely on competitive elections – and monarchies – which 
rely on hereditary succession – can be viewed as institutionalized regimes, i.e., polities that 
rely on predictable, binding rules regarding the access to, and succession in power; in the 
remainder of political regimes (which I label non-institutionalized), political conflicts 
surrounding these two issues are typically solved with violence. The second argument is 
that democracies and monarchies are the result of a gradual evolution of domestic political 
structures, which did not necessarily involve the violent removal of previous elites from 
power; by contrast, non-institutionalized regimes – and particularly military dictatorships 
and party regimes – mostly emerged in a political vacuum or were imposed by force and 
involved the irregular removal of prior rulers from power.  
Chapter 3 deals with the nature of political conflicts in the two resulting broad categories 
of political regimes (that is, institutionalized and non-institutionalized regimes). First, 
some crucial assumptions about relevant actors, their preferences, and their behavior will 
be specified. It will then be discussed how political institutions have the potential to 
mitigate conflicts of interest and allow for their peaceful resolution. Finally, some 
expectations that are relevant for the remainder of the dissertation will be discussed: the 
main implications of this discussion are, first, that the nature of political conflicts is 
fundamentally different in institutionalized and non-institutionalized regimes; and, second, 
that specific institutions have distinct effects depending on the type of conflict.  
The remainder of the dissertation is organized in a somewhat unconventional fashion: 
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Rather than outlining the hypotheses at the end of Chapter 3 and then moving on to 
describe the data, methods, and results in consecutive chapters, I decided instead to treat 
each aspect of the topic in a separate chapter. Although all working hypotheses are derived 
from the same conceptual and theoretical framework, all empirical chapters can be read 
independently from each other, and each of them will include – in addition to the empirical 
analysis – a brief review of the relevant literature and a section devoted to the discussion 
of theoretical expectations.  
The empirical chapters of the dissertation are organized into three main parts: the first part 
analyzes regimes as the product of violent conflicts; the second part treats regimes as 
targets of violent conflicts; finally, the third part investigates regimes’ propensity to initiate 
violent conflicts.  
With regard to the first part, Chapter 4 investigates the distinctive conditions in which 
political regimes emerge. It analyzes how internal and external security threats (broadly 
understood as the latent risk of intrastate and interstate armed conflict, respectively) impact 
the military’s propensity to get involved in domestic politics and how military 
interventions, in turn, shape political structures. I find that military coups become more 
likely as the intensity of internal security threats increases: the higher the risk of civil war, 
the higher the risk of military coups. By contrast, the relationship between external 
security threats and military intervention in politics is curvilinear: the probability of a 
military coup first increases and then decreases as the risk of interstate conflict increases. 
On the long run, these patterns of military activity profoundly affect political systems: 
democracies are most likely to endure when the military is weak or virtually inexistent; 
single-party dictatorships are most likely to emerge when the military is strong but less 
prone to intervention in domestic politics; finally, countries with a politically active 
military are characterized by chronic political instability and intermittent periods of 
military rule.  
The second part of the dissertation is devoted to the two most common threats each regime 
must face, namely rebellions and military coups. Chapter 5 investigates whether some 
political regimes are more likely to experience civil wars on the one hand and military 
coups on the other hand. It also re-examines one recent finding, that authoritarian regime 
types differ systematically with regard to their risk of civil war. I do not find any support 
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for this argument, however: non-institutionalized regimes all face a similar risk of civil 
war. By contrast, democracy – because it is, as Popper (1963) and Przeworski (1999) 
stated, the only regime that allows for regular, peaceful alternations in power – is 
associated with a consistently lower risk of domestic conflict, and I also find some 
tentative evidence that monarchies are internally more peaceful than other 
nondemocracies. Finally, while authoritarian regime type does not affect the risk of civil 
war, it is a strong and robust predictor of military coups. To the extent that prior research 
has uncovered a relationship between authoritarian regime type and civil war, I argue that 
this relationship is due to measurement error on the side of the dependent variable: it 
merely results from the inclusion of military coups in commonly used datasets on intrastate 
armed conflict.  
Chapters 6 and 7 examine two further consequences of Przeworski’s (1999) argument, that 
the possibility of changing governments is sufficient to prevent civil war. Chapter 6 
investigates whether, in systems in which there is no regular procedure to dismiss the 
leader, gerontocracy produces social peace. The underlying argument is that, in the 
absence of formal limits to incumbency, alternation in power occurs either through the 
leader’s death or a revolution: since old leaders can be expected to leave office reasonably 
soon, dissatisfied opposition groups then prefer to wait rather than to rebel. However, this 
can only happen when the dictator’s launching organization is not able to replace him after 
his death. I find that, in civilian dictatorships, the risk of intrastate armed conflict decreases 
as the dictator gets older. Chapter 7 is devoted to the impact of electoral competition on the 
risk of rebellion, and analyzes the effects of parliamentary elections outcomes in all 
regimes that hold such elections. The main argument is that allowing opposition parties to 
compete in elections and win a large share of the votes can be profoundly destabilizing, 
unless these parties are granted the possibility to influence political decisions and/or 
remove the leader from power: in short, rebellion occurs when opposition parties’ electoral 
support does not correspond to their political power under current institutions.  
Finally, the third part of the dissertation investigates whether some regimes are more likely 
to make a systematic use of violence as a means of solving political conflicts. This 
question echoes the recent discussions on the power-maintenance strategies authoritarian 
leaders frequently use in order to ensure their political survival. Some of these strategies, 
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such as cooptation (see, e.g., Gandhi 2008a; Gandhi and Przeworski 2006, 2007; Arriola 
2009), or, to a certain extent, coup-proofing (see, e.g., Quinlivan 1999; Belkin and Schofer 
2003; Roessler 2011; Pilster and Böhmelt 2011, 2012) are nonviolent, but some others 
involve the use of physical violence. Chapters 8 and 9 will examine two particular forms 
of violent power-maintenance strategies, namely repression and the initiation of 
diversionary wars, respectively. State repression – understood here as the repression of 
rights to physical integrity perpetrated by state actors – is targeted at opposition groups. 
The initiation of diversionary wars is commonly thought of as a reaction of incumbents to 
the loss of public support, but one of the central arguments made in Chapter 9 is that 
diversion, in fact, can be best conceived as authoritarian leaders’ reaction to threats posed 
by the military. Thus, we should expect these two forms of state violence to depend 
primarily on the intensity of threats originating from regime opponents or the armed 
forces, and to be unrelated to regime type. Yet, many scholars see it otherwise. A common 
argument in these two fields of research is that military officers – because of parochial 
interests, or because they hold specific beliefs about the desirability and usefulness of 
military force – generally tend to favor the use of violence over more peaceful means of 
solving conflict (on repression, see Poe et al. 1999; Davenport 2007b; on the initiation of 
interstate conflicts, see Dassel 1998; Dassel and Reinhardt 1999; Sechser 2004; Weeks 
2012). If this view is correct, military dictatorships can be expected to make a more 
extensive use of repression and diversion. Yet, findings in Chapters 8 and 9 indicate that 
these arguments are not borne out. First, military dictatorships are not more likely to 
repress physical integrity rights (Chapter 8). Moreover, widespread physical integrity 
rights violations leave regimes exposed to a higher risk of military defections and increase 
the risk of coups. Second, while military dictatorships are indeed more likely to initiate 
militarized interstate disputes, this relationship is entirely driven by coup risk (Chapter 9): 
everything else being equal, the military’s influence on domestic politics decreases the risk 
that a country initiates an interstate conflict. Finally, Chapters 8 and 9 further highlight the 
pacifying effects of institutionalization – democracies and monarchies being, on the whole, 
less likely to use violence against either the opposition or foreign actors.  
The final chapter (Chapter 10) summarizes these findings, draws some conclusions from 
the empirical analysis, and discusses some implications for future research.  
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2 
 
Political regimes in the world, 1946-2008  
 
 
 
Plato had defined the human being as an animal, biped and featherless, and was applauded. 
Diogenes plucked a chicken and brought it into the lecture-room with the words, ‘Here is Plato’s 
human being.’ In consequence of which there was added to the definition, ‘having broad nails’ 
(Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Book 6, Chapter 40).19 
 
There are two lessons that can be learned from this anecdote. First, most definitions are 
implicitly comparisons (that is, objects are defined in contrast to what they are not). 
Second, purely descriptive definitions are not only difficult to achieve, but also pointless, 
because there is an infinite number of criteria on which we can rely to distinguish between 
classes of objects. In the example reported above, if we assume that the function of a 
definition is to accurately describe reality, there are no logical reasons to contest Plato’s 
definition. The reason why we still believe that plucked chickens and human beings should 
be sorted into different conceptual categories is that such a distinction would be causally 
relevant.  
Conceptualization is thus the process of drawing causally relevant distinctions between 
classes of objects. The same applies to political regimes. There are numerous ways of 
distinguishing between political regimes: the main criterion could be, for example, the 
height of the chief executive, the number of windows in the presidential palace, or the 
procedure through which political offices are filled. None of these criteria is inherently 
                                                 
19 As quoted in Piering, Julie (n.d.), “Diogenes of Sinope (c. 404-323 B.C.E.)”. Internet Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/diogsino/ (accessed January 31, 2015). 
22 
invalid, but we still expect the latter to be more important in its consequences.    
Identifying causally relevant distinctions between political regimes is the aim of this 
chapter. It will thus define the frame of the dissertation and attempt to organize the 
diversity of political regimes in the contemporary era, by first drawing boundaries between 
democratic and non-democratic regimes, and then discussing how the latter should be 
differentiated. It will review several ways of classifying political regimes, and discuss 
some conceptualization and measurement issues. The main classification criterion is 
whether there is a regular procedure for selecting the chief executive: there are various, 
equally plausible alternative classification criteria, but this choice is guided by the 
expectation that the manner in which political offices are filled has several important 
consequences for the stability of political regimes. It should also be kept in mind that every 
attempt at classifying political regimes must confront a trade-off between exhaustiveness 
and accuracy: no classification can possibly capture the huge diversity of contemporary 
political regimes, unless it comprises more than hundred categories (but this, of course, 
would make the classification absolutely useless). The goal of this dissertation is to reach 
some general conclusions about relatively common institutional traits, which are shared by 
a large number of political systems. As a consequence, the regime classification used here 
will rely on a small number of (sometimes rather crude) criteria. To put it more bluntly, the 
resulting regime categories will be highly heterogeneous and many of them will 
necessarily include some “plucked chickens.” Yet, this approach represents a first way of 
making sense of the diversity of political regimes, and broad categories are necessary in 
order to empirically distinguishing between country-specific effects and institutional ones.  
 
2.1. DEMOCRACY AND DICTATORSHIP 
 
How to conceptualize and measure democracy is a controversial question: in their 
comparative assessment of alternative democracy indices, Munck and Verkuilen (2002) 
surveyed no less than nine large-N datasets, and since then, a plethora of new measures 
have been made available (see, e.g., Beck et al. 2001; Bühlmann et al. 2011; Alexander and 
Welzel 2011; Pemstein et al. 2010; Coppedge et al. 2011; Boix, Miller and Rosato 2013). 
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Although most of these approaches rely on Schumpeter’s (2003 [1942]) or Dahl’s (1989)20 
procedural definition of democracy, all differ in their theoretical conception of democracy, 
their operational definition of the concept – i.e., the disaggregation of the concept into 
observable subcomponents – and their way of aggregating these subcomponents into an 
overall measure. Most of the debates revolve around questions such as which components 
should be taken into account in the measurement of democracy, or whether democracy 
measures should be categorical or continuous (see, e.g., Alvarez et al. 1996; Collier and 
Adcock 1999; Elkins 2000; Munck and Verkuilen 2002; Ulfelder 2006; Gleditsch and 
Ward 2007; Bogaards 2010; Cheibub et al. 2010; Coppedge et al. 2011). 
This is hardly the place to discuss how democracy should be conceptualized and measured 
in general, or to engage in normative debates about how democracy ought to be like and 
what ideal conception of democracy should be used as a benchmark to evaluate real-world 
regimes. My justification for choosing one approach instead of another is methodological 
in essence, and this choice is ultimately guided by expectations about causal relationships 
between democracy and political violence.21 The most important of these expectations can 
be summed up in one sentence: according to Popper (1963) and Przeworski (1999), 
elections are substitutes to violence in the sense that they allow voters to get rid of 
unwanted governments in a peaceful way.  
                                                 
20 Schumpeter’s (2003 [1942]) theory of democracy is often called minimalist while Dahl’s (1989) is not. 
Yet, both approaches are actually very similar, to the extent that Schumpeter does not restrict his 
definition of democracy to the mere existence of competition between political parties. After offering his 
famous definition of the “democratic method” (“that institutional arrangement for arriving at political 
decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the 
people’s vote,” p. 269), he adds several qualifications to his initial statement. For example, to the extent 
that his definition does not preclude the possibility of unfair or severely restricted competition, he states 
that democracy requires a considerable amount of freedom of discussion and freedom of the press to be 
effective; he also adds that the role of voters is not limited to selecting governments, but also includes 
removing them from office (p. 272). Contrary to Dahl (1989), he does not explicitly name the right to 
vote and the right to run for public office as democratic criteria, but his theory still relies on the 
assumption that every citizen is in principle free to run in elections, “in the same sense in which everyone 
is free to start another textile mill” (Schumpeter 2003 [1942], 272).    
21 Of course, this is not as simple as it seems, since normative and empirical questions cannot be considered 
fully independently from each other. For example, one of Dahl’s (1989) justifications for why democracy 
is desirable is that it supposedly promotes individuals’ moral autonomy, their sense of responsibility, and 
their ability to take care of their own interests (pp. 92-93): to which extent political regimes affect these 
outcomes is an inherently empirical question. Conversely, opting for a procedural definition of 
democracy implies having at least some expectations about the outcomes institutions are supposed to 
produce (because we know at least since Arrow’s theorem that elections do not reflect the “will of the 
people,” elections are not a valuable good per se; they are only desirable to the extent that they lead to 
certain outcomes). Which outcomes are desirable is, in turn, a normative question. 
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Popper’s (1963) and Przeworski’s (1999) basic argument can be summed up as follows. 
Keeping in mind that any society is necessarily conflict-ridden and that not all of these 
conflicts can be resolved by means of negotiation or deliberation, the possibility of 
changing governments (however good or bad these are) is desirable per se, because the 
very prospect of future alternation induces the losing side to wait for the next elections 
rather than to engage in violent conflict. Przeworski (1999) further elaborates on this point 
and argues that alternation through elections is preferable to other mechanisms for 
changing governments (e.g., lottery), because majority voting conveys information about 
the distribution of preferences among voters: under majority voting, the side that just won 
the elections would also be the most likely to prevail in a civil war. Thus, elections induce 
compliance from the party that would otherwise be the most likely to resort to violence.  
I thus adopt the minimal approach to democracy proposed by Alvarez et al. (1996, 4-5) and 
Cheibub et al. (2010, 69), and define democracy as a regime in which the chief executive 
office and the seats in the legislature are filled through competitive elections. I also adopt 
their operational definition of democracy: for a regime to be classified as a democracy, it 
must meet all of following requirements: 1) the chief executive must be chosen by (direct 
or indirect) popular elections; 2) the legislature must be chosen by direct popular elections; 
3) there must be at least two parties competing in both executive and legislative elections; 
4) at least one actual alternation in power must have taken place (Cheibub et al. 2010, 69). 
The two most striking features of this operational definition are, first, the absence of any 
participation requirement, and second, the alternation rule. With regard to participation, 
Alvarez et al. (1996, 5) argue that in virtually all countries, universal suffrage can be taken 
for granted in the post-World War II era. Participation is also notoriously absent from the 
list of attributes of most current democracy indices, including Polity (Munck and Verkuilen 
2002, 11). The alternation requirement is somewhat more counter-intuitive, and is probably 
one of the most controversial features of this approach (see especially Ulfelder 2006; 
Bogaards 2007).22 Broadly speaking, the alternation rule is used as a proxy for the 
                                                 
22 Bogaards (2007) argues that “election outcomes and regime type can vary independently in principle” (p. 
1212) – without specifying on which criteria definitions of “regime type” should rely instead – and 
demonstrates that elections outcomes in Africa are poor predictors of countries' scores on the Polity and 
Freedom House indices. This is not entirely convincing, yet: there is actually no clear theoretical reason 
why these two measures should be used as benchmarks, and the low correlation between electoral 
outcomes and countries’ scores on both scales can indicate error on both sides. Ulfelder’s (2006) 
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competitiveness of elections:23 given the increasing number of dictatorships that hold 
multiparty executive elections, the first three rules are not sufficient to unambiguously 
distinguish regimes in which the opposition has a real chance to win from those in which 
elections are systematically biased in favor of the incumbent. As Alvarez et al. (1996, 5) 
state, “alternation in office constitutes prima facie evidence of contestation.”  
More generally, this approach presents several features that make it suitable to testing 
Popper’s (1963) and Przeworski’s (1999) hypothesis.24 First, it relies on a procedural 
definition of democracy: since the theory sketched above is based on voters’ expectations 
about future leadership changes, the procedure for selecting and removing government 
officials from office must be regular, predictable. An alternation in office that would occur 
randomly or by irregular means would not generate any expectations about the 
opposition’s future chances of accessing power.  
Second, the resulting democracy measure is dichotomous. This logically results from the 
aggregation rule that underlies the classification: since all components are treated as 
necessary conditions, there are only two possible cases, i.e. either all requirements are met 
                                                                                                                                                   
argumentation is more sophisticated: although he does not contest the face validity of electoral outcomes 
as an indicator of competition, he argues that the retroactive coding of systems as democracies or 
dictatorships according to whether the incumbent eventually lost the elections involves a bias against new 
or instable democracies. To be more specific, systems in which the ruling party never lost an election are 
coded as dictatorships, even if there are no exceptional allegations of fraud or repression (e.g., 
Botswana); whenever a party eventually loses elections and yields office, the regime is classified as a 
democracy for the entire period the same party was in power under the same rules. Retroactive coding 
also works the other way around: if a democratically elected incumbent once decides to close the 
legislature, cancel elections, or ban opposition parties, the regime is coded as dictatorship for the entire 
period his party was in power. As Ulfelder (2006) argues, this is problematic because 1) most recent 
democracies are automatically classified as dictatorships because they did not have enough time to 
produce electoral losers; 2) democracies that break down after a short time are treated as if they never 
were democracies in the first place (i.e., instable countries are ceteris paribus more likely to end up in the 
category of dictatorships), which makes the measure inappropriate to analyze the conditions under which 
democracy endures. While I still believe that there are no acceptable alternatives to assess the 
competitiveness of elections, these problems should be taken seriously. 
23 Alvarez et al.’s (1996) initial argumentation is slightly different. If the incumbent never loses, the question 
arises whether elections are not held only because he is certain to win, and whether he would not cancel 
results if he ever lost. When the opposition eventually wins and is allowed to assume office, they take it 
as retrospective evidence that the incumbent was in fact willing to relinquish power and did not hold 
elections only because he was certain to win. By contrast, if the opposition wins but the incumbent 
cancels results and refuses to yield office, there is evidence that the system never was a democracy. If the 
incumbent repeatedly wins elections, there is no way to unambiguously identify the regime as either 
democracy or dictatorship (electoral fraud being per definition difficult to observe in a reliable way): the 
question thus arises whether to err by coding as democracies regimes that are actually dictatorships (false 
positives), or by coding as dictatorships regimes that are actually democracy (false negatives). “Err we 
must,” they argue. “The question is which way” (Alvarez et al. 1996, 11; see also Cheibub et al. 2010). 
24  To my knowledge, this hypothesis has so far never been directly tested. 
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(in which case the regime is democratic) or one rule is broken (in which case the regime is 
not democratic). This also implies that there is no gradation or further differentiation 
within the subgroup of nondemocracies: undertaking a further differentiation within the 
category of autocracies would thus require identifying other dimensions than each 
country’s “democraticness.” The dichotomous nature of Alvarez et al.’s (1996) democracy 
measure as well as its underlying aggregation level is one of its most contested features 
(see especially Munck and Verkuilen 2002). However, one argument in favor of this 
strategy is that attributes of elections can hardly be considered independently from each 
other: if democracies are countries in which the chief executive’s office is filled as a 
consequence of voters’ choices, breaking one of the rules instantaneously makes the other 
rules ineffective and meaningless. In other words, arguing that Kazakhstan (where 
elections are held and repeatedly won by the incumbent with an overwhelming majority of 
the votes) is more or less “democratic” than South Africa in the Apartheid era (during 
which elections were relatively competitive but not inclusive) or China (in which no 
national elections are organized at all) does not make any sense: in each of these cases, 
voters do not choose office holders, and these are selected through other processes than 
popular elections.  
Third, this definition of democracy is minimal, that is, exclusively based on the electoral 
component of democracy. Several aspects possibly related to democracy (e.g., rule of law, 
horizontal accountability, or protection of civil liberties) are deliberately left out of the list 
of requirements systems must meet to qualify as democracies. Obviously, this feature is 
not completely unrelated to the aggregation rule, to the extent that specifying too many 
necessary conditions would result in a concept without empirical referent.25 The decision 
to reduce democracy to its electoral dimension is admittedly debatable, not only from a 
purely normative point of view, but also to the extent that institutional constraints on the 
chief executive’s power, rule of law or the absence of restrictions on civil liberties very 
                                                 
25 Alvarez et al. (1996, 4) as well as Munck and Verkuilen (2002, 9) seem to argue that this holds true of 
every democracy measure, regardless of the aggregation rule. However, while additive scales also 
encounter this problem, they are not limited to the same extent. Specifying a too large number of criteria 
for an additive scale has the consequence that no country can reach the maximal score, but the scale is 
still able to discriminate between countries that reach a fairly high score from those at the lowest end of 
the scale: thus, the measure still contains some empirical information. By contrast, multiplicative indices 
that include too many necessary conditions result in all countries reaching the same score of 0. While 
such a scale would still convey the information that no real-world country approximates some ideal 
conception of democracy, it would be of no use for an empirical analysis. 
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probably affect the relationship between elections and political violence: for example, it is 
possible that systems in which one party constantly wins elections but that also encompass 
powerful checks on the executive and grant the opposition the possibility to influence 
policies are less prone to political violence than centralized political systems with no 
possibility of alternation. Likewise, the extent to which alternation generates compliance 
probably depends on the ability of elected officials to effectively govern, which in turn 
depends on issues such as civilian control of the military or state capacities. In short, I do 
not argue that such issues are completely unimportant. I do argue, however, that minimal 
definitions of democracy are preferable to more extensive ones from an analytical point of 
view. First, as discussed above, there is a clear, direct causal argument linking elections to 
peace. Second, while characteristics of elections – e.g., competitiveness and inclusion – are 
theoretically interdependent, the effects of elections and the effects of other attributes of 
democracy (such as executive constraints, rule of law, or civil liberties) can be analyzed 
independently from each other. Third, although more demanding definitions of democracy 
can be preferable from a normative point of view, minimal democracy measures make it 
possible to isolate specific causal relationships and investigate them separately, while 
existing classifications that rely on non-minimalist definitions tend to collapse different 
institutional features into a single measure and make it impossible to properly test specific 
hypotheses.  
This latter issue has been extensively discussed with regard to the widely used Polity index 
(Marshall et al. 2011). The index is made up of six components that are added and 
converted into a 21-points scale ranging from -10 to 10: regimes receiving a score higher 
than 5 on the index are then classified as democracies, regimes receiving a score lower 
than -5 are classified as authoritarian regimes, and the remainder are labeled “anocracies”. 
These coding rules generate two related problems: first, there are hundreds of possible 
institutional combinations through which a regime can achieve a specific score (Gleditsch 
and Ward 1997). This problem is especially acute in the case of anocracies, which account 
for more than half of the range of the scale: an anocracy can be an anocracy for various 
reasons, and there is no institutional combination through which one can perfectly predict 
whether a regime belongs to the group of anocracies or not.26 Second and relatedly, the 
                                                 
26 Yet, curiously, the most heterogeneous of these categories seems to be the one of authoritarian regimes: a 
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aggregation rule that underlies the index makes it hard to interpret empirical relationships: 
if, for example, a positive correlation is found between anocracies and civil conflict (see, 
e.g., Hegre et al. 2001; Fearon and Laitin 2003), it is nearly impossible to identify which 
dimension of democracy (or institutional combination) is driving the relationship (Cheibub 
et al. 2010; Regan and Bell 2010). These issues do not only concern the Polity index, but 
also other additive democracy measures such as the Freedom House index.27 These 
analytical issues thus call for a more parsimonious operational definition of democracy.  
 
2.2. CONCEPTUALIZING AUTHORITARIAN REGIME TYPE 
 
The inherent difficulty in classifying authoritarian regimes partly stems from the fact that, 
unlike democracy definitions,28 operational definitions of dictatorships cannot be derived 
from an “ideal” model of authoritarianism (monarchies being the only exception in this 
respect). While the distinction between democracy and dictatorship is deductive, 
classifications of authoritarian regimes are inductive, i.e., they are taxonomies rather than 
typologies. In the absence of a theoretical (normative) definition of dictatorship, the only 
possible approach consists in observing real-world dictatorships and trying to make sense 
of their diversity.  
The resulting regime classifications are easy to criticize: they tend to place too much 
emphasis on a few visible and often arbitrarily defined traits, the criteria used to 
distinguish regimes are not always consistent, and they often result in categories that are 
neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive (see Svolik 2012, Chapter 2). Yet, some of these 
critiques are somewhat overstated, and they are not always well-founded: provided that 
regime classifications are one-dimensional – which is often the case – using, say, Geddes’ 
(1999) or Cheibub et al.’s (2010) tripartite classifications is not fundamentally different 
from using a simple trichotomous variable which can, in turn, be included in a statistical 
                                                                                                                                                   
quick comparison between Polity scores and Cheibub et al.’s (2010) disaggregated data reveals that (for 
the period from 1946 to 2008) 24% of the regimes scoring between -6 and -10 have an elected executive, 
an elected legislature and multiple parties; in 21% of these regimes, the executive and the legislature are 
both unelected and opposition parties are banned. Interestingly, a substantial proportion of autocracies 
could be in fact qualified as hybrid regimes. 
27 Note that the Freedom House index is not a measure of democracy per se, but it is commonly used as one 
(see, e.g., Muller and Weede 1990; Weber 2010). 
28 Of course, the fact that the definition of democracy is first normative and then empirical is the source of 
many of the difficulties of measuring democracy. 
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model together with variables measuring other aspects of political regimes. For example, 
nothing speaks against using Geddes’ (1999) classification (as a measure of the identity of 
leaders) simultaneously with measures of political competition, ideology, regime 
repressiveness, or whichever dimensions researchers deem relevant for answering their 
research question.  
Viewing regime classifications as simple variables also solves the issue of arbitrariness. 
For example, comparing economic growth in, say, military and party regimes is neither 
“better” nor “worse” than examining whether rule of law, civil liberties, or the number of 
veto players affect economic development: regime definitions are not set in stone and they 
can be used flexibly, depending on the research question. In short, the stance I adopt here 
is that regime classifications can be useful shortcuts as long as it can be proven that they 
have some predictive power. In turn, which institutional traits are causally relevant is first 
a theoretical and then an empirical question: examining the predictive power of “regime 
type” is the overarching goal of this dissertation, but it requires, first, identifying the 
institutional traits that can be expected to be causally related to the outcomes of interest – 
that is, choosing among the numerous classifications of authoritarian regimes that have 
been proposed in recent years. This will be the aim of the following sections.  
 
2.2.1. Contemporary approaches to authoritarian regimes 
 
Researchers’ growing interest in dictatorships has given rise to a proliferation of 
classifications of authoritarian regimes, most of which are coupled with publicly available 
datasets that cover a large number of countries over a long period of time.29 At first glance, 
many of these classifications seem interchangeable to the extent that they tend to correlate 
with each other and identify the same regime types: for example, the overwhelming 
majority of discrete classifications of autocracies includes a category for military 
dictatorships (Geddes 1999; Hadenius and Teorell 2007a; Cheibub et al. 2010; Magaloni et 
al. 2013), monarchies (the only exception in this regard being Geddes’ initial typology, 
which was subsequently updated so as to include monarchies) and some measure of party 
                                                 
29 Given the objectives of the present work (which is mostly empirical), I will limit the discussion to these 
approaches and deliberately ignore purely theoretical contributions. 
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regimes (Geddes 1999; Hadenius and Teorell 2007a; Magaloni et al. 2013). As Wilson 
(2014) notes, this apparent similarity has resulted in the widespread practice of substituting 
datasets for each other in robustness checks of empirical findings.30 Yet, these measures 
differ in both their theoretical underpinning and their operationalization of regime type.  
Broadly speaking, discrete regime type measures either emphasize the institutional setup 
of the regime (Hadenius and Teorell 2007a; Wahman et al. 2013) or the launching 
organization on which the dictator relies to access and maintain power (Geddes 1999; 
Cheibub et al. 2010). The latter approach rests on the argument that identifying who rules 
and who supports the ruler is crucial for understanding the risks and constraints dictators 
face and how they are likely to exercise power once in office. Geddes (1999) distinguishes 
between military dictatorships, party regimes, and personalist autocracies: her main point 
is that relying either on the armed forces, a mass party or a narrow clique affects both the 
dictator’s longevity in office and elites’ behavior in face of external crises. Understanding 
how dictators behave, she argues, requires identifying on whom they depend to stay in 
power and what the fundamental interests of their constituents are. For example, regimes 
that rely on the military are the most brittle because, contrary to civilian elites, most 
military officers do not want to hold onto power at any cost.  
While many scholars have criticized the notion of “personalism” as a distinct regime 
category – arguing instead that personalism is an attribute that can be more or less present 
in every type of dictatorship (e.g., Hadenius and Teorell 2007a; Svolik 2012, 31) – Geddes’ 
approach with regard to party regimes and military dictatorships has clearly set the agenda 
for subsequent research: it would be indeed difficult to find any cross-country comparative 
study on authoritarianism published in the last fifteen years that does not at least refer to 
the military/party dichotomy, and even harder to find one that does not distinguish between 
military and civilian regimes.31 
Cheibub et al.’s (2010) approach is relatively similar to the extent that they differentiate 
                                                 
30 Wilson convincingly argues that this practice, instead of being methodologically sound, rather indicates 
poor theory-building. 
31 Svolik (2012), who is overall very critical of the use of regime classifications, could be that exception. 
However, the two last chapters of The Politics of Authoritarian Rule – which deal with the problems of 
authoritarian control – mirror the military / party dichotomy to the extent that they deal with the 
effectiveness of these two types of launching organizations in ensuring the regime’s stability. Even 
though his arguments differ widely from Geddes’ (1999) theory, he reaches a similar conclusion: party-
based regimes are more stable than military-based ones. 
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authoritarian regimes according to the characteristics of the ruling elite. Dictators, they 
argue, are often deposed by regime insiders: thus, identifying which group has effective 
decision-making power provides insight into the internal organization of the regime, the 
type of incentives and constraints the dictator faces, and how he is likely to exercise power 
or be removed from office (Cheibub et al. 2010, 84). They put forward a tripartite 
classification of authoritarian regimes that encompasses the categories of civilian 
dictatorships, military regimes and monarchies.  
By contrast, Hadenius and Teorell’s (2007a) initial typology of authoritarian regimes, as 
well as its updated version by Wahman et al. (2013), is explicitly based on institutions. 
They reject approaches based on the identity of the ruler, and differentiate instead three 
modes of accessing and maintaining political power, namely hereditary succession, 
popular elections, and the actual or threatened use of military force (Hadenius and Teorell 
2007a, 146). From these rules, they derive three generic regime types, namely monarchies, 
electoral regimes, and military dictatorships. The category of electoral regimes is further 
split into several subtypes, according to the degree of competition allowed by the regime. 
Thus, the most important conceptual divergence between their classification and the two 
alternatives is the emphasis on rules rather than leadership traits.  
That being said, the main reason why regime typologies so frequently overlap despite 
relying on different theoretical foundations is that in practice, most of them are based on a 
mix of criteria that are partially derived from both approaches. For example, Cheibub et al. 
(2010, 88) define monarchies as regimes in which the ruler bears the title of “king” or 
equivalent, and takes power and/or is replaced by rules of hereditary succession. Yet, these 
rules do not logically follow from their main criteria for distinguishing regimes, i.e. the 
aforementioned “inner sanctum.” To the extent that hereditary succession is an institution 
in the narrowest sense of the term, the coding rules for identifying monarchies can hardly 
be deduced from the identity of the launching organization.32 This lack of consistency 
                                                 
32 This makes sense to the extent that monarchies are not necessarily based on primogeniture, which gives the 
ruling dynasty some leverage in the succession process: thus, the royal family is not “constrained” by 
exogenous succession rules (Cheibub et al. 2010, 85). Yet, this is only valid for the subset of monarchies 
in which primogeniture is not a formal rule. Furthermore, it is not completely clear why the ruler has to 
bear the title of king: if the argument is that any ruling family, once it is in power, has an incentive to 
choose the leader within its own ranks (i.e., that hereditary succession is not an institution), it should also 
apply to some civilian autocracies which are not formally monarchies but are de facto based on hereditary 
succession. Either hereditary succession results from the preferences of the launching organization (in 
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between theoretical foundation and actual operationalization rules is even more obvious in 
Hadenius and Teorell’s (2007a) and Wahman et al.’s (2013) classification: first, although 
they claim that they primarily focus on “institutions on which (…) elites rely to regulate 
the access to and maintenance of public authority” (Wahman et al. 2013, 22), they include 
the “actual or threatened use of military force” (which can hardly be viewed as an 
institution) in their categorization of modes of regime maintenance (Hadenius and Teorell 
2007a, 146; Wahman et al. 2013, 21). Second, their regime classification is not logically 
derived from these institutions, since no-party and one-party regimes are neither based on 
military force nor on hereditary succession, and most of them (if any at all) are not based 
on elections.33 However, in spite of these internal inconsistencies and the fact that as a 
result, regime typologies frequently overlap, the main reason for opting for a classification 
instead of another is the authors’ underlying arguments about the consequences following 
from these distinctions: as I shall argue later, distinguishing different sets of regimes on the 
basis of different and somehow inconsistent rules is a less than elegant solution, but it is 
also a necessary evil.  
 
2.2.2 Rules that do not bind: Does the mode of accessing political power define regime 
type? 
 
As discussed above, there are two main ways of making sense of the diversity of 
nondemocratic regimes: the first way consists in identifying who rules and who supports 
the ruler; the second way consists in identifying the rules that regulate access to, and exit 
from political offices and the way political power is exercised. The argument I put forward 
is that this second approach is inherently problematic.  
The “institutional” approach to nondemocratic regimes is at first glance compelling 
because it is parsimonious (differentiating subtypes of democratic and nondemocratic 
regimes requires only one criterion) and symmetric (the distinction between subtypes of 
                                                                                                                                                   
which case the formal denomination of the regime is irrelevant), or it is an institution (in which case the 
strict “inner sanctum” criterion does not apply): either way, the classification is not entirely consistent 
with the underlying theoretical approach. 
33 To a certain extent, this applies to multiparty autocracies as well. The fact that they organize elections or 
not is not the point: the point is that the chief executive is not selected or removed as the result of popular 
elections, and whether elections constrain his behavior at all is still an open question. 
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nondemocratic regimes is undertaken on the basis of the same criteria that are used to 
distinguish between subtypes of democracies). The idea that the criteria for distinguishing 
democracies from dictatorships should be the same as the ones for distinguishing between 
subtypes of dictatorships is prima facie logical. The problem, however, is that not all 
regimes are institutionalized to the same extent: the fundamental difference between 
democracies and nondemocracies might not lie in the nature of institutions, but rather in 
the extent to which these are actually constraining. To put it otherwise, there are two 
possible views regarding the role of institutions in democracies and dictatorships: the first 
view holds that democracies and dictatorships are different because they rely on different 
institutions. The second view holds that, while democracies rely on institutions, 
dictatorships most often do not.  
The role of formal, written institutions in dictatorships is still subject to debate, but current 
research points to two potential pitfalls in analyzing them: first, formal institutions often 
do not correspond to actual practices (see, e.g., Ginsburg and Simpser 2014). Second, 
authoritarian institutions that resemble democratic ones – e.g., elections or parliaments – 
are in fact instruments of control, that do not constrain the leader but instead help him 
consolidate his rule (e.g., Gandhi 2008a). These two facts suggest that the criteria we use 
for identifying democracies are not necessarily valid for distinguishing types of autocracies 
from one another. 
Defining regimes based on their institutional traits first requires knowing what precisely an 
institution is. Definitions of (political) institutions can be broad or narrow, but most of 
them tend to emphasize three core components. First, institutions are constraints; second, 
they are, if not permanent, at least relatively durable; third, they are transparent. With 
regard to the first aspect, North (1991, 97) defines institutions as the “humanly devised 
constraints that structure political, social and economic interaction.” Riker views them as 
“rules about behavior, especially about making decisions” (Riker 1982, 20, as quoted in 
Ostrom 1986, 3). The second aspect – durability – is emphasized by Glaeser et al. (2004, 
275), who state that transitory rules would not be as binding as permanent ones. The third 
component – transparency – is emphasized by Ostrom (1986), who offers a comprehensive 
definition of institutions as rules:  
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Rules (…) refer to prescriptions commonly known and used by a set of participants to order 
repetitive, interdependent relationships. Prescriptions refer to which actions (or states of the world) 
are required, prohibited, or permitted. Rules are the result of implicit or explicit efforts to achieve 
order and predictability within defined situations by: (1) creating positions (…); (2) stating how 
participants enter and leave positions; (3) stating which actions participants in these positions are 
required, permitted, or forbidden to take; and (4) stating which outcome participants are required, 
permitted, or forbidden to affect (Ostrom 1986, 5; italics in original).  
 
With these basic points in mind, the inherent difficulty of studying institutions in 
authoritarian settings becomes apparent: it requires, first, assessing whether formal 
institutions really constrain the dictator’s behavior (i.e., whether he would behave 
differently in their absence, or under different institutions); second, being able to 
distinguish between outcomes that result from the existence of institutions and those that 
result from the dictator’s policy choices (see Glaeser et al. 2004); third, distinguishing 
between “real” institutions and power-maintenance strategies that autocrats implement to 
cope with specific problems, and that they can modify at will. In sum, the problem with 
dictatorships is that formal institutions typically do not constrain the dictator, and the real 
sources of constraints are often not institutions. 
The second aspect of the problem is obvious in the case of military dictatorships. Although 
Wahman et al. (2013) insist that their focus in on the institutional setup of authoritarian 
regimes, they define military dictatorships as regimes that rely on the “actual or threatened 
use of military force” as their primary mode of regulating access to, and maintenance of, 
political power (p. 21; see also Hadenius and Teorell 2007a, 146). Yet, the use of military 
force as a means to access and maintaining political power can hardly be viewed as an 
institution. Leaving military dictatorships aside, it is not obvious whether the other 
institutions Wahman et al. (2013) identify really determine how leaders attain, maintain 
and exercise power. Many contemporary authoritarian regimes may display a whole set of 
seemingly democratic institutions, such as parties, legislatures, and contested elections.34 
But, to the extent that elections are not competitive enough to put the chief executive’s seat 
at stake and that legislatures either are not popularly elected or are controlled by the 
                                                 
34 The problem with classifying closed party dictatorships such as the USSR as “electoral regimes” is self-
evident enough that there is no need to elaborate on it. 
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regime-sponsored party or do not have the power to remove the government from office – 
in short: that the chief executive is neither selected nor removed through these mechanisms 
– it is highly questionable whether authoritarian elections qualify as a constraint. 
Furthermore, most of these “institutions” fall short of the permanence requirement: in most 
authoritarian regimes – with the exception of some “hybrid” regimes that do allow fairly 
competitive executive and legislative elections but for some reason fail to be completely 
democratic35 – elections can be canceled, legislatures can be closed, opposition parties can 
be banned, without fundamentally altering the nature of the regime.36 This is not to say that 
these arrangements are generally inconsequential: such an assertion would be flatly 
contradicted by the most recent findings on contemporary dictatorships. For example, 
elections have been shown to contribute to the stabilization of authoritarian regimes 
(Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009), as well as parties and legislatures (Gandhi 2008a, 2008b; 
Gandhi and Przeworski 2006, 2007). Yet, most researchers agree that even if these 
arrangements resemble democratic institutions, they serve distinctively authoritarian 
purposes. For example, while surveying the various functions elections can perform under 
dictatorship, Gandhi and Lust-Okar (2009) argue – amongst other – that relatively 
competitive elections can be used to divide the opposition or provide the incumbent with 
valuable information on the level of public support for the regime, while uncontested 
elections signal the regime’s strength and deter potential challengers from defecting. While 
analyzing the role of parties and legislatures, Gandhi (2008a) is very careful to state that 
these are only “nominally democratic institutions,” and not diminished versions of their 
democratic counterparts. While these organs may help regimes regulate the interactions 
between ruling elite and key segments of the civil society, the dictator’s propensity to 
cooperate does not result from their existence: rather, the existence of parties and 
legislatures results from the need to gain support from specific segments of the population 
(see also Gandhi and Przeworski 2006, 2007). In this sense, parties and legislatures are not 
“institutions” in the sense of durable constraints, but rather instruments of control.  
All in all, this implies that many authoritarian institutional arrangements are rather tools 
                                                 
35 Some would say the reason is simply measurement error: see, for example, the “Botswana controversy” in 
Alvarez et al. 1996, Ulfelder 2006, Bogaards 2007, Cheibub et al. 2010. 
36 Of course, this does not mean that it can be done without consequences, as the Algerian military’s decision 
to cancel the 1991 legislative elections exemplifies. 
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than constraints, and rather problem-oriented than permanent. Contrary to democracies, 
dictatorships are institutionally flexible, in the sense that one of these arrangements could 
disappear without the regime’s basic structures and way of functioning being 
fundamentally altered. In other words, the set of necessary conditions included in the 
definition of democracy implies that, once one of these rules is broken, democracy ceases 
to exist. It is by contrast harder to identify formal institutions that autocrats cannot modify 
without changing the nature of the regime: to take an extreme example, it is doubtful 
whether the highly personalized regime of contemporary Kazakhstan would be drastically 
different if the current president had decided not to hold the 2015 presidential elections 
(that is, the elections he won with more than 97% of the votes).37 In most cases, we know 
that an authoritarian regime has ended when both the leader and his ruling coalition have 
changed.  
Given the difficulties in identifying effective institutions in dictatorships, I will thus rely 
on the “ruling coalition” approach (Geddes 1999; Cheibub et al. 2010) to distinguish non-
democratic regimes. I only depart from these approaches in one way: I argue that, unlike 
other authoritarian regimes, monarchies rely on binding rules that regulate access to, and 
succession in power. Details will be provided in the next section.  
 
2.3. A CLASSIFICATION OF POLITICAL REGIMES 
  
The regime classification I will rely on is a slightly modified version of Cheibub et al.’s 
(2010) regime classification. The original classification includes – besides democracies – 
three regime categories, namely monarchies, which rely on kinship networks, military 
dictatorships, which are ruled by a military officer or a junta of military commanders, and 
civilian dictatorships, which rely on a small body within a ruling party (Cheibub et al. 
2010, 84). While I adopt the overall classification, my approach to political regimes differs 
from Cheibub et al.’s (2010) in two ways: first, I add one regime category (see below). 
Second, my theoretical approach to political regimes – that is, the rationale behind the 
definition of regime categories, and expectations about the consequences of these 
distinctions – is slightly different from theirs.  
                                                 
37 “Kazakh leader gains crushing election victory.” BBC news, April 27, 2015, available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-32471428 (accessed May 2, 2015). 
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Figure 2.1. Political regimes in the world, 1946-2008 
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Figure 2.1. summarizes the classification criteria. The first step consists in identifying the 
rules that specify how the effective leader is selected, dismissed, and replaced: regimes 
that provide such formal rules are considered institutionalized, while those that rely on 
looser or more informal rules are labeled non-institutionalized regimes. Consistently with 
the definition of institutions I rely on (see Section 2.2.2.), these rules have to be effectively 
binding, durable, and transparent. In other words, these institutions have to be formal – 
which means that I do not take temporary power-sharing arrangements into account – and 
they have to be implemented effectively – which means that the selection of the effective 
leader has to take place in accordance with these rules on a regular basis. There are, on the 
whole, two ways of selecting leaders that satisfy these criteria: on the one hand, in 
democracies, the leader is selected through regular, competitive elections, for a fixed term 
in office; on the other hand, in monarchies, access to power is determined by hereditary 
succession. 
 
2.3.1. Institutionalized regimes 
 
The category of institutionalized regimes is comprised of monarchies – that rely on 
hereditary succession – and democracies – that rely on periodic, competitive elections. 
Theoretically speaking, there are other conceivable ways of selecting chief executives: 
elections and hereditary elections do not exhaust all possibilities.38 Yet, in contemporary 
political regimes, these two rules are the only ones that are applied consistently and across 
a wide range of cases.  
Since these two rules pertain to the selection of the effective leader, they are mutually 
exclusive: the chief executive cannot be elected and inherit power at the same time. 
Ceremonial monarchies are thus classified as democracies if the effective head of 
                                                 
38 An alternative could be leadership selection by seniority in party-based regimes or military juntas. The rule 
would be self-enforcing on the long run, since it would incite members of the launching organization to 
invest in the regime (see Svolik 2012, Chapter 6 for a discussion of this mechanism in party regimes) and 
give the most powerful elites an incentive to wait until the current leader dies or retires instead of 
attempting to overthrow him (more on this in Chapter 6). Since the extent to which the ruling 
organization effectively controls political appointments varies from one dictatorship to another, this could 
partly explain the variations in the durability of these regimes: military and party regimes that explicitly 
rely on the seniority rule can be expected to be more stable than their counterparts that do not. 
Unfortunately, I am not aware of any available dataset that could provide such an information. 
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government is democratically elected. Another notable feature of Cheibub et al.’s (2010) 
classification is that the coding rules for both monarchies and democracies specify that a 
leadership change under rules identical to the ones that brought the previous leader to 
office must have taken place at least once. With regard to democracies, this means that 
leaders who attained power through elections must be replaced through elections, i.e., that 
the opposition must access power under rules identical to the ones that brought the 
previous leader in office (for a discussion of the alternation rule, see Alvarez et al. 1996, 
10-13; Cheibub et al. 2010, 70-71). With regard to monarchies, the chief executive must 
not only bear the title of king or equivalent but also either inherit the throne from a relative 
or be succeeded by a family member, which excludes self-proclaimed monarchs such as 
Jean-Bedel Bokassa of the Central African Republic. Because elections and hereditary 
succession have to exist de jure and be practiced de facto, these procedures for selecting 
leaders are both characterized by a certain degree of stability and predictability. 
At first glance, including monarchies in the subgroup of institutionalized regimes might 
seem at odds with the definition of institutions discussed in Section 2.2.2 (see Ostrom 
1986; North 1991). In some respects, hereditary succession is an institution: it is a binding, 
commonly known rule that specifies which “players” can legally enter what types of 
positions and which decisions they are allowed to take. Concretely, hereditary succession 
specifies that only certain individuals can legally become monarchs; if primogeniture is 
not automatic, it specifies who (that is, the ruling dynasty) is allowed to choose the ruler 
among the group of potential contenders; it finally specifies the duration of the chief 
executive’s term in office39 and the conditions under which the ruling coalition is allowed 
to replace him (that is, after his death), and who is or is not a potential successor. Yet, these 
rules clearly benefit the monarch and it is not obvious to which extent they constitute a 
constraint on his behavior: to the extent that he is the only legitimate ruler and cannot be 
removed from office (while he still can legally abdicate on his own initiative), hereditary 
succession frees him from any constraint from either citizens or his ruling coalition and 
protects him against any attempt to hold him accountable. From this perspective, 
monarchy could be viewed as the most extreme form of power personalization.  
                                                 
39 Hereditary succession does not necessarily imply that monarchs are selected for life; however, 
primogeniture makes lifelong tenure a requirement for practical reasons (since it takes the successor quite 
a long time to come of age). 
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However, by legally restricting the set of potential contenders for the throne, hereditary 
succession still entails a fundamental constraint on the monarch’s discretionary power: 
contrary to most dictators, monarchs cannot select their successors. Although this 
restriction might seem secondary, its crucial implication is that the current leader cannot 
use his power to designate successors as a bargaining chip, and hence cannot manipulate 
his ruling coalition by distributing future positions as rewards for loyalty. Paradoxically, 
the very fact that they have no hope of attaining power under current institutions thus 
makes members of the ruling elite more independent from the monarch than they would be 
from any other dictator. As will be discussed in Chapter 3, this also reduces some of the 
uncertainty that often characterizes the relationships between the leader and the members 
of his ruling coalition (see Tullock 1987; Svolik 2012). Besides the fact that monarchies 
and democracies rely on strict procedures for selecting the chief executive, what these two 
systems have in common is that the current ruler does not play the decisive role in the 
succession process.  
 
2.3.2. Non-institutionalized regimes  
 
Thus, democracies and monarchies display formal rules that ensure orderly access to, and 
succession in power. By contrast, regimes I classify as non-institutionalized lack such 
rules: they are rather anarchic systems in which conflicts regarding access to power are 
typically solved by force. In those systems, politics tend to be personalized, unregulated 
and opaque: in general, the leader stays in office for life unless he his forced from power 
by rivals, and succession in office is the result of either cooptation (that is, the new leader 
is chosen by his predecessor, provided that the latter is powerful enough to impose his will 
on his allies) or of a violent struggle between elites jockeying for power. This most 
obviously applies to what Geddes (1999) labels personalist dictatorships, in which power 
is concentrated in the hands of a single ruler and which are consequently highly vulnerable 
to succession crises upon the leader’s death. But even in more collegial forms of 
dictatorship, there are usually no agreed-upon procedures to remove a leader from power 
without violence or to select a new one. Even if the regime relies on a formal organization 
– such as a party or the military – and real power lies in a formal body such as the 
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Politburo in communist one-party regimes or the junta in corporate military dictatorships, 
the processes of leadership selection and succession are typically informal and often entail 
large-scale violence (see Sandschneider 1985; Tullock 1987; Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin 
2008; Svolik 2012). To take the example of the Soviet Union, Acemoglu, Egorov and 
Sonin (2008), 990) report that, of the 40 Politburo members appointed between 1919 and 
1952, only one could leave the body and survive. The fate of several of Mao’s potential 
successors after his death is also telling, as are the violent succession crises that 
characterized leadership transitions in China until recently (Sandschneider 1985). To state 
the matter in a more abstract way, a growing body of research, beginning with Tullock 
(1987), has begun to conceptualize authoritarian politics in terms of dynamic coalition 
formation (e.g., Acemoglu, Robinson and Verdier 2004, Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin 
2008, 2009; Svolik 2012): in dictatorships, there are no rules that prescribe how political 
positions should be allocated, and there is always the possibility of a subversive coalition 
forming against the leader and his closest allies. 
But are all non-institutionalized regimes alike? Intuitively, we might at least expect that 
there are more differences between the categories of institutionalized and non-
institutionalized regimes than within the latter category. Yet, as already discussed, various 
attempts at differentiating authoritarian regimes and the resulting findings regarding 
dictatorships’ behavior suggest that non-institutionalized regimes are not necessarily a 
homogeneous group. Precisely because we now know that most dictators are removed 
from power by members of their own ruling coalition (Tullock 1987; Haber 2006; Gandhi 
2008a; Cheibub et al. 2010; Svolik 2012), identifying the group who has the power to 
effectively constraint the leader’s decision by threatening to remove him from office is one 
straightforward way to predict how regimes will behave and with what outcomes. If the 
incumbent and his coalition rule without formal constraints, the identity of the current 
leader – and, by extension, of his supporters – becomes relevant to predict variations 
among non-institutionalized regimes.  
Consequently, the next step consists in distinguishing regimes that are led by a member of 
the military from those led by a civilian. This criterion for differentiating non-
institutionalized regimes has two advantages. First, it is directly observable40 and does not 
                                                 
40 This does not, of course, preclude difficult and sometimes contestable coding decisions. For example, 
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require making subjective judgments about, for example, the degree of concentration of 
power or the nature of decision-making processes. Second, the civilian/military dichotomy 
is widely believed to be causally related to a wide range of outcomes. It is believed, for 
example, to affect the stability of political regimes, because military officers tend to value 
political power less highly than civilian politicians and often still have the option of 
continuing their previous career following a transition back to civilian rule (Nordlinger 
1977; Geddes 1999). Military officers’ specific professional socialization is also widely 
thought to affect their preferences and beliefs about the appropriateness and effectiveness 
of the use of violence in crisis situations: this argument is regularly used to explain why 
military dictatorships seem to be both internally (Nordlinger 1977; Poe et al. 1999; 
Davenport 2007b; Fjelde 2010) and externally (Sechser 2004; Lai and Slater 2006; Weeks 
2012; Horowitz and Stam 2014) more violent than autocracies ruled by civilians.  
Dictators who are not members of the armed forces often rely on a political party to 
maintain their rule. However, this is not always the case: as Hadenius and Teorell (2007a) 
report, some countries (such as the Maldives) prohibit all parties. Furthermore, ruling 
parties differ strikingly with regard to their internal organization, their degree of autonomy, 
their extent of control on the population, and the extent to which they can exercise some 
constraints on the autocrat’s rule (Smith 2005; Magaloni 2008; Gehlbach and Keefer 
2012). While the role played by some ruling parties – e.g., the Chinese Communist Party 
or the Mexican Partido Revolucionario Institucional – in ensuring cohesion at the elite 
level and establishing inter-temporal power-sharing agreements is now well-documented in 
the literature (Geddes 1999; Brownlee 2005; Magaloni 2006, 2008; Svolik 2012; Köllner 
2013), not all parties perform these functions. Some ruling parties are loose organizations 
that assemble the dictator’s following, some others are created by fiat to mobilize popular 
                                                                                                                                                   
Cheibub et al. (2010) code as military all leaders who are or ever were members of the military, even if 
they retired from service (with the exception, however, of those who fought in World War II and left the 
military afterwards). While the underlying argument (that these leaders still have connections with, and 
access to the armed forces, which sets them apart from civilian leaders) is convincing, this decision still 
has the drawback of lumping together active members of the military and leaders who were once in the 
armed forces but retired long before taking office. But then again, undertaking a more fine-grained 
distinction between former members of the military who still have significant connections with the armed 
forces from those who have not would require making arbitrary decisions about, for example, the 
minimal duration of military service before past membership in the armed forces is deemed significant 
enough, or the time elapsed between the moment the leader left the armed forces and the moment he took 
office.  
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support behind the new regime,41 and many of them are “parties of power” (see Herron 
2009; Isaacs 2011) that operate in the shadow of the regime’s strongman. Cheibub et al. 
(2010) do not take these distinctions into account: the group of civilian regimes is rather a 
residual category that encompasses all nondemocratic regimes that are neither governed by 
a hereditary monarch nor by a military officer. Yet, given the prominence of party-based 
autocracies in the literature, I undertake a further differentiation within the subgroup of 
civilian regimes: I classify these regimes as single-party regimes if they effectively allow 
only one party and prohibit all the others, and as (other) civilian autocracies otherwise.42  
Arguably, the mere existence of opposition parties does not perfectly reflect what I intend 
to measure (that is, the strength of the ruling party and its ability to exert some control on 
both the population and the dictator), given that some powerful ruling parties (e.g., the PRI 
in Mexico) allowed an organized opposition to run in elections and sometimes gain a fair 
share of the votes. However, given that the strength and internal cohesion of ruling parties 
are difficult to gauge empirically, this proxy has two advantages. First, it is directly 
observable and does not rely on subjective judgments on the part of the coder. Second, 
although crude, it is still informative: it indicates, on the one hand, whether the ruling party 
was able to eliminate organized opposition and become the “only game in town.” On the 
other hand, the existence of opposition organizations outside the ruling party is likely to 
crucially affect the relationships between the dictator and his allies, because it might 
strengthen the autocrat’s power by generating divergent incentives for dissatisfied elites – 
since some members might try to exit the ruling party and join another organization while 
some other might prefer to plot a coup (see Haber 2006; relatedly, Cox 2008; for an 
alternative point of view, see Magaloni 2008).  
                                                 
41 Apparently, this practice is also common among military regimes (see Geddes et al. 2014). A well-known 
example is the South Korean Democratic Republican Party, which was created by the junta shortly after 
the 1961 military coup but was later discarded by Park and was banned upon the latter’s death 
(Nordlinger 1977, 136-7; Savada et al. 1992). 
42 Empirically, this distinction is made using the variable “de facto,” which is available in the dataset (see 
Cheibub et al. 2009). The dataset provides three variables that measure the number of political parties: 
“De jure” indicates whether there are legal opposition parties, and both “de facto” and “de facto 2” 
indicate whether opposition parties actually exist (the latter information being arguably more useful, since 
the legal status of opposition parties does not always reflect actual practices). The difference between “de 
facto” and “de facto 2” is that, while the former simply indicates whether parties exist beside the 
incumbent's party, the latter measures the existence of parties “outside the regime front” (Cheibub et al. 
2009, 5). “De facto 2” provides valuable information, but I still prefer to rely on “de facto,” because I am 
not entirely clear about what exactly “regime front” means and how the authors were able to observe this 
empirically. 
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The remaining category of civilian autocracies is arguably the most heterogeneous one, 
since it encompasses, among others: a) relatively institutionalized, party-based 
dictatorships such as Mexico under the PRI; b) pure personalist autocracies such as the 
Philippines under Marcos; c) ambiguous cases such as Botswana (which many researchers 
would classify as democracy); and d) regimes sui generis such as the Islamic Republic of 
Iran. Thus, this group rather constitutes a residual category than a distinctive regime type. 
Yet, a distinctive trait of these regimes is that the leader relies on multiple sources of power 
– or, alternatively stated, that neither the dictator’s party nor the military is powerful 
enough to exercise independent decision-making power or decide over political 
appointments. This intra-elite competition, on the one hand, fosters inter-organization 
rivalries and thereby makes the leader relatively independent from his allies (see Haber 
2006), since most of them are not able to coalesce to remove him from office. On the other 
hand, the lack of cohesion of the ruling elite should make these regimes more fragile, and 
more vulnerable to succession crises.  
 
2.3.3. What this classification is not.  
 
Because authoritarian regimes can be differentiated by other (different but potentially 
overlapping) criteria, I will briefly discuss these in order to avoid unnecessary confusion.  
First, the distinction between single-party regimes, military regimes and civilian regimes 
does not reflect the relative openness of these regimes; it is, for example, unrelated to 
current discussions on “competitive” or “electoral” authoritarianism (e.g., Levitsky and 
Way 2002; Schedler 2006). Likewise, civilian autocracies are not necessarily hybrid 
regimes (see Diamond 2002) and single-party regimes are not necessarily totalitarian 
regimes, even though the latter mostly rely on a party (see Linz 2000).  
By the same token, the repressiveness of authoritarian regimes is not part of the 
classification I use. The extent to which authoritarian regimes restrict civil liberties is 
better reflected by indicators such as the Freedom House index or the Cingranelli and 
Richards Human Rights Data Project. With regard to coercion (that is, the extent to which 
regimes repress physical integrity rights), I treat it as a potential consequence of regime 
type (see Chapter 8) rather as one of its defining features.  
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Finally, the distinction between single-party regimes, military dictatorships and civilian 
autocracies does not reflect differences in institutional strength; nor does it indicate to 
which extent power is personalized. The recurring discussions on the institutionalization of 
party regimes such as the Communist regime in contemporary China could mislead one 
into thinking that these regimes are less prone to power personalization; but, as stated 
above, not all ruling parties are able to exert control on the chief executive to the same 
extent. It is not quite implausible to assume that party regimes are more likely to develop 
strong institutions on the long run than are, say, military juntas. But, in the absence of any 
comprehensive comparative analysis of institutional strength across dictatorships, I prefer 
to refrain from making bold assumptions. This, of course, does not preclude that these two 
dimensions – the identity of the ruling coalition and the degree of institutional strength of 
the regime – are partly overlapping; but this is an empirical question, not a working 
assumption.  
Personalism – and its variants, such as sultanism (Chehabi and Linz 1998) or 
neopatrimonialism (Bratton and van de Walle 1994) – is a recurrent topic in the literature 
on dictatorships, and, following Geddes (1999), many authors (especially in the 
international relations literature) have investigated its effects, thereby treating personalist 
regimes as a distinct type (e.g., Peceny et al. 2002; Peceny and Butler 2004; Reiter and 
Stam 2003; Pickering and Kisangani 2010; for other applications, see, e.g., Davenport 
2007b; Wright 2008; Gurses and Mason 2010). Clearly, the personalization dimension 
seems to matter. There are yet several reasons why I do not undertake any further 
distinction between regimes that are personalized and those that are not. The first one is 
that power personalization is a somewhat ambiguous concept (Svolik 2012, 30-31) that is 
hard to gauge empirically. Second, as several scholars have noted (Hadenius and Teorell 
2007a; Svolik 2012), power personalization is best conceived as a continuum rather than 
as a dichotomy, and as an attribute that can vary within and across regimes rather than as a 
distinct type. While, in some regimes, political power is without doubt concentrated in the 
hands of a single individual (the Dominican Republic under Trujillo or Turkmenistan 
under Niyazov are paradigmatic cases), many other cases – such as Chile under Pinochet – 
are more ambiguous (see Geddes 1999; Barros 2002). Furthermore, many regimes may 
switch from collective leadership to power personalization and back again: the USSR and 
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the People’s Republic of China are typical examples (see Svolik 2012).  
The working assumption made here is that all non-institutionalized regimes, regardless of 
whether they are ruled by a party, the military, or a coalition of both, are to some extent 
likely to degenerate into personal rule. Again, this does not preclude the possibility that, 
for example, military leaders are more likely to consolidate their personal power at the 
expense of their allies than party leaders are:43 the point is simply that, with regard to the 
degree of power personalization, there are more differences within each regime category 
than between these categories. 
 
2.3.4. The origins of institutionalized and non-institutionalized regimes  
 
To sum up, I identify five regime types that can be sorted into two broader categories. The 
category of institutionalized regimes is comprised of monarchies and democracies, while 
the category of non-institutionalized autocracies consists of military dictatorships, single-
party regimes, and civilian autocracies. What distinguishes institutionalized regimes from 
non-institutionalized ones is foremost the existence or absence of a regular procedure for 
selecting the chief executive. But there is yet another common trait shared by most non-
institutionalized regimes: they were often established in a manner that was not only 
irregular, but also involved the forceful – and often violent – displacement of the previous 
ruling elite. By contrast, the establishment of institutionalized regimes either occurred 
gradually or was the result of a negotiation between several groups competing for power.  
Consider, first, transitions to democracy. Democratization is often the result of a 
negotiation between authoritarian elites and disenfranchised citizens groups, as the 
literature on pacted transitions highlights: for example, O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) 
work on the third wave of transitions to democracy highlight the role of moderate elite 
groups (“soft-liners”) in democratization processes. The fundamental lessons that can be 
drawn from their analysis are, first, that even if mass mobilization sometimes plays a 
crucial role in the initiation of the transition, democratization cannot occur unless a part of 
the ruling elite is willing to negotiate with moderate opposition forces; second, that soft-
                                                 
43 Tullock (1987) claimed that on the long run, all juntas tend to shrink to one single individual, but the idea 
is contested (see Acemoglu et al. 2009). 
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liners enjoy a pivotal position in the process and are often able to impose a transition on 
their own terms; and third, that they are mostly able to retain a substantial power in the 
subsequent regime. More recent works on democratization – although they place a greater 
focus on the role of mass mobilization – also emphasize the crucial role played by 
authoritarian elites, and view democratization as the result of negotiations made under the 
shadow of revolution (e.g., Rosendorff 2001; Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2000, 
2001, 2006).  
Interestingly enough, some studies on democratization depart from the widespread 
assumption that democratization results from a confrontation between the elites and the 
disenfranchised, and argue instead that elites sometimes willingly expand political rights 
for reasons that have more to do with intra-elite competition than with the threat of a 
revolution. For example, according to Llavador and Oxoby (2004), the expansions of the 
franchise that occurred in several European countries during the 19th century resulted from 
the need to manipulate politicians’ constituencies in order to alter their incentives to 
implement specific policies. Lizzeri and Persico (2004) adopt a similar approach: in the 
example they discuss, England gradually expanded the franchise to create incentives for 
politicians to increase health and infrastructure spending – that is, to provide public goods 
– in order to deal more effectively with epidemics and other public health emergencies that 
resulted from urbanization in the 19th century. In the same vein, Green (1993) views the 
parliamentary government of Medieval England as a way to facilitate information 
transmission between the king and the barons, and as a mechanism that enabled the king to 
issue costly signals in order to generate compliance (for a related argument, see North and 
Weingast 1989).  
The point is neither that mass mobilization plays no role in transitions to democracy, nor 
that democratization ever involves threatened or actual violence. The argument is rather 
that transitions to democracy are often initiated with the consent – if not the active 
participation – of at least a part of the ruling elite, and often do not involve the forceful 
removal of the latter. This point is less documented with regard to monarchies, but 
historical evidence indicates that European monarchies were the result of a gradual 
evolution of formal rules regulating access to political leadership and the relationships 
between the king and his allies: for example, hereditary succession gradually replaced 
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elections in the course of the Middle Age (see Kurrild-Klitgaard 2000; Kokkonen and 
Sundell 2014). Likewise, contemporary monarchies in North Africa and the Middle East 
emerged as decentralized systems based on family networks and evolved toward more 
centralized systems as a result of the state-building process that unfolded during the 20th 
century (Anderson 1991):44 before then, hereditary succession was seldom practiced, and 
although it has now become a common practice, the modes of leadership succession are 
still being negotiated in some contemporary Middle Eastern monarchies (Anderson 1991; 
Peterson 2001).  
By contrast, the establishment of most non-institutionalized regimes is almost by definition 
the result of a violent power struggle that ultimately resulted in the forceful replacement of 
previous elites. While there are some exceptions to this general pattern – for example, 
although Peru under Alberto Fujimori and Russia under Vladimir Putin can be counted as 
weakly institutionalized dictatorships, both leaders accessed power in a way that did not 
involve substantial violence – the association between non-institutionalized regimes and 
violent establishment is practically tautological in the case of military dictatorships (the 
illegal and forceful replacement of a civilian government being a definitional feature of 
military coups) and is also clear in the case of party regimes: for example, most communist 
party regimes were established in the aftermath of a revolution (as in the cases of the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Soviet Union), a foreign intervention (as in the 
cases of North Korea and Eastern European communist regimes), or a combination of both 
(as in the case of Mongolia). Likewise, the origins of many African party states – often 
headed by independence leaders – can be traced to wars of decolonization (see Bratton and 
van de Walle 1994).  
This pattern is not merely incidental, and it involves two crucial implications for the 
dynamics of violent conflicts in non-institutionalized polities. First, the nature of the 
conflict that resulted in the downfall of the prior regime helps predict how the subsequent 
regime will operate: this aspect of the problem will be discussed in further detail in 
                                                 
44 The fact that most monarchies in North Africa and the Middle East were established recently and had no 
historical precedents constitutes, according to Anderson (1991), a definitive rebuttal of the culturalist 
arguments according to which the persistence of monarchies in the MENA countries can be attributed to a 
form of legitimacy rooted in tradition. Interestingly enough, of the four monarchies that existed in the 19 th 
century in the region – Morocco, Oman, Egypt, and North Yemen – two were overthrown shortly after 
independence (Anderson 1991, 6). 
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Chapter 3. Second and most importantly, it is precisely the irregularities and violence that 
characterize the emergence of non-institutionalized regimes that bring about what Svolik 
(2012) identifies as the two fundamental problems of authoritarian politics, namely the 
problem of “authoritarian control” and the problem of “authoritarian power-sharing:” in 
order to ensure their political survival, authoritarian incumbents must deal with two kinds 
of threats, the first ones coming from regime opponents and the second one from regime 
insiders. The first problem arises from the forceful replacement of prior elites, which are 
likely to pose serious challenges to the new regime unless they can be completely 
neutralized. The second problem arises from the characteristics of the new ruling coalition, 
because regime elites who have participated in a violent seizure of power are likely to 
exhibit aggressive behavior. These issues will be dealt with in Chapter 3. Additionally, 
Chapter 3 will discuss how well-designed institutions can contribute to solving these 
problems.  
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THE ROOTS OF POLITICAL CONFLICT 
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3 
Institutions and conflicts in institutionalized and non-institutionalized 
regimes 
 
 
As discussed above, the central difference between institutionalized regimes on the one 
hand and non-institutionalized regimes on the other hand is in the existence of regular 
procedures for selecting and replacing the effective leader: in monarchies and democracies, 
leaders enter power in a regular way and have no discretionary power in selecting their 
successor. But why does it matter? The central argument that will be made in this chapter 
is that institutionalization has a decisive impact on the preferences and behavior of the 
ruler and his ruling coalition. Specifically, I argue that institutionalization has the potential 
to mitigate the two central problems that plague intra-elite relationships in the typical 
dictatorship, namely the problem of adverse selection and the problem of uncertainty. By 
affecting the stability of the regime at the elite level, institutionalization has broader 
consequences, to the extent that it will also partly determine the behavior of the military.  
The chapter is organized as followed: first, some crucial assumptions about relevant actors, 
their preferences, and their behavior will be specified. It will then be shown how political 
institutions have the potential to mitigate conflicts and allow for their peaceful resolution. 
Finally, some expectations that are relevant for the remainder of the dissertation will be 
discussed: the main implications of this discussion are, first, that the nature of political 
conflicts is fundamentally different in institutionalized and non-institutionalized regimes; 
and, second, that specific institutions have distinct effects depending on the type of 
conflict.  
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3.1 SOURCES OF POLITICAL CONFLICT IN INSTITUTIONALIZED AND NON-
INSTITUTIONALIZED REGIMES 
 
3.1.1. Sympathy for the devil? The retirement problem in non-institutionalized 
regimes 
 
Many works on dictatorship begin with (or implicitly rely on) the assumption that dictators 
want to stay in power (see, e.g., Tullock 1987; Geddes 1999; Gandhi 2008a; Svolik 2012). 
This assumption might seem trivial – after all, even elected leaders in democracies 
probably prefer winning elections over losing them – unless its hidden implication is made 
more explicit: contrary to democratically elected leaders, dictators want to stay in power at 
all costs. For example, Alvarez et al. (1996, 12) remark that “the dream of many political 
elites is to rule perpetually and to rule with consent.” Since there is an obvious trade-off 
between both objectives, what distinguishes dictators from democrats becomes clear: after 
a certain time in office, most leaders have to decide whether to stop ruling or to start ruling 
without consent. Dictators are those who make the second choice.  
Empirically, it seems that while all rulers have to balance these two conflicting goals 
against each other, not all of them choose the same exchange rate: the relative payoffs of 
ruling perpetually and ruling without massive opposition appear to vary from one ruler to 
another. While most democrats and even some autocrats – like Ghanaian ex-military ruler 
and president Jerry Rawlings45 – step down in a peaceful manner, some others are willing 
to risk jail, exile, or, in the most extreme cases, death. This, in turn, begs another question: 
What explains dictators’ unwillingness to yield office?  
Recent scholarship offers a simple explanation for why, for most dictators, retirement is 
simply not an option: while democrats, on average, fare relatively well after they lose 
office, a substantial proportion of dictators face severe punishment such as exile, jail, or 
                                                 
45 Rawlings seized power in a coup in 1979 and ruled as a military leader for more than a decade. He then 
held multiparty elections – in which he ran as a civilian – and won twice (in 1992 and 1996). In 2000, 
having spent his two constitutionally allowed terms, he voluntarily stepped aside. See Polgreen, Lydia. 
2009. “Ghana's unlikely democrat finds vindication in vote.” New York Times, January 9, 2009, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/10/world/africa/10rawlings.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed 
May 2, 2015); Comarin, Elio. 2000. “Captain Rawlings tire sa révérence.” RFI, December 7, 2000, 
available at http://www1.rfi.fr/actufr/articles/012/article_4903.asp (accessed May 2, 2015). 
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death. Goemans et al. (2009a) report that nearly half of dictators who lost office during the 
post-World War II period suffered some kind of post-tenure punishment. This, in turn, 
predicts how far dictators are willing to go to avoid losing office: for example, a series of 
empirical studies (Goemans 2000, 2008; Debs and Goemans 2010) finds that their 
anticipated post-tenure fate affects leaders’ propensity to initiate or continue external 
conflicts.  
This literature is somewhat less specific about what exactly determines the severity of 
post-tenure punishment. Regime type is one of the commonly cited factors: for example, 
Debs (2010) finds that because of the threat they represent for subsequent rulers, military 
leaders are more likely to be imprisoned or killed upon exit, unless they manage to hand 
power to civilians and negotiate a transition to democracy. Using Cheibub et al.’s (2010) 
data, Debs and Goemans (2010) find that military dictators face a significantly higher risk 
of jail, exile or death than civilian dictators. Goemans (2000) argues that leaders of semi-
democratic (or semi-authoritarian) regimes face roughly the same risk of post-tenure 
punishment as dictators, but are also more likely to be removed from office in the first 
place. The factor which seems to be the most tightly associated with post-tenure fate, 
however, is the way leaders lose office: Goemans (2008, 780-1) reports that almost all 
leaders who lost office in a regular way (i.e., in accordance with rules or established 
conventions) enjoy a safe retirement, while 80% of those who were removed from power 
in an irregular manner suffered some form of punishment during the year immediately 
following their exit.  
In turn, the risk of being removed from office in an irregular fashion seems to depend 
foremost on the manner in which the dictator accessed power in the first place (Goemans 
2008; Goemans et al. 2009a). Why dictators who entered office by unconstitutional ways 
are more likely to lose it in an irregular manner and to suffer subsequent punishment is not 
difficult to understand. First, accessing power in an irregular manner means overthrowing 
the previous ruling coalition, and thus requires being able to neutralize all remaining 
potential challengers: a failure to do so increases the dictator’s risk of being himself 
deposed by the contenders he once removed from power.46 Second, challengers who 
succeed in removing the dictator from office obviously face similar incentives to eliminate 
                                                 
46 Other reasons why those dictators are more insecure in office are discussed in the next section. 
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their former rival, especially if this rival accessed power by force: rulers who once 
overthrew a government are susceptible – that is, both willing and able – to do it again, and 
cannot credibly commit to comply with the new regime (see Debs 2010). 
Curiously, the links between leaders’ anticipated post-tenure fate and the use of force 
against domestic opponents have received less attention than the mutual relationship 
between the risk of punishment and the initiation of diversionary wars. There is, however, 
evidence that (1) democrats – who, by definition, have accessed power in a regular 
manner, and are less likely to suffer punishment after leaving office – are ceteris paribus 
less likely than autocrats to use state repression (Davenport and Armstrong 2004; 
Davenport 2007a); (2) state repression “works” in the sense that it lengthens autocrats’ 
tenure (Escriba-Folch 2013a) and prevents regime transition (Albertus and Menaldo 2012); 
(3) military dictators are more likely to have accessed power in an irregular manner and 
more likely to leave office in an irregular manner, more likely to face a harsh post-tenure 
punishment (Debs 2010; Debs and Goemans 2010),47 and more likely to engage in 
physical integrity rights violations (Poe et al. 1999; Davenport 2007b). Combined with the 
overwhelming consensus that the use of repression primarily depends on the magnitude of 
threats leaders face (Davenport 2007a), this accumulation of empirical evidence is on the 
whole consistent with a view of violence as dictators’ desperate response to threats to their 
own physical integrity.  
Yet, the causal arrow might well run the other way around: an alternative – and equally 
plausible – explanation for the correlation between irregular entry, violence, irregular exit, 
                                                 
47 Debs’ (2010) study provides an interesting explanation for why military dictatorships are both less durable 
and more likely to democratize than other dictatorships. While standard explanations rely on the 
argument that military leaders are less interested in being in power and more likely to secure rents after 
leaving office (Geddes 1999), Debs (2010) argues that this is precisely their capacity to secure rents that 
makes military leaders most likely to suffer post-tenure punishment, since this also implies that they 
should pose the greatest threat to the new leader. This creates an incentive for military leaders to hand 
power to civilians and negotiate a transition to democracy. He consistently finds that former military 
dictators face the worst fate after leaving office, unless the new regime is a democracy. Yet, this finding 
begs further questions: while it is a well-established fact that a large proportion of military rulers have 
negotiated their exit with civilian elites and participated in the regime’s peaceful transition to democracy 
(see, e.g., Geddes et al. 2014), it is not entirely clear (theoretically speaking) why democracy – rather 
than another dictatorship – should help former military leaders secure a safe exit from office. Contrary to 
dictatorships, democracies cannot insulate themselves from demands of their voters, and these are the 
most likely to want former dictators to be punished. Furthermore, pacted transitions are inherently 
undemocratic processes: there is no obvious reason why such arrangements cannot be negotiated with 
another dictator. In short, while empirical evidence suggests that democratic leaders do not feel the need 
to eliminate former dictators, and that retiring dictators anticipate this and tend to prefer democratization 
over transition to another authoritarian regime, why it is the case remains mysterious. 
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and post-tenure punishment, is that dictators who enter office illegally and use violence to 
stay in power are simply more likely to end up being overthrown and punished for their 
behavior.48 These explanations do not differ strikingly in their consequences, but they 
imply different underlying assumptions about dictators’ primary motivations. While causal 
path A suggests that dictators who access power through irregular or violent means end up 
“stuck” in office – knowing that they cannot relinquish power without risking jail, exile or 
death – and have no choice but to resort to extreme measures to protect themselves, causal 
path B assumes that dictators could choose to yield office peacefully but that they enjoy 
power so much that they are willing to use every possible strategy to stay in office, 
regardless of the risk of being subsequently punished.49 In short, both explanations rely on 
different assumptions about dictators’ average level of risk acceptance. But then again, 
they do not differ in their consequences: irregular seizures of power initiate a vicious circle 
in which dictators often have no choice but to use violence to maintain themselves in 
office; and the use of violence makes peaceful retirement virtually impossible. In short, in 
non-institutionalized regimes, violence breeds violence.  
 
 
3.1.2. Leaders and their ruling coalitions 
 
Intra-elite conflicts – either in the form of “palace coups” or of subversive coalitions made 
up of factions of the military and the ruling elite – are one of the main sources of variation 
in the political survival of autocrats (Goemans et al. 2009a; Cheibub et al. 2010; Svolik 
2012). While research shows that democracies are not immune to such phenomena (see, 
e.g., Maeda 2010), coups, purges and other forms of power struggles are the modus 
operandi of many authoritarian governments (Tullock 1987).  
Predicting conflicts between rulers and their coalition requires making general 
                                                 
48 There is a similar debate ongoing in the diversionary war literature: while the risk of post-tenure 
punishment creates an incentive for dictators to initiate or continue interstate wars even if they cannot 
win (Goemans 2000; Goemans 2008; Debs and Goemans 2010), there is also evidence that the fate of 
dictators is more sensitive to war outcomes than the fate of democrats (Debs and Goemans 2010) and that 
losing a war increases the risk of post-tenure punishment (Goemans 2008; Escriba-Folch 2013b). 
49 Neither explanation is entirely satisfying. If causal path A is correct, it is unclear why dictators want to be 
in power to begin with. If causal path B is correct, it is unclear why dictators do not take the opportunity 
to leave office peacefully while they have the chance. 
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assumptions about the preferences of key regime elites. To begin with, it can either be 
assumed that members of the ruling coalition want to become rulers themselves, and that, 
given an opportunity to overthrow the incumbent and replace him, they will seize it. 
Alternatively, it can be assumed that they are not interested in taking power (or at least not 
enough to engage in a risky conspiracy). But both assumptions are equally unsatisfactory, 
because they do not explain why, for example, the current president of France runs a 
comparatively low risk of being overthrown by his own defense minister whereas such 
situations happen fairly often in the average dictatorship (Tullock 1987; Cheibub et al. 
2010; Svolik 2012).  
A way of making sense of these variations is to assume that the preferences of higher 
regime officials (and, in turn, their relationships with the current incumbent) are partly 
determined by the political environment in which they operate: this is the approach I will 
take. More specifically, I argue that intra-elite relationships in non-institutionalized 
autocracies are plagued with two interrelated problems: an uncertainty problem and an 
adverse selection problem. While institutionalized regimes have managed to mitigate these 
two issues, their prevalence in newly established autocracies explains why leaders in these 
regimes run a higher risk of being overthrown by their own allies. Each of these 
mechanisms will be discussed in turn below.  
The first argument I put forward is that regime type has an impact on the personality of 
individuals who self-select into the ruling coalition. Adverse selection is a recurring topic 
in organizational economics and has received some attention in the conflict literature (e.g., 
Weinstein 2007), but is still a comparatively understudied issue in the cross-national, 
comparative literature on political regimes in the sense that we still lack thorough 
empirical investigations (for a notable exception, see Besley and Reynal-Querol 2011). 
The topic is nonetheless ubiquitous: for example, while discussing whether democracy is 
an appropriate method for selecting effective governments, Schumpeter (2003 [1942], 288-
9) examines the argument that selecting individuals who are successful at the polls is not 
the most straightforward way to fill political offices with competent statesmen and 
administrators, and that good tacticians are also more likely – once in office – to avoid 
being punished for their incompetence. With regard to nondemocratic regimes, Tullock 
(1987, 18) bluntly states that self-selection processes in dictatorships result in dictators 
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being frequently both intelligent and aggressive, while “accidents of gene selection” in 
hereditary monarchies often bring inept kings in power. More recently, Egorov and Sonin 
(2005) propose an explanation for why (personalist) dictators tend to be surrounded by 
incompetent advisors: first, the dictator himself has an incentive to select only individuals 
who are (comparatively) unlikely to betray him; second, dictators – contrary to democrats, 
who are constrained by laws – are usually unable to commit not to punish potential 
contenders, which discourages most talented individuals from entering the government. In 
a rare cross-national examination of leadership selection in democracies and dictatorships, 
Horowitz and Stam (2014) show that, while democratic leaders with prior war experience 
are less likely to pursue aggressive foreign policies than those without military 
background, the reverse is true of dictatorships: severely autocratic regimes, they argue, 
are more likely to reward individuals who reacted to combat experience by developing 
aggressive and risk-acceptant attitudes.50  
Selection effects can partly explain the well-established fact that dictators are most likely 
to be overthrown and replaced by one of their allies (see, e.g., Tullock 1987; Gandhi 
2008a; Cheibub et al. 2010; Svolik 2012). In newly established dictatorships, the ruling 
coalition is typically made up of a dictator and his supporters, most likely military 
members and former supporters of the previous incumbent, who coalesced to overthrow 
the previous incumbent and took over power by force. In most extreme cases, the new 
coalition can be made up of complete outsiders (for example, in the case of “rebel 
regimes” such as Fidel Castro’s regime in Cuba), but either way, the very process through 
which it attained power requires a fair amount of risk acceptance: elites of the prior regime 
freely made the choice of joining a plot, thereby risking failure and subsequent 
punishment. With regard to open rebellion, failure can easily result in the death of its 
leaders. If coup plotters are willing to run such high risks, they presumably expect rewards 
that outweigh these risks: knowing that the most frequent path to becoming a dictator is to 
rise in the governmental hierarchy (Tullock 1987, 131; Cheibub et al. 2010), one obvious 
reward elites can expect is either succeeding to the first dictator or having the opportunity 
to overthrow and replace him. Thus, in newly established dictatorships, ruling coalitions 
are likely to be populated by individuals who are both motivated by the prospect of 
                                                 
50 Colgan (2013) puts forward a similar argument with regard to revolutionary leaders.  
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becoming dictators and willing to take the risk.  
This, in turns, leads to the second aspect of the problem, namely structural uncertainty. 
Tullock (1987) pointed out that in any authoritarian elite group, there is always the 
possibility of a subversive coalition forming against the dictator: if a coup is attempted, 
individuals who supported whoever wins at the end are rewarded, and those who backed 
the loser are punished. Furthermore, for members of the ruling coalition, remaining neutral 
is rarely an option: first, the winner is likely to interpret hesitation as treason; second, 
neutral members can lose office simply because their position is needed for rewarding 
more active supporters; third, insecure dictators tend to distribute high rewards for loyalty 
and harsh punishment for treason, which in turn generates an incentive for regime officials 
to denounce false conspiracies in order to improve their own position at the expense of 
potential rivals. Thus, members of the ruling elite live under constant threat coming from 
the sitting autocrat, his allies and his potential contenders. Knowing that their current 
position is fundamentally of temporary nature, they hence face a high incentive to grasp at 
any opportunity to seize power: each member who succeeds in accumulating enough 
power to overthrow the incumbent might be tempted into doing just that, not only because 
he has the opportunity to do so, but also because he faces a greater risk that the dictator or 
one of his rivals turn against him.  
The uncertainty problem is somewhat alleviated under what Svolik (2012) calls 
“established autocracy” (i.e., regimes in which there is a sharp power imbalance between 
the leader and his allies). Svolik (2012) shows that these established autocrats become less 
likely to be overthrown by a member of their inner circle as their tenure increases (see also 
Bienen and van de Walle 1989, 1992). The explanation is that, when the autocrat appears 
to be more secure in office, potential challengers might find it more difficult to overcome 
their coordination problems: absent a clear signal that a substantial number of higher 
officials would back an attempt to overthrow the autocrat (or at least refrain from betraying 
the plot), they find themselves unable to recruit allies because other members of the ruling 
elite fear that the coup may fail (see also Tullock 1987). But another implication is that, 
when the incumbent seems to be unlikely to lose office in the near future, his allies have 
less to worry about being overthrown together with him and are therefore less incited to 
take preemptive measures: on the long run, the mechanism reinforces itself. 
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Some authors argue that formal institutions can facilitate power-sharing agreements 
between the dictator and his allies when political power is more evenly shared between 
them, and thus prevent instability at the elite level (see, e.g., Magaloni 2008; Köllner 2013; 
Svolik 2012). Most of these studies have focused on the role of parties in facilitating 
bargaining between the dictator and his ruling coalition, and consistently found these to 
increase authoritarian regimes’ duration (Geddes 1999; Magaloni 2008; Svolik 2012). For 
example, Magaloni (2008) argues that parties enable dictators to credibly commit to 
reward their allies if they remain loyal to the regime: by delegating their control on 
political appointments to the ruling party, dictators can establish some credible limits to 
their own ability to renege on their promises, and thereby generate incentives for elites to 
invest in the survival of the current regime instead of plotting against it (for a variant of 
this argument, see Svolik 2012). The obvious problem is that it remains so far unclear 
whether the stabilizing effect of parties can be generalized to the whole universe of party-
based regimes: the analyses mentioned above tend to draw general conclusions from a 
small subset of cases, typically China, the Soviet Union or the PRI regime in Mexico. In 
the absence of comprehensive, global analyses of power allocation mechanisms in ruling 
parties, it is not entirely clear whether the longevity of party regimes can be attributed to 
the role of institutions: for example, Magaloni’s (2008) argument about credible power-
sharing agreements rests on the assumption that parties have the power to appoint 
members into government positions, but it is unclear how many ruling parties really have 
this power. Yet, Magaloni’s main point can still be generalized to other regimes: if the 
argument is correct, it implies that rulers who do not have the power to select their 
successors – typically, monarchs or elected leaders – should be less likely to be overthrown 
by their allies.  
All in all, this suggests that “established autocracy” (Svolik 2012) is the first step toward 
stability at the elite level, to the extent that it mitigates the uncertainty problem. The 
second step consists in mitigating adverse selection problems: as discussed above, leaders 
are less likely to be overthrown by their allies if they manage to avoid being surrounded by 
higher officials whose primary goal is to become dictators themselves. This can be 
achieved through delegation, that is, if leaders give up their power to appoint their own 
successor. The reason is that, in weakly institutionalized or “anarchic” dictatorships, the 
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most effective way of becoming a dictator is to be part of the inner circle of the current 
incumbent (Tullock 1987). If, by contrast, the incumbent has given up his power to appoint 
his successor, being part of the incumbent’s inner circle does not guarantee access to 
power, since succession in office depends on other criteria (e.g., succession orders in 
hereditary monarchies, or elections in democracies). Thus, if succession in office is 
regulated by formal rules, key regime positions are more likely to be filled by individuals 
whose primary goal is not to become rulers themselves but rather to pursue their own 
career path: potential challengers will not necessarily be part of the ruling coalition, since 
challenging the regime from the inside does not make success more likely.   
To sum up: 
(1) Rulers who attained power by illegal or violent means are the most likely to be 
overthrown by their allies, because they will be surrounded by ambitious and risk-
seeking individuals who are, furthermore, uncertain about their own future.  
(2) As rulers succeed in consolidating their own power, uncertainty problems are 
somewhat mitigated and coup risk decreases.  
(3) Formal rules regulating access to, and succession in power mitigate both 
uncertainty and adverse selection problems.  
Three final points need to be discussed. First, power concentration and institutionalization 
seem to be inherently contradictory. However, as will be shown in Section 3.2., 
establishing formal institutions (e.g., hereditary succession) typically involves a risk for 
the ruler, since it deprives his allies from the possibility to attain power in the future: such 
measures are thus most likely to be taken by rulers who are already relatively secure in 
office.  
Second, as has been pointed out above, the combination of uncertainty and adverse 
selection creates a vicious circle: overt instability at the elite level is likely to attract 
ambitious and opportunistic individuals, and the overrepresentation of such individuals in 
key regime positions in turn aggravates instability issues. Both effects are mutually 
reinforcing. By the same token, regime stability creates a virtuous circle: knowing that the 
incumbent is unlikely to be overthrown not only reassures elites on their own fate (thereby 
decreasing the risk of “preemptive” coups) but also reinforces their belief that even if they 
wanted to attempt a coup, they would not be able to find allies to do so.  
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Third and finally, the impact of formal institutions might seem overstated in light of what 
has been discussed about the relationship between rulers and their allies: why should they 
be expected to abide by the rules? This will be the topic of Section 3.2.  
 
3.1.3. Regime elites and the opposition 
 
A second common form of violent political conflict is armed struggle taking place between 
the incumbent and one or several opposition groups. This formulation already conveys an 
assumption that is often implicit but nonetheless pervasive in prior cross-country 
investigations of the relationship between political regimes and intrastate armed conflicts 
(e.g., Muller and Weede 1990; Hegre et al. 2001; Fjelde 2010; Gurses and Mason 2010): 
that civil wars can be conceptualized as political conflicts that have become violent. To 
state the matter differently, expecting political regimes to have an influence on intrastate 
armed conflict requires assuming that such conflicts are (at least partly) motivated by 
political issues. This might seem self-evident, but, as will be discussed below, one 
persistent debate in the comparative literature on civil wars revolves around the question of 
whether these conflicts are political in essence, or are simply economic conflicts, 
analogous to organized crime (Collier 2000).  
In spite of the well-known shortcomings of “grievances-based” approaches (see Collier 
and Hoeffler 1998, 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003), I still assume that intrastate armed 
conflicts can break out over issues related to the distribution of political power. The 
assumption I make here is that the preferences of opposition groups mirror those of the 
incumbent and his allies: what is at stake in intrastate conflicts is political power, that is, 
control over the state’s government or a portion of its territory. There is a “soft” version 
and a “hard” version of this assumption: the soft version states that opposition groups tend 
to rebel when they have been submitted to an unwanted leader for too long. The hard 
version states that, regardless of leadership changes that occur at the government level, 
opposition groups will still resort to violence unless they have a fair chance of attaining 
power themselves. Importantly, these assumptions are completely agnostic about what 
fundamentally motivates rebel leaders. They can be motivated by personal ambition or 
greed, or by genuine political, religious or otherwise ideological beliefs; like incumbents, 
they can be office-seeking or policy-seeking. But either way, in order to be able to 
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implement their preferred policies or capture the state’s income, they first have to be in 
power, which requires seizing control of the central government or of a sizable portion of 
the state’s territory.  
Treating rebels’ preferences as relatively uniform across cases has some implications for 
the conceptualization of armed rebellion, since it implies that all intrastate armed conflicts, 
in spite of their differences, have some common causes. One consequence is that, although 
there is a relative51 consensus among scholars that not all civil wars are the same, most of 
the hypotheses I will test throughout the dissertation pertain to all types of conflicts: I do 
not distinguish between, for example, conflicts over government from conflicts over 
territory, or ethnic from non-ethnic civil wars.  
Table 3.1. gives some examples of distinctions that are commonly undertaken in the civil 
conflict literature. The first striking point is that civil conflicts can be distinguished along 
numerous dimensions that are sometimes overlapping but nonetheless conceptually and 
empirically different: for example, while separatist conflicts are mostly fought by ethnic 
minorities, almost half of ethnic conflicts concern government control (Buhaug 2006, 
694); territorial conflicts are not necessarily fought over separatist purposes (de la Calle 
and Sanchez-Cuenca 2012, 582); nor are they necessarily rural (Staniland 2010). 
 
Table 3.1. Types of civil war in the comparative conflict literature 
 
Type of civil war  Example 
Ethnic vs. non-ethnic civil war Sambanis 2001b 
Urban vs. rural insurgency Staniland 2010 
Territorial vs. non-territorial conflict  De la Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca 2012 
Governmental vs. separatist conflict  Buhaug 2006 
 
 
Given the many dimensions along which intrastate conflicts can be differentiated and the 
lack of a clear theory that would link political regimes to each of these “conflict types,” 
                                                 
51 The consensus is not perfect since proponents of the “greed” approach typically rely on aggregated data 
and treat all civil wars as fundamentally similar (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2004; Fearon and Laitin 
2003). More curiously yet, many empirical studies that investigate the impact of political regimes on civil 
wars do not undertake any distinctions between different types of conflicts (Hegre et al. 2001; Reynal-
Querol 2002a, 2005; Regan and Bell 2010; Gleditsch and Ruggeri 2010; Fjelde 2010; for an exception, 
see Reynal-Querol 2002b). 
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one is left with a choice between two equally unsatisfactory options: the first option 
consists in working with aggregated conflict data under the assumption that political 
regime has roughly the same influence on all types of intrastate armed conflict; the second 
option would be to adopt a purely inductive approach and investigate whether, say, 
monarchies are more prone to non-ethnic, territorial conflicts over government while 
military dictatorships are more vulnerable to ethnic, urban insurgencies without rebel 
territorial control. But there is yet a reason not to take these distinctions into account: there 
is growing evidence that these differences between types of civil war are not due to 
fundamental differences in rebels’ objectives and preferences, but rather to the balance of 
power between government and rebel groups. In short, power asymmetry determines 
which form the conflict will take: relative capabilities, for example, determine whether 
conflicts are likely to be fought in urban or rural areas (Staniland 2010) or whether the 
rebels will resort to insurgency or terrorism (de la Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca 2012). With 
regard to the commonly made differentiation between governmental and territorial 
conflict, Buhaug (2006) finds that whether rebel groups seek state control or self-
determination depends on their strength relative to the government: while weak states tend 
to attract revolutions, rebel groups that challenge stronger states anticipate that they will 
never be able to seize control of the central government and are thus more likely to claim 
independence for a limited portion of the state territory. This does not only explain the fact 
that some states are more prone to governmental conflicts than others, but also the 
evolution of claims made by individual rebel groups: demands might shift from 
independence to regime change and back again, depending on rebel groups’ changing 
expectations about the outcome of the conflict (see pp. 694-5).52 
A fundamental lesson that can be drawn from these studies is that the causes of civil 
conflict outbreak are not the same as the causes of conflict escalation, conflict intensity, 
and conflict continuation or termination. This distinction is not trivial: First, it has crucial 
implications for the research design, and particularly for the choice of the operational 
definition of intrastate armed conflict (see Chapter 5); second, it is a highly relevant aspect 
of the debate about the relative impact of “greed” and “grievances” on civil conflict.  
                                                 
52 A more radical conclusion that can be drawn from Buhaug’s (2006) findings is that the stated goals of the 
rebellion should never been taken at face value (i.e., that claims over government control or independence 
are fundamentally a question of discourse and have a very limited explanatory value). 
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A series of studies by Collier and Hoeffler (Collier 1999, 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 
2004; Collier et al. 2008) have highlighted the role of economic and material benefits that 
rebel leaders gain from civil war and hence severely challenged the “traditional” 
explanations of rebellion: in short, armed conflicts are not motivated by grievances 
(because these are so ubiquitous that they cannot account for the relative rarity of 
rebellion) but by greed, and provided that rebellion is feasible, the opportunity will never 
be passed up. One version of the “greed” hypothesis is based on the assumption that 
expected post-conflict payoffs are the primary cause of civil conflict: Collier and 
Hoeffler’s (1998) main argument is that the motivation of rebel groups is to capture the 
state’s revenues. Similarly, Collier (2000) puts forward that criminal violence perpetrated 
by gangs and mafias and large-scale conflicts between insurgents and the state are located 
on the same continuum: what makes rebellion a distinctive form of crime is, first, the size 
of the group engaged in such activities, and second, the type of goods (that is, natural 
resource exports) the group seeks to loot. A later, and more radical version of the greed 
hypothesis (Collier and Hoeffler 2004) is that sustained conflict is not due to rebels’ 
expected payoffs in case of victory, but rather to the fact that civil war provides some 
groups with opportunities to enrich themselves in the course of the conflict. As Collier puts 
it: 
 
Various identifiable groups will “do well out of the war.” They are opportunistic businessmen, 
criminals, traders and the rebel organizations themselves. The rebels will do well through predation 
on primary commodity exports, traders will do well through widened margins on the goods they sell 
to consumers, criminals will do well through theft, and opportunistic businessmen will do well at the 
expense of those businesses which are constrained to honest conduct. If some people do well out of 
civil war they may not be particularly concerned to restore peace (Collier 1999, 9–10).53 
 
At first glance, this latter approach seems to be inherently incompatible with the idea that 
political regime type has an impact on civil conflict: if what motivates rebel groups is the 
prospect of enriching themselves during the war, there is no reason why we should expect 
                                                 
53 Reasons why these particular groups have better opportunities to enrich themselves are discussed 
throughout the paper. Civil war benefits criminals because government expenditures on the police 
decrease as military expenditures increase; it benefits some businessmen because it disrupts economic 
competition; and it obviously benefits rebel groups that are able to seize control over lootable resources. 
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them to be more or less opportunistic under democracy than under monarchy or military 
dictatorship. If civil war has political causes, these causes have to be located in factors 
such as weak statehood (see, e.g., Fearon and Laitin 2003) rather than in the institutional 
setup of the regime.  
There are, yet, some reasons to believe that both approaches are not mutually exclusive. 
Most of the greed-based arguments actually pertains to the sustainability of civil conflict 
rather than to its outbreak: violent conflicts, so the argument goes, only reach the level of 
full-scale civil war when rebels are able to recruit combatants, provide them with weapons, 
and finance the insurgency. In other words, the greed approach to civil war does not really 
seek to explain what sparks violence but rather what makes violence escalate and last. 
Several studies, furthermore, suggest that the motivations of the combatants and the 
strategies they pursue might evolve in the course of the conflicts, depending on the 
intensity of the conflict: for example, Regan and Norton (2005) argue that, since initial 
mobilization entails few costs for the participants, grievances may be sufficient to spark 
low-level unrest; yet, as the state becomes increasingly repressive in response to the threat, 
rebel leaders must resort to providing combatants with selective benefits (see also 
Weinstein 2007). Relatedly, while reviewing the available empirical evidence on natural 
resources and civil war, Ross (2004a) notes that “lootable” resources such as drugs and 
gemstones seem to be related to the duration of armed conflicts (the explanation being that 
in resource-rich states, war becomes so profitable that combatants gradually lose their 
incentive to reach a peace settlement), but not with the onset of armed conflict. In a 
detailed analysis of thirteen cases of civil war in resource-rich countries, he further 
observes that in all of these cases, rebel groups only started to loot resources after the 
conflict began (Ross 2004b): this finding suggests that, while looting is necessary for 
combatants to finance the insurgency, it does not necessarily constitute their primary goal 
at the outbreak of the conflict. 
To sum up, understanding how conflicts escalate and last requires taking collective action 
problems and the self-interests of rebel leaders into account. What makes violence break 
out, by contrast, is not necessarily greed. For the purposes of the empirical investigation, I 
assume that the risk of intrastate armed conflict increases when opposition groups are 
durably excluded from power and believe they would have a fair chance to prevail in a 
66 
civil war (more on this latter point in Chapters 5 and 7). A crucial implication is that not all 
institutional features of political regimes should be related to the occurrence of intrastate 
conflict. More specifically, since democracies are the only systems in which opposition 
groups strong enough to pose a serious threat to the central government are unlikely to be 
durably excluded from power, I expect democracies to experience fewer intrastate armed 
conflicts than any other regime type. By contrast, while I expect regime institutionalization 
to reduce the risk of intra-elite conflicts and military coups, I do not expect it to have any 
direct effect on rebellion: if this expectation is correct, monarchies should display the same 
vulnerability to intrastate conflicts as any other nondemocratic regime.54 
 
3.1.4. Incumbents and the military  
 
If there is one lesson to be learned from the Arab Spring, it is the following: virtually no 
regime can maintain itself without the active support of the armed forces. The military’s 
behavior is perhaps the ultimate factor that determines the success or failure of popular 
uprisings: revolutions tend to fail whenever the armed forces remain loyal to the regime, 
and to succeed whenever they defect and switch to the opposition’s side (D’Anieri 2006; 
Barany 2011; Croissant 2013a; Nepstad 2013). For many authoritarian regimes, the 
military constitutes the main “pillar” of stability (Gerschewski 2013); yet, it tends to defect 
quite often. Coups account for the overwhelming majority of irregular changes of 
leadership and regime transitions in nondemocratic countries (Svolik 2012); and even 
when alternations through elections are taken into account, coups account for almost one 
tenth of all leadership changes (Goemans et al. 2009a).  
But what, then, explains why military coups are pervasive in some countries while they are 
virtually absent from some others? General explanations are never entirely satisfying 
because of the huge diversity of armed forces, and because the military, even when it is 
highly cohesive and professionalized, cannot be viewed as a monolithic entity. Assigning 
preferences to the military as if it were a homogeneous organization is thus inherently 
problematic. Yet, for the reasons mentioned above, leaving the military out of the picture is 
not a conceivable alternative.  
                                                 
54 As we shall see, however, this expectation is not borne out. 
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For the remainder of this subsection, I will proceed in two steps. I will first provide a very 
brief and non-exhaustive review of theoretical approaches that attempt to provide a 
generalizable explanation of coups. These theoretical approaches fall into three general 
categories: a corporate-interests approach, a class-conflict approach, and an opportunity 
approach. As will be shown, however, while these explanations may contribute to a more 
thorough understanding of individual events, none of these can perfectly account for the 
cross-country variations in the frequency of coups. Next, I will discuss some recurring 
findings of previous studies on coups, and draw some conclusions about how the military 
is likely to behave in specific political environments. 
 
3.1.4.1. General approaches to the explanation of military coups: Corporate interests, class 
conflicts, and opportunities 
 
Corporate grievances have been repeatedly emphasized by early studies on military coups 
(Finer 1962, Decalo 1973, Needler 1975, Nordlinger 1977): the military intervenes either 
to pursue specific demands (e.g., better pay, easier promotion, less political interference in 
appointments or other military affairs) or to hinder what it perceives as threat to its 
integrity. The most radical proponent of this approach, Nordlinger (1977), goes as far as to 
say that “almost all coups are at least partly, and usually primarily, inspired by the 
military’s own interests” (p. 192). He reports some striking examples: for instance, in the 
period from 1912 to 1964, every Peruvian government that attempted to reduce military 
expenditures ended up overthrown; one coup was even justified by the statement that the 
government “had not built even one military base” (p. 67).  
The corporate-interests approach has been criticized for crediting coup plotters with too 
much concern for the whole organization’s utility and overlooking their own personal 
ambitions: as Bienen notes, “Military factions can be little more than gangs of thugs (…) 
willing to risk the stability of the state and the military’s own cohesion and identity to stay 
in power” (Bienen 1981, 368). A related issue is that numerous cross-national studies have 
failed to uncover any clear relationship between military government and defense spending 
patterns (see, e.g., McKinlay and Cohan 1975, 1976; Zuk and Thompson 1982): if coup 
plotters are motivated by a genuine desire to improve the military’s status and capacities, it 
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is then hard to explain why they do not act accordingly once they have taken power.  
The most serious problem, however, is that corporate grievances fail to explain the cross-
national variations in patterns of civil-military conflicts: in short, conflicts between the 
military and civilian governments are so pervasive that one may wonder why coups do not 
occur all the time. For example, Clinton and the US military quarreled endlessly about the 
status of homosexuals and the inclusion of women in fighting units, among others (see 
Desch 2001, Chapter 3); yet, it seems reasonable in hindsight to assume that the Clinton 
administration did not face any serious risk of being overthrown. By contrast, in some 
other contexts, coups can occur for reasons that seem entirely futile, as in this account of 
the overthrow of the Bolivian interim government in 1980: 
 
Relations between the military and the Gueiler government were always tense (…). At one point, in 
the Spring of 1980, the rivalry became almost comic. Garcia Meza complained bitterly to President 
Gueiler during an official ceremony in Cochabamba that the NCO academy there did not have a 
swimming pool and that this was an affront to the honor of the armed forces. In front of the press, 
the president placed her hand on the general’s arm and said soothingly, “Alright, General, we’ll 
build you a pool, and then you won’t have to overthrow the government after all.”… On 17 July, in 
the early hours of the morning, the garrison at Trinidad rose against the government.” (Farcau 1994, 
quoted in Goemans et al. 2009b, 272).  
 
Thus, explaining coups would require identifying the reason why the military is sometimes 
willing to use force to protect its interests and sometimes not.  
Class-conflict approaches to military intervention face similar issues. They are based on 
the assumption that military interventions result from redistributive conflicts between the 
pro-democratic poor and the anti-democratic elites (see, e.g., O’Donnell 1973, Acemoglu 
and Robinson 2006; for a review and critique of early class-conflict approaches to coups, 
see Thompson 1975). The ideology of the military is either assumed away (Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2006) or viewed as generally conservative (O’Donnell 1973; Nordlinger 1977).55 
                                                 
55 Although Nordlinger (1977) generally portrays military officers as ideologically conservative, he offers an 
interesting alternative explanation of one paradigmatic case of coup motivated by class conflict, namely 
the Chilean coup of 1973. According to him, what sparked the coup was not the military's opposition to 
socialist economic objectives, but rather the fact that the government encouraged the formation of leftist 
organizations who not only began to arm themselves and factory workers, but also allegedly attempted to 
infiltrate the military (Nordlinger 1977, 76-77). Thus, the defense of corporate interests, rather than 
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Class-conflict explanations of military coups are still discussed in the contemporary 
literature (see, e.g., Tusalem 2010, Hiroi and Omori 2014; for a critique, see Slater et al. 
2014). Still, they are clearly at odds with one emerging finding, that most coups since the 
end of the Cold War have resulted in a transition to democracy (Marinov and Goemans 
2014; Croissant 2013b; Thyne and Powell 2015; Powell 2014a). Furthermore, they seem 
only applicable to a small subset of cases: in his account of coups in West Africa, Bienen 
(1985) note that those were led by junior officers or NCOs, most of which were allegedly 
motivated by a general discontent about current elites, policy failures and socio-economic 
and ethnic inequalities. Many of the subsequent regimes had a clear anti-elite, populist 
tone. On the whole, the range of political motives underlying military intervention is too 
broad for ideological explanations to have any predictive power: while reviewing prior 
research on coups, Zuk and Thompson (1982) note that coup plotters have been 
alternatively described as “opportunists, revolutionary reformers, modernization 
vanguards, middle-class political surrogates, constitutional guardians, reactionary 
oligarchs, or corporate military welfare defenders” (Zuk and Thompson 1982, 60; see also 
Needler 1975). Even though most post-coup announcements include a policy program, the 
emphasis on political motives, rather than reflecting a genuine desire to reform the 
political system, may in fact result from the necessity to either form alliances with civilians 
or to provide an ex-post justification of military interventions (Tullock 2005 [1974]; 
Thompson 1975; see also Nordlinger 1977). As Thompson (1975) puts it, “One could 
hardly expect a coup leader to proclaim to his troops, his countrymen, and the world that a 
president has been abruptly removed in order to save the coup leader’s political skin” 
(Thompson 1975, 467). 
Finally, opportunity approaches to coups are prominent in the early literature (see, e.g., 
Finer 1962) as well as in more recent scholarship, as demonstrated by the renewed interest 
in coup-proofing strategies (Quinlivan 1999; Belkin and Schofer 2005; Roessler 2011; 
Pilster and Böhmelt 2011, 2012). Opportunity-centered explanations are silent on what 
motivates military intervention and rather focus on which factors determine its feasibility. 
So far, however, the empirical record on the side of opportunity approaches is mixed at 
best. For example, while theories of “military centrality” (Jenkins and Kposowa 1990, 
                                                                                                                                                   
political motives, was the decisive cause of the coup.   
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1992; Kposowa and Jenkins 1993; Maniruzzaman 1992; Wang 1998) assume that coups 
occur when the military’s capabilities in terms of resources and organization are superior 
to those of civilian institutions, there is still no consensus as to which factors facilitate or 
impede coups: For example, conflicts within the military – e.g., ethnic divisions, social and 
intergenerational conflicts, or inter-branch rivalries – have alternatively been said to 
increase or reduce coup risk (Finer 1962; Janowitz 1964; Decalo 1973; Bienen 1974, 1985; 
Jenkins and Kposowa 1990, 1992; Kposowa and Jenkins 1993; Belkin and Schofer 2005). 
To give an even more striking example, military strength (in terms of both manpower and 
resource endowment) is typically assumed to facilitate military takeovers; yet, Powell 
(2012) finds that military size aggravates coordination issues and that increasing military 
expenditures actually makes coup attempts less likely to succeed.  
Moreover, these approaches are not entirely convincing, to the extent that they suffer from 
the same kinds of problems as the corporate-interests approaches: opportunity is simply 
too ubiquitous to explain the considerable variation in patterns of military involvement in 
domestic politics. Weak states – in which the overwhelming majority of coups occur (see, 
e.g., Londregan and Poole 1990) – succumb quite easily to quickly executed coups, even 
when those are organized by a small faction of the military without the support of the 
military’s high command. Tullock’s (2005 [1974]) account of one of the numerous coups 
that occurred in Iraq provides a nice example: 
 
The government of Iraq was once overthrown because a division of infantry, moving from one part 
of the country to the other, passed through the capital, and its general took advantage of the 
opportunity. The fact that he had relatively weak military support was not obvious until it was much 
too late (Tullock 2005 [1974], 283-4).  
 
But even in established democracies, full civilian control of the military is not self-evident. 
The overwhelming organizational advantages of the military vis-à-vis any other civilian 
group, and the fact that, contrary to parties or churches, it possesses weapons, led Finer to 
state that, instead of asking why officers sometimes intervene, “we ought surely ask why 
they ever do otherwise” (Finer 2009 [1962]: 5). Similarly, Przeworski calls it a “miracle” 
that “people who have guns obey those without them” (Przeworski 1999, 16). In sum, what 
makes coups seem so random and unpredictable is that even small and underequipped 
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militaries are hardly constrained by structural factors. 
 
3.1.4.2. Some assumptions about the military’s preferences 
 
As discussed above, assigning preferences to the military as a whole organization is 
inherently difficult – if not bound to failure – and global explanations of coups generally 
do not perform very well (Croissant 2013b). Yet, prior research has pointed to several 
stylized facts about coups, which provide some clues about the military’s willingness to 
interfere in domestic politics.   
The first stylized fact is that, while the corporate-interests approach generally fails to 
explain why coups are attempted in the first place, it can explain why coup plotters receive 
support from the military as a whole. Since most officers value the unity and internal 
cohesion of the military more than anything else, they often go along with coup plotters 
regardless of whether they are themselves in favor of an intervention or not (Needler 1975; 
Geddes 1999). Thus, even if the motives of the first movers are idiosyncratic, the success 
or failure of interventions can be explained by a desire to preserve the organization’s 
integrity. Powell (2012) finds that militaries that are given larger financial endowments are 
not only less likely to attempt coups, but also less likely to succeed: according to him, this 
is because these resource endowments give the military strong incentives to oppose any 
conspiracy that would emerge within its own ranks.  
This softer version of the corporate-interests approach does not even require making strong 
assumptions about commonly shared values or beliefs, because if a coup is staged, officers 
are always worse off if they remain passive, regardless of the outcome of the intervention. 
If the coup fails, the government is likely to respond with coup-proofing measures that 
would weaken the military; if the coup succeeds, officers who remained loyal to the 
regime run the risk of being punished for their defection (Geddes 1999, 126-8; see also 
Tullock 1987). The worst possible outcomes are either a complete disintegration of the 
military hierarchy – with the consequence that military commanders lose not only control 
over their subordinates but also their pivotal position vis-à-vis the civilian government – or 
a civil war in which factions of the military fight against each other (Geddes 1999).  
A second stylized fact is that the military rarely intervenes against “legitimate” 
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governments (see, e.g., Finer 2009 [1962]; Luttwak 1979; Needler 1975; Nordlinger 1977; 
Belkin and Schofer 2003). More specifically: 
(1) Officers rarely attempt coups they believe will be met by mass protests. This is 
why military interventions are less frequent in countries where civilian organizations 
are highly developed and where there is a certain level of public attachment to 
civilian institutions (Finer 2009 [1962]; Putnam 1967; Luttwak 1979; Belkin and 
Schofer 2003). Finer’s (2009 [1962], 93–98) discussion of the failed coups in 
Germany in 1920 and France in 1961 clearly shows that otherwise successful coups 
can fail because plotters either encounter mass popular opposition (Germany) or lack 
civilian support (France). This effect is not restricted to democracies: according to 
Geddes (2006), the ability to mobilize popular opposition to coups is one of the 
factors that contribute to the stability of party-based autocracies. 
(2) In countries where political participation is broad and the public is organized in 
parties, unions, etc., coups are usually caused by performance failures on the part of 
the government. Such performance failures typically include economic crises with 
large-scale unemployment and massive inflation, chronic cabinet instability, or the 
government’s failure to maintain public order (see Luttwak 1979; Nordlinger 1977; 
O’Kane 1981; Powell 2012); conversely, high growth rates have been found to 
inhibit coups (Londregan and Poole 1990). Interestingly, military governments’ 
withdrawal from politics is often motivated by these very same reasons (Nordlinger 
1977; Needler 1980).  
A final stylized fact – which reflects a near consensus in the literature – is that coups rarely 
overthrow stable regimes (e.g., Decalo 1973; Bienen 1985), and, conversely, that coups 
tend to breed further coups (Luttwak 1979; O’Kane 1981, 1983; McGowan and Johnson 
1984; Londregan and Poole 1990; Belkin and Schofer 2003). In spite of the regularity of 
this finding, however, the causal mechanisms underlying this empirical pattern are rarely 
discussed at length.56 
Finer (2009 [1962], 118-9) provides such an explanation: after having successfully 
removed a government from office, military officers have to reckon with the possibility 
                                                 
56 There are some discussions about factionalism and the dynamics of coups and countercoups in military 
governments (see Finer 1962; Nordlinger 1977), but the “coup trap” (Londregan and Poole 1990) is a 
somewhat different phenomenon. 
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that this government or its supporters might become strong enough to return to power and 
retaliate. Thus, they can never fully disengage and have to continue to regularly intervene 
in politics “if only for self-defense,” Finer writes (p. 119).  
The simplest explanation, however, is that on the whole, officers tend to behave in the 
same way as civil servants or higher-ranking officials. The analogy should not appear 
surprising given the numerous parallels that have been drawn between professional 
soldiers and civil servants (for example, O’Donnell’s [1973] “bureaucratic 
authoritarianism” or Nordlinger’s [1977] discussion of military officers’ governing style). 
But the point here does not concern the natural affinity between officers and bureaucrats, 
but rather their similar way of reacting to political instability. When political regimes are 
stable – that is, when the country has not experienced an irregular change of leadership in 
recent years and when it seems unlikely that the government will be forcefully removed 
from office in the near future – the dominant strategy for military officers is to stay out of 
politics. Even those who strongly dislike the current government are deterred from 
attempting a coup because they are unlikely to be supported by their colleagues. In such 
regimes with no recent history of military intervention, the higher levels of the military 
hierarchy are likely to be populated by individuals whose primary motivation is to keep 
their current jobs and move up the career ladder. By contrast, when interventions become 
routine and membership in the military becomes a privileged path to political power, the 
organization begins to attract individuals who are interested in seizing power themselves, 
or at least less willing to prevent others from trying to do that. Furthermore, leaders who 
face a high coup risk – including military leaders themselves – tend to make an extensive 
use of the well-documented “coup-proofing” strategies (Quinlivan 1999; Belkin and 
Schofer 2005; Pilster and Böhmelt 2011, 2012; Powell 2012; see also Tullock 2005 [1974], 
1987), which include, among others, developing paramilitary organizations to 
counterbalance traditional military forces, moving senior officers from one position to 
another – or keeping the most influential ones away from the country, if not removing 
them from office altogether – or exacerbating internal rivalries by creating multiple 
branches with overlapping jurisdiction that monitor one another. More radically, coup 
prevention can consist in purges and widespread assassinations. Officers operating in such 
high-risk environments thus have shorter time horizons and face higher incentives to 
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participate in anti-government plots: political instability may motivate preemptive military 
coups for the same reasons that explain why members of the ruling coalition of a dictator 
may attempt to overthrow him in anticipation of forthcoming power struggles. 
Finally, potential threats do not only come from insecure leaders, but also from potential 
conspirators from within the military’s ranks: officers who failed to join a successful coup 
run the risk of being punished for their defection or simply losing their position because it 
is needed for rewarding coups participants. Because, in highly unstable regimes, neutrality 
rarely pays off and participation in coups entails fewer opportunity costs, the dominant 
strategy for officers is to anticipate the next change of leadership and try to jump on the 
coup bandwagon on time (see Geddes 1999; Tullock 2005 [1974]; Tullock 1987).  
To summarize the discussion, the officer corps – like civilian elites – is also affected by the 
adverse selection and the uncertainty problems discussed in Section 3.1.2. It follows that, 
first, instability at the elite level can breed coups even when the military has no specific 
grievances or high-ranking officers are not particularly interested in participating in 
politics. Second, civilian control of the military is an equilibrium, but it is a fragile one: 
once it is disrupted, military intervention in politics becomes a vicious circle, and coups 
breed further coups.  
 
 
3.2. POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AS CONFLICT-RESOLUTION DEVICES  
 
The previous section dealt with potential sources of political conflict in political regimes, 
especially in weakly institutionalized ones. This section will discuss the function of 
political institutions as conflict-resolution devices.  
Specifically, section 3.1. described three types of conflict: those taking place between the 
incumbent and the regime’s higher officials; those taking place between the incumbent and 
the military; and those taking place between the ruling elite and the political opposition. 
The central argument made here that political institutions have the potential to pacify at 
least two57 of these types of conflict, namely intra-elite conflicts and conflicts between 
                                                 
57 The question of the impact of political institutions on conflicts between the government and the military is 
somewhat more complicated. As will be discussed throughout the dissertation, I assume that political 
institutions have an indirect effect on the military's propensity to interfere in political affairs: first, I argue 
75 
elites and opposition groups.  
But here is the crux of the problem: any claim that institutions can somehow solve 
conflicts over the distribution of political power must rely on the rather strong assumption 
that every actor abides by the rules and does not try to subvert them. This is not self-
evident: as Hardin (2013) notes, contracts are abided by because they are enforced by a 
third party (typically the state); yet, there is no third party to enforce political institutions 
and guarantee that every participant plays by the rules. Thus, any causal argument about 
the effect of political institutions requires identifying the reasons why actors would choose 
to comply with these rules even if they have sufficient power to subvert them.  
Part of the problem can be solved if formal rules are conceived as coordination devices, 
similar to conventions on road traffic (Hardin 1987; 1989; 1997): there is in principle no 
reason why we should drive on the left side or on the right side of the road, but drivers are 
better off if everyone follows the same convention. A rule stipulating that everyone should 
drive on the right is thus likely to be observed by everyone – even if it is arbitrary in its 
content and was established by unilateral imposition – because deviating from it would 
bring about heavy costs. This echoes the discussion on ruling coalitions in the previous 
section: a member of one of these coalitions might be completely indifferent about whether 
the current ruler stays in power or is replaced by someone else, but he surely cares about 
whether the others will coordinate on the same option as himself. Formal institutions can 
solve part of the problem by providing all members with a focal point (Schelling 1960) to 
coordinate their actions. 
Yet, this is only one part of the problem. While interactions between members of the ruling 
coalition often (not always) take the form of a coordination game (i.e., a situation in which 
actors are better off if everyone chooses the same strategy) and thus can be pacified by 
formal rules (see Hardin 1989), this is not true of every type of interaction. Thus, the mere 
existence of a set of formal rules does not always guarantee compliance: for political 
institutions to “work,” they must be self-enforcing in the sense that once rules are 
established, nobody has an incentive to deviate from them, and even actors who would 
                                                                                                                                                   
that institutions indirectly affect coup risk to the extent that they contribute to the stabilization of political 
regimes (that is, I expect every stable regime to be less coup-prone, regardless of which specific 
institutions contributed to this stability). Second, since coup risk partly depends on the risk of intrastate 
armed conflict (more on this in Chapter 4), every institution that decreases the risk of intrastate armed 
conflict indirectly decreases coup risk. 
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have the power to subvert extant institutions choose instead to abide by them. To put it in 
more concrete terms, we can easily think of institutions that are not self-enforcing because 
at least someone is better off unilaterally deviating from the rule: for example, the reason 
why primogeniture gradually replaced agnatic seniority in European monarchies might lie 
in the fact that in the latter system, the age difference between the current monarch and the 
next in line for the throne was not large enough to guarantee that the monarch would die 
before his heir (Kokkonen and Sundell 2014). To take another example, Tullock (1987) 
argues that juntas – i.e., systems in which political power lies with a small group of 
individuals who take decisions by unanimity – are inherently unstable, because one 
member will always try to accumulate power at the expense of his allies: thus, juntas tend 
to gradually shrink to one man, either because one member has succeeded in consolidating 
his power or because those who have failed to do so have been gradually eliminated by the 
other members. In these two examples, rules are established but they do not provide 
sufficient incentives for the most powerful actors to abide by them instead of trying to 
subvert them. 
In the following subsections, I will discuss the properties of two political systems – 
democracies and monarchies – and identify the institutional mechanisms that make these 
two systems self-enforcing. As already noted, monarchy and democracy are not the only 
conceivable self-enforcing institutions.58 Yet, they are today the most common forms of 
institutionalized political systems, and they both display some properties that make them 
less prone to violent political struggles. The central argument I will make is that, while 
democracies are better at solving conflicts between ruling elite and political opposition, 
monarchies are better at preventing intra-elite conflicts.  
 
3.2.1. Self-enforcing institutions (1): Electoral competition  
 
Why and under which conditions democracy endures is one of the oldest and the most 
controversial questions in comparative politics: Weingast (1997, 245) rightly characterizes 
                                                 
58 In a short article, Tullock (2002) discusses several historical forms of nondemocratic governments that 
achieved stability and were relatively successful. Most of these systems relied on some variant of 
elections or hereditary succession, but were nonetheless very different from contemporary democracies or 
monarchies. 
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the literature on this topic as “immense, multifaceted, and compartmentalized.” There are, 
on the one hand, studies devoted to the conditions under which democracy is more likely 
to endure – the most prominent of which are economic prerequisites of democracy (e.g., 
Lipset 1959; Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). 
On the other hand, and more closely related to the question of self-enforcing institutions, 
numerous studies have been devoted to the question of which specific institutional 
arrangements make democracies more likely to endure (for an overview, see Ginsburg 
2011): recurrent topics include presidentialism (Linz 1990; Stepan and Skach 1993; 
Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; Cheibub 2002, 2007) and counter-majoritarian institutions 
(Mittal and Weingast 2010; Alberts, Warshaw and Weingast 2012). The topic of electoral 
engineering in plural societies has likewise received a great deal of attention (Horowitz 
1993, 2004, 2006, 2007; Fraenkel and Grofman 2004, 2006a, 2006b, 2007; Reilly 2002; 
Mozaffar et al. 2003). What all these works have in common is that they treat specific 
institutional arrangements as instrumental to the stability of democracy.  
In this respect, what constitutes Przeworski’s (1999, 2003, 2006) fundamental innovation 
is his claim that democracy, even reduced to its barest minimum – that is, periodic 
electoral competition between at least two political parties – constitutes by itself an 
effective way of preventing conflicts.59 According to him, democracy is self-enforcing to 
the extent that it reduces the opposition’s incentives to rebel against the incumbent and 
increases the incumbent’s willingness to relinquish office peacefully after his term in 
office.  
The argument has two parts. First, from the perspective of the opposition, Przeworski 
(1999) argues that the mere possibility of changing governments – regardless of the 
procedure – can avoid violence because the losers can expect to become winners in the 
next round. This can be achieved through any regular procedure (e.g., a lottery), but 
elections have two further advantages. On the one hand, the incentive to get reelected leads 
governments to pursue relatively moderate policies, which further decreases the 
opposition’s incentives to rebel. On the other hand, elections are a public display of force: 
they indicate who would rebel if the incumbent tried to usurp power and, conversely, who 
                                                 
59 This, of course, does not mean that democracy can endure under any condition: economic development is 
crucial to the survival of democracy (see especially Przeworski 2005). 
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would support the incumbent if the opposition tried to grab power by force. Because they 
publicly indicate everyone’s preferences, elections thus prevent contenders from 
developing optimistically biased beliefs regarding the outcomes of a conflict (on this latter 
point, see also Londregan and Vindigni 2008).60 Moreover, a system of leadership 
selection based on majority rule has the consequence that political power broadly 
coincides with numerical strength: in democracies, groups that are strong enough to 
successfully challenge the government are precisely those that have the strongest 
incentives to comply.  
The second part of the argument concerns incumbents. Incumbents are more likely to yield 
office instead of trying to cling to power (and perhaps risking a costly rebellion) if 1) they 
are confident that the new winner will do the same after his term in office, and that they 
themselves retain some chance of returning to office later (Przeworski 1999); and 2) they 
believe that the new incumbent will not use his power to imprison them, force them into 
exile or otherwise prevent them from running for office again (Przeworski 2015). This is 
why many former dictators who consider stepping down may nevertheless find it difficult 
to obey the results of elections, but this is also why, once a peaceful alternation has taken 
place, all contenders quickly acquire the habit of abiding by the rules and electoral 
competition becomes an equilibrium from which nobody has an incentive to deviate 
(Przeworski 2015; for variants of this argument, see Moehler and Lindberg 2009 and 
Svolik 2013b).  
To sum up, democracy performs two related functions. First, because it shortens the 
waiting time until the next change of leadership, it decreases the opposition’s incentives to 
resort to violence. Second, because it lowers the stakes of politics, it solves the “retirement 
problem” discussed in Section 3.1.1. Both mechanisms are mutually enforcing because 
repeated, peaceful alternations in power show that the opposition is better off waiting than 
                                                 
60 An interesting variant of this argument can be found in a recent article by Fearon (2011): an elected ruler 
might decide to stay indefinitely in power and refuse to organize elections. Yet, while any other 
infringement of voters' rights might not prompt any violent reaction – because citizens typically have 
disparate preferences and do not necessarily agree on what constitutes a transgression, and because some 
groups might acquiesce to transgressions perpetrated against other groups (see Weingast 1997) – 
cancelling elections or refusing to step down after an electoral defeat constitutes a clear abuse of power 
and hurts everyone’s preferences in the same way. Knowing that citizens could easily overcome their 
coordination problems in such situations, incumbents have an incentive to accept election outcomes. 
Thus, the very existence of elections automatically generates an incentive for the incumbent to abide by 
the rules. 
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rebelling, and that the incumbent is better off surrendering power than attempting to usurp 
it. While democracy is not established easily, it becomes an equilibrium on the long run.  
 
 
3.2.2. Self-enforcing institutions (2): Hereditary succession 
 
In Autocracy, Tullock (1987, 166) predicted that on the long run, most (nondemocratic) 
regimes would converge toward some form of monarchy. Almost thirty years later, it 
seems that history has given him right to some extent. First, contemporary monarchies are 
notoriously stable: they display the longest lifespan among post-1945 autocracies 
(Hadenius and Teorell 2007a, 150), and Middle East monarchies have proven much more 
resilient to the Arab Spring than neighboring republics (Bank et al. 2013). Second, 
hereditary succession – the defining feature of monarchy – is now becoming a widespread 
practice among authoritarian regimes, including those that are not formally monarchies 
(Brownlee 2007). Examples include cases as diverse as North Korea, Togo, Azerbaijan, the 
Dominican Republic, Singapore, Syria, or Haiti. All in all, this suggests that monarchies 
are not an endangered species, and that their share in the universe of authoritarian regimes 
is likely to increase in the near future. 
According to Tullock (1987), the fundamental reason why hereditary succession is 
conducive to regime stability in the long run it that it provides both the dictator and its 
ruling coalition with a satisfactory solution to succession problems. From the perspective 
of the dictator, the most obvious problem is that appointing a successor increases his risk 
of being assassinated: “Obviously the sooner the successor becomes dictator in his own 
right the better from his standpoint and shortening the life of the current dictator is an 
obvious way of speeding up the succession” (Tullock 1987, 151). Hereditary succession 
(and especially primogeniture) mitigates this risk to the extent that, first, the heir is more 
likely than a member of the ruling coalition to simply wait for his father to die instead of 
overthrowing him, because the age discrepancy still gives him a chance of a long reign; 
second, the existence of a firm succession rule reduces the heir’s uncertainty about the 
current dictator eventually changing his mind, and thereby his incentive to make the first 
move and overthrowing him while he has the opportunity to do so; and third, the personal 
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relationships between father and son are likely to be better than between the dictator and 
his officials. So far, the empirical evidence clearly speaks in favor of this theory: Kurrild-
Klitgaard (2000) compares succession rules in Denmark from 935 to 1849 and shows that 
monarchs became much less likely to be deposed by their successors as primogeniture 
became the established way of selecting kings. After comparing the succession rules in 
several European monarchies during the period from 1000 to 1800, Kokkonen and Sundell 
(2014) similarly show that monarchs were less likely to be overthrown in states practicing 
primogeniture than in states practicing other succession orders. 
This, in turn, also explains why hereditary succession prevents regimes from collapsing as 
a consequence of succession crises. Members of the ruling coalition might have a 
preference for becoming dictators themselves, but what they want to avoid in the first 
place is losing in a succession conflict, or backing a candidate who turns out not to be the 
preferred option of the other members. Thus, provided with a credible alternative to open 
competition, they have an incentive to back the dictator’s chosen heir simply because they 
expect other members to do the same. Primogeniture is, again, the best option since 
members of the ruling coalitions are most likely to view this choice as one the dictator will 
not renege on, and one other officials will very probably back. By providing members of 
the ruling coalition with a focal point on which they can coordinate their actions, 
hereditary succession reduces uncertainty and thereby prevents succession issues to 
degenerate in open conflict and eventually regime collapse (Tullock 1987, 157). 
These arguments, however, beg further questions: while they shed light on why hereditary 
succession is conducive to regime stability in the long run, they do not explain how and 
why it gets established in the first place. The first obvious question is why a dictator would 
want to appoint a successor at all, since it is likely to adversely impact his survival in 
office (if not his life expectancy). Tullock’s (1987) initial argument is that dictators are 
practically always better off not choosing any successor, unless they are interested in their 
legacy (p. 151) – which is not necessarily the case. In short: since succession struggles and 
regime breakdown upon the autocrat’s death only affect members of the ruling elite and are 
not a concern for the autocrat himself, why should he be interested in designating a 
successor? 
More recent studies on hereditary succession have provided a partial answer to this 
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question, by showing that competition between members of the ruling elite are likely to 
affect the current autocrat’s survival in office: Kokkonen and Sundell (2014) as well as 
Brownlee (2007) argue that, assuming that members of the ruling coalition are primarily 
interested in maintaining their current status, they are most likely to invest in the current 
regime if they expect it to survive after the death of the dictator; by contrast, they are more 
likely to defect if they anticipate a succession crisis. Thus, the autocrat’s ability to reward 
his supporters after his death helps him ensure his stability in office. Most importantly, in 
the absence of a designated successor, any member of the ruling coalition might anticipate 
the forthcoming power struggle and be tempted to make the first move (i.e., overthrow the 
current autocrat) to avoid being eliminated by the winning contender upon the ruler’s death 
(see Section 3.1.2). A variant of this argument can be found in Kurrild-Klitgaard’s (2000, 
67) study: in open succession systems (i.e., when there is no formal succession rule, and 
members of the ruling coalition compete for appointments), the most serious contender 
faces a high risk of being eliminated by remoter contenders; anticipating this, he thus has 
an incentive to eliminate the current autocrat in order to secure his own position.61  
The problem with these arguments is that they all rely on the assumption that members of 
the ruling coalition are risk-averse, that is, that they prefer formal succession rules (which 
imply that each member is certain he will not be chosen as a successor) over open 
competition (which implies that each member has a fair chance to become the next 
autocrat but also risks being eliminated by his competitors). Tullock (1987), Brownlee 
(2007), and Kokkonen and Sundell (2014) all explicitly assume that elites prefer 
maintaining their current status over engaging in a risky power struggle and hence are 
ready to accept any stable succession order, even if this means giving up the possibility to 
assume office themselves in the future. This assumption is probably correct when the rule 
                                                 
61 There are some other reasons why a dictator would want to designate an official successor, but these 
explanations rather suggest that the dictator would be better off selecting a member of the ruling elite 
rather than one of his relatives. One of these reasons is that, by officially designating a successor, the 
dictator is able to divert the attention of potential coup plotters from him to the successor (if the dictator 
is relatively old and the successor relatively young, conspirators have an incentive to eliminate the 
successor rather than the incumbent). Another reason is that it gives the successor a vested interest in the 
political survival of the autocrat and a strong incentive to betray any plot against him. A further potential 
advantage is that hurdles accumulate on potential challengers' path to power if they have to neutralize 
both the dictator and his successor, which can be enough to deter at least some of them from a coup 
attempt. Finally, knowing who is the most likely to try to overthrow him provides the dictator with the 
ability to monitor his most dangerous potential contender. 
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has already been in effect for a long time, i.e. in established monarchies: in these cases, 
elites enter their positions knowing that they have virtually no chance of becoming rulers, 
and the stability of the regime makes it less likely that the ruling coalition is made up of 
risk-seeking individuals who are ready to take any opportunity to attain power. Yet, the 
risk-aversion assumption is by far more questionable when the ruling coalition is made up 
of individuals who (1) assumed office at a time when the question of succession was still 
open and entered the ruling coalition in the hope that they could themselves attain power in 
the future; and/or (2) participated in the coup that overthrew the previous autocrat, which 
clearly demonstrates that they were willing to risk their current positions in order to have a 
better chance of becoming autocrats themselves.  
It is thus debatable whether establishing hereditary succession helps dictators surrounded 
by ambitious and risk-seeking elites avoid being removed from office: by officially 
informing his supporters that none of them has a chance of taking office after his death, he 
provides them not only with a strong motive to overthrow him but also with the 
opportunity to do so, since the announcement gives them a solution to overcome their 
coordination problems (i.e., each member knows that other members will probably not 
back the dictator in case a coup is attempted, so everybody has an incentive to defect first).  
Brownlee’s (2007) study on hereditary succession in contemporary autocracies provides 
interesting clues, since the analysis deals only with regimes that are not formally 
monarchies. He identifies twenty-two cases of dictators who attempted to install their heir 
in power, and finds that the ruling coalition’s decision to back the dictator’s choice or to 
oppose it depended on whether it enjoyed a precedent for selecting the successor from 
within its ranks: “established” parties that were involved in the selection of previous rulers 
were by far more likely to veto the dictator’s decision than loose elite coalitions. 
Interestingly, Brownlee interprets this finding as evidence that elites prefer hereditary 
succession over open competition:  
 
When there is no precedent for choosing a leader from within the ruling organization, elites may 
support hereditary succession as a method for preserving their influence and mitigating the 
uncertainty that surrounds an aging ruler and an impending leadership change (Brownlee 2007, 626).  
 
There is yet another possible interpretation: the fact that dictators are more likely to 
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succeed in installing their heir in power in the absence of such precedents does not 
necessarily mean that elites are willing to back the dictator’s choice in order to avoid 
power struggles, but could also be taken as evidence that they were simply too weak to 
impose their preferences. Furthermore, Brownlee’s (2007) analysis reveals that many 
dictators try to establish hereditary succession even when another succession procedure 
exists: the conclusion that follows is that dictators, for some reason,62 genuinely prefer 
hereditary succession (i.e., that their aim in imposing hereditary succession is not merely 
to avoid succession struggles) while the ruling coalition does not; and dictators who 
succeed in imposing their heirs are the ones who have managed to overcome challenges 
from their ruling coalition in the first place. In other words, hereditary succession might 
not be the cause but rather simply a symptom of dictators’ security in office.  
To conclude the discussion, the reasons why some autocracies establish hereditary 
succession while some others do not remain so far mysterious: while many authors argue 
that hereditary succession results from a consensus between the incumbent and his allies, 
available evidence rather suggests that it is often unilaterally imposed by powerful rulers 
(that is, paradoxically: by rulers that need it the least), for reasons that can be but are not 
necessarily related to concerns about the stability of the regime. Yet, regardless of the 
circumstances under which hereditary succession is established, the fact is that the system 
tends to be conducive to stability: first, as discussed above, rulers are ceteris paribus less 
likely to be overthrown under hereditary succession than under open succession rules 
(Kurrild-Klitgaard 2000). Second, although coups still happen fairly often in monarchies – 
albeit less often than in non-institutionalized autocracies – they usually do not end the 
regime: Cheibub et al. (2010) report that most monarchs who are overthrown are replaced 
by a family member. A study shows that the homicide rate among European monarchs in 
the period from AD 600 to 1800 was about 15% (Eisner 2011), and yet, monarchy 
remained the dominant form of political regime throughout this whole period. Finally, 
there is some evidence that regicides are less likely to result in severe regime crises than 
assassinations of political leaders in systems where there is no institutionalized succession 
                                                 
62 One reason could be that hereditary succession solves the “retirement problem” discussed in section 2.2.1: 
if a dictator wants to leave office, he does not have to be concerned about his successor’s intention to 
eliminate him if said successor is a relative. 
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procedure (Iqbal and Zorn 2008).63 All in all, this suggests that, like competitive elections, 
hereditary succession is not established easily but becomes stabilizing on the long run. 
More specifically, it contributes to the pacification of political conflicts by mitigating the 
two crucial problems identified in Section 3.1., namely the problem of uncertainty and the 
problem of adverse selection: the problem of uncertainty is solved by the very existence of 
a procedure for replacing leaders, which implies that regime elites are less concerned about 
the risk of losing their current position as the result of a change of leadership, and therefore 
less likely to attempt a preemptive coup. The problem of adverse selection is mitigated 
because elites know that their chance of attaining power under the current state of affairs is 
very low: thus, key regime positions are less likely to be filled by individuals who are 
solely motivated by the prospect of seizing power for themselves. In turn, a leader who 
attained power peacefully is less likely to be surrounded by ambitious and risk-seeking 
individuals. Finally, because of the combination of these two mechanisms, the risk of a 
subversive coalition forming against the current ruler decreases (which, in turn, reinforces 
both effects). 
 
 
3.3. SOME EXPECTATIONS 
 
Chapters 2 and 3 dealt with two broad issues: first, the definition of democratic and non-
democratic regimes; and second, the extent to which the internal organization of each 
political regime type can be expected to affect the nature and intensity of political 
conflicts. Two broad categories of political regimes were distinguished: on the one hand, 
institutionalized regimes (monarchies and democracies), which rely on binding rules to 
regulate access to, and succession in power; and on the other hand, non-institutionalized 
regimes, in which access to political positions is unregulated and often involves substantial 
violence. Following these theoretical considerations, I put forward to general propositions:  
Proposition 1: In general, we should expect non-institutionalized regimes to be 
                                                 
63 Unfortunately, Iqbal and Zorn (2008) use a measure of regulated succession that aggregates elections and 
hereditary succession. Since instances of hereditary succession are relatively rare in the period of 
investigation of their analysis, doubts remain as to whether the result is not entirely driven by 
democracies. 
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more vulnerable to intra-elite conflicts than institutionalized regimes.  
Proposition 2: In general, we should expect democracies to experience fewer 
conflicts between elites and opposition groups than non-democracies (including 
monarchies).  
These two general propositions are associated with several expectations, which will be 
examined throughout the dissertation. First, I expect instability at the elite level to impact 
the military’s propensity to intervene in domestic politics. Second, the exposure to specific 
risks should have broader repercussions on the behavior of the ruling elites, and on their 
readiness to use violence: state repression, for example, is one response non-democratic 
states commonly use in order to protect themselves against threats posed by organized 
opposition groups. Finally, since non-institutionalized regimes are often the outcome of a 
violent power struggle that resulted in the forceful removal of the previous ruling coalition, 
we can expect the nature and intensity of political conflicts taking place in each country to 
affect the specific form non-institutionalized regimes will take: this will be the topic of the 
following chapter. 
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4 
Not all regimes are born equal:  
How internal and external security threats shape domestic political 
structures 
 
 
A quick glance at the distribution of political regimes worldwide reveals a puzzling 
empirical regularity: island states – and particularly microstates such as the Solomon 
Islands or the Federated States of Micronesia – are overwhelmingly democratic (Anckar 
2006, 2008; Srebrnik 2004). What can explain this striking pattern? So far, much of the 
relatively sparse literature on islands has focused on factors such as Protestantism, colonial 
heritage, ethnic or cultural homogeneity, or the remoteness and intimacy of islands which 
promote an increased sense of community, mutual trust and solidarity among citizens (e.g., 
Hadenius 1992; Anckar 1999, 2008; Srebrnik 2004; Ott 2000; Congdon Fors 2014; 
relatedly, Anckar 2004). But maybe there is a more straightforward explanation: what most 
of these states have in common, beside their remoteness and their small population, is the 
absence of a standing army.  
Table 4.1. provides an overview of all island countries with fewer than one million 
inhabitants that were classified as democracies by Boix, Miller and Rosato (2013) for the 
year 2007. The right column indicates whether these countries had a regular military in the 
same year: The information is drawn from the Correlates of War National Material 
Capabilities dataset.64 
 
 
 
                                                 
64 I counted no regular military when both “milex” and “milper” had a value of 0. 
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Table 4.1. Armed forces in democratic island states (2007)  
Country Regular military  Country  Regular military 
Antigua and Barbuda  
Bahamas  
Barbados  
Cape Verde  
Comoros  
Dominica  
Grenada  
Iceland  
Kiribati  
Malta  
Marshall Islands 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Missing 
No  
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
Micronesia 
Monaco  
Nauru 
Palau 
São Tomé and Príncipe  
Solomon Islands 
St Kitts and Nevis 
St Lucia  
St Vincent and the Grenadines  
Tuvalu  
Vanuatu 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Missing 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
(Sources: Boix, Miller and Rosato 2013; Correlates of War project) 
 
A possible reason why the overwhelming majority of these states has no regular army is 
the relative absence of foreign threats: because they have natural borders, these countries 
are less likely to be involved in a territorial dispute with one of their neighbors; and 
because territorial conflicts between neighboring states constitute the most frequent 
instance of international conflict (see Bremer 1992; Vasquez 1995), islands are much less 
exposed to the risk of foreign invasion than mainland countries. Of course, natural borders 
do not entirely preclude the risk of invasion by a major power: as a matter of fact, many of 
the countries listed in Table 4.1. used to be colonies and gained their independence only 
recently. But, since their natural insulation protects them against territorial claims by a 
neighbor, invasion by a major power is virtually the only scenario in which island 
countries could get involved in an interstate conflict; and in those cases, the power 
imbalance would make armed resistance futile. In short, for island countries, the risks 
associated with a standing army simply outweigh its potential benefits.  
But what exactly are these risks? Recent research provides a clear answer: military coups 
are one of the most widespread symptoms of political instability. Since 1946, coups have 
removed more leaders from office than assassinations, rebellions, popular uprisings, and 
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foreign interventions combined (Goemans et al. 2009a; Svolik 2012). Likewise, coups 
have overthrown a large number of democratic governments and are responsible for the 
majority of authoritarian reversals (Maeda 2010, 1135); furthermore, states that inherit a 
powerful, interventionist military are believed to be less likely to democratize (Gibler 
2007; Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni 2008) and have been shown to be more likely to 
revert to authoritarianism after a democratic transition (Cheibub 2007).  
Island states are arguably idiosyncratic cases and there are several competing hypotheses – 
besides the absence of a regular military – that could explain why they have managed to 
become and remain democratic. But consider, now, Costa Rica. In 1948, in the aftermath 
of a civil war won by opposition forces, the new President José Figueres Ferrer decided to 
disband the army. What motivated this decision is debatable (Høivik and Aas 1981), but its 
consequences less so: 1948 clearly marked the end of a long history of armed political 
struggles and irregular transfers of power (see Lehoucq 1996, 330). Since then, no Costa 
Rican president was ever overthrown by a military coup. In contrast to its Latin American 
neighbors, which experienced repeated military intervention in domestic politics, the 
country remained a stable democracy for the next six decades, although regularly 
surrounded by dictatorships.  
The aim of the chapter is to analyze the impact of militarization on the emergence and 
survival of political regimes. More specifically, it investigates how the nature and 
intensity of security threats impact the risk of a military coup, and how repeated 
military interventions shape domestic political structures. It builds on several strands 
of literature that analyze the impact of intrastate (Finer 2009 [1962]; Nordlinger 1977; 
Acemoglu et al. 2008; Svolik 2012) and interstate (Dassel 1998; Desch 2001; Arbatli 
and Arbatli 2014; MacMahon and Slantchev 2015; Piplani and Talmadge 2015) 
conflicts on the military’s propensity to intervene in domestic politics, and how these 
threats eventually affect the development and stabilization of political regimes 
(Midlarsky 1995; Thompson 1996; Rasler and Thompson 2004; Gibler 2007, 2010). 
The argument developed here can be summarized as follows: (1) When confronted 
with either external or internal security challenges (understood here as the risk of 
interstate or intrastate armed conflict, respectively), states react by building a strong 
military and investing resources into it. 
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(2) Militarization poses a well-known dilemma to states: A military that is powerful 
enough to prevail in a war is also powerful enough to impose its will on civilian 
governments. Investing in the armed forces means endowing them with sufficient 
resources to overthrow the system they are intended to protect (Feaver 1999). One 
consequence is that states with a weak military – or no military at all – are ceteris 
paribus less likely to experience coups.  
(3) Provided that the military is powerful enough to seize power for itself, whether or 
not it will take this opportunity depends, in turn, on the nature and the intensity of the 
threat. Specifically, while internal threats monotonically increase the risk of a military 
intervention, the relationship between external threats and military coups takes the 
form of an inverted U: maximal external security threats tend to induce military 
loyalty and immunize regimes against coup risk.  
This simple framework helps predict not only the occurrence of military coups, but also 
the type of political regimes that are most likely to emerge on the long run. Given that 
coups are the most frequent cause of democratic breakdowns (Maeda 2010) and that the 
military can have incentives to prevent democratization (Acemoglu et al. 2008), 
democracies are more likely to emerge and survive in the absence of serious security 
threats. By contrast, situations in which the military enjoys a pivotal position within the 
political system and has incentives to intervene – that is, moderately high external security 
threats and very high internal security threats – should be conducive to military 
dictatorship. Finally, highly centralized autocracies (that is, single-party regimes) should 
be concentrated in countries that experience chronic external security threats but low 
internal security threats.  
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: next section reviews and discusses 
past scholarship on the impact of security threats on the military’s propensity to intervene 
in domestic politics. Section 4.2 presents the theory and some empirically testable 
implications. Section 4.3. is devoted to the empirical analysis: proxying the risk of 
interstate war by the number of contiguous land borders, and the risk of civil war by the 
proportion of males aged 15 to 24 in the adult population, I find empirical support for my 
arguments. Section 4.4. concludes.   
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4.1. BACKGROUND: HOW DOES THE RISK OF ARMED CONFLICT IMPACT 
POLITICAL STABILITY? 
 
International relations scholars have long argued that high threat environments were an 
impediment to democratization. This idea can be at least traced back to Otto Hintze (1970 
[1906]), who famously contrasted continental, militarized states (e.g., Prussia in the 19th 
century) with insular states, which did not have to rely on a large standing army to protect 
their borders and could afford more decentralized political structures (e.g., England in the 
same period). Harold Lasswell’s (1941) “garrison state” theory is also based on the 
premise that a challenging international environment should lead to the development of an 
authoritarian state dominated by the military.  
The idea that domestic politics are partly shaped by the international environment has 
recently given rise to one of the most serious challenges to the democratic peace theory. As 
several authors have argued, the empirical relationship between democracy and peace is 
potentially due to the fact that states that find themselves in peaceful zones are both more 
likely to become (and remain) democratic and less likely to be at war with their neighbors 
(Midlarsky 1995; Thompson 1996; Rasler and Thompson 2004; Gibler 2007, 2010, 2014; 
Gibler and Tir 2010, 2014; Gibler and Miller 2013; Gibler and Braithwaite 2013; Miller 
and Gibler 2011). The underlying argument is that democracies only emerge in peaceful 
environments and that high external threats lead to dictatorship, either by delaying 
democratization processes or by facilitating authoritarian reversals.  
Generally speaking, studies on international threat and political regime identify two paths 
toward autocracy. The first one is state centralization, i.e., a gradual concentration of 
power and resources in the hands of the chief executive or a small ruling elite (Thompson 
1996; Rasler and Thompson 2004; Gibler 2010). This power and resources concentration 
arises either because of the direct effects of war involvement on social and economic 
structures (Thompson 1996; Rasler and Thompson 2004) or because rally effects provide 
the chief executive with an opportunity to neutralize opposition parties and eliminate 
institutional veto points in the political system (Gibler 2010). The second mechanism is 
militarization, i.e. the development of a powerful standing army that can be used by elites 
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to repress domestic opponents and prevent democratization (Gibler 2007; Gibler and Tir 
2010; Miller and Gibler 2011). Although both mechanisms are arguably distinct in their 
logic and consequences, the majority of these studies have tended to treat them as similar 
(see, e.g., Gibler and Tir 2010).  
Both explanations have received some support in the empirical literature. With regard to 
the state centralization hypothesis, there is growing evidence from the quantitative 
literature that high external threats tend to jeopardize political pluralism: territorial threats 
– the most salient ones – have been found to reduce political tolerance among the public 
(Hutchinson and Gibler 2007) and decrease the occurrence of anti-government protest 
(Hutchinson 2011). At the same time, studies on state repression regularly come to the 
finding that interstate conflicts have a detrimental effect on the protection of physical 
integrity rights and civil liberties (e.g., Poe and Tate 1994; Poe et al. 1999; Davenport and 
Armstrong 2004; Davenport 2007b). Wright (2014) shows that in spite of institutional 
constraints, even democracies tend to increase repression when involved in territorial 
conflicts, and argues that this is because voters – who would otherwise punish the leader 
for these practices – become more tolerant of such behaviors in wartime. Gibler (2010) 
demonstrates that external threats to the state’s territory move opposition parties to support 
the chief executive – which results in a decrease of party polarization and a gradual 
removal of institutional checks on the executive – and provides compelling evidence that 
elites in nondemocratic systems similarly tend to circle the wagons when faced to a direct 
challenge to the territorial integrity of the state.  
The militarization hypothesis rests on the argument that external threats give the military a 
pivotal position in the political system (which, in turn, reduces the prospects of 
democratization). This proposition has some advocates: for example, Dassel and Reinhardt 
(1999, 63) state that high external threats naturally lead civilian leaders to cede greater 
autonomy and political authority to the military, and go as far as to posit that this can 
motivate the military to unilaterally initiate interstate disputes in order to protect its 
interests when these are threatened (see also Dassel 1998). Interestingly, Acemoglu et al. 
(2008) argue that potential foreign threats should help countries democratize through this 
very mechanism: absent such threats, democratic leaders – because they do not depend on 
the military to stay in power – cannot credibly commit not to disband the armed forces, 
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which creates an incentive for the military to oppose regime transition (see also Arbatli and 
Arbatli 2014).  
However, the very idea that foreign threats reinforce the military’s position in the political 
system has become increasingly challenged in recent years. Desch (2001) was one of the 
first to argue that high external threats actually help civilian leaders control the military: 
challenging international environments, he argues, focus the military’s attention outwards 
and reduce its dispositions to participate in domestic politics, enhance the cohesiveness of 
civilian institutions (thereby reinforcing their control on the armed forces), and lead to a 
convergence of the preferences of civilian elites and military officers.65  More recent 
studies have examined the impact of external threats (including actual war involvement) 
on military coups, and found a negative effect (Arbatli and Arbatli 2014; Piplani and 
Talmadge 2015). Possible reasons for this negative relationship include rally effects that 
may deter the military from trying to overthrow the incumbent (Arbatli and Arbatli 2014), 
credible commitment effects (Acemoglu et al. 2008, Arbatli and Arbatli 2014), 
coordination and organization issues (e.g., the lack of physical access to the regime’s key 
locations, or unpredictable relocations of military units) that limit the military’s ability to 
plan and execute coups (Piplani and Talmadge 2015), or the fact that, in wartime, the 
military’s primary concern is to avoid defeat (McMahon and Slantchev 2015). All in all, 
recent evidence suggests that the relationship between external threat and military 
intervention in politics may not be as straightforward as previously assumed.  
Perhaps surprisingly, the effect of internal threats on military coups has received a more 
limited amount of attention in the recent literature. Although early researchers have 
consistently noted that coups tend to occur in periods of intense domestic turmoil, many 
recent studies on coup risk (e.g., Londregan and Poole 1990; Belkin and Schofer 2003; 
Powell 2012) either do not control for civil war or do not elaborate on its effects. The most 
recent advances in the literature on internal threats and military coups pertain to the moral 
hazard problems resulting from the use of the military as a repressive agent. For example, 
                                                 
65 Interestingly, this latter point echoes Dassel’s (1998) argument on the impact of external threats on civil-
military relations: the preferences of civilians and military officers may converge (thereby reducing the 
potential for conflicts) either because the military has an incentive to support the actual leadership or 
because war involvement makes civilian leaders completely dependent on the military for its own 
survival. As Desch (2001) notes, the absence of conflict is not necessarily indicative of good civil-
military relations. 
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Acemoglu et al. (2008) argue that dictators who overly rely on their armed forces for 
internal repression run a high risk of being overthrown by the very same agents in charge 
of protecting them (see also Feaver 1999; Besley and Robinson 2009). Democratization 
does not solve the problem, since it only aggravates commitment issues: the expectation 
that it will lose its pivotal position within the political system increases the military’s 
incentives to prevent democratization. Svolik’s (2012) analysis is based on roughly similar 
premises, but he argues that the relationship between the magnitude of internal threats and 
the risk of military intervention is curvilinear, coups being the most likely at intermediate 
levels of threats: when threats arising from distributional conflicts are low, the military 
lacks resources to intervene in politics, but when these threats reach their maximal 
intensity, the government tends to systematically accommodate the military’s policy 
preferences, which reduces the risk of intra-elites conflict and thereby the likelihood of 
overt military intervention. Although this latter argument is theoretically compelling, it is 
nevertheless at odds with the fact that early analyses of military coups and governments 
(e.g., Nordlinger 1977) as well as more recent studies (Desch 2001; Piplani and Talmadge 
2015) find coups to be more likely in periods of violent domestic strife. It also fails to 
account for the fact that coups and civil wars tend to occur in similar contexts (Collier and 
Hoeffler 2005). Clearly, the question of how domestic strife and military coups relate to 
each other is still not settled.  
 
4.2. SECURITY THREATS, COUPS, AND POLITICAL REGIMES: THEORY AND 
HYPOTHESES 
 
The starting point of the argument developed here is what McMahon and Slantchev (2015) 
call the “guardianship dilemma.” When confronted with either external or internal security 
challenges, most states react by spending more resources on the armed forces. This 
investment in security gives rise to the old problem of civilian control on the military, as 
summarized by Feaver (1999): 
 
The very institution created to protect the polity is given sufficient power to become a threat to the 
polity. (…) On the one hand, the military must be strong enough to prevail in war. (…) On the other 
hand, just as the military must protect the polity from enemies, so must it conduct its own affairs so 
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as not to destroy or prey on the society it is intended to protect. Because the military must face 
enemies, it must have coercive power, the ability to force its will on others. But coercive power 
often gives it the capability to enforce its will on the community that created it. 
 
From the perspective of the incumbent, this problem takes the form of a trade-off between 
the risk of losing a war and the risk of being overthrown by the military (see Roessler 
2011). Confronted with this dilemma, rulers can solve it by purposefully weakening their 
military or disbanding it altogether, at the costs of leaving themselves exposed to threats. If 
these threats are serious enough, rulers most likely will not choose this option and will 
have to deal with a permanent and more or less acute coup risk.   
Coup risk, in turn, varies according to the nature and magnitude of security threats. With 
regard to the magnitude of the threat, the central assumption I make is that the strength of 
the military increases monotonically as threats become more acute; and, as the power of 
the military increases, so does its ability to turn against the incumbent and seize power. 
With regard to the nature of the threat, I argue that, while internal threats monotonically 
increase the risk of a military intervention, maximal external security threats tend to induce 
military loyalty and immunize regimes against coup risk. The reason why we should 
expect internal and external threats to have so drastically different effects on coup risk can 
be summarized as follows: whereas foreign foes threaten everyone – including the military 
– domestic opponents’ primary target is the ruling elite, which does not necessarily include 
the armed forces. Thus, high external threats bolster intra-elite cohesion and lead everyone 
to circle the wagons; by contrast, serious domestic challenges to the incumbent’s authority 
force the military to take sides, and choose which orders to obey. In short, while the threat 
posed by foreign foes affects both the incumbent and the military, domestic turmoil 
threatens the military and the incumbent in an asymmetric way. 
There are several aspects to this argument. First, while a military defeat resulting in a 
foreign occupation is clearly an undesirable outcome for the armed forces – to the extent 
that such an outcome would adversely affect their own organizational survival – regime 
transitions are not necessarily detrimental to the military’s parochial interests (see Geddes 
1999). If domestic threats become acute enough, the military still has the option of 
bandwagoning with the regime’s opponents, and trade support for better wages, increased 
autonomy or other perks. As a matter of fact, provided that the military has become 
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dissatisfied enough with the current leader, defections in revolutionary situations happen 
fairly often (for discussions of individual cases, see Lee 2005, 2009; D’Anieri 2006; Hall 
2010; Barany 2011, 2013). Furthermore, to the extent that domestic conflicts often concern 
the regime or the incumbent, the armed forces can view a change of leadership as an 
effective way of solving the problem: they can either choose to remove the incumbent 
from office and thus eliminate the source of the conflict altogether; alternatively, they can 
turn against the incumbent because they hold him responsible for the turmoil and believe 
they would be able to better handle the situation (Nordlinger 1977). By contrast, a 
leadership change is unlikely to affect the intensity of external threats to the same extent: 
on the contrary, officers that consider staging a coup must both successfully execute it and 
deal with the same threats that faced the previous incumbent (McMahon and Slantchev 
2015). If anything, a forceful change of government during a period of crisis is likely to 
spark domestic turmoil and thus undermine the country’s prospects of prevailing in the war 
(Arbatli and Arbatli 2014). In short, high external threats leave the military few choices but 
to support the incumbent in order to secure its own survival. 
Second, the military rarely intervenes against governments that enjoy widespread support, 
and it rarely attempts coups that are likely to result in mass protests (Finer 2009 [1962]; 
Nordlinger 1977; Geddes 2006). Acute external threats tend to bolster public support for 
the incumbent through rally-around-the-flag effects, which, in turn, deter the military from 
staging a coup (Arbatli and Arbatli 2014). By contrast, high domestic threats indicate, if 
anything, that the incumbent is losing its legitimacy, which provides the military with 
better opportunities to attempt a coup that it believes will not be met by mass opposition 
(Nordlinger 1977). Relatedly, from the perspective of the military, firing at domestic 
opponents is not the same as firing at foreign foes: as researchers have regularly noted, 
attempts to use the military for internal repression can easily backfire on governments, and 
are a relatively widespread triggering factor for their overthrow (Finer 2009 [1962]; 
Needler 1975; Nordlinger 1977). 
Finally, actual involvement in an interstate conflict is now widely believed to immunize 
regimes against coup risk, to the extent that it hinders both coordination between potential 
participants and physical access to key regime locations (see Tullock 1987; Belkin and 
Schofer 2005; Powell 2014b; Arbatli and Arbatli 2014; Piplani and Talmadge 2015). By 
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contrast, civil wars do not involve the deployment of military units out of the country, and 
thus often do not prevent regular military units from having access to the capital (Piplani 
and Talmadge 2015). Therefore, since domestic conflicts do not pose the same logistical 
obstacles as conflicts abroad do, they do not reduce the feasibility of intervention to the 
same extent.  
I thus test the two following hypotheses: 
 
H1: there is a monotonic, positive relationship between the level of internal threats and the 
frequency of military coups. 
H2: there is an inverted-U relationship between the level of external threats and the 
frequency of military coups.  
 
This framework helps predict not only the occurrence of military coups, but also the type 
of political regimes that are the most likely to emerge on the long run. First, the existence 
of a strong and possibly interventionist military is arguably an obstacle to democratization: 
a powerful military can have an incentive to prevent transitions to democracy because the 
new democratic government cannot commit not to reform or disband it altogether 
(Acemoglu et al. 2008). Second, a legacy of military intervention in domestic politics is 
one of the key factors that hinder democratic consolidation and leads to authoritarian 
reversals (Cheibub 2007; Svolik 2008). We should thus observe that countries that 
experience low levels of internal and external threats are on the whole more likely to 
become and remain democratic.66  
 
H3: democracies emerge by low levels of (a) internal and (b) external threats. 
 
So far, I have adopted Gibler’s (2007, 2010; see also Gibler and Tir 2010, 2014) main 
argument, that democratization is more likely in weakly militarized societies. Yet, what 
these studies have overlooked is that strong militaries are not necessarily interventionist. In 
                                                 
66 I inspect the likelihood that a certain country is democratic or not at a certain time. This, in turn, can either 
be explained by the fact that countries that inherit a powerful military are less likely to democratize at all, 
or that coup-prone democracies do not remain democracies for long. My argument is agnostic as to which 
mechanism is at work. 
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turn, the absence of military intervention is not necessarily synonymous with democracy, 
or, to put it differently, the military’s influence on domestic politics and propensity to 
intervene are not the same in all nondemocratic regimes: some of the most stable – and 
most repressive – authoritarian regimes display actually a fairly high level of civilian 
control of the military and have proven relatively immune to coups.  
Which are these regimes? Prior studies on civil-military relations point to a clear tendency: 
on the whole, single-party autocracies (particularly Communist regimes) seem to have 
been the most successful in effectively controlling the military and avoiding coups, while 
at the same time maintaining large and highly professionalized standing armies (Perlmutter 
and LeoGrande 1982; Nordlinger 1977, 15-8). The Soviet Union is the most typical 
example, but this holds true for other single-party states such as China, Cuba, or Tanzania 
under Nyerere as well. Given that military coups are the most frequent form of irregular 
leadership change in authoritarian regimes (Svolik 2012), this relative consensus is 
consistent with the fact that party regimes are among the most stable dictatorships (Geddes 
1999; Magaloni 2008). The source of this relative stability can be located in the internal 
structure of party regimes: because of the overlap of party and military positions, the 
absence of clear boundaries between both institutions, and the fusion of political and 
military leadership, overt conflicts between civilian leaders and military commanders are 
less frequent and less likely to result in the overthrow of the regime (Perlmutter and 
LeoGrande 1982). Furthermore, party-based regimes are generally able to implement a 
series of control mechanisms that make military takeovers less likely: such control 
mechanisms include dual command systems, the cooptation of military commanders into 
high party positions, and a system of appointments based on political loyalty, but also the 
extensive use of surveillance and targeted punishments (Nordlinger 1977; Perlmutter and 
LeoGrande 1982). As a result, frictions between civilian leaders and military commanders 
happen quite frequently in party regimes, but these are rather factional conflicts – in which 
the military intervenes to support one faction of the ruling party – rather than direct 
challenges to the party’s rule (Perlmutter and LeoGrande 1982).  
Thus, two “models” of nondemocratic systems can be distinguished: the first one is 
characterized by the pivotal position of the military within the political system and by 
recurring conflicts in which the military usually prevails, while the second one is 
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characterized by a high degree of civilian control of the military. This distinction broadly 
corresponds to the two pathways toward autocracy discussed by prior studies (see 
Thompson 1996; Rasler and Thompson 2004; Gibler 2010; Gibler and Tir 2010, 2014): 
party regimes are the result of the state centralization process, while militarization results 
in relatively unstable regimes in which the military frequently intervenes. One crucial 
implication is that these two processes are fundamentally incompatible and result in very 
different political structures, since power concentration should lead to (or be facilitated by) 
a low level of military involvement in domestic politics, while militarization should, on the 
contrary, lead to recurring frictions between civilian authorities and the armed forces.67  
This, in turn, begs the question of why some authoritarian governments have been able to 
implement the control mechanisms described above while most others have not. One 
possible reason is that these control mechanisms require a strong party infrastructure to be 
effective, which would explain why only party-based autocracies have been able to 
successfully establish them. But this explanation is not entirely satisfying, because it does 
not account for the military’s acquiescence during the early stage of the implementation of 
the system: as Nordlinger (1977, 17) notes, although this system of civilian control on the 
military has shown itself to be effective in maintaining the regime’s stability on the long 
run, its implementation can prove difficult to the extent that it requires extensive political 
interference in military affairs, and a powerful military is likely to strongly oppose any 
attempt by civilian leaders to infringe on its autonomy. On the long run, the system 
becomes stable, but it may spark military interventions during the early years of its 
implementation. Thus, a more complete explanation of the lower coup risk in single-party 
dictatorships would first require identifying the factors that facilitated the implementation 
of a system of party-based control on the military.  
The argument I propose is that the security environment in which most party regimes 
operated during the post-World War II period can partly explain why they were able to 
establish full civilian control on the military while most other dictatorships could not: one 
possible reason why China, Cuba, Tanzania, or the Soviet Union experienced few direct 
challenges from the military is that these countries were either surrounded by overtly 
                                                 
67 As noted above, prior studies usually do not make this distinction (see, for example, Gibler and Tir 2010, 
958). 
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hostile states or regularly involved in interstate conflicts. If this explanation is correct, we 
should observe that party systems are more likely to emerge and to endure in threatening 
international environments: because of enduring external threats, incumbents were 
successful in both neutralizing threats coming from the military (see Desch 2001; 
McMahon and Slantchev 2015) and eliminate organized opposition while at the same time 
retaining the support of a significant part of the public (see Rasler and Thompson 2004; 
Gibler 2010; Hutchison 2011). By contrast, we should also observe that countries that are 
exposed to high internal threats are less likely to be ruled by a party regime, since power 
centralization requires that the military seldom participates in domestic repression. 
Importantly, this explanation suggests that party regimes’ ability to maintain effective 
control on the military does not directly result from their institutional setup. Rather, both 
phenomena – party regimes and civilian control on the military – are the outcome of a 
particular security environment: because of a combination of low internal threat and high 
external threat, party systems inherit a quiet opposition that can easily be neutralized and a 
large but harmless military which attention is constantly focused on interstate conflicts 
rather than on domestic politics. 
Thus, on the long run, patterns of civil-military relations in nondemocratic countries affect 
domestic political structures: countries that face relatively intense external threats and very 
acute internal threats are more likely to have a politically active military and, in turn, to 
experience intermittent military rule. By contrast, countries that face low internal threats 
and high external threats are characterized by a higher degree of civilian control on the 
military; in turn, highly centralized, closed party dictatorships are more likely to emerge 
and endure when the military is less prone to intervention in domestic politics.  
 
H4: Military dictatorships emerge by (a) high levels of internal threat and (b) intermediate 
levels of external threats. 
H5: Single-party dictatorships emerge by (a) low levels of internal threats and (b) high 
levels of external threats  
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4.3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
4.3.1. Measuring internal and external security threats 
 
Measuring latent risk of interstate or intrastate armed conflict is not as straightforward as 
measuring the actual occurrence of such conflicts. Yet, directly measuring actual instances 
of intrastate or interstate conflicts is not a practicable option. As Svolik (2013a, 789) 
observes, directly measuring domestic turmoil or full-scale civil war can induce selection 
biases, because mass mobilization partly depends on the repressiveness of the regime. If 
military dictatorships are more likely to emerge in periods of domestic turmoil, but also 
more likely to respond to protests with repression (see, e.g., Poe et al. 1999; Davenport 
2007b) and thus more likely to deter opponents from engaging in anti-regime activity in 
the first place, military intervention in politics acts as a negative confounder.  
Thus, I rely on a proxy to capture the risk of intrastate armed conflict, namely the share of 
youths in the adult population. This measure has two advantages. First, the United Nations 
data (2013) – on which the measure is based – provide a good coverage with few countries 
missing. Second, the share of youths in the adult population has a clear theoretical link 
with intrastate armed conflict: although youth cohort size does not directly “cause” civil 
conflict, the fact that young men account for most acts of political violence is practically a 
self-evident truth, and research has consistently noted that revolutions, civil war outbreaks, 
and other major episodes of political instability are typically associated with the presence 
of a large proportion of youths relative to the total adult population (see, e.g., Moller 1968; 
Mesquida and Wiener 1999; Goldstone 2002; Collier 1999; Cincotta et al. 2003; Staveteig 
2005; Urdal 2004, 2006). “Youth bulges” (i.e., a high proportion of youths aged 15 to 24) 
are prominent both in the “greed” and the “grievances” perspectives in the civil war 
literature. On the one hand, according to the “cohort size hypothesis”, the larger a youth 
cohort relative to the total population, the lower its income and the higher its 
unemployment rate: thus, grievances arise from a mismatch between employment 
prospects and the size of the labor force (Goldstone 2002; Cincotta et al. 2003; Staveteig 
2005; Urdal 2004, 2006). On the other hand, because of lowered opportunity costs (e.g., 
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the absence of alternative income-earning opportunities, or fewer responsibilities for 
families), young men are cheap recruits for rebel organizations (Mesquida and Wiener 
1999; Collier 1999; Urdal 2006).  
While some studies on civil war measure youth bulges as the proportion of young males in 
the total population (e.g., Fearon and Laitin 2003), I opt for the proportion of males aged 
15 to 24 in the adult population (that is, the total population aged 15 or older), in order to 
avoid artificially deflating this ratio in countries with a large population under 15. As Urdal 
(2004, 2006) argues, the former indicator is questionable from a theoretical perspective, 
because if political violence arises from frustrations due to the overcrowding of the job 
market, it implies that only the youth-to-adults ratio (not the youth-to-children ratio) is 
causally related to civil conflict. Moreover, one prominent argument in the civil war 
literature (the “demographic bonus” or “demographic dividend” argument) is that youth 
bulges do not impact political violence if they are followed by significantly smaller 
cohorts: whereas an increased dependency ratio (i.e., a large share of nonworking 
population) adversely impacts economic growth, a relative increase of the working-age 
population may foster economic development through increased savings and thus provide 
youth cohorts with better employment prospects (Cincotta et al. 2003; Urdal 2006).  
I therefore proxy the risk of civil war by dividing the number of males aged 15-24 by the 
number of males aged 15 and older, using UN data on population: The indicator ranges 
from less than 13% (Italy in 2008) to almost 50% (Cap Verde in 1983). Table 4.2. displays 
summary statistics. 
 
Table 4.2. Share of males aged 15-24 in the population over 15, 1950-2008. 
 
Mean Max. Min.  Std. Dev. 
29.95%  48.05% 12.59% 6.71% 
(Source: UN Population division, 2013) 
 
The level of external threat is measured by the total number of direct contiguous borders of 
each state by land, based on the Direct Continuity dataset from the COW project (Stinnett 
et al. 2002). This strategy is justified by a widespread consensus in the international 
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conflict literature: the overwhelming majority of interstate rivalries, recurrent militarized 
disputes, and wars occur between neighbors. Possible explanations include the regular 
interactions and increased conflict potential between neighboring states, the fact that few 
states have a sufficient military reach to fight against non-neighbors (or, alternatively, that 
proximate states are generally perceived as more threatening), or the fact that neighboring 
states are simply more likely to have territorial disputes (for a discussion of these 
arguments, see Starr and Most 1976, and Vasquez 1995; for an empirical evaluation, see 
Senese 2005). Given that territorial disputes are more enduring, more prone to escalation, 
more likely to result in full-scale war, and more likely to be followed by recurrent 
militarized conflicts than disputes over policy or regime (see, e.g., Kocs 1995; Vasquez 
1995; Hensel 1996; Vasquez and Henehan 2001; Senese and Vasquez 2003; Dreyer 2012), 
contiguity has emerged as one of the most powerful predictor of interstate war: for 
example, Wallensteen (1981) finds that most neighboring major powers have experienced 
war. Bremer (1992) finds contiguity to have a stronger impact on war than alliances, power 
parity, or economic development, and identifies it as the most decisive factor for the 
outbreak of a war between any pair of states. According to some accounts, war is about 
300 more likely to occur between contiguous states than between noncontiguous states 
(Kocs 1995). A more recent study not only confirms that the probability of a militarized 
interstate dispute (MID) is higher for neighboring dyads than for non-neighbors, but also 
that contiguity additionally affects how states respond to other determinants of war, such 
as alliances or power parity (Reed and Chiba 2010).  
Accordingly, a number of studies on the impact of the international environment on 
domestic structures have relied on this indicator or variations thereof to assess external 
threat (e.g., Gibler 2007; Gibler 2010; Gibler and Tir 2014). The measures used by these 
studies are arguably more sophisticated than the mere count of land borders: for example, 
Gibler and Tir’s (2014) measure of potential territorial threat include information such as 
the history of violent or peaceful transfers of territory between neighbors, the onset of civil 
war in a neighboring country, or the existence of an active defense pact with all neighbors. 
I, however, prefer to rely on the raw count of land borders, because the aforementioned 
indicators are prone to displaying considerable short-term fluctuations that make them 
unsuitable to examine long-lasting effects of the international environment on domestic 
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political structures: states seldom disband their armed forces as soon as they start 
developing more peaceful relationships with their neighbors, and the military’s political 
involvement is unlikely to change overnight. Even if contextual factors are likely to affect 
the military’s resources endowment, the mere existence of land-contiguous countries 
should create a powerful incentive for states to maintain a standing army at all.  
Table 4.3. displays summary statistics.  
 
Table 4.3. Land borders: Summary statistics, 1946-2008 
Mean Max. Min.  Std. Dev. 
3.40 14 0 2.36 
(Source: Correlates of War, Contiguity dataset) 
 
4.3.2. Internal and external threats and instances of military coups 
 
To test Hypotheses 1 and 2, I use logistic regression. Military coups – the dependent 
variable – are measured using Powell and Thyne’s (2011) dataset. Coups are defined as 
“illegal and overt attempts by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to 
unseat the sitting executive” (Powell and Thyne 2011, 252). I do not distinguish between 
successful and failed coups, and I collapse country-years with multiple coups into a single 
value. 
 
Table 4.4. Coup attempts, 1950-2005 
Frequency Percent Total observations 
377 5.15 7,326 
(Source: Powell and Thyne 2011) 
 
The model further includes several control variables that can affect the expected 
relationship between security threats and military coups, and whose omission might bias 
the results. First, large countries – both in terms of population and area – are likely to have 
a larger number of land borders than smaller ones: I thus include the log of population and 
the log of country size in square kilometers in the model (data on both variables come 
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from the UN). Second, the share of youths in the population is strongly correlated to the 
level of economic development, as measured by GDP per capita: to the extent that coups 
happen more frequently in poorer countries (Londregan and Poole 1990), GDP per capita 
is a potential positive confounder. I thus add the natural log of GDP per capita in the 
model: data are drawn from the Maddison project dataset (Bolt and van Zanden 2013). For 
a similar reason, I add a Cold War dummy, since the frequency of both international 
conflicts and military coups has decreased after 1990 (Powell and Thyne 2011). Two 
further possible correlates of coups, namely ethno-linguistic fractionalization (Jenkins and 
Kposowa 1990, 1992) and economic growth (O’Kane 1981; Johnson et al. 1984; 
Londregan and Poole 1990) are also included. Data on ethnic fractionalization are drawn 
from the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (Cederman, Wimmer and Min 2010).  
 
Table 4.5. Summary statistics (1950-2005) 
 Mean  Standard deviation Observations 
(ln) Country size 12.30 1.81 7,284 
(ln) Population 15.93 1.53 7,256 
(ln) GDP/capita  7.92 1.06 7,054 
Economic growth 0.02 0.06 6,943 
ELF 0.41 0.31 6,858 
(Sources: World Bank; Maddison project database; Cederman et al. 2010) 
 
Finally, I address potential time-dependence issues by including a variable that records the 
number of years passed since the last occurrence of a coup. Standard errors are clustered at 
the country level. Table 4.6. displays the results.   
Results displayed in Table 4.6. lend support to the two hypotheses. Consistently with 
Hypothesis 1, coup risk increases monotonically with the share of males aged 15-24 in the 
adult population, the variable being significant at the 1% level. For each unit increase in 
the percentage of youths in the population, the estimated coup risk increases by 5%. Given 
that the youths-to-adults ratio varies from about 10% to almost 50% in the sample, this 
effect is non-negligible: It means that, everything else being equal, a country with 50% of 
young males in its adult population is about 7 times as likely to experience a coup as a 
country with 10% of young males in its adult population. If the variable increased from its 
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minimal value (0) to its maximal value (100) in an average country, the odds of this 
country experiencing a coup would increase by a factor of about 130.  
 
Table 4.6. Internal threats, external threats, and coup risk, 1950-2005 (logistic 
regression, reporting odds ratios) 
 
 Model 1: Military coups 
Years since past coup a 0.918*** (0.010) 
GDP/capita a, b 0.913 (0.084) 
Population a, b 0.937 (0.061) 
ELF 1.224 (0.278) 
Cold War 1.993*** (0.337) 
Land borders 1.393*** (0.162) 
Land borders (squared) 0.965*** (0.012) 
Country size b 1.110 (0.075) 
% males aged 15-24 a 1.054*** (0.017) 
Growth a 0.056*** (0.054) 
Constant 0.011*** (0.015) 
Countries 147 
Observations 6,286 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a Lagged one year b Log 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 2 is confirmed as well: The predicted curvilinear relationship between external 
threats and military coups, approximated by the joint inclusion of a linear and quadratic 
term for the number of land borders in the model, is reflected by the positive coefficient 
associated with the linear term and the negative coefficient associated with the quadratic 
term. This indicates that, as expected, the risk of military coups first increases and then 
decreases with the level of external security threats. Both coefficients are significant at the 
1% level.  
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Control variables, on the whole, impact the dependent variable in the expected way, but 
only some of them attain statistical significance. Economic growth displays a strong 
association with coup risk – coups becoming far less likely as growth rates increase. As 
expected, coups were more frequent during the Cold War than afterwards. Finally, I also 
find empirical support for the notion of “coup traps” (Londregan and Poole 1990): 
Countries that experienced a coup in the recent past are more likely to experience another 
one, this risk decreasing by 8% each year. By contrast, ELF and population are not 
remotely significant. The most surprising finding is that GDP per capita has no discernible 
impact on coup risk. However, the variable attains statistical significance as soon as the 
share of youths in the population is removed from the model, and displays an actually 
quite large (negative) effect on the dependent variable. This can, on the one hand, suggest 
that economic development has only an indirect effect on coups: economic development 
affects age structures which, in turn, affect coup risk. On the other hand, this finding can 
also be due to multicollinearity: given the high correlation between GDP per capita and 
share of youths in the population, these results should be approached with caution. Note, 
however, that the results regarding Hypothesis 1 are not due to multicollinearity: estimates 
remain quite stable regardless of whether GDP per capita is included in the model.  
 
4.3.3. Security threats and political regime type 
 
Hypotheses 3, 4, and 5 relate to the impact of internal and external security threats on the 
emergence and survival of political regimes. I begin with Hypothesis 3, which involves a 
comparison between democracy and dictatorship. It will be tested on the whole sample, 
using a binary dependent variable that takes on the value of 1 if the country is classified as 
democratic, 0 otherwise. To measure democracy, I use data from the Democracy & 
Dictatorship dataset (Cheibub et al. 2010).  
The model includes, in addition, a small set of control variables. Three of these – GDP per 
capita, ethno-linguistic fractionalization, and the number of democratic regimes in the 
world – are relatively consensual covariates of democracy. Economic development is one 
of the most robust predictors of democracy (see Lipset 1959; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 
1994; Barro 1999; Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Boix and Stokes 2003; Epstein et al. 
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2006). Ethnic diversity, on the other hand, is widely believed to be detrimental to the 
development and persistence of democratic institutions (see Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; 
Horowitz 1993; Aghion et al. 2004; and, to a certain extent, Collier 2009). Finally, the 
yearly count of democratic countries in the world is intended to capture diffusion effects 
(see Przeworski et al. 1996; O’Loughlin et al. 1998; Brinks and Coppedge 2006).  
The last control variable – population – is not a “standard” predictor in democratization 
studies: several authoritative studies on the determinants of democracy either fail to 
uncover any relationship between population and democracy (e.g., Barro 1999; Acemoglu 
et al. 2005, 2009) or do not consider it at all (e.g., Boix and Stokes 2003; Epstein et al. 
2006). Yet, small population has long been deemed a prerequisite for the successful 
establishment of democracy (see Dahl and Tufte 1973), and small states are notably more 
likely to be democratic than large ones. Noting that small states receive by far better 
ratings on the Freedom House scale, Diamond and Tsalik (1999) argue that the size of 
political communities impacts a large number of outcomes such as the sense of political 
efficacy among citizens, political accountability, the representation of marginalized groups, 
and checks on the central government’s power. A related argument is that large polities are 
more likely to be ethnically or socially fragmented (Dahl and Tufte 1973). In a somewhat 
similar vein, several studies have argued that small states offer better conditions for the 
development of democracy by promoting an increased sense of community, mutual trust 
and solidarity among citizens (e.g., Anckar 1999, Ott 2000, Congdon Fors 2014). Since 
population is a potential correlate of democracy, it is therefore a potential confounder: 
omitting population from the model could introduce a bias inasmuch as countries with a 
low number of land borders are more likely to be small countries with a small population.  
Hypotheses 4 and 5 predict that, under certain structural conditions, a dictatorship will be 
more or less likely to take the form of a military regime or a party regime, respectively. 
The test for both hypotheses relies, again, on logistic regression. Dependent variables are 
measured using Cheibub et al.’s (2010) classification of nondemocratic regimes (see 
Chapter 2). Control variables are the same as in the previous model. Thus, the models used 
to test Hypotheses 4 and 5 are broadly similar to the one used to test Hypothesis 3, with 
two notable differences: First, instead of using a yearly count of democracies as control 
variable, I use a count of similar regimes (that is, the number of military dictatorships in 
108 
the world is used to predict the probability that a particular country is a military 
dictatorship at a certain point of time; the same goes for party regimes). Second, for 
Hypotheses 4 and 5, the sample is restricted to nondemocratic regimes, in order to avoid 
distorting the results: to the extent that GDP per capita is on average much higher in 
democracies than in autocracies (and that economic development, in turn, is likely to 
influence other variables such as age structure), including democracies in the sample could 
inflate or deflate the mean value of some of the predictors and therefore mask important 
differences between authoritarian subtypes. 
Table 4.7. displays the results.  
 
Table 4.7. Security threats and political regimes, 1950-2005 (logistic regression, 
displaying odds ratios) 
 Model 2: Democracy Model 3: Military  Model 4: Party 
GDP/capita a, b 2.478*** (0.468) 0.813 (0.172) 0.509*** (0.119) 
Population a, b 1.360** (0.192) 1.232 (0.172) 1.088 (0.147) 
ELF 0.568 (0.334) 0.237** (0.140) 1.027 (0.508) 
Land borders 0.762*** (0.053) 1.548** (0.312) 1.178** (0.087) 
Land borders (squared)  0.955** (0.021)  
Similar regimes (count) 1.020*** (0.005) 1.030*** (0.010) 1.059*** (0.014) 
% males aged 15-24 a 0.928*** (0.027) 1.079** (0.037) 0.824*** (0.033) 
Countries 149 113 113 
Observations 6,446 3,902 3,902 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a Lagged one year b Log 
 
 
Estimates regarding democracy are displayed in Model 2. Hypotheses 3a (concerning 
internal security threats) and 3b (concerning external security threats) are both supported 
by the data: the proportion of youths in the adult population and the number of land 
borders are both negatively associated with a country’s odds of being a democracy, and 
both significant at the 1% level. Land borders have a particularly strong effect, each 
additional border decreasing the odds by almost 25%. The effects of age structure are less 
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dramatic, but still non-negligible: for each additional percentage point, the odds decrease 
by a factor of 0.93. Given that the youths-to-adults ratio varies from roughly 10% to 
almost 50% in the sample, this means that, if the variable increased from its minimal to its 
maximal value in an average country, the odds of this country being democratic would 
decrease by about 280%.   
In Model 3, the positive coefficient associated with the count of land borders and the 
negative coefficient associated with the quadratic term of land borders support Hypothesis 
4b: The likelihood of a country being a military dictatorship first increases and then 
decreases with its number of neighbors. Both coefficients are significant at the 5% level. 
Likewise, the positive and statistically significant coefficient associated with the 
proportion of youths in the adult population lends empirical support to Hypothesis 4a: the 
higher the youths-to-adults ratio in one country’s population, the higher the probability that 
this country is ruled by the military. Finally, Hypotheses 5a and 5b are both supported by 
the data, as can be seen in Model 4: party regimes are associated with a comparatively high 
number of land borders and a comparatively low proportion of young males in the adult 
population. According to the estimates in Model 4, each additional land border increases a 
country’s odds of being a party dictatorship by nearly one fifth (p<.05), while each unit 
increase in the ratio of youths to the adult population decreases the odds by a factor of 0.82 
(p<.001). The population’s age structure – and therefore the risk of internal armed conflict 
– hence impacts party dictatorship even more dramatically than it impacts democracy. 
With regard to control variables, the yearly count of similar regimes in the world has a 
positive influence on the dependent variables in each model. As expected, GDP per capita 
is positively related to democracy. It has, by contrast, no impact on a country’s probability 
to be ruled by a military dictator, and a negative and significant effect on the likelihood 
that a country is a one-party regime. Even though none of the estimations return any 
anomaly, two surprising findings emerge: first, ethnic fractionalization is negatively 
correlated to military dictatorship in Model 3. This is unexpected inasmuch as ethnic 
diversity is generally deemed a powerful predictor of domestic conflict in general, and 
military coups in particular (see Jenkins and Kposowa 1990, 1992). Second, contrary to 
the widely held belief that democracy is associated with small political communities, I find 
that population size correlates positively with democracy. This result might seem puzzling 
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at first glance. However, it is not exceptional (see, e.g., Barro 1999), and it echoes one 
recent finding, that large populations enhance political competition at the district level 
(Gerring et al. forthcoming): since Cheibub et al.’s (2010) measure of democracy is 
predominantly a measure of contestation, this finding is perhaps not so startling after all. 
More broadly, it has two implications. First, it suggests that, to the extent that past research 
has uncovered a negative relationship between population size and democracy, this 
relationship might be spurious (i.e., driven by the fact that many small countries are 
islands, and many islands are democracies), and that more research is needed to 
disentangle the effects of demography and geography on political institutions. Second, this 
finding indicates that if insulated countries are more likely to be democratic, this is not 
because of their small population, but rather because of a relatively secure environment.  
 
4.3.4. Robustness checks 
 
In addition to the tests discussed above, I perform a series of robustness checks.68 I first 
check whether the results are driven by a few influential observations (i.e., country-years 
that take on extreme values on one or several of the independent variables): this does not 
seem to be the case. Second, I investigate the results’ sensitivity to the inclusion or 
removal of control variables. In particular, since the proportion of youths in the population 
is highly correlated with GDP per capita, I check whether the main results hold up when 
GDP is removed from the model. Yet, the proportion of youth remains statistically 
significant in all models. The results are not sensitive to the removal of other controls 
either.  
I then retest Model 2 after replacing Cheibub et al.’s (2010) democracy measure with an 
alternative binary measure developed by Boix, Miller and Rosato (2013): the results are 
not affected. Likewise, they hold when the dependent variable in Model 1 is replaced by a 
measure of successful coups only (Powell and Thyne 2011).  
Finally, I investigate the results’ sensitivity to model specification, and re-estimate all five 
models using probit, rare-event logit and a random effects model.69 I find that probit results 
                                                 
68 Estimates that are not displayed in the text are available on request.  
69 Given that military coups are comparatively rare, and that both political regimes and the independent 
variables exhibit a low variance over time, fixed effects models are inappropriate. 
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are highly similar to logit results: no main findings are overturned. The same is true of the 
rare events corrected estimations: the exponentiated coefficients associated with the 
independent variables remain the same as in the logit model, with a two-digit precision. 
Although random effects models are more severe, most findings remain unaffected. The 
main problem that arises regards Models 1 and 3: although land borders retain their effects 
and statistical significance in these models, estimates regarding the proportion of youths in 
the population become unstable. It turns out, however, that this is mainly due to the high 
correlation between age structure and GDP: youth bulges are positively and significantly 
associated with both military coups and military regimes as long as GDP is left out of the 
model.  
 
4.4. CONCLUSION  
 
All states are confronted with the well-known trade-off between security through and 
security from the armed forces: as they face increasingly acute security challenges, leaders 
often react by endowing the military with institutional or financial resources, thereby 
increasing the risk that it becomes powerful enough to blackmail, overthrow or replace 
them. One implication of this idea is that coup risk partly depends on the security threats 
states face.  
I find support for this expectation to the extent that countries facing comparatively low 
levels of security threats are less likely to experience military coups. But coup risk also 
varies according to the nature of security threats. Because a high risk of international war 
fosters the military’s neutrality while a high risk of civil war increases its incentives to get 
involved in domestic politics issues, these two types of security threats have a different 
effect on coup risk: internal threats monotonically increase the risk of a military 
intervention, whereas the relationship between external threats and coup risk takes the 
form of an inverted U. I also find support for the hypothesis that countries facing few 
serious security threats are, on the long run, more likely to become and remain democratic 
(see Midlarsky 1995; Thompson 1996; Gibler 2007; Gibler and Tir 2010). The nature and 
intensity of security threats also help predict the emergence and persistence of specific 
types of authoritarian regimes: because moderately high external security threats and very 
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high internal security threats give the military a central position in the political system and 
incentives to intervene in domestic politics, such a combination often results in the 
emergence of military dictatorships. By contrast, countries in which internal security 
threats are very low but external security threats are very high are more likely to be ruled 
by a highly centralized party regime.  
These results have to be approached with caution – if only because the indicators used to 
measure internal and external security threats do not perfectly match the concepts – and 
would need refinement. But in spite of these limitations, these findings contribute to a 
growing literature on the impact of security threats on coup risk, and provide a further 
confirmation of Desch’s (2001) hypothesis, that a hostile international environment is not 
necessarily detrimental to civilian control on the military. On the other hand, they also 
demonstrate that civilian control on the military cannot be equated with democracy, to the 
extent that it can also contribute to authoritarian stability. 
The results sketched above also shed light on some recurring findings such as, for 
example, the fact that small and insulated states are more likely to be democratic than large 
or continental states: the persistence of democracy in island states is not necessarily due to 
cultural factors, and might instead be due to the fact that, in those countries, the military 
never was powerful enough to pose a serious threat to democratic institutions. Likewise, 
the finding that high external threats decrease the likelihood of a military coup helps 
explain why authoritarian leaders who face a high coup risk frequently initiate 
international conflicts (Miller and Elgün 2011; Powell 2014b).  
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PART II:  
REBELLION UNDER DEMOCRACY AND DICTATORSHIP 
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5 
Intrastate armed conflicts and military coups in democratic and 
autocratic regimes 
 
 
This chapter deals with the effects of political regime type on the outbreak of intrastate 
armed conflict: the objective is to re-examine theoretical arguments on this relationship 
and empirically assess their validity. Special attention will be devoted to measurement 
issues, which tend to plague many studies on regime type and domestic conflict and have 
generated a great deal of controversy.  
The first aspect of the problem I will address here concerns the relationship between 
democracy and intrastate armed conflict. The emerging consensus is that there is no 
“domestic democratic peace:” very few studies, if any, identify a monotonic relationship 
between democracy and intrastate armed conflict (for a review, see Hegre 2014). Yet, the 
overwhelming majority of these studies rely on the Polity index, which displays some 
particular properties that make it inappropriate for predicting intrastate armed conflicts 
(see Vreeland 2008). These issues are now well-known, but curiously, very few cross-
national analyses on the relationship between democracy and civil war have so far been 
performed on the basis of measures other than the Polity IV index.70 I will thus bridge this 
lacuna and reassess the relationship between democracy and civil war using a minimal, 
dichotomous democracy measure.  
A second aspect of the problem concerns the differences between authoritarian regimes. In 
recent years, scholars have begun to move beyond simple bipartite or tripartite regime 
                                                 
70 Although the Freedom House index is often used as a proxy for democracy, it is not a democracy measure 
per se: it was originally developed as a measure of political rights and civil liberties, and does not include 
components measuring other aspects of democracy. Some studies on the effects of political regimes do 
not rely on Polity IV (Cohen 1997; Reynal-Querol 2005; Keefer 2007; Schneider and Wiesehomeier 
2008) but they investigate the effect of particular democratic institutions, not the effect of democracy as a 
whole. 
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classifications, and to analyze how “qualitative” differences71 between authoritarian 
regimes affect the risk of civil war. Authoritarian regime, so the argument goes, can be 
expected to behave in a different way, irrespective of their degree of “democraticness:” 
who governs and how political power is allocated between different groups is crucial for 
understanding the manner in which each regime will deal with organized opposition 
groups; in turn, these strategies of political control affect the opposition’s propensity to 
comply or resort to violent means to pursue its preferences. Three recent studies adopt 
such an approach and find significant differences between authoritarian regime types: 
Gurses and Mason (2010) find party regimes to be relatively immune to intrastate conflict, 
because they are able to either legitimize their rule through an all-encompassing ideology 
or to secure loyalty through corporatist bargaining between regime elites and 
representatives of important civil society groups. Fjelde (2010) relies on a broadly similar 
approach and finds a robust association between regime type and civil war onset. 
Specifically, she finds party regimes to be the most resilient and military dictatorships to 
be the most vulnerable: the underlying argument is that, while the former are internally 
cohesive and able to secure co-operation from both elites and citizens through a wide 
range of coercion and co-option strategies, the latter are more brittle because of their 
insulation, the absence of a coherent ideology to mobilize mass support, and their lack of 
cohesiveness at the elite level, and often rely exclusively on raw repression to maintain 
their rule. Her findings are confirmed by a recent study by Wilson (2014): though Wilson 
is somewhat critical of Fjelde's approach and argues for measuring co-optation capacity 
directly instead of using regime classifications, authoritarian regime type remains a 
significant predictor of domestic conflict in his replication. 
Yet, because they primarily rely on casualties to define intrastate armed conflict, datasets 
on civil war often conflate rebellions and military coups into a single measure (Powell and 
Thyne 2011). This is the case of the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, used by both 
Fjelde (2010) and Wilson (2014), and – to a lesser extent – of the Correlates of War 
dataset, used by Gurses and Mason (2010). This is problematic for two reasons: first, 
Fjelde’s (2010) and Wilson’s (2014) approach to co-optation and coercion – like most 
theories linking political regime type to the outbreak of civil war – explains only conflicts 
                                                 
71 The expression is from Hadenius and Teorell (2007a). 
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initiated by opposition groups against the regime apparatus, not intra-elite conflicts: thus, 
if further analyses revealed that authoritarian regime type impact civil wars and military 
coups in a similar way, this would indicate that something is wrong with the theory. 
Second and most importantly, given the relative rarity of civil wars – and the fact that there 
is a direct theoretical relationship between authoritarian regime type and military coups 
(see Chapter 3) – there is a possibility that the relationship between authoritarian regime 
type and civil wars is entirely driven by the inclusion of some military coups in civil war 
datasets. Therefore, it is necessary to test whether authoritarian regime types are related to 
civil war outbreak because they impact rebellion or because they affect coup risk.  
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.1. offers a brief overview of the literature on 
political regimes and the outbreak of intrastate armed conflicts. Section 5.2. discusses 
some important problems in the measurement of intrastate armed conflict: the main point 
is that, while measures that rely on a low casualties threshold (such as the UCDP/PRIO 
Armed Conflict dataset) are generally preferable for assessing the relationship between 
political regime and domestic conflict, the main drawback of such data is that they do not 
allow for a careful distinction between rebellions and military coups. In Section 5.3., I will 
discuss theoretical arguments on the relationships between regime type, intrastate armed 
conflicts, and military coups: in particular, it will be examined whether there are 
theoretical reasons to expect the relationship between regimes and rebellions to be entirely 
driven by the relationship between regimes and coups. I will then proceed to test my 
hypotheses on a dataset that covers the period from 1950 to 2005: section 5.4. presents the 
data and the results of the empirical analysis. Finally, Section 5.5. reports the results of an 
additional test performed on a new dataset that covers the period from 1816 to 1913. 
Section 5.6. concludes.  
 
 
5.1. BACKGROUND: DOES POLITICAL REGIME INFLUENCE THE RISK OF CIVIL 
WAR? 
 
So far, most of the quantitative, cross-national literature on political regimes and civil wars 
has focused either on whether democracy reduces the risk of civil war (hence treating 
authoritarian regimes as a residual category) or on the hypothesis that semi-democratic 
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regimes are more conflict-prone than either democracies or pure authoritarian regimes. In 
both cases, the empirical evidence is mixed. Democracy seems to decrease the severity of 
violent conflicts (Benson and Kugler 1998; Lacina 2006) and there is growing evidence 
that some specifically democratic institutions are associated with a linear decrease of the 
probability of conflict (see e.g. Cohen 1997; Reynal-Querol 2002a, 2002b, 2005; Carey 
2007; Schneider and Wiesehomeier 2008; Gleditsch and Ruggeri 2010). Yet, there is 
overall no strong evidence of a monotonic relationship between democracy and civil war 
(Hegre 2014).  
With regard to semi-democratic regimes, numerous studies have identified an inverted U 
relationship between democracy level and civil war: using Polity data (Marshall et al. 
2011), they find that “hybrid” or “anocratic” regimes (i.e., regimes that are situated in the 
middle of the democracy-autocracy continuum) are systematically associated with higher 
levels of political violence (Henderson and Singer 2000; Hegre et al. 2001; Fearon and 
Laitin 2003; see also Muller and Weede 1990). The argument underlying this finding is 
that democracies are able to decrease the desirability of rebellion and autocracies to 
increase its costs (or limit the opposition’s opportunities to challenge the regime); by 
contrast, hybrid regimes typically allow opposition groups to mobilize support but do not 
provide them with peaceful strategies to access political power. Although the general 
argument is theoretically compelling, a study by Vreeland (2008) has challenged this 
finding on a methodological ground, showing that the Polity index includes several 
components that assign intermediate scores to countries experiencing political violence.72 
Thus, the statistical relationship uncovered by these studies is (at least partially) 
endogenous. After removing the biased components from the Polity index, Vreeland does 
not find any evidence for a U-shaped relationship between democracy and civil war. A 
more recent study by Regan and Bell (2010) has attempted to reassess the anocracy 
hypothesis. After controlling for the potential bias in the Polity data, they find that the 
association between hybrid regimes and civil war is mostly due to their transitional 
character: regime type per se does not seem to have any effect on the probability of 
conflict.  
                                                 
72 These components measure the degree of regulation of political participation (PARREG) and the degree of 
political competition (PARCOMP), respectively (see Vreeland 2008; Marshall et al. 2011). Both 
components take on intermediate values when partisan competition involves violence. 
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Thus, the empirical evidence for a causal relationship between political regime and civil 
war is weak at best. However, this could result from the widespread use of highly 
aggregated democracy measures: since the Polity index – on which most of past research is 
based – conflates different institutional features into a single dimension, the effects of 
institutional differences between regimes that reach the same score on the scale are not 
taken into account. Three recent studies, moving beyond this single-dimensional approach 
to political regimes, investigate these “qualitative” differences between nondemocratic 
regimes and their effects on intrastate armed conflict. Gurses and Mason (2010) contrast 
“exclusionary authoritarian regimes” (which they equate with the personalist autocracies 
from Geddes' [1999] classification), that are characterized by weak institutions and a high 
vulnerability to elites defections and violent contestation, with “inclusionary authoritarian 
regimes” (i.e., one-party autocracies), that are able to legitimize their rule through ideology 
and to maintain their stability through a mix of sanctions and rewards (Gurses and Mason 
2010, 143-144). Using Geddes’ (1999) data on authoritarian regimes, they find personalist 
regimes to run a higher risk of civil war than single-party regimes and monarchies. Fjelde 
(2010) also finds party regimes to be the least vulnerable to intrastate armed conflicts. Her 
results differ from those of Gurses and Mason in that she consistently identifies military 
regimes as running a higher risk of conflict than other authoritarian regimes. She argues 
that political regime type affects the extent to which the dictator is able to resort to co-
optation or repression: this, in turn, explains why military dictatorships (that she argues 
rely almost exclusively on repression, which can easily backfire) are more conflict-prone 
than the average of authoritarian regimes, while single-party regimes (that are, according 
to her, able to co-opt opposition groups) are the most stable category. Finally, Wilson 
(2014) replicates and extends Fjelde’s (2010) analysis by controlling for the existence of 
democratic institutions in authoritarian regimes, and confirms her findings about military 
dictatorships and single-party regimes.  
The problem with these studies is that they rely heavily on untested assumptions about 
both authoritarian regimes’ tendency to either co-opt or repress the opposition and the 
impact of co-optation and repression on the outbreak of armed conflict (the only – partial – 
exception being Wilson [2014], who argues against the use of regime typologies to 
measure co-optation capacities). This is problematic for two reasons. First, there are more 
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direct ways of examining the extent to which authoritarian regimes co-opt or repress and 
of testing the impact of co-optation and repression on armed conflicts (direct measures of 
political repression abound, and there are some ways of measuring co-optation: see, e.g., 
Arriola 2009). Second, most these arguments lack empirical evidence. For example, there 
is to date no evidence that co-optation reduces the opposition's propensity to rebel, and it is 
unclear whether co-optation is targeted at opposition parties or at key elite groups to begin 
with (see, e.g., Gandhi 2008a; Magaloni 2008; Gerschewski 2013). Relatedly, while it is 
now relatively well-established that party regimes are able to secure intra-elite cohesion 
and to tie key actors (military, business elites, etc.) to the regime  (Geddes 1999; Brownlee 
2005; Magaloni 2008; Magaloni and Kricheli 2010; Svolik 2012), these approaches say 
little about party regimes’ ability to mediate conflicts between government and citizens. 
Likewise, there is no evidence that military regimes are unable to practice co-optation (see 
Geddes et al. 2014) or that regimes that do not practice co-optation are more repressive 
(Frantz and Kendall-Taylor 2014). Finally, Fjelde’s (2010) claims, that military regimes are 
more repressive than average, and that repression leads to increased levels of violence, are 
not backed by solid empirical evidence (see Davenport 2007a, 2007b; Geddes et al. 2014). 
In short, relying on broad regimes categories and speculating about how each type is likely 
to deal with organized opposition is both unnecessary and potentially misleading. Yet, in 
spite of these shortcomings, these studies – by unpacking the heterogeneous category of 
nondemocracies according to their difference in nature instead of their democracy level – 
make a strong case against the widespread use of single-dimensional democracy measures, 
and suggest an interesting avenue for future research.  
To sum up, according to the current state of knowledge, democracy appears to be unrelated 
to the risk of intrastate armed conflict, but this finding might be due to the widespread 
practice of using highly aggregated, single-dimensional measures of political regimes. In 
turn, there is some evidence that this practice is flawed, to the extent that not all 
authoritarian regimes exhibit the same probability of experiencing armed conflict. If there 
is any lesson to be drawn from the current state of the arts, it is that measures of political 
regimes are not interchangeable, and that the choice of a specific dataset is likely to 
drastically affect the observed relationship between regimes and conflicts. Yet, such 
findings are also likely to be affected by the way intrastate armed conflicts are measured: 
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curiously, this topic has received much less attention in current discussions about the 
impact of political institutions on armed conflicts. Issues related to the measurement of 
intrastate armed conflict will be discussed in the following section. 
  
5.2. ON CONCEPTS AND NUMBERS:  EXAMINING THE REGIME TYPE – CIVIL WAR 
RELATIONSHIP WITH QUANTITATIVE DATA 
 
As discussed in the last section, empirical findings about the relationship between political 
regimes and intrastate armed conflict seem to depend to a large extent on the peculiarities 
of each measure of political regime. But does the same hold true for civil war datasets? 
Measures of domestic conflict – unlike measures of political regimes – rely at least on a 
common definition of the concept. Most existing data collection efforts rely on a broadly 
similar operational definition of civil wars (see, e.g., Small and Singer 1982; Doyle and 
Sambanis 2000; Gleditsch et al. 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003): virtually all of these 
definitions emphasize a common set of criteria, which can be summarized as follows: 
(1) Civil wars are fought over political issues, pertaining either to the government or 
the territory of a state, or both. 
(2) They are fought within domestic borders, and among domestic actors.  
(3) They involve the active participation of the state’s government and its army. 
(4) They involve the use of armed force between two or more organized parties.  
(5) They result in a certain number of battle-related fatalities.  
These criteria are intended to distinguish intrastate armed conflicts from other, distinct 
forms of collective violence, such as interstate conflicts, coups, organized crime, terrorism, 
riots, politicide, or ethnic cleansing. Yet, their apparent simplicity is deceiving: deciding 
how “armed force” should be coded (i.e., what exactly counts as a weapon) or what 
“parties” are (i.e., to which extent they have to be organized) is no easy task. Likewise, the 
notion of “domestic borders” is somewhat ambiguous: most datasets – typically, the 
Correlates of War dataset (Small and Singer 1982) or the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict 
Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002) – treat civil wars and “extrastate” or “extrasystemic” 
conflicts (i.e., conflicts occurring between a state and non-state actors outside of the 
metropole, such as, e.g., colonial wars) as separate categories. Yet, as Sambanis (2004, 
816) observes, distinguishing intrastate from extrasystemic wars is often difficult, since 
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some separatist conflicts can be viewed as wars of decolonization.73 More generally, 
attempts to provide for a general definition of civil war (that is, one that could apply to a 
wide range of cases) raise two kinds of issues. First, it can be asked whether these 
definitions do not lump together very diverse phenomena, which would lead researchers to 
overlook important empirical associations to the extent that different kinds of civil war 
may have different causes and consequences (see, e.g., Sambanis 2001b). Second and 
conversely, these definitions tend to draw arbitrary boundaries between forms of political 
violence that could actually be causally interrelated and conceptually similar. As Sambanis 
(2004, 815) puts it:  
 
In the end, it may be difficult to study civil war without considering how groups in conflict shift 
from one form of violence to another, or it may be profitable to analyze political violence in the 
aggregate, rather than cut across that complex phenomenon with arbitrary definitions. 
 
Consequently, a growing attention has been devoted to the shifting shapes of political 
conflict in recent years. For example, Besley and Persson (2009) analyze how state 
capacities determine whether violent conflict between state and political opposition takes 
the form of repression or civil war: they find that, while the richest states are at peace and 
the poorest ones tend to experience civil war more often, repression is widespread at 
intermediate levels of economic development. De la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca (2012) use 
a similar approach to predict whether opposition groups will resort to terrorism or to large-
scale violence. Taken together, these findings suggest that political violence is best 
conceived as a polymorphous phenomenon, and highlight the necessity to go beyond 
simple, binary definitions of intrastate conflict. 
In spite of the inherent difficulty of correctly measuring civil war, however, the most 
contested feature of these definitions – and also the decisive criterion for choosing one 
dataset instead of another – is the battle-deaths threshold. All quantitative measures of civil 
                                                 
73 Curiously, this aspect has received so far only limited attention. In my opinion, the real question is not how 
to distinguish civil wars from wars of decolonization, but rather whether it makes sense (theoretically 
speaking) to distinguish them at all. To the best of my knowledge, Fearon and Laitin (2003) are the only 
ones who include anti-colonial wars in their list of civil wars. They explicitely state (p. 76) that they see 
no reason why they should exclude these wars from their analysis. There are, of course, reasons that 
would speak against the inclusion of these conflicts in some empirical analyses – depending, again, on 
the hypotheses being tested – but such coding decisions are not self-evident and have to be justified. 
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war rely on some fatalities threshold conflicts have to reach to be included in civil wars 
datasets, but this requirement varies greatly from one data project to another: the COW 
project sets this threshold to 1,000 battle-deaths per year,74 while the UCDP/PRIO Armed 
Conflict dataset relies on a less restrictive threshold of 25 battle-deaths. 
The most obvious, potentially controversial question is whether operational definitions and 
measures of civil war should rely on a battle-deaths threshold at all: the implication that 
999 deaths (or 24, depending on the threshold being used) are somehow not “enough” for 
an event to be coded as a war violates common sense. Yet, common sense also suggests 
that battle-related casualties are part of the very definition of war (and, by extension, civil 
war): everyone would agree that a conflict that does not result in any fatality is not a war, 
and after all, the fact that civil wars cause deaths is probably one of the most important 
reasons why we study them. Since the concept of war is dichotomous in nature while 
deaths counts are not, such thresholds are hence both necessary and arbitrary. Moreover, 
from a more practical point of view, analyzing the probability of civil war requires being 
able to identify the beginning of the event, and hence determining a cut-off point to 
distinguish between events and non-events.  
The second question is how high this threshold should be.75 As noted above, this is the 
main difference between the COW and the UCDP/PRIO measures of civil war:76 while the 
25 fatalities threshold on which the UCDP/PRIO dataset relies makes it a relatively 
inclusive dataset, the COW project has been subject to intense criticism for excluding from 
its war list major episodes of violence that just failed to pass the 1,000 fatalities threshold 
while fulfilling every other criteria.  
Some of these critiques rest solely on appeals to common sense. For example, Gleditsch et 
al., referring to the Northern Ireland conflict (which never qualified for the COW battle-
deaths threshold), point to the “apparent anomaly of excluding such well-known conflicts 
from a dataset on armed conflict” (Gleditsch et al. 2002, 617; emphasis added). Sambanis 
                                                 
74 This is true of most measures of civil war (e.g. Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fearon and Laitin 2003). 
75 A third, related question (which I will not discuss here) is whether measures of civil war should be based 
on an annual or total deaths count (for a discussion, see Sambanis 2001a, 2004). 
76 Note, however, that the UCDP / PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset distinguishes between “armed conflicts” 
(resulting in fewer than 1,000 battle-related deaths per year) and “wars” (at least 1,000 battle-related 
deaths per year; see Gleditsch et al. 2002, 619). The debate, thus, is not a conceptual one (i.e., whether 
low-scale conflicts should be called wars), but rather an empirical one (whether low-scale conflicts 
should be included in statistical analyses). 
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(2001a) suggests adapting the battle-deaths threshold to each country’s population size 
(i.e., replacing the absolute number of deaths with a per capita measure): “The argument in 
favor of such a measure,” he argues, “would be that it would allow us to distinguish events 
of civil violence that are significant within the context of a country’s size” (Sambanis 
2001a, 6; emphasis added).77 These arguments, however, are not entirely convincing: 
according to which specific criteria should the Northern Ireland conflict be included in 
civil war datasets, and what kind of methodological issues do arise when similar conflicts 
are excluded?  After all, neither significance78 nor visibility belongs to the core definitional 
features of civil war. 
Sambanis (2001a, 2004) gives yet another reason why researchers should use either a 
lower absolute fatalities threshold or a per capita threshold: from a purely statistical point 
of view, conflicts that cross the 1,000 fatalities threshold are more likely in larger (i.e., 
populous) countries than in smaller ones. While this problem is partly corrected by 
including a control for population in statistical models, this selection bias might precisely 
be the reason why empirical studies on civil war repeatedly find a positive correlation 
between population size and civil war.  
There are other methodological reasons for adopting a lower battle-deaths threshold. One 
of these reasons is purely statistical in nature: rare events are in general difficult to analyze, 
because most statistical procedures tend to underestimate their probability (King and Zeng 
2001), and because the low proportion of ones makes the result sensitive to the inclusion 
or deletion of a few influential observations. Thus, the higher the battle-deaths threshold, 
the higher the proportion of zeroes, and the higher the probability of both Type I and Type 
II errors. A related problem is that highly asymmetric dependent variables limit 
possibilities in terms of sampling and model specification (Gleditsch et al. 2002, 617).79  
Another potential issue is that conflict onsets are coded in the first year in which conflicts 
                                                 
77 For similar reasons, Sambanis (2001a) also calls for the inclusion of civilian deaths in the fatalities counts, 
to the extent that civil wars typically kill more civilians than combatants and that battle-deaths “do not 
reveal the extent of civilian suffering that takes place in civil wars” (p. 8). Yet, restricting deaths counts to 
battle-related deaths has a practical advantage, to the extent that it automatically excludes instances of 
one-sided killings in which the targeted group was not able to mount effective resistance. Relying on a 
total death count to measure civil war would result in blurring the boundaries between two-sided violence 
and state-sponsored mass killings. 
78 To be sure, civil wars generally are significant events, but not all significant events are civil wars. 
79 This, of course, does not mean that considerations of practical convenience should override concerns about 
measurement validity. 
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reach the battle-deaths threshold. Arguably, some conflicts may escalate slowly, i.e. 
produce fewer than 1,000 deaths in the first year(s) and subsequently escalate to large-
scale violence. Consequently, in some cases, the duration of the conflict may be truncated, 
and its start and end dates incorrectly identified: this, in turn, might lead to reverse 
causation issues to the extent that even lower-scale conflicts can have an influence on, e.g., 
economic growth or political regime type (that is, typical predictors of civil conflict). This 
is less of a concern in the case of the UCDP/PRIO dataset (the lower battle-deaths 
threshold leaves less room for error), but some middle-intensity conflicts might last for 
years until they enter the COW war list.  
Most importantly, high battle-deaths thresholds automatically exclude conflicts that break 
out but never escalate because they are either settled or repressed immediately: it is thus 
unsurprising that state capacities are regularly found to be one of the most powerful 
predictors of large-scale violence, since weak states do not have the capacity to effectively 
repress rebel groups or accommodate their demands. This, however, does not mean that 
grievances do not impact the probability of conflict (or, alternatively, that strong states do 
not produce grievances): actually, while the number of fatalities a conflict produces seems 
to be foremost dependent on relative capabilities, including factors such as government 
and rebel control over territory (Sambanis 2001a, 9; de la Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca 2012, 
584), the determinants of conflict outbreak and conflict escalation are not necessarily the 
same. Relying on a too high battle-deaths threshold to measure civil war can lead to 
misleading results to the extent that such indicators conflate conflict outbreak and 
escalation into a single measure. For example, two authoritative studies on the causes of 
civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2003, and Collier and Hoeffler 2004) recently made a strong 
case against grievance-based approaches, and in favor of opportunity-based explanations: 
it is perhaps not entirely coincidental that both studies used a measure of civil war based 
on a 1,000 battle-deaths threshold. Thus, assessing the impact of grievances on the 
outbreak of intrastate armed conflict perhaps requires using a more inclusive measure of 
conflicts.  
There are, yet, some reasons that speak against the use of a low battle-deaths threshold. 
One of these reasons is underreporting bias: put bluntly, an armed conflict resulting in 25 
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fatalities – or fewer80 – having taken place in Germany in 2003 is more likely to appear on 
the UCDP/PRIO war list than a similar conflict in North Korea in 1962. While full-scale 
civil wars may not go unnoticed in either of these countries, smaller-scale episodes of 
violence might end up overrepresented in rich, democratic countries, and underrepresented 
in poor, nondemocratic countries. 
One second potential pitfall is the inclusion of unrelated events in civil war datasets. 
Consider, for instance, the UCDP/PRIO’s operational definition of armed conflict:   
 
An armed conflict is defined by the Uppsala Conflict Data Project as a contested incompatibility that 
concerns government or territory or both where the use of armed force between two parties results in 
at least 25 battle-related deaths. Of these two parties, at least one is the government of a state 
(Gleditsch et al. 2002, 618-9). 
 
This very concise definition nevertheless stresses several key features of domestic conflict. 
First and most obviously, the object of the incompatibility (government or territory) is 
political, which distinguishes internal conflict from organized crime or other forms of 
collective violence. Second, “parties” are not loose groups but relatively structured 
organizations: in practice, this means that rebel organizations must have names and be able 
to articulate clear demands for episodes of internal violence to be qualified as intrastate 
armed conflicts (see Strand et al. 2004), so that these can be set apart from spontaneous 
riots. Third, in order to differentiate civil wars from communal violence, the government 
must be directly involved in the conflict.81 Finally, the requirement that both the 
government and rebel organizations make use of armed force82 and are able to mount 
effective resistance makes it possible to differentiate civil conflicts from one-sided 
violence such as genocide or politicide (see Gleditsch et al. 2002, Strand 2004). Thus, this 
seemingly short operational definition actually succeeds in discriminating between 
                                                 
80 Some authors use a lower fatalities threshold. For example, de la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca (2012) 
include in their analysis all armed organizations that killed at least 10 people if they were active during 
more than a year. 
81 There is a priori no clear reason why conflicts between different non-state actors should not be counted as 
intrastate armed conflicts in general. Yet, the decision to exclude these conflicts has some positive 
consequences for the empirical analysis I will carry out in the next sections, since I am primarily 
interested in conflicts between government and opposition groups. 
82 This criterion is somewhat loosened by the fact that “arms” do not need to be manufactured weapons, i.e., 
sticks and stones qualify as arms (see Strand et al. 2004, 3). 
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numerous forms of collective violence.83 
There are yet some forms of political violence that are theoretically distinct from civil wars 
but nevertheless enter the UCDP/PRIO dataset because of the 25 battle-deaths threshold. 
For example, using a low threshold makes it difficult to distinguish civil war from 
domestic terrorism: as Sambanis (2008, 181) notes, the Irish Republican Army is 
alternatively coded as a terrorist organization or as a rebel movement engaged in a 
separatist war, depending on the authors and coding rules (recall that the Irish conflict does 
not appear in the COW war list). However, failing to distinguish between civil conflict and 
domestic terrorism might not be as problematic as it seems, to the extent that both 
phenomena often have the same underlying causes: in both cases, the use of violence is 
motivated by a desire to achieve national independence, change the government, or affect 
policies. Thus, terrorism and civil war do not differ in their causes but rather in their 
manifestation: after stating that what foremost distinguishes terrorism from civil war is 
power imbalance between the two parties, a lower level of active public support for the 
insurgents, and a lower level of violence (p. 181), Sambanis (2008, 183) deems terrorism 
as one of the many violent strategies that can be used – or not – during civil war. In turn, 
the intensity of violence and the way it is used seems to depend foremost on relative 
capabilities, i.e. the extent to which rebel organizations are able to control territory, recruit 
new members, and provide them with weapons: in a recent study, de la Calle and Sánchez-
Cuenca (2012) find that state capacities predict well whether a given insurgency will take 
the form of a terrorist campaign (in which insurgents typically do not control territory and 
are forced to operate underground) or a civil war with rebel control on significant portions 
of the national territory; territorial insurgencies – which are the most lethal ones – are 
concentrated in weak states, while nonterritorial ones occur more frequently in countries 
with intermediate levels of development.84  
A second – and by far more problematic – issue concerns the inclusion of coups d'état in 
                                                 
83 Of course, differentiating civil wars from state-sponsored violence, communal violence or criminal activity 
can get tricky in some borderline cases: Some rebel organizations might resort to criminal activity to 
finance themselves, so that they become indistinguishable from criminal networks on the long run; some 
governments might fight by proxy using militias, so that the war is primarily fought by non-state actors; 
and in some cases of state-sponsored violence, the targeted group is able to inflict some casualties on the 
stronger party, which makes some instances of genocide or politicide indistinguishable from civil wars 
(for a discussion, see Sambanis 2004). 
84 Interestingly, they note (p. 582) that territorial control does not depend on whether the conflict concerns 
territory or government.  
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civil war datasets, since coups fit into most operational definitions of civil war: they are 
contested incompatibilities regarding government, they involve the use of force among two 
organized parties – one of which is the state’s government – and they can, in some 
instances, result in 25 battle-deaths. This problem is arguably less acute in the case of the 
COW dataset – because few coups claim 1,000 fatalities – and in the case of separatist 
conflicts. Yet, a significant number of the events that appear in the UCDP/PRIO list of 
conflicts over government might be, in fact, military coups: Powell and Thyne (2011, 256) 
state that they have identified no less than 38 events in this dataset that could actually be 
best described as coups.  
Why is it so problematic? First, because most theories that link political regimes and 
political violence are based on the assumption that civil wars are initiated by marginalized 
opposition groups.85 By contrast, coups are typically assumed to be initiated by a faction of 
the political elite, generally with the active support of the military: for example, one of the 
most comprehensive datasets on coups (Powell and Thyne 2011) explicitly requires a 
seizure of the executive power to be perpetrated by regime insiders to be classified as a 
coup. Second, it is also a widely accepted premise that civil wars require the active 
participation of a substantial part of the public (see, e.g., Chacon, Robinson and Torvik 
2011), while this is not necessarily the case of military coups.  In a nutshell, coups and 
civil conflicts occur for different reasons, and their success is conditioned by different 
structural factors. Thus, conflating both phenomena into a single measure can result in two 
undesirable consequences. First, it could mask important statistical relationships, to the 
extent that countries that experience many civil wars but few coups appear to be similar to 
those that experience few civil wars but many coups. Second, this could lead to incorrect 
interpretations of the causal link between the independent variable of interest and the 
outbreak of domestic armed conflict.  
This problem of both Type I and Type II errors is especially acute in the case of empirical 
analyses linking political regime type to intrastate armed conflict – specifically, when the 
theory to be tested aims for the explanation of conflicts initiated by opposition groups 
                                                 
85 While this assumption is most often implicit, the point pertains to virtually all cross-national quantitative 
studies on political regime type and civil war: studies on democracy and intrastate armed conflict 
typically adopt a grievance-based approach (see, e.g., Hegre et al. 2001; Reynal-Querol 2002a, 2002b, 
2005; Lacina 2006; Regan and Bell 2010), as do recent studies on authoritarian regime type and domestic 
conflict (Gurses and Mason 2010; Fjelde 2010; Wilson 2014). 
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against the regime apparatus, and does not concern intra-elite conflicts. With regard to type 
I errors, while the influence of political structures on regimes’ vulnerability to elite splits is 
now well-documented (see, e.g., Geddes 1999; Magaloni 2006, 2008; Svolik 2012), their 
impact on intrastate armed conflict remains controversial (see, e.g., Collier and Hoeffler 
2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003). With regard to type II errors, many theories are based on 
the assumption that no single institutional arrangement allows political leaders to 
simultaneously counter threats from their elite (i.e., avoid coups) and successfully manage 
challenges from mobilized opposition groups (i.e., avoid revolutionary conflicts), and that 
there seems to be a trade-off between immunity to coups or elite splits and immunity to 
popular uprisings. For example, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) argue that democracies 
are more likely to be challenged by elites and dictatorships from “below.” With regard to 
dictatorships, O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) argue in their prominent work on 
democratization that opposition mobilization is more likely to result in a peaceful 
transition when an authoritarian regime loses its cohesiveness. “Conversely, no transition 
can be forced purely by opponents against a regime which maintains the cohesion, 
capacity, and disposition to apply repression. Perpetuation in power or armed military 
struggle become the only likely outcomes of such cases” (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 
21). Svolik (2012) argues that dictators who rely extensively on the armed forces may be 
able to successfully avoid opposition mobilization but run the risk that the military – 
endowed with resources and privileges that make it able to overthrow the government – 
turns against the regime itself. The point is made most explicit in Roessler’s (2011) 
analysis of African personalist regimes: by choosing to exclude powerful groups from the 
central government in order to avoid being overthrown, dictators simply choose to trade 
coup risk for civil war.  
If some regimes are able to resist challenges from the opposition while some others are 
better at avoiding elite splits, testing hypotheses pertaining to the effects of political 
institutions on civil conflict requires carefully distinguishing between conflicts initiated by 
the opposition from those resulting from splits within the state apparatus. For example, the 
recurring finding that democracy is not sufficient to prevent civil war could result from the 
fact that democracies do experience fewer large-scale conflicts, but are structurally more 
vulnerable to coups than authoritarian regimes (see, e.g., Pilster and Böhmelt 2012). 
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Conversely, the statistical association between authoritarian regime type and civil conflict 
onset uncovered by recent studies (e.g., Fjelde 2010; Wilson 2014) could be entirely driven 
by the inclusion of military coups in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset.  
 
 
5.3. REEXAMINING THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL REGIME TYPE ON INTRASTATE 
ARMED CONFLICT AND MILITARY COUPS: SOME EXPECTATIONS 
 
As discussed in the previous section, some military coups result in enough casualties to be 
included in datasets of intrastate armed conflicts. Yet, theoretically speaking, coups and 
intrastate armed conflicts are distinct phenomena: while the grievance-based civil war 
literature typically assumes that armed conflicts are initiated by dissatisfied opposition 
groups, coups are initiated either by regime insiders supported by some factions of the 
armed forces, or by the military itself – usually as a consequence of splits at the elite level 
(Powell and Thyne 2011): Thus, coups are essentially conflicts taking place between 
groups within the regime apparatus, which clearly sets them apart from intrastate armed 
conflicts.  
Given that 1) coups and armed revolts are fundamentally different processes, and 2) extant 
measures of civil war possibly conflate both phenomena, it becomes necessary to 
reexamine the relationship between political regimes and intrastate armed conflicts. The 
remainder of this chapter will thus directly deal with a crucial question: are Fjelde’s (2010) 
– and, by extension, Wilson’s (2014) – findings regarding authoritarian regime type and 
civil war entirely driven by the inclusion of coups in intrastate conflicts datasets? 
This question, in turn, implies that authoritarian regime type can be expected to impact the 
probability of a military coup. Therefore, as a first step, this section will present some 
theoretical expectations about political regimes’ vulnerability to civil conflicts and military 
coups, respectively: the main point is that there are, indeed, reasons to believe that 
authoritarian regime type affects coup risk. More specifically, the argument presented here 
is that the distinction between democracy and nondemocracy reflects how political power 
is allocated between incumbents and opposition groups, while the distinction between 
authoritarian subtypes reflects how political power is shared between different factions of 
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the ruling elite. Thus, the former distinction is relevant to the explanation of conflicts 
between elites and citizens, whereas the latter is more useful to predict the occurrence of 
intra-elite conflicts. In more concrete terms, I expect democracies to experience fewer civil 
wars than dictatorships. I also expect substantial variations between authoritarian subtypes 
with regard to military coups, but not with regard to civil wars.  
 
5.3.1. Political causes of civil war 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the minimalist approach to democracy (Przeworski 1999) holds 
that people submitted to an unwanted ruler tend to revolt only if there are no other ways to 
get rid of him: in democracies, institutional mechanisms – competitive elections – that 
allow for regular alternations in power incite dissatisfied groups to wait rather than to 
revolt. Furthermore, the fact that parties that lost the election can expect to win in the 
future round lessens the sense of permanent exclusion that ultimately leads groups to rebel. 
In short, democracies should experience fewer intrastate conflicts than nondemocracies 
because “only democracy provides an institutional framework that permits reform without 
violence” (Popper 1963, 4).  
The fact that democracy decreases the likelihood of civil war is not well established in the 
quantitative civil war literature (for a review, see Hegre 2014). Yet, previous studies have 
mostly been challenged on a methodological (Vreeland 2008) rather than theoretical 
ground, and issues of data availability and quality could be part of the reasons why the 
empirical evidence is mixed: as noted above, most of the tests of the “domestic democratic 
peace” have been performed with the Polity index, which is now increasingly viewed as 
unsuitable to analyze the relationship between political regime type and the outbreak of 
intrastate armed conflict (see Section 5.1.). The specificity of the minimalist approach to 
democracy calls for more direct tests of this hypothesis. 
I thus expect democracies to experience fewer domestic conflicts than nondemocracies. By 
contrast, I do not expect to uncover any significant difference between authoritarian 
regime types with regard to their vulnerability to armed conflict. One of the key findings 
of past research on authoritarian regimes is that those are more likely to break down as the 
result of splits within the ruling elite, and that the overwhelming majority of dictators who 
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lost power through irregular means were removed by government insiders or members of 
the armed forces (Svolik 2012; Kendall-Taylor and Frantz 2014). In short, popular 
uprisings are not the major threat to authoritarian rulers. Rather, it is the internal balance of 
power between factions of the elite that determines the stability of nondemocratic regimes 
and the fate of authoritarian rulers. Accordingly, most contemporary approaches to 
authoritarian regimes focus on how power is shared between regime insiders (Geddes 
1999; Haber 2006; Gandhi 2008a; Magaloni 2008; Cheibub et al. 2010; Svolik 2012). 
Elites being the main threat to autocrats and the primary target of authoritarian power-
sharing agreements, differences between authoritarian subtypes – or “qualitative” 
differences, as Hadenius and Teorell (2007a) put it – do not concern the mass public. 
Power-sharing arrangements between factions of the ruling elite are of little relevance to 
the voters, so if it is true that civil wars are initiated by dissatisfied citizens or marginalized 
opposition groups, variations in dictatorships’ proneness to civil conflict should be 
primarily explained by their degree of inclusiveness (or “democracy level”). In other 
words, there are few reasons to expect a politically insulated monarchy to behave 
differently from a politically insulated military dictatorship.  
To sum up, I expect democracies to experience fewer intrastate armed conflicts than 
dictatorships, but I do not expect dictatorships to vary systematically in their vulnerability 
to armed conflict. I thus test the following hypotheses: 
 
H1: Democracies run a lower risk of intrastate armed conflict than autocracies.  
H2: Authoritarian regime type does not impact the risk of intrastate conflict. 
 
5.3.2. Political causes of military coups  
 
The Chilean military dictatorship was in some respects a rather unconventional case. 
Contrary to most armed forces with a strong legacy of intervention in domestic politics, the 
Chilean military was comparatively cohesive and professionalized, and the four members 
of the junta rapidly agreed on a set of formal decision-making procedures upon the 1973 
coup (Barros 2002). As a consequence, with its seventeen years of existence, the regime 
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lasted much longer than the average military dictatorship.86 Yet, the junta almost imploded 
as one of its four key members, air force commander Gustavo Leigh, was forcefully 
removed from office in 1978. A major crisis ensued, as eighteen other air force generals 
resigned rather than accept to replace him.87 The crisis originated in Leigh’s objections to 
Pinochet’s attempts to consolidate personal rule, and escalated as he vocally opposed the 
1977 referendum called by Pinochet to seek public backing against the United Nation’s 
condemnation of his human rights record, and the 1978 plebiscite that allowed Pinochet to 
proclaim himself President. In 1978, he even told the Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera 
that he was in favor of returning Chile to democratic rule, and added that “ideas cannot be 
abolished through decree laws” and that Chile should authorize left-wing parties “in the 
same way the Swedes do.”88 And yet, Leigh was by no means a “soft-liner:” following the 
1973 coup, he famously stated that the junta’s objective was to eradicate the “Marxist 
cancer”89 from the country. He nonetheless disagreed with Pinochet about the very 
objectives of the military government: in one of his last television interviews, he stated that 
he was in favor of “putting the house in order, sweeping up, giving it a new coat of paint 
and handing it back over, calling elections and going home calmly with a sense of job 
accomplished. Not carrying on indefinitely.”90 
The Chilean case provides an interesting example of the divisions that can arise from 
interests conflicts between military leaders, and reveals, if anything, that military 
dictatorships are inherently brittle. This instability has been highlighted by many authors 
(e.g., Finer 2009 [1962]; Nordlinger 1977) and there is some empirical evidence that they 
tend to experience more coups than civilian-led regimes (Belkin and Schofer 2003; Powell 
2012). Military regimes display several peculiarities that may explain this instability. First, 
leaders who came to power through extraconstitutional means – such as the vast majority 
of military leaders – are much more likely to lose power in an irregular way (Londregan 
and Poole 1990; Goemans et al. 2009a). A reason why this is the case is that the first coup 
                                                 
86 The average duration of post-World War II military dictatorships is estimated between five (Nordlinger 
1977) and nine years (Geddes et al. 2014). 
87 Gunson, Phil. 1999. “Gustavo Leigh.” Guardian, October 2, 1999, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/news/1999/oct/02/guardianobituaries1 (accessed April 30, 2015). 
88 Ibid. For an alternative view, see Barros (2002). 
89 Ibid. 
90 Honan, William H. 1999. “Gustavo Leigh Guzman, 79, who served in Chilean military junta.” New York 
Times, October 1, 1999, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1999/10/01/world/gustavo-leigh-guzman-
79-who-served-in-chilean-junta.html (accessed April 30, 2015). 
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sets a precedent and breaks the fragile equilibrium of political control on the military (see 
Chapter 3): for example, Belkin and Schofer (2003, 608) argue that “coups have a 
powerful symbolic impact by legitimizing extraconstitutional methods as acceptable 
mechanisms for political transitions.” Relatedly, Nordlinger (1977, 40) suggests that, while 
officers might be reluctant to overthrow a (legitimate) civilian regime, they might have 
fewer qualms about toppling a rival faction that seized power illegally. While discussing 
the dynamics of coups and countercoups in military dictatorships, Geddes states that in 
these regimes, coups “are primarily a way of changing leadership while maintaining the 
regime itself” (Geddes 1999, 135).  
Second, as the Chilean example above highlights, the military – contrary to political 
parties – lacks a coherent ideology that could help maintain the cohesion of elites and 
prevent policy disagreements. Even if leading officers are united around some common 
goals such as national security, they typically disagree about how exactly these goals are to 
be achieved: as Nordlinger (1977, 145) notes, most coup plotters have “only vague ideas 
about their governing objectives and the means for attaining them.”  While these 
disagreements are not necessarily conducive to factionalization as long as the military 
remains focused on national security tasks, they are likely to lead to serious conflicts if one 
faction of the military assumes power and begins to implement policies other officers 
dislike.  
Third and most importantly, even coup leaders do not necessarily agree about how long 
they plan to stay in office before surrendering power or which conditions are appropriate 
for withdrawing (see, for example, O’Donnell and Schmitter [1986] on the divisions 
between “hardliners” and “softliners” in authoritarian elites coalitions). While many 
interventionist officers conceive their role as fundamentally temporary (Finer 2009 [1962]; 
Nordlinger 1977), some of them might either see it otherwise or simply find themselves 
enjoying political power after some time spent in office. These fundamental conflicts of 
interest are further aggravated by the fact that most officers except for the highest regime 
officials do not face a severe risk of prosecution after a regime transition, and that, while 
the survival of ruling parties after a regime change is dependent on their level of popular 
support, the military is likely to retain at least some of its influence and bargaining power 
(Geddes 1999; for some qualifications, see Debs 2010): as the regime becomes challenged, 
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while the highest ranking officials face an incentive to cling to power, the bulk of the 
officers might find a withdrawal a more attractive option.   
Thus, we should expect military dictatorships to be, on average, particularly prone to intra-
elite splits. But what about other authoritarian regimes? A quick glance at the average 
duration of authoritarian regimes provides some clues: monarchies and party regimes 
appear to be comparatively durable (see Geddes 1999; Hadenius and Teorell 2007a; 
Magaloni 2008). Since authoritarian regimes break down at different rates and coups are 
one of the main causes of dictatorships’ demise, this already indicates that the frequency of 
coups should vary from one regime type to another. There are, moreover, some theoretical 
reasons to expect monarchies and party regimes to be relatively immune to coups. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, the institution of hereditary succession in monarchies is a powerful 
tool to prevent intra-elite splits. In turn, the stability of intra-elite relationships should deter 
the military from attempting to seize power: as prior research on civil-military relations 
has highlighted, the military seldom unilaterally intervenes unless the regime displays 
severe signs of internal instability (e.g., Finer 2009 [1962]).  
These arguments, to a certain extent, apply to party-based regimes as well, since prior 
research has consistently highlighted both their relative stability91 and their ability to 
maintain elite cohesion and avoid intra-elite splits (Geddes 1999; Brownlee 2005; 
Magaloni 2008). There are yet other reasons why we should expect party regimes to be 
less prone to coups than other types of dictatorships. One of these reasons has been 
discussed in Chapter 4: the persistence of external threats limits the military’s ability to get 
involved in domestic affairs, enhances the cohesion of elites, and thus lessens the risk of 
conflicts between civilian rulers and armed forces (see Desch 2001; Piplani and Talmadge 
2015; McMahon and Slantchev 2015). Another reason is that single-party regimes have by 
definition succeeded in either incorporating or eliminating organized opposition, which 
deprives potential coup plotters from any civilian support in case they manage to attain 
power.  
A final reason why party regimes can be expected to experience fewer military coups is 
                                                 
91  This is not tautological. The fact that party regimes last longer could be explained by the fact that they are 
able to successfully deal with attempted coups (i.e., that coups are more likely to fail in party regimes 
than in other dictatorships). My argument, by contrast, pertains to all attempted coups, including failed 
ones: The idea is that, regardless of their odds of success, coups are attempted less frequently in these 
regimes. 
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given by Geddes (2006): the existence of a mass party makes it easier for the incumbent to 
mobilize support in case a coup is attempted. Given that the military is generally reluctant 
to intervene in the face of mass protest, anticipating large demonstrations in support of the 
dictator can deter potential coup plotters. Geddes is careful to note that this is not because 
parties genuinely increase popular support, but because they facilitate the organization and 
coordination of opposition and the monitoring of participants by party members (Geddes 
2006, 4).  
To sum up, I expect authoritarian regimes to vary systematically with regard to their 
vulnerability to coups, military dictatorships displaying the highest risk, and monarchies 
and party regimes the lowest risk of coup. I expect civilian autocracies to fall somewhere 
in the middle, and to experience fewer coups than military regimes but more than 
monarchies and party regimes.  
 
H3: Military dictatorships run a higher coup risk than other regimes.  
H4: Monarchies and party regimes run a lower coup risk than other regimes. 
 
What about democracies? Empirical studies analyzing the frequency of coups across 
regime types remain rare, and mostly come to contradictory results (see e.g. Powell, 2012; 
Lehoucq and Pérez-Liñán, 2014; Thyne and Powell 2015). On the one hand, there are good 
reasons to expect democracies to be more vulnerable to coups than at least some types of 
autocracies. First, autocracies’ higher repressive capacities (Davenport 2007a) make them 
able to raise the costs of coups: for a failed coup, conspirators might expect a harsher 
punishment in autocracies than in democracies, which makes the latter an easier prey for 
coup plotters. Second, democracies are less likely than autocracies to divide and weaken 
the military to avoid coups, because coup-proofing tends to make the military ineffective 
and military defeats have a direct potential impact on the probability of an elected leader 
being removed from office (Pilster and Böhmelt 2011; 2012). 
On the other hand, the fact that in democracies, access to and alternation in power occur 
through regular procedures should reduce instability at the elite level and thereby decrease 
officers’ incentives to get involved in domestic politics (see Chapter 3). Thus, although 
democracies are somewhat limited in their capacity to implement coup-proofing measures, 
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I still expect them to run a lower risk of coup than non-institutionalized regimes.  
 
H5: Democracies run a lower coup risk than non-institutionalized regimes. 
 
 
5.4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
5.4.1. The data 
 
5.4.1.1. Dependent variable  
 
The dependent variable is a categorical variable that takes on the value of 1 in the years an 
internal conflict breaks out (subsequent conflict years are coded 0), 2 if there has been at 
least one attempted or successful military coup in the country-year, and 0 otherwise. Data 
on military coups are drawn from Powell and Thyne’s (2011) dataset. Coups are defined as 
“illegal and overt attempts by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to 
unseat the sitting executive” (Powell and Thyne 2011, 252). I do not distinguish between 
successful and failed coups, and I collapse country-years with multiple coups into a single 
value. 
With regard to intrastate armed conflicts, I use data from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict 
Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Harbom and Wallensteen 2010), that defines armed conflict 
as a “contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both where the use 
of armed force between two parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths” and in which 
one of the two parties is the government of a state (Gleditsch et al. 2002, 618-619). I 
specify the variable as follows: 
(1) I use only data on purely intrastate or internationalized internal conflicts. I thus 
exclude interstate as well as extrasystemic conflicts. While some authors choose to 
include extrasystemic (i.e., anti-colonial) conflicts in their list of civil wars (see, e.g., 
Fearon and Laitin 2003), I see at least one good reason not to do so: since I am 
primarily concerned with the impact of regime type on intrastate conflict, including 
wars of decolonization would imply assigning the colonizers’ political system to the 
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colonies; this would severely bias the analysis to the extent that colonized 
populations were virtually never granted the same political rights as the citizens of 
the metropole.  
(2) I do not distinguish between conflicts over territory and conflicts over 
government: Both conflict types take on the value of 1 on the dependent variable.  
(3) I do not distinguish between different intensity levels either. The UCDP/PRIO 
dataset makes it possible to distinguish between minor conflicts (that claim between 
25 and 1,000 battle-deaths) and wars (that result in more than 1,000 battle-deaths), 
but I do not see any theoretical reason for treating these two types separately. 
(4) The intermittency threshold (i.e., how many years of inactivity must have passed 
between two different observations of an active conflict before a new onset is coded) 
is set by two years. This reflects standard practice in the civil war literature (see, e.g., 
Fjelde 2010; Gleditsch and Ruggeri 2010).  
(5) In the period from 1950 to 2005, there have been 248 outbreaks of civil conflict 
and 377 attempted or successful coups. In 52 cases, both a coup and a conflict onset 
were reported in the same country-year. Since it is unclear whether these 
observations are measurement errors (i.e., coups classified as intrastate armed 
conflicts) or whether some countries simply experienced both a domestic conflict and 
a military coup in the same year, I code these cases as missing. 
 
5.4.1.2. Independent variables 
 
To measure political regime type, I use Cheibub et al.’s (2010) dataset (see Chapter 2). 
This measure has several advantages. First, the operational definition of democracy that 
underlies Cheibub et al.’s (2010) measure is directly related to the main theoretical 
argument regarding democracies and civil war – namely, that the mechanism linking 
democracy to civil war (if there is one) is the possibility of alternation through contested 
elections. Second, Cheibub et al.’s (2010) operational definition of military dictatorship 
also makes the measure suitable to test Hypothesis 2: regimes are coded as military 
dictatorships if they are not democratic and if the chief executive is or ever was a 
professional member of the military. In other words, their definition of military regimes is 
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based on the mere identity of the leader. Thus, since one common argument suggests that 
military dictatorships should not be particularly conflict-prone precisely because military 
leaders have the possibility to withdraw before public dissent escalates into civil war (see 
Geddes 1999; Debs 2010; Geddes et al. 2014), this definition is well-suited for the 
empirical analysis. Finally, contrary to some commonly used datasets – see, e.g., Hadenius 
and Teorell (2007b) – Cheibub et al. (2010) do not code rulers who came to power through 
insurgency as military, which avoids potential endogeneity issues.  
The independent variables thus consist of five dummy variables measuring democracy, 
civilian autocracy, single-party regime, military dictatorship, and monarchy, respectively.  
 
Table 5.1. Summary statistics on regime type, coups and conflicts, 1950-2005 
 Observations Conflict outbreaks  Coups 
Military dictatorship 1,575 55 193 
Monarchy 595 5 13 
Civilian autocracy 1,549 59 49 
Single-party regime 808 17 13 
Democracy 2,807 56 53 
(Sources: UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset; Cheibub et al. 2010; Powell and Thyne 2011) 
 
5.4.1.3. Control variables 
 
In addition to the dependent and independent variables, I use several control variables 
which have been found to be robustly associated with the onset of civil war: I control for 
per capita income using data from the Maddison Project Database (Bolt and van Zanden 
2013), and ethnic fractionalization using data from the Ethnic Power Relations dataset 
(Cederman, Wimmer and Min 2010). Since the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset 
requires an armed conflict to claim a minimal number of battle-deaths to be included in the 
data, I control for population (see Sambanis 2004): Data are taken from Ross’ (2013) Oil 
and Gas dataset. Finally, I add a Cold War dummy which takes on the value of 1 from 
1946 to 1990.  
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Table 5.2. Summary statistics on control variables, 1950-2005 
 Mean Standard deviation Observations 
(ln) GDP/capita 7.92 1.06 7,054 
(ln) Population 15.93 1.53 7,256 
ELF 0.41 0.31 6,858 
Regime duration 16.39 13.97 7,334 
(Sources: Maddison Project database; Cederman et al. 2010; Cheibub et al. 2010; Ross 2013) 
 
5.4.2. Results 
 
To test my hypotheses, I use multinomial regression. This allows me to test whether each 
regime is more likely to be challenged from the inside or from below. Following Fjelde 
(2010) and Wilson (2014), I also control for regime duration, and add two variables that 
measure the number of years since the last occurrence of a conflict or a coup, respectively. 
I use robust standard errors clustered by country. All regime variables are lagged one year. 
 
Table 5.3. Regime type, civil conflict onset, and military coups, 1950-2005 
(multinomial regression, reporting relative risk ratios) 
 (1) (2) 
 Outcome: conflicts Outcome: coups 
   
Peace duration (conflicts) a 0.974*** (0.009) 1.000 (0.009) 
Peace duration (coups) a 1.002 (0.011) 0.938*** (0.014) 
GDP/capita a,  b 0.872 (0.122) 0.783** (0.090) 
Population a,  b 1.438*** (0.091) 0.938 (0.054) 
ELF 3.929*** (1.434) 1.725** (0.403) 
Cold War 0.519*** (0.103) 1.653*** (0.302) 
Democracy a 0.623* (0.158) 0.806 (0.162) 
Civilian dictatorship a 0.659 (0.167) 0.601*** (0.113) 
Party dictatorship a 0.645 (0.201) 0.300*** (0.08) 
Monarchy a 0.428*** (0.139) 0.514** (0.141) 
Regime duration a 0.992 (0.0134) 0.963*** (0.0127) 
Constant 0.001*** (0.000) 1.765 (2.168) 
Countries 150 150 
Observations 6,464 6,464 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  
a Lagged one year; b Log 
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Table 5.3. displays the results. Model 1 shows the impact of regime type on the outbreak of 
intrastate armed conflict. In Model 2, military coups are the outcome. In both models, 
military dictatorships – that display, according to Fjelde (2010), the highest risk of civil 
conflict – are the reference category. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
Model 1 reveals few clear tendencies regarding dictatorships’ vulnerability to armed 
conflict: as expected (Hypothesis 2), most of the authoritarian regime dummies do not 
differ significantly from the baseline with regard to their risk of intrastate armed conflict. 
Importantly, the model indicates that military dictatorships do not run a higher risk of 
conflict than one-party regimes. In fact, the only regimes that run a significantly lesser risk 
of conflict than military dictatorships are democracies (which lends support to Hypothesis 
1) and, somewhat more surprisingly, monarchies. While democracy is found to decrease 
the risk of conflict by approximately one third – the coefficient being only marginally 
significant – monarchies are less than half as likely to experience civil war as military 
dictatorships. The effect is strongly significant.  
As expected, military regimes experience more coups than all of the other regimes (Model 
2): all relative risk ratios associated with authoritarian regime dummies are below 1. The 
effect is statistically significant in the cases of monarchies, civilian dictatorships, and one-
party regimes, the latter having the strongest effect: the estimated probability of 
experiencing a coup is more than three times as high in military dictatorships as in party 
regimes. Thus, even though single-party regimes neither increase nor decrease the risk of 
civil war compared to military dictatorships, they still display peaceful attributes: they 
appear to run the lowest risk of coup among all regime types. Civilian dictatorships and 
monarchies also experience significantly fewer coups than military regimes, both regimes 
decreasing coup risk by about 40% and roughly 50%, respectively. 
Finally, even though the coefficient associated with democracies indicates a lower 
vulnerability to coups, the difference is not statistically significant. Additional tests with 
alternative binary democracy measures (Boix et al. 2013) further indicate that the 
democracy-dictatorship dichotomy is not relevant to predict the occurrence of coups: 
Hypothesis 5 is not supported.  
Some interesting tendencies regarding control variables can be noted. GDP per capita has a 
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negative influence of both conflict risk and coup risk, but is only significant in the latter 
case. Conversely, population size only impacts (positively) the risk of a conflict onset. The 
duration variables that measure the number of years since the last occurrence of a coup and 
the last occurrence of a conflict impact negatively the probability of a coup and the 
probability of conflict, respectively. Finally, the effect of the Cold War dummy (significant 
in both models) is positive in the case of coups but negative in the case of conflicts.  
To sum up, these findings lend some preliminary support to Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4: among 
all regime types included in the analysis, one-party regimes run the lowest risk, and 
military regimes the highest risk of coup d’état; yet, both regimes do not differ from each 
other with regard to their vulnerability to civil war. Overall, the type of authoritarian 
regimes does not seem to make any difference for the risk of intrastate armed conflict, with 
the notable exception of monarchies. Finally, the results confirm Hypothesis 1, but 
Hypothesis 5 is rejected: when compared to military dictatorships, democracies are 
associated with a lower risk of civil war, but are not immune to coups. 
On the whole, the results sketched above are at odds with those of Fjelde’s (2010) and 
Wilson’s (2014) studies. But is this difference in findings due to the difference of datasets? 
Fjelde performs her tests using two different datasets, namely Hadenius and Teorell’s 
(2007b), and Wright’s (2008) update of Geddes’ (1999) classification of authoritarian 
regimes. In his replication of Fjelde’s study, Wilson (2014) obtains similar results with 
Wrights’ (2008) and Hadenius and Teorell’s (2007b) datasets, but the regime dummies 
from Cheibub et al.’s (2010) dataset fail to attain statistical significance. Differences in 
coding could thus explain why I cannot replicate Fjelde’s (2010) results: although military 
regimes are coded in a broadly similar way in these three datasets,92 the measure I built for 
one-party regimes (that relies exclusively on the number of existing parties) is a somewhat 
crude measure of the concept, and only loosely related to the potential for co-optation or to 
the constraints on the autocrat’s power (which are the main causal mechanisms linking 
one-party regimes to domestic conflict in Fjelde’s analysis). Since Geddes et al. (2012) 
directly code party regimes, their data should allow me to test my hypotheses in a more 
direct way. I thus check whether my findings hold with an alternative measurement of 
                                                 
92  In spite of broadly similar operational definitions, there are still non-negligible divergences between 
Geddes et al.’s (2012) and Cheibub et al.’s (2010) coding of military dictatorships (see Croissant 2013b). 
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authoritarian regime types: Geddes et al.’s (2012) dataset distinguishes between 
monarchies, military dictatorships, personalist autocracies, and party regimes. I use the 
dummy variables from the dataset without modification.  
 
Table 5.4. Regime types according to Geddes et al. (2012) 
Regimes Observations 
Military dictatorships 554 
Party regimes 2,073 
Personalist autocracies 1,011 
Monarchies  499 
(Source: Geddes et al. 2012) 
 
Note that, because the sample is restricted to nondemocracies, the number of observations 
drops to 3,852. The model specification and control variables remain the same (except for 
the regime duration variable, built on the basis of Geddes et al.’s classification). I use 
military dictatorships as the reference category. Table 5.5. displays the results. 
Models 3 and 4 report the results for intrastate conflicts and coups, respectively. The 
different measurement of political regime type leads to some minor changes in the results, 
but overall, findings remain the same: autocratic subtypes do not have any effect on the 
probability of domestic conflict (Model 3). However, regime type has a strong effect on 
coup risk (Model 4): All relative risk ratios associated with regime types differ 
significantly from the baseline. Military dictatorships therefore run the highest risk coup 
risk, whereas party regimes and monarchies (displaying the strongest coefficients) are the 
least likely to experience a coup: both regimes are only about 25% as likely to experience 
a coup as military dictatorships.  
The main difference between Models 1 and 2 – based on Cheibub et al.’s (2010) measure – 
and Models 3 and 4 – based on Geddes et al.’s (2012) measure – concerns monarchies. In 
Model 1, monarchies appeared to be less likely to experience civil war. This result is not 
confirmed in Model 3: although monarchy has a relatively large negative effect on the 
dependent variable, this effect is not statistically significant. By contrast, the effect of 
monarchy on coups is much higher in Model 4 than in Model 2. Moreover, monarchies 
emerge as the most stable regime type in Model 4, and even outperform party regimes. In 
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spite of these differences, the main findings remain the same: there is no variation in non-
institutionalized regimes’ probability of experiencing civil war.  
 
 
Table 5.5. Regime type, coups, and intrastate armed conflicts, 1950-2005 
(multinomial regression, reporting relative risk ratios)  
 (3) (4) 
 Outcome: conflicts Outcome: coups 
   
Peace duration (conflicts) a 0.981 (0.017) 0.990 (0.011) 
Peace duration (coups) a 1.009 (0.019) 0.929*** (0.016) 
GDP/capita a,  b 0.914 (0.155) 0.901 (0.106) 
Population a,  b 1.410*** (0.134) 0.830*** (0.058) 
ELF 3.134*** (1.314) 1.380 (0.383) 
Cold War 0.405*** (0.097) 1.661** (0.345) 
Monarchy a  0.518 (0.331) 0.241*** (0.066) 
Personalist dictatorship a 0.579 (0.333) 0.603** (0.126) 
Party dictatorship a 0.567 (0.298) 0.261*** (0.059) 
Regime duration a 0.982 (0.024) 1.014 (0.011) 
Constant 0.001*** (0.001) 5.588 (8.199) 
Countries 115 115 
Observations 3,852 3,852 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  
a Lagged one year; b Log 
 
 
 
5.5. A CLOSER LOOK AT POLITICAL REGIMES AND CIVIL WAR: DEMOCRACIES 
AND MONARCHIES IN THE 19th CENTURY 
 
The results discussed above point to two interesting tendencies regarding regime types and 
civil war. One of these results – the negative effect of democracy on civil war – is 
theoretically consistent; the second one – the fact that monarchy decreases the risk of civil 
war as well – is, by contrast, rather surprising. Albeit unexpected, this latter result is not a 
mere anomaly: Gurses and Mason (2010) obtain a broadly similar result.93 But this finding 
                                                 
93 More specifically, using Geddes’ (1999) data, they find that monarchies and party regimes decrease the 
risk of civil war compared to personalist autocracies, while other regime types (e.g. military 
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is still surprising, given the restrictions placed on political participation in those regimes 
and the fact that there is absolutely no constitutional way of removing an unpopular 
monarch from power. Actually, given the relative rarity of both monarchies and civil wars, 
this finding might be a statistical artefact: monarchies represent only roughly 8% of all 
observations for the period from 1946 to 2008. Moreover, the share of monarchies steadily 
decreases over time, representing about 7% of the sample for the period from 1975 to 
2008, and about 6% for the post-Cold War period. Finally, the distribution of monarchies 
displays a strong regional variation: apart from ceremonial monarchies that are de facto 
ruled by an elected official, monarchies are inexistent in Europe, America and Oceania, 
and virtually absent from Sub-Saharan Africa – with the notable exceptions of Swaziland, 
Burundi and Ethiopia, the two latter of which are not exactly known for their peacefulness. 
Most of contemporary monarchies are instead concentrated in oil-exporting countries of 
the Middle East. Accordingly, the average per capita income of monarchies diverges 
strongly from the one of other authoritarian regimes, as can be seen in Table 5.6. 
 
 
Table 5.6. Per capita income in monarchies and non-monarchic dictatorships, 1946-
2008  
 
 Mean income Std. deviation Max. income Min. income 
Monarchies 6,184.42 6,982.66 42,916 390 
Non-monarchic regimes 2,393.08 2,453.84 28,138 207 
(Sources: Maddison Project database; Cheibub et al. 2010) 
 
 
On average, monarchies are roughly 2.5 times as rich as non-monarchic dictatorships. Note 
that the mean per capita income of monarchies increases substantially if the two poorest 
monarchies (which are, unsurprisingly, Burundi and Ethiopia) are removed from the 
sample. Thus, given the small number of monarchies and their similarities, it appears 
difficult to distinguish the specific effects of monarchy from those of its covariates (e.g. 
income, rentierism, or other geographic, cultural or religious factors). To further 
complicate matters, regime type is not independent from regime tenure: Hadenius and 
                                                                                                                                                   
dictatorships) do not differ significantly from personalist autocracies. 
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Teorell (2007a) find that monarchies – with an average duration of 25 years – display the 
longest life span among authoritarian regimes. This might further bias analyses since most 
regimes are more prone to civil war within the period that immediately follows political 
transitions (see, e.g., Hegre et al. 2001; Regan and Bell 2010).  
All in all, these statistical patterns cast doubt on the validity of any empirical association 
between monarchy and civil war. Even if this relationship exists independently from all 
correlates of monarchy, this would still not exclude possible reverse causation issues: the 
causal mechanism underlying the statistical association between monarchy and civil war 
might not be that monarchy “causes” peace (or displays institutional features that make it 
inherently immune to civil war), but rather that countries that managed to avoid civil 
conflict (for reasons unrelated to regime type) are on the whole less likely to have 
undergone a regime transition than countries that experienced internal turmoil. This 
explanation is not implausible if we keep in mind that most of the regimes prior to the 20th 
century were monarchies (which were later replaced by other regime types), and that civil 
wars do not happen randomly (i.e., that some countries display characteristics that make 
them prone to civil conflict, while some others never experience internal turmoil). With 
these basic facts in mind, if we assume that regimes that repeatedly experience armed 
conflict are on the long run more likely to transition than those that remain unchallenged, 
and that monarchies are less likely to emerge from a successful rebellion than other regime 
types, then the share of monarchies at war should mechanically decrease as time passes: 
history has gradually eliminated fragile monarchies, and the only ones that survived 
throughout the 20th century are by definition those in which civil war, for some reason, 
never occurs. This scenario provides an explanation for why there are so few monarchies 
left at the beginning of the 21st century, and why the remaining ones seem to be relatively 
immune to intrastate armed conflict.  
Deciding between both hypotheses (monarchies are immune to civil war vs. only peaceful 
countries managed to remain monarchies) requires testing these on a sample of regimes 
that includes not only old and rich monarchies, but also newly established or relatively 
poor monarchies. As discussed above, such cases are rare in the contemporary period, 
especially after 1975. However, this was not always the case: monarchies were one of the 
most widespread regime types prior to the 20th century. I thus reassess the relationship 
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between regime type and civil war using a dataset that covers the period from 1800 to 
1913. To test whether monarchies really are immune to civil conflict, I develop my own 
dataset on monarchies. The dataset also includes a measure of democracy recently 
developed by Boix, Miller and Rosato (2013): This allows me to check whether findings 
regarding democracy’s negative effects on civil war can be generalized.  
I begin by summarizing the coding rules underlying the classification of regimes I use for 
the empirical analysis (Section 5.5.6.). Section 5.5.7. provides an overview of the data and 
methods and presents the main results.  
 
5.5.1. Political regimes in the 19th century 
 
This section presents an overview on political regimes in the 19th century. The dataset 
covers the years from 1800 to 1913, and includes 71 independent countries. States are 
considered independent if they appear in the Correlates of War State System Membership 
list (2011).  
The first step consists in distinguishing democracies from nondemocratic regimes. Since 
Cheibub et al.’s (2010) “Democracy and Dictatorship” dataset – on which the empirical 
analysis in the previous sections was based – only covers the post-World War II era, I use 
another recent democracy measure developed by Boix, Miller and Rosato (2013). Their 
dataset covers all independent countries from 1800 onwards: to date, this is the most 
comprehensive dichotomous measure of democracy. Boix et al. (2013) rely on a minimal, 
Schumpeterian definition of democracy, that is conceptually similar to Cheibub et al.’s 
(2010) definition. To qualify as democracy, a country must meet following requirements: 
(1) the executive must be directly or indirectly elected in popular, free and fair elections, 
and be responsible either directly to voters or to a legislature; (2) the legislature must be 
elected in free and fair elections; (3) a majority of adult men must be entitled to vote. Thus, 
the residual category of authoritarian regimes includes all regimes that fail to satisfy at 
least one of these necessary conditions.  
Boix et al.’ (2013) measure of democracy presents several advantages compared to other 
datasets (e.g., Polity IV) that cover a similar period. First, their measure is dichotomous 
and provides a clear-cut distinction between democracies and authoritarian regimes. 
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Second, contrary to the Polity data, Boix et al.’s (2013) measure does not include any 
indicator that is directly or indirectly related to the outbreak of internal political violence 
(see Vreeland 2008). Third, Boix et al. (2013) include a minimal suffrage requirement 
(which is absent from Polity IV) for a country to be classified as a democracy. Most 
currently available democracy datasets exclude this criterion for legitimate reasons: for 
example, Alvarez et al. (1996, 5) explicitly state that, for datasets that classify countries 
from 1946 onwards, suffrage is not an issue since it became universal in virtually all 
countries after WWII. However, omitting the participation criterion becomes problematic 
when it comes to identifying democracies in the 19th century, since universal suffrage was 
by no means granted. Finally, as already noted, Boix et al. (2013) and Cheibub et al. 
(2010) define and measure democracy in a broadly similar way, although there are some 
slight differences in the coding rules on which both measures rely:94 This allows for a 
direct comparison of the results obtained for the two periods.  
The second step consists in distinguishing monarchies from other nondemocratic regimes 
for the 1800-1913 period. To my knowledge, there is to date no publicly available, 
comprehensive dataset that provides such information for the entire period under 
consideration: I thus construct my own dataset on nondemocratic regimes in the 19th 
century.95 The category of nondemocratic regimes comprises all regimes that receive a 
score of 0 in Boix et al.’s (2013) dataset, with the exception of those which have 
practically ceased to function due to foreign occupation or other factors: these cases are 
identified through the standardized authority scores from the Polity IV project96 (Marshall 
et al. 2011) and coded as missing. Remaining regimes are then sorted into two categories: 
the first one includes monarchies, that is, regimes in which the effective ruler bears the title 
of “king” or equivalent and has attained power by rules of hereditary succession. The 
second category includes all regimes in which the head of state either bears the title of 
“president” or equivalent or has accessed power by other means than hereditary 
                                                 
94 The major difference – besides the participation criterion – is that the alternation rule is absent from Boix 
et al.’s (2013) measure. This involves a loss of transparency in the coding rules (it is not entirely clear 
how Boix et al. measure competition) but solves the problem of retroactive coding (see Ulfelder 2006). 
95 The coding is based on the Encyclopædia Britannica (various years) and Wikipedia. The latter is now 
widely accepted as a reliable source (see Eisner 2011; Kokkonen and Sundell 2014) and, to the extent that 
I have been able to cross-check, Wikipedia information is indeed accurate. Coding errors are my own. 
96 Only countries given a score of -66 (foreign interruption) are considered undergoing a period of effective 
interruption. Scores of -88 (transition) are not taken into account. To avoid endogeneity, I do not take 
scores of -77 (interregnum) into account either.   
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succession: for convenience purposes, these regimes are hereafter referred to as 
“republics.” 
 
 
Table 5.7.: Democracies in the world, 1800-1913 (by continent and date of transition) 
 
Europe North America South America 
France, 1848-1851; 1870-1913 
Switzerland, 1848-1913 
Greece, 1864-1913 
United Kingdom, 1885-1913 
Luxembourg, 1890-1913 
Belgium, 1894-1913 
Netherlands, 1897-1913 
Norway, 1900-1913 
Denmark, 1901-1913 
Portugal, 1911-1913 
Sweden, 1911-1913 
United States, 1800-1913 
Canada, 1867-1913 
Chile, 1909-1913 
Cuba, 1909-1913 
Argentina, 1912-1913 
Asia Africa Oceania 
 Orange Free States, 1854-1902 New Zealand, 1857-1913 
Australia, 1901-1913 
(Source: Boix, Miller and Rosato 2013) 
 
 
  
In order to facilitate the comparison of results, I use the same definition of monarchy as 
Cheibub et al. (2010): monarchies are defined as regimes in which the legal, regular way 
of accessing political power is hereditary succession. By “regular way”, I mean that 
hereditary succession has to occur in accordance with custom or the constitution (de jure 
rule) and must take place effectively (de facto rule). This excludes regimes in which a 
leader chooses a family member as his successor without hereditary succession being a 
formal rule, as well as failed attempts by new leaders to establish a monarchy. 
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Table 5.8. Monarchies in the world, 1800-1913 (by continent and year) 
 
Europe Africa Asia 
Austria, 1800-1913 
Bavaria, 1800-1871 
Denmark, 1800-1900 
Portugal, 1800-1806; 1820-1909 
Prussia, 1800-1867 
Spain, 1800-1807; 1814-1872; 
1875-1913 
Sweden, 1800-1911 
United Kingdom, 1800-1884 
Wuerttemberg, 1800-1871 
Saxony, 1806-1871 
Belgium, 1811-1893 
France, 1814-1847 
Modena, 1815-1860 
Netherlands, 1815-1896 
Parma, 1815-1860 
Sardinia, 1815-1861 
Tuscany, 1815-1860 
Two Sicilies, 1816-1860 
Baden, 1819-1870 
Serbia, 1830-1913 
Greece, 1832-1863 
Italy, 1861-1913 
Romania, 1866-1913 
Hungary, 1867-1913 
Luxembourg, 1867-1889 
Germany, 1868-1913 
Bulgaria, 1886-1913 
Morocco, 1800-1912 Afghanistan, 1800-1913 
China, 1800-1911 
Iran, 1800-1913 
Japan, 1800-1913 
Korea, 1800-1910 
Nepal, 1800-1913 
Oman, 1800-1913 
Russia, 1800-1913 
Thailand, 1800-1913 
Turkey, 1800-1913 
Bhutan, 1907-1913 
North America South America Oceania 
 Brazil, 1824-1888  
 
 
Likewise, coding rules for identifying monarchies are similar to those underlying Cheibub 
et al.’s (2010) classification. To be classified as monarchies, countries have to meet two 
requirements: first, the ruler has to bear the title of “king” or equivalent;97 second, de facto 
hereditary succession must have taken place at least once (i.e., the current leader has 
inherited power or is replaced by rules of hereditary succession). The first criterion refers 
                                                 
97 E.g., “sultan”, “emperor”, “prince”, “shah”, or “grand duke”. 
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to the de jure rule, whereas the second one is intended for newly established regimes or 
newly independent countries. If the new leader succeeds in transmitting power to a family 
member, the predecessor and the successor are both coded as monarchs. If he fails, 
however, the regime is not considered a monarchy and is instead classified in the category 
of “others”. For example, French ruler Napoleon I bore the title of emperor, but did not 
have any hereditary predecessor or successor: he was not related to the previous royal 
family, he accessed power via a coup d’état, and his regime was abolished before his 
successor could effectively reign. His heir, Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte, took the throne as 
Napoleon III forty years later, in 1852. Yet, he did not access power by rules of hereditary 
succession either (he was instead elected by popular vote as president of the Second 
Republic) and the monarchy was abolished before he could pass power to his son. 
Therefore, none of these two rulers is coded as a monarch.  
There are, however, two exceptions to this rule. First, periods of interruption are not taken 
into account: when a monarchic regime is abolished and subsequently restored, both 
periods are coded as monarchies as long as the last monarch of the first period and the first 
of the second period belong to the same family and at least the second one took the throne 
by rules of hereditary succession. Second, leaders without hereditary predecessor and 
successor are still considered monarchs if they are directly affiliated to another country’s 
royal family. For example, Otto I, the first monarch of the newly established Kingdom of 
Greece, was removed from the throne in 1863 without having managed to pass power to 
his designated successor. Yet, since he was the son of King Ludwig I of Bavaria, I code 
him as monarch.  
 
 
5.5.2. Democracies, monarchies, and civil war: An additional test with new data 
 
I now move on to the empirical analysis. I still expect democracy to lower the risk of civil 
war (see Section 5.3.1). By contrast, I expect monarchies to run the highest risk of civil 
war: first, the restrictions placed on political participation deprive citizens of any peaceful 
way of making demands on the state; second, the monarch typically rules without 
constraints, except from those of a narrow ruling elite; third and most importantly, citizens 
do not choose their leader and cannot remove him from office. Recall Przeworski’s (1999) 
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argument on democracy’s advantage compared to other regime types: people submitted to 
an unwanted leader revolt when there is no other way of getting rid of him, but prefer to 
wait when they expect an alternation in power to take place reasonably soon. Thus, in 
democracy, people do not revolt because leaders are selected for short mandates and are 
not reelected if they lose public support. If we extend this argument, in a typical 
dictatorship, alternation occurs either through the leader’s death or through a revolution. In 
monarchies, even the leader’s death does not lead to alternation because he is immediately 
replaced by a member of the ruling dynasty: rebellion is thus the only way of getting rid of 
an incompetent or unpopular leader.   
I thus test following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 6: Democracies run a lower risk of civil war than monarchies and republics. 
Hypothesis 7: Monarchies run a higher risk of civil war than democracies and republics. 
  
Since the UCDP/PRIO data (on which the empirical analysis in section 5.4. was based) is 
only available from 1946 onwards, I rely on the Correlates of War (COW) Intra-State War 
data, version 4.0 (Small and Singer 1982; Sarkees 2010) to measure civil war. Data are 
available from 1816 to present. The dataset includes any armed conflict that takes place 
within the boundaries of a state and involves “effective resistance by both sides, and a total 
of at least 1,000 battle-deaths during each year of the war” (Sarkees 2010, 5). “Effective 
resistance” means either that “both sides [are] initially organized for violent conflict and 
prepared to resist attacks of their antagonists” or that “the weaker side (…) is able to inflict 
upon the stronger opponents at least five percent of the number of fatalities it sustains” 
(Small and Singer 1982, 215): these criteria are used to distinguish wars from one-sided 
state killings. The threshold of 1,000 fatalities is much higher than the one of the 
UCDP/PRIO dataset used in the previous analysis, which raises some comparability issues. 
Yet, one advantage of this threshold is that it limits the risk that coups are included in the 
civil wars list.  
The COW project operates a further distinction within the category of intrastate armed 
conflict: civil wars, which involve the participation of the national government (war types 
4 and 5 in the COW wars typology), are differentiated from regional internal wars (war 
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type 6), in which at least one of the participants is a local or regional government, and 
intercommunal wars (war type 7), in which none of the participants is a government 
(Sarkees 2010, 8). My analysis includes war types 4, 5, and 6, but I exclude 
intercommunal wars. However, given the relative rarity of wars, I do not distinguish 
between conflicts for control of the central government (war type 4) and conflicts over 
local issues (war type 5): both categories are collapsed into a single value. Finally, I only 
report the first year of the conflict: subsequent war years are coded 0.  
 
Table 5.9.: Civil war onset (1816-1913) 
 
 Observations Percent 
Civil war onset 106 2.08 
Peace and ongoing conflict years 4,979 97.92 
Total 5,085 100 
(Source: Correlates of War) 
 
 
From the same data source, I generate a variable (peace duration) that records the number 
of years passed since the last instance of intrastate armed conflict. The variable is used to 
address time-dependence issues.98  
Some of the control variables included in the previous analysis (e.g., ethnic 
fractionalization) are not available for the period under consideration. However, data can 
be found for two of the most robust predictors of civil war, namely GDP per capita and 
population. To measure GDP per capita, I use the same data as in section 5.4: the 
Maddison project database (Bolt and van Zanden 2013) spans the whole period between 
AD 1 and 2010 and incorporates estimates of GDP per capita for most of the countries 
under investigation. Data on population are drawn from the National Material Capabilities 
dataset from the COW project (Singer et al. 1972): Population values are available from 
1816 to present. Note, however, that data on both variables (especially GDP per capita) is 
extremely sparse. In particular, estimates on GDP are almost inexistent for the period from 
1815 to 1860 as well as for countries outside of Europe and North America.  
 
                                                 
98 All duration variables are left-censored. 
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Table 5.10. Descriptive statistics 
 
 Mean Std. deviation Nonmissing observations 
Population (in thousands) 20202.03 53786.31 3162 
GDP/capita 2070.432 1153.438 1626 
(Source: Maddison project database; COW National Material Capabilities dataset) 
 
 
I begin with a simple logit model without any control variables. I use republics as 
reference category, since I expect these regimes to run a higher risk of civil war than 
democracies but a lower risk of civil war than monarchies. To address reverse causation 
issues (since regimes are coded on the 31st of December), both independent variables are 
lagged one year. Results are displayed in Table 5.11, Model 5. 
 
 
Table 5.11. Democracies, monarchies, and civil war onset, 1816-1913 (logistic 
regression, reporting odds ratios) 
 Model 5 Model 6 
   
Peace duration a  0.994 (0.011) 
Monarchy a 0.701 (0.342) 0.190*** (0.100) 
Democracy a 0.255** (0.145) 0.251** (0.143) 
Population a, b  1.439** (0.251) 
GDP/capita a, b  0.388*** (0.135) 
Regime durationa  0.999 (0.003) 
Countries 68 32 
Observations 4,850 1,454 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a Lagged one year  b Log 
 
 
As expected, democracy appears to have a relatively strong, negative effect on civil war 
onset: democracies’ risk of experiencing armed conflict is only about 25% as high as 
republics’ risk. The effect is significant at the 5% level. This lends preliminary support to 
Hypothesis 6. Monarchies appear to be negatively related to the outbreak of civil war, but 
the effect is moderate and the variable does not pass the 10% significance threshold.   
Model 6 includes GDP per capita, population, regime duration, and peace years as control 
variables, and uses robust standard errors clustered by country. Given the large amount of 
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missing data for GDP and population, the sample shrinks dramatically: the number of 
observations is reduced to 1,454 and half of the countries are excluded from the analysis. 
Yet, results regarding democracy hold up: democracies are four times less likely to 
experience civil war than republics. Even when relevant controls are included, the variable 
remains significant at the 5% level. Note, however, that this only holds true when 
democracies are compared to republics: a pairwise comparison of democracies and 
monarchies reveals that the former perform slightly better than the latter, but the effect is 
negligible and not statistically significant.   
What about monarchies themselves? When controls are included, the effect of the variable 
increases dramatically and becomes significant at the 1% level: according to the estimates 
of Model 6, monarchy divides the risk of civil war by five. This finding invalidates 
Hypothesis 7. Monarchy does not increase the risk of civil war. On the contrary, the fact 
that monarchies have a consistently negative effect on civil war onset gives some 
confidence that the peaceful attributes of monarchies are not a mere statistical artefact, and 
that this effect is not a mere regional effect.  
 
 
5.6. CONCLUSION 
 
Contrary to previous studies (Gurses and Mason 2010; Fjelde 2010; Wilson 2014), I do not 
find authoritarian regime type to affect the probability of civil conflict. More specifically, 
my findings question the finding that military regimes are internally more violent than 
other dictatorships, and challenge the emerging view of party regimes as “gentler and 
kinder”99 dictatorships: the stability of the latter can be explained by their ability to 
manage intra-elite conflicts, but is not related to their ability to channel public dissent more 
effectively. Conversely, the instability of military dictatorships is primarily due to their 
vulnerability to coups: I do not find any evidence that they are more likely to be 
challenged from dissatisfied citizen groups. To the extent that prior research has uncovered 
a statistical relationship between authoritarian regime type and domestic conflict, I argue 
that it is probably spurious: the fact that military dictatorships experience more coups than 
                                                 
99 The expression is from Lijphart (1999), who called consensus democracies “kinder and gentler” 
democracies. 
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party regimes, and that some widely used civil war datasets include some instances of 
military coups in their list of conflicts, might partly explain this finding.  
I also find that, compared to dictatorships, democracies are less likely to experience civil 
war. The fact that this effect holds up across different periods lends strong support to the 
theoretical expectation that democracies exhibit institutional features that make them 
inherently less vulnerable to rebellion, regardless of contextual factors. This result also 
contradicts one recurring finding, that democracy is not sufficient to prevent domestic 
conflict (see Hegre 2014): as discussed in Sections 5.1. and 5.2., this finding might result 
from an incorrect specification of the dependent or independent variables. 
These results, so far, are consistent with the theoretical expectations formulated in Section 
5.3. Yet, two surprising findings emerge: first, in spite of the institutionalization of the 
chief executive’s selection, democracies are not immune to coups. Second, contrary to 
theoretical expectations, monarchy does not lead to an increased risk of civil war: as a 
matter of fact, the negative effect of monarchy on intrastate armed conflict remains robust 
to several model specifications and for different periods of investigation.  
These findings need further investigations, but they point to two clear tendencies: first, 
they highlight the relative stability of institutionalized regimes (democracies being less 
prone to civil war, and monarchies being immune to both coups and conflicts). Second, 
they confirm the idea that authoritarian regime type is not a predictor of intrastate armed 
conflict: in non-institutionalized regimes, large segments of the population are typically 
excluded from decision-making, regardless of the identity of the rulers or the way they 
access and leave office; thus, these institutional features do not increase or decrease 
citizens’ incentives to revolt, but they are powerful predictors of autocrats’ ability to 
manage intra-elite conflicts and to avoid extraconstitutional seizures of power.  
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6 
Alternation through death: Is gerontocracy an equilibrium? 
 
 
According to the minimal approach to democracy, the reason why civil wars are less 
frequent in democracies is that opposition parties can expect a leadership change in a 
foreseeable future: although they would be better off in the short run rebelling rather than 
complying, they are, on the long run, better off complying if they have a reasonable chance 
of winning the next elections (Przeworski 1999). In dictatorships, waiting until the dictator 
dies is generally much costlier. This waiting time, however, is considerably shortened 
when the dictator is old. Therefore, the risk of domestic conflict should decrease along 
with the age of leaders. 
The peace-inducing effect of aging might be a reason why, in primitive and agrarian 
societies, elderhood was often associated with high status (Flanagan 1989; Posner 1995) 
and why, in many tribes, the chief was chosen among the oldest men (Simmons 1945; 
Read 1959; Spencer 1965). This is classically explained by two main groups of factors, 
based either on social ties which are acquired with age or on personal characteristics, such 
as wisdom or knowledge (Werner 1981). However, the explanation according to which 
older leaders are more competent is contradicted by recent evidence showing that aging 
leaders tend to produce less economic growth (Jong-A-Pina and Mierau 2011) and to be 
more often involved in interstate wars (Horowitz et al. 2005; Potter 2007; Bak and Palmer 
2010). Furthermore, both explanations fail to explain why, in modern democracies, 
gerontocracy declines. The explanation I put forward is that old leaders are preferred over 
younger ones unless there is a regular, institutionalized mechanism to change the leader 
                                                 
 Parts of this chapter appear in: Magni Berton, Raul, and Sophie Panel. 2017. Strategic gerontocracy: why 
nondemocratic systems produce older leaders. Public Choice 171 (3): 409-427.  
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without bloodshed: gerontocracy in nondemocratic systems is a functional equivalent of 
periodic elections and fixed terms in democracies.   
More specifically, if this explanation is correct, we should expect systems in which the 
leader is elected but cannot be removed to produce older leaders than systems in which the 
leader is selected through other procedures than elections (typically, dictators): if there is 
no institutional mechanism to remove the leader, voters face a clear incentive to select a 
candidate who is likely to give up power after a few years, in order to minimize the 
possible loss and avoid the worst-case scenario (i.e., the scenario in which a bad ruler stays 
in office for decades). Since future leaders may be appreciated or hated, the minimax 
strategy consists in shortening the time of their reign. The other crucial implication is that 
introducing a fixed term in office and regular elections in these systems should 
automatically decrease the average age of elected leaders.   
These consequences are difficult to observe empirically because systems in which the 
leader is elected but not removable have become relatively rare since the Middle Age, as 
most monarchies stopped practicing elections and gradually adopted hereditary succession 
(see Kokkonen and Sundell 2014). In most post-World War II political systems, the leader 
either inherits power (as in hereditary monarchies), accesses power by force (as in most 
dictatorships), or is elected for a fixed term (as in democracies). A quick glance at history 
lends some credence to the intuition that leaders selected for life tend to be fairly old: for 
example, in Venice, most elected officials were selected for a fixed term in office except 
for one who was elected for life, namely the Doge (Tullock 2002). As a consequence, 
while European kings started their reigns at age 33 on average, the Doge’s mean age at 
start of reign was about 68 (Eisner 2011).100 This combination of mechanisms for limiting 
incumbency has proven fairly stable in the long run, since Venice experienced few coups 
or inter-family wars in its several centuries of existence (Tullock 2002, 252).  
In the contemporary period, there is one instructive case of a political system in which the 
leader is elected for life, namely the Vatican. Although the pope is elected, there are no 
mechanisms but his death to dismiss him. As a consequence, since 1503, the average age 
of popes on the day of their election is 64. In particular, the last two popes were over 75 at 
their election, which reflects the increase in life expectancy: no re-elective democracy is so 
                                                 
100 Means are calculated for the period from AD 600 to 1800. 
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gerontocratic. Electing old popes produces a limitation in incumbency (the average length 
of pontificate is 10 years), which could approach that of a re-elective democracy.  
The case of the Vatican is emblematic because elections are clearly the way by which the 
leader is selected. As noted above, systems in which individuals self-select into leadership 
positions – as it is the case of most contemporary dictatorships – cannot be expected to be 
as gerontocratic, since there are no ways to prevent a young dictator from taking over 
power.101 There are, yet, some recent examples that approximate the Vatican case: for 
example, Tullock (1987, 159) points to a similar tendency to move toward gerontocracy in 
the USSR, which political system provided a fairly routinized procedure to select the 
General Secretary of the Party but none to dismiss him. Indeed, while Stalin was fairly 
young (44 years) as he accessed office, the age of the following General Secretaries 
increased continuously and peaked with Chernenko (aged 73 as he assumed office). The 
average age of Stalin’s successors at the time they took office was 62 years. By contrast, 
Mexican Presidents from 1933 to 2000 took office at the mean age of 48 years. This 
average drops to 46.5 years if an outlier (Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, who entered office at age 
63) is removed from the sample, and is not influenced by the evolution of life expectancy, 
since the last two PRI Presidents entered office at the age of 40 and 43 years, respectively. 
The USSR and the PRI regime were both party dictatorships, but the PRI dictatorship 
displayed an interesting feature: a constitutional reform in 1933 introduced a fixed six-year 
presidential term without the possibility of reelection. Since the expected tenure of 
Mexican leaders was truncated, this lowered the incentive to select aging leaders.  
To give a final example, Xi Jinping was appointed General Secretary of the Chinese 
Communist Party at age 59, and became thereby the youngest General Secretary since 
1980. China after Mao started moving toward gerontocracy as well. Yet, the Communist 
Party recently introduced an age limit for party leaders and a limit of two terms for 
presidents (Köllner 2013). Both measures exclude the possibility of lifelong tenure, and, if 
fully implemented, can be expected to produce younger leaders on the long run. They can 
                                                 
101 Indeed, coup plotters can be very young, like for example Sierra Leone’s Valentine Strasser (who became 
at age 25 the world’s youngest head of state as he took over power in 1992). Another famous coup plotter, 
General Augusto Pinochet, was in his late fifties when he became President of Chile – but then again, he 
was appointed by the other members of the junta by joint decree. Incidentally, Geddes (1999, 123) notes 
that one of the reasons why he was first chosen to lead what was supposed to be a collegial junta was that 
he was then its most senior member. 
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also be expected to mitigate the violent power struggles that usually characterize political 
succession in China (see Sandschneider 1985): according to Köllner (2013, 97), Jiang 
Zemin’s succession in 2002 was the first one that occurred without significant intra-party 
tensions.  
These examples lend some credence to the idea that selecting aging leaders does not 
necessarily reflects people’s genuine preferences or expectations about the competence of 
their rulers, but is simply a way to foster civil peace. There are yet other empirical 
consequences that can be derived from this hypothesis. For example, high-ranked civil 
servants in democracies are likely to be considerably older than elected officials.102 In 
general, non-removable offices are likely to be held by old people, with the exception of 
military members who tend to retire earlier. The main testable consequence of this 
hypothesis, however, is that, in political regimes which are deprived of an institutional way 
to dismiss the leader, the risk of violent conflict decreases as he gets older.  
So far, the relationship between leaders’ age and domestic conflict has never been 
investigated. While leaders are more and more considered as one of the main units of 
analysis in international relations, current research almost exclusively focuses on the 
impact of leaders’ features on their own behavior (e.g., Horowitz and Stam 2014), 
including studies centered on the age of dictators (Horowitz et al. 2005; Potter 2007; Bak 
and Palmer 2010). The argument presented here departs from prior research on age and 
leadership to the extent that it investigates the impact of leaders’ age on the expectations 
and subsequent behavior of people ruled by these leaders, rather than on leaders’ own 
behavior. This difference probably explains why, while the relationship between age of 
dictators and international wars has been largely studied, nothing is yet known about age 
and civil wars. Indeed, unlike international wars that are initiated by leaders, civil wars are 
often triggered by an organized part of civil society.103 Personal characteristics of leaders 
indubitably influence their activity – like their foreign policies, for example – but they also 
influence the activity of their environment, like the opposition’s propensity to revolt.  
                                                 
102 If this explanation is correct, this provides a justification for the seniority principle that regulates 
promotions in most public administrations. This also provides an explanation for the seemingly absurd 
way of selecting members of the French Constitutional Council: The only members who are appointed 
for life are retired Presidents. Other members serve a non-renewable term of nine years. 
103 Although it might be difficult to identify the initiator of a conflict with accuracy, most studies on political 
institutions and civil war at least implicitly rely on the assumption that civil conflicts are initiated by 
dissatisfied opposition groups, not the incumbent (see Chapters 3 and 5). 
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In the next section, I add some qualification to this general argument, and present the 
hypotheses. Section 6.2. provides an overview on the data and methods. Section 6.3. 
presents the results. Section 6.4. concludes.  
 
6.1. AGING AUTOCRATS AND CIVIL WAR: THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
The general hypothesis tested here is that, in systems in which there is no institutional way 
of getting rid of unwanted rulers, the risk of revolt varies according to their age: the older 
the leader, the lower the risk of domestic conflict. The underlying argument is that 
leadership change generally occurs through three mechanisms: a regularized procedure to 
dismiss the leader, the leader’s death, or a revolution.104 Rebellion becomes desirable when 
opposition parties cannot expect any alternation in power reasonably soon, i.e. when the 
leader is young and there is no formal limitation to his tenure. Thus, introducing a rule that 
reduces leaders’ expected tenure (such as regular elections and fixed terms in office) or 
selecting a relatively old leader should decrease the desirability of rebellion.  
This formulation implies that the impact of leaders’ age on revolt is observable only under 
certain conditions. The most straightforward implication is that regimes that have regular, 
competitive elections (i.e., democracies) make null the impact of age on civil wars because 
they rely on other mechanisms to get rid of the leader. Since even young leaders can be 
dismissed when they become unpopular, age becomes entirely irrelevant.  
 
H1: In democracies, the age of the leader does not impact the risk of civil war. 
 
There are yet other potential exceptions to the general rule. According to Przeworski 
(1999), democracy produces social peace through two related but nevertheless distinct 
mechanisms: first, leaders change regularly; second, the “losers” can expect to become 
winners in the next round. Distinguishing between these two mechanisms is less relevant 
in the case of democracies since they produce both effects. However, things get tricky in 
the case of nondemocratic regimes in which alternation in power occurs regularly but all 
leaders belong to the same ruling coalition. Indeed, the theory sketched above is silent 
                                                 
104 Strictly speaking, another mechanism is voluntary retirement. But this is very rare (Goemans et al. 2009a). 
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about what foremost leads opposition groups to rebel. A “soft” version of the theory would 
state that rebellion is motivated by the opposition’s willingness to avoid being ruled by a 
bad leader for a long period of time. A harder version would state that, even when 
alternation in power occurs fairly regularly, opposition groups will always tend to rebel 
unless they have a chance of attaining power in a foreseeable future.105 These assumptions 
about the motivations of opposition groups have implications for the relationship between 
leaders’ age and rebellion: if the prospect of a future alternation in power – regardless of 
who will take office next – is sufficient to produce social peace, we should expect all 
nondemocratic regimes to be more stable if they are ruled by relatively old leaders. If, 
however, the decisive factor is the opposition’s chance of attaining power, the impact of 
leaders’ age should depend on the regime’s ability to produce successors to the incumbent.  
Monarchies constitute an emblematic case, since their defining feature is hereditary 
succession. Like every ruler, monarchs grow old and eventually die; yet, they are 
immediately replaced by their designated heir upon their death. Alternation through death 
does occur, but does not significantly affect the opposition’s chances of being in power: the 
softer version of the theory would predict that the likelihood of rebellion decreases as the 
monarch grows older, but it seems more reasonable to assume that, for the opposition, 
there are few incentives to wait until his death since it will not increase its own chances of 
taking power. Thus, in monarchies, the incentives to rebel are stable over time and are not 
affected by the monarch’s age. Monarchies cancel the impact of the leader’s age on the risk 
of rebellion exactly as democracies do, but for completely different reasons: whereas 
democracies impact this relationship by shortening time horizons, monarchies do by 
lengthening them to infinity.  
 
H2: In monarchies, the age of the leader does not impact the risk of civil war. 
  
The three remaining regimes – military dictatorships, party regimes, and civilian 
autocracies – are more ambiguous. All of these regimes are poorly institutionalized, 
display strong tendencies toward power personalization, are not based on a clear time 
                                                 
105 This distinction resembles Collier and Hoeffler’s (2004) greed and grievances approach, applied to 
political regimes: in the former case, opposition group are simply unhappy about the current incumbent; 
in the latter case, they want to be in power themselves. 
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horizon, and do not rely on transparent rules regarding the access to and succession in 
power: we should then expect the leader’s age to be empirically related to domestic 
conflict in all of these regimes.  
Yet, party regimes and military dictatorships display a particular characteristic that 
distinguishes them from civilian autocracies: both rely on a strong organization that is 
somehow involved in the selection and removal of leaders. This has two implications. 
First, even though most of these regimes (with some exceptions, such as the PRI regime 
discussed above) do not provide a transparent, regular procedure for alternation and 
leadership succession, these organizations are able to remove and replace leaders fairly 
often in practice. Second, even though leadership change mostly occurs in an irregular 
fashion and often involve purges, assassinations and other forms of violence (for 
succession in party regimes, see Svolik 2012; for succession in military dictatorships, see 
Geddes 1999), it usually does not end the regime, and, most importantly, it tends to bring 
regime insiders to power. This means that, regardless of the degree of power concentration 
and personalization in each regime, the mere existence of an organization able to select 
successors from within its own ranks should cancel the peace-inducing impact of the 
dictator’s aging: opposition groups considering rebellion cannot expect to have better 
chances of accessing power upon the leader’s death. Note also that in party and military 
regimes, the launching organization’s ability to remove leaders from power should lessen 
the risk that the country is ruled by a completely incompetent autocrat, and thereby reduce 
the potential for mass discontent. The most important point, however, is that, in these 
regimes, individual characteristics of the leader are likely to be less relevant for explaining 
the occurrence of civil war. 
 
H3: In single-party regimes, the age of the leader does not impact the risk of civil war. 
H4: In military dictatorships, the age of the leader does not impact the risk of civil war. 
 
By contrast, civilian autocrats do not have a strong organization on which to rely (see 
Cheibub et al. 2010, 86). They can rely on the military to maintain their rule, but do not 
belong to the core organization; they can be backed by a party, but the operational 
definition of civilian autocracies implies that this party is weaker than in typical party 
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regimes, and does not preclude the existence of other parties who compete for office. All in 
all, this implies that, when the leader dies, his launching organization is usually not able to 
replace him, which provides a window of opportunity for opposition groups. In those 
regimes, we should expect a negative relationship between the leader’s age and the risk of 
civil war.  
 
 
H5: In civilian autocracies, the age of the leader decreases the risk of civil war  
 
To sum up, elections are not the only path toward social peace: regimes in which there are 
no institutionalized ways of removing leaders can still be relatively stable as long as the 
leader’s expected tenure does not exceed a reasonable amount of time, that is, when the 
leader is relatively old. However, this mechanism is at work only in a specific subset of 
regimes, namely those in which the opposition can reasonably expect that the incumbent’s 
launching organization will not be able to impose a successor upon his death. Interestingly, 
this might be one of the reasons why some personalist autocrats are able to stay in power 
for decades (see Geddes 1999), and why dictators’ overall risk of losing office decreases 
throughout their tenure (Bienen and van de Walle 1989, 1992; Svolik 2012, Chap. 3): the 
length of time dictators spend in office does not only affect their political resources and 
their ability to control their ruling coalition, but also the desirability of rebellion (since 
long-lasting autocrats are likely to be older on average).  
Before turning to the empirical analysis, a caveat is in order: it is important to keep in 
mind that the hypotheses to be tested only pertain to the timing of the rebellion within each 
regime category, and say nothing about each regime’s baseline risk of experiencing a civil 
conflict. A source of potential confusion resides in the fact that regular alternations in 
power were used in the previous chapters to explain why democracies generally 
experience fewer civil conflicts than nondemocracies. This, of course, does not pertain to 
the comparison between dictatorships that will be performed in the following sections: the 
argument is that, in some regimes, the probability that a violent conflict breaks out will 
depend on the age of the incumbent, while in some others, this probability remains 
constant over time.  
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6.2. DATA AND ESTIMATION STRATEGIES 
 
I estimate the probability of armed conflict onset with logistic regression. I use two 
different estimation strategies: first, I distinguish five subsamples that correspond to the 
five regime types I investigate. Second, I conduct analyses based on interaction terms: on 
the whole sample, I estimate the impact of each political regime interacted with the 
leader’s age. All models include controls for time-dependence and use robust standard 
errors clustered by country.  
The dependent variable is a dummy that takes on the value of 1 in years an internal conflict 
breaks out if at least two years have passed since the last observation of the conflict. 
Subsequent conflict years are coded 0. The measure of armed conflict is based on the 
UCDP/PRIO data. I include conflicts over government and conflicts over both government 
and territory; however, I exclude separatist conflicts, since they do not concern the central 
government and hence are not necessarily related to alternation in power. For reasons 
exposed in Chapter 5, I also exclude country-years in which both an armed conflict and a 
coup (according to Powell and Thyne 2011) are reported: these observations are coded 0. 
To address potential time-dependence problems, I compute a variable measuring the time 
in years since the most recent occurrence of civil conflict, and add it to the list of 
predictors.  
 
Table 6.1. Distribution of political regimes and intrastate conflict outbreaks, 1946-
2008 
 Total 
observations  
Conflict outbreaks 
(frequency) 
Conflict outbreaks 
(% years) 
Military dictatorship 1,694 43 2.54 
Monarchy 656 3 0.46 
Civilian autocracy 1,703 44 2.58 
Single-party regime 841 15 1.78 
Democracy 3,209 39 1.22 
(Sources: Cheibub et al. 2010; UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset) 
Data on regime type are drawn from Cheibub et al.’s (2010) dataset (see Chapter 2). 
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Descriptive statistics on the distribution of political regimes and on the frequency of 
intrastate conflict are shown in Table 6.1. 
The leaders’ age is the main explanatory variable. Data are provided by the Archigos 
database (Goemans et al. 2009a). In years where two (or more) leaders were reported, I 
select only the age of the leader in office on First January, in order to avoid reverse 
causation issues: the leaders’ age comes ever before the conflict. However, I also add a 
dummy that indicates the years a change of leadership occurred.  
 
Figure 6.1. Leaders’ age by regime type, 1946-2004 
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The main problem with the leader’s age is that it is correlated with the number of years the 
leader has been in office. Thus, the effect of age on civil war could be due to the negative 
correlation between leaders’ tenure and the probability of a civil war outbreak: the longer 
leaders stay in office, the lowest the risk of armed conflict, either because they have had 
time to reinforce their control on the country or because their long tenure precisely 
indicates they have been popular enough to avoid being violently overthrown (for a 
discussion, see Bienen and van de Walle 1989, 1992). In order to distinguish both effects, I 
also add a variable that measures the number of years the leader has already been in office.  
Descriptive statistics on these variables are displayed in Table 6.2. 
 
 
Table 6.2. Regime duration, leaders’ mean age and leaders’ average tenure by regime 
type, 1946-2004  
 Total 
observations 
Average regime 
duration 
Leaders’ mean 
age 
Leaders’ mean 
tenure (years) 
Democracy 2,585 31.0 58.8 3.0 
Military dictatorship 1,534 12.5 53.3 7.6 
Single-party regime 802 12.9 57.7 9.7 
Monarchy 587 32.5 51.6 10.4 
Civilian autocracy 1,468 12.4 59.1 6.4 
Total 6,976 22.2 56.9 6.1 
(Sources: Cheibub et al. 2010; Archigos) 
 
Table 6.2. reveals that civilian autocracies are the most gerontocratic, slightly more than 
democracies. However, they are not those in which the leaders’ average tenure is the 
longest. Monarchs and party leaders govern roughly ten years on average, while civilian 
autocrats stay in office roughly six years on average. This difference can be partly 
explained by the fact that monarchs tend to access office earlier, and that the average 
regime duration is relatively low for civilian autocracies: they display the shortest 
timespan among all regimes.  
Finally, in addition to leader duration and peace duration, I include all control variables I 
used in Chapter 5, that is: the natural log of GDP per capita (Bolt and van Zanden 2013); 
Cederman et al.’s (2010) index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF); population 
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(Ross 2013); regime duration, based on the modified version of Cheibub et al.’s (2010) 
regimes data; and a Cold War dummy.  
Table 6.3. displays descriptive statistics. 
 
Table 6.3. Descriptive statistics by regime 
 Democracy Military Monarchy Party Civilian Sample 
Cold War (N. obs.) 1,641 1,232 467 725 1,005 5,114 
Post Cold War (N. obs.) 944 302 120 77 463 1,906 
ELF: mean  
(std. dev.) 
0.304 
(0.266) 
0.412 
(0.306) 
0.533 
(0.335) 
0.500 
(0.319) 
0.485 
(0.319) 
0.404 
(0.309) 
(ln) GDP/capita: mean 
(std. dev.) 
8.567 
(0.949) 
7.364 
(0.730) 
8.103 
(1.128) 
7.269 
(0.790) 
7.534 
(0.824) 
7.895 
(1.039) 
(ln) Country size: mean 
(std. dev.) 
12.208 
(1.847) 
12.604 
(1.516) 
11.797 
(2.063) 
12.625 
(1.688) 
12.316 
(1.873) 
12.328 
(1.797) 
(ln) Population: mean (std. 
dev.)  
16.174 
(1.484) 
15.947 
(1.319) 
14.753 
(1.569) 
15.686 
(1.413) 
15.915 
(1.652) 
15.907 
(1.530) 
Peace duration: mean  
(std. dev.) 
18.827 
(17.175) 
13.099 
(11.827) 
14.929 
(12.567) 
14.249 
(11.830) 
11.195 
(12.233) 
15.058 
(14.476) 
Leader duration: mean 
(std. dev.)  
3.013 
(3.986) 
7.555 
(8.250) 
10.407 
(9.529) 
9.668 
(8.383) 
6.420 
(6.703) 
6.108 
(7.267) 
Leader change (% of obs.) 24.14 14.28 6.30 6.11 11.31 15.68 
Regime duration: mean 
(std. dev.) 
31.003 
(31.852) 
12.486 
(10.076) 
32.596 
(28.061) 
17.372 
(13.773) 
15.406 
(13.017) 
22.216 
(24.346) 
 
 
6.3. RESULTS 
 
I first run the model for each regime subsample. Table 6.4. displays the results.  
Results reported in Table 6.4., Model 1 indicate that age has a negative and significant 
impact on the dependent variable in the case of civilian autocracies: in those regimes, the 
risk of civil war decreases by about 5% as the age of the leader increases by one year. 
Furthermore, as expected, the impact of age is almost inexistent in the cases of 
democracies (Model 2), monarchies (Model 3), party regimes (Model 4) and military 
168 
dictatorships (Model 5). Results concerning monarchies have to be interpreted cautiously: 
the small number of valid observations (309) as well as the positive sign of peace duration 
cast some doubts on the validity of the inference, and two other control variables (Cold 
War and Leader change) are omitted from the estimation due to perfect prediction of the 0 
outcome.106 These anomalies notwithstanding, all hypotheses are so far supported.  
 
Table 6.4. Leaders’ age and civil conflict onset by regime type, 1946-2001 (logistic 
regression, reporting odds ratios) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Civilian Democracy  Monarchy Party Military  
      
Peace duration 0.966 0.991 1.302** 0.934** 1.015 
 (0.020) (0.0119) (0.134) (0.0292) (0.0169) 
Age 0.952** 0.993 1.029 1.009 1.029 
 (0.020) (0.0212) (0.0301) (0.0398) (0.0186) 
Leader tenure 1.040 0.937 0.736*** 1.036 0.924*** 
 (0.050) (0.0634) (0.0354) (0.0464) (0.0140) 
Regime duration 0.950** 1.016 1.007 0.977 1.043** 
 (0.028) (0.0168) (0.0622) (0.0528) (0.0195) 
Leader change 4.295*** 1.507 omitted 4.028 1.308 
 (1.680) (0.563)  (4.107) (0.604) 
ln(GDP/capita) 1.740** 0.627* 0.382** 1.303 0.396** 
 (0.453) (0.151) (0.180) (0.476) (0.162) 
ln(Population) 1.333** 1.333** 3.070 1.008 1.025 
 (0.179) (0.158) (3.873) (0.282) (0.163) 
ELF 1.959 7.731*** 0.0578 0.485 4.064** 
 (1.401) (6.064) (0.278) (0.445) (2.593) 
Cold War 1.262 0.629 omitted 0.248** 0.485 
 (0.593) (0.391)  (0.146) (0.246) 
Constant 5.09e-05*** 0.00345* 2.43e-08 0.0101 1.775 
 (0.000) (0.0117) (4.60e-07) (0.0429) (4.837) 
Observations  2,616 309 729 1,503 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
 
 
 
On the whole, control variables display the expected sign, with a notable exception: GDP 
per capita has a positive and significant effect in Model 1. The fact that regime duration 
increases the risk of civil conflict onset in military dictatorships is somewhat surprising, 
                                                 
106 A closer look on the data reveals that none of the three conflict outbreaks reported in monarchies occurred 
after the end of the Cold War. 
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but nonetheless consistent with Fjelde’s (2010) findings: one explanation could be that 
military dictatorships first enjoy some support from the public, but their popularity 
declines over time (see Nordlinger 1977). Perhaps the most interesting finding is that 
leadership change is only associated with civil conflict in the case of civilian autocracies: 
the effect of the variable is consistently positive across all regimes, and non-negligible in 
the case of party regimes; yet, it does not pass the statistical significance test except in 
civilian autocracies (where it increases the risk of conflict by a factor of 4.3). Since 
leadership change and civil conflict outbreaks are measured in the same year, it is 
impossible to know whether succession crises in civilian autocracies have a tendency to 
escalate into mass conflict or whether civil conflicts result more often in a change of 
leadership in these regimes (i.e., whether leaders of civilian regimes simply lose more wars 
than other leaders). However, this lends support to the idea that civilian autocracies are the 
only ones in which changes of leadership deeply destabilize the whole regime.  
As a first check for the sensitivity of the results, I rerun Model 1 with country and year 
fixed effects. Although fixed effects are a highly conservative estimation method given the 
structure of the data, the impact of age on civil conflict outbreak holds with these 
estimates. Actually, the results regarding age even improve: the variable becomes 
significant at the 1% level and has a larger estimated effect on the dependent variables, the 
risk of civil war decreasing by 10% for each additional year. I also try King and Zeng’s 
(2001) correction procedure for rare-event data: neither the coefficients nor the 
significance of the variables of interest vary substantially.  
I now move on to report the results of estimations with interaction terms. Results are 
displayed in Table 6.5. 
Models 6 to 8 display coefficients for age, regimes and the interaction of both. In Model 6, 
the impact of the leader’s age in civilian autocracies is compared with its impact in all 
other regimes (including democracies). Model 7 is the same model restricted to 
nondemocratic regimes. Finally, Model 8 includes interaction terms for all regimes, which 
allows me to observe the effect of age in all of them; military dictatorships are the 
reference category.   
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Table 6.5. Leaders’ age and civil conflict onset, 1946-2001 (logistic regression, 
reporting odds ratios) 
 (6) (7) (8) 
 Ref.: all regimes Ref.: autocracies Reference: military  
    
Peace duration 0.986 (0.00962) 0.990 (0.0130) 0.987 (0.00963) 
Age 1.003 (0.0104) 1.007 (0.0119) 1.013 (0.0170) 
Age * civilian 0.968* (0.0190) 0.963** (0.0176) 0.958** (0.0197) 
Civilian 8.824* (10.49) 9.307** (10.26) 11.22** (13.08) 
Democracy    0.946 (1.536) 
Age * democracy    0.989 (0.0278) 
Party    1.595 (2.576) 
Age * party    0.990 (0.0292) 
Monarchy    0.983 (0.0341) 
Age * monarchy    0.633 (1.217) 
Regime duration 1.001 (0.0147) 0.984 (0.0167) 1.003 (0.0145) 
Leader’s tenure 0.986 (0.0207) 0.989 (0.0225) 0.976 (0.0217) 
Leader change 1.961*** (0.454) 2.305*** (0.613) 2.082*** (0.490) 
ln(GDP/capita) 0.699* (0.131) 0.883 (0.181) 0.759 (0.150) 
ln(Population) 1.225*** (0.0908) 1.153 (0.101) 1.235*** (0.101) 
ELF 2.468** (1.009) 1.559 (0.625) 2.600** (1.050) 
Cold War 0.590** (0.146) 0.477** (0.138) 0.563** (0.144) 
Constant 0.008** (0.0162) 0.006** (0.0140) 0.003*** (0.006) 
Countries  151 117 151 
Observations 6,569 3,953 6,569 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
 
In all models, I find that the risk of armed conflict significantly decreases as the dictator 
gets older: for each year added to the leader’s age, there is a drop of 3% to 4% in the odds 
of civil war. This means that a 30-year-old leader is 4.5 to 7.5 times as likely to experience 
civil war as an 80-year-old leader. Note that the results hold even though I control for the 
leader’s tenure. By contrast, none of the other interaction terms in Model 8 attains 
statistical significance: civilian autocracies are the only regime in which the leader’s age 
has an influence on rebellion. Taken together, these results lend further support to all 
hypotheses being tested. 
All models estimate a large, positive and significant effect of civilian autocracies on civil 
war. Although this result makes intuitive sense – to the extent that it is easier to overthrow 
a regime which is not based on a solid institutional setup (see Acemoglu et al. 2010; 
Gurses and Mason 2010) – it should be recalled that coefficients of constitutive terms of 
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interaction terms cannot be interpreted as “normal” coefficients (see Brambor et al. 
2006).107 With regard to other political variables, neither leaders’ tenure nor regime 
duration attain statistical significance in any of the models. By contrast, change of 
leadership is consistently positively correlated to the outbreak of civil conflict. Other 
control variables display the expected signs, but their level of statistical significance and 
the magnitude of their estimated effect vary across models. Interestingly, yet, political 
variables are the only ones that are significantly associated with the onset of intrastate 
armed conflict when the sample is restricted to nondemocratic regimes: neither GDP per 
capita nor population nor ethno-linguistic fractionalization attain statistical significance in 
Model 7.  
The same aforementioned robustness checks are performed. Findings hold when standard 
errors are clustered by countries or by year; they hold under country and years fixed 
effects; and they are confirmed using rare-event logit. 
 
 
6.4. CONCLUSION  
 
When submitted to an unwanted ruler, people must decide whether to rebel or to wait until 
the next change of leadership. If no alternation in power can be expected within a 
reasonable length of time, rebellion then becomes the preferred option. Peaceful 
alternation can occur either through institutionalized mechanisms (like elections) or 
through the leader’s death: this is why, in regimes that lack such institutionalized 
alternation mechanisms, the leader’s aging reduces the probability of a rebellion.   
I find that, in democracies, the age of the leader does not impact the risk of domestic 
conflict, while in some dictatorships the leader’s age correlates negatively with the 
outbreak of civil war. This finding helps understand why primitive and agrarian societies 
                                                 
107 These coefficients should be interpreted as the marginal effects of each constitutive term when the other 
constitutive term is equal to zero (see Brambor et al. 2006). For example, in Model 8, civilian autocracies 
are associated with an increase of the odds of civil conflict by a factor of 11 relative to military 
dictatorships. Since civilian autocracies are included in the model together with an interaction term of age 
and regime, this indicates that civilian dictatorships are 11 times as likely to experience civil war as 
military dictatorships when the dictator is 0 years old. Conversely, the very small (and insignificant) 
coefficient of age in all models indicates that age has no impact on civil wars when the civilian 
dictatorship dummy is set to 0. 
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were typically ruled by old men, while this is less the case of contemporary regimes. 
However, simply contrasting democracies – that display regular mechanisms to get rid of 
the leader – with autocracies – that lack such mechanisms – may be an oversimplification. 
After taking into account the diversity of contemporary authoritarian regimes, it appears 
that the impact of the leader’s age on civil conflict is dependent on the institutional 
context: in military dictatorships, party regimes, and monarchies, the age of the leader does 
not have any discernible effect on civil wars, while it is highly relevant to explain the 
occurrence of civil conflict in civilian autocracies. Two conclusions can be drawn from 
these findings: first, collective leadership reduces the impact of the leader’s personal 
characteristics on the behavior of citizens. Second, in dictatorships, the ruling coalition’s 
ability to replace aging autocrats alters citizens’ time horizons and thus cancels the impact 
of age on rebellion.  
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7 
Party competition, alternation, and rebellion:  
How election outcomes affect the risk of intrastate armed conflict  
 
 
 
According to Przeworski (1999), civil war is less likely to break out when elections take 
place regularly and when opposition parties have a fair chance of winning them. A 
relatively straightforward implication with regard to electoral competition follows: 
democracy produces social peace when no single political force dominates (Przeworski 
1999). For political parties to choose compliance instead of rebellion, all of them must 
have a fair chance of attaining political power: if a party repeatedly wins elections by a 
large margin, opposition parties are better off rebelling. By contrast, if election outcomes 
are close – i.e. if popular support is evenly distributed between the several political forces 
– opposition parties can reasonably expect to win in the next round, and lose their 
incentive to rebel.  
Although theoretically compelling, this argument recently came under fire. Using electoral 
data from Colombia, Chacon et al. (2011) show that in fact, violent conflict is ceteris 
paribus more likely to occur in situations in which electoral support is evenly distributed 
between ruling party and opposition party. Their underlying argument is that compliance 
depends not only on opposition groups’ probability of doing well under current 
institutions, but also on their probability of prevailing in an armed confrontation. Since the 
fighting strength of opposition groups is related to their electoral support, democracies are 
more likely to achieve stability when the balance of power between government and 
opposition parties is asymmetric: parties without popular support may not have any chance 
of winning the next election, but they also have few chances of winning a war. The 
somewhat counterintuitive consequence is that weak parties – those that would have the 
strongest incentive to rebel – are also the most likely to comply.  
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The argument I put forward is that both views are correct. Opposition groups, on the one 
hand, are ceteris paribus more likely to rebel when they enjoy broad popular support. On 
the other hand, they are ceteris paribus less likely to rebel when they have a reasonable 
chance of attaining political power under the current institutions. Consequently, there are 
two paths toward social peace: either opposition parties are deterred from rebelling by the 
incumbent’s overwhelming electoral victories, or they perform well at the polls and are 
subsequently allowed to take office and sit in the legislature. By contrast, conflict breaks 
out in situations where the political power opposition parties are granted does not match 
their level of popular support: in these cases, opposition parties are better off rebelling than 
complying.  
Next section offers a brief review of contemporary scholarship on authoritarian elections 
and explores how the argument sketched above can pertain to both democracies and 
authoritarian regimes. In Section 7.2., I derive an empirical expectation from this 
argument. Section 7.3. gives an overview on the data and methods and presents the results. 
Section 7.4. concludes.  
 
 
7.1. THE STABILIZING FUNCTION OF AUTHORITARIAN ELECTIONS 
 
The overwhelming majority of contemporary political regimes – including many highly 
repressive ones – hold regular elections at the national level. But, obviously, not all 
electoral regimes are the same: elections are held for different bodies, and vary enormously 
with regard to their competitiveness. In established democracies, both the executive and 
the legislature are elected, with typically close electoral outcomes and narrow margins of 
victory; on the other side of the spectrum, the most closed authoritarian regimes hold 
elections in which the chief executive’s seat is not at stake at all, or that the incumbent 
repeatedly wins with 100% of the votes. Between these two extreme poles, features of 
elections vary greatly, especially in authoritarian regimes (see Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009; 
Hyde and Marinov 2011).   
The diffusion of elections across political regimes, especially in recent years (see, e.g., 
Levitsky and Way 2002; Hadenius and Teorell 2007a), has given rise to a growing body of 
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research examining their role and effects in authoritarian regimes. Early works have 
approached authoritarian elections from the perspective of the opposition, and investigated 
– with varying degrees of optimism – whether semi-competitive elections can contribute to 
the liberalization of authoritarian regimes on the long run (see, e.g., van de Walle 2002; 
Schedler 2002; Levitsky and Way 2002; Howard and Roessler 2006; Lindberg 2006a, 
2006b). More recently, observing that dictators sometimes face a serious risk of losing 
elections, scholars have begun to wonder why they hold them at all. Consequently, an 
emerging body of research has begun to analyze elections from the perspective of the 
ruling regime, starting from the assumption that elections should provide autocrats with 
some benefits that outweigh these risks. The underlying argument is that authoritarian 
elections are not necessarily concessions extracted from the incumbent by opposition 
forces (see, e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). Nor are they mere window-dressing: they 
can also be instruments of control that contribute to the regime’s stability.108 
Broadly speaking, arguments pertaining to the function of elections in authoritarian 
regimes can be sorted into three groups: elections are assumed to perform either a 
cooptation function, an information function, or a deterrence function. With regard to the 
cooptation function, Gandhi and Przeworski (2006, 2007) argue that some authoritarian 
regimes choose to hold multiparty legislative elections in order to broaden their basis of 
support when they need to neutralize threats from potential opposition groups: by giving 
these groups a vested interest in the survival of the regime, dictators who allow an elected, 
multiparty legislature reduce their risk of losing office. Relatedly, Lust-Okar (2004, 2006) 
analyzes the manner in which relatively competitive elections can contribute to the 
stability of authoritarian regimes: by deciding to open electoral competition for opposition 
parties, incumbents can choose to allow some parties to compete in elections – which, in 
turns, provides these parties with access to state resources they can distribute in exchange 
for electoral support – while excluding others. This gives legal and illegal opponents 
conflicting interests, which, in turn, strengthens the incumbent – legal opponents becoming 
less willing to challenge the regime, and the most radical opponents being marginalized.  
According to the second line of argumentation, autocrats can use elections to garner crucial 
                                                 
108 For an exhaustive review of the different arguments about elections in authoritarian regimes, see Gandhi 
and Lust-Okar (2009). 
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information about the support they enjoy among the public, or the strength of potential 
opponents. One of Cox’s (2008) main arguments is that bargaining failures resulting in 
coups often arise from the fact that autocrats often have only incomplete information about 
their potential challengers: elections can solve this problem by giving both incumbent 
parties and opposition parties the ability to credibly communicate their relative strength 
(see also Londregan and Vindigni 2008). Magaloni (2006) similarly suggests that 
authoritarian elections are used to gather information about the extent of the party’s 
support and its geographic distribution, which, in turn, allows incumbents to reward their 
supporters and punish defectors. In a somewhat different but related way, Malesky and 
Schuler (2011) argue that, although single-party regimes that do not allow contested 
elections are per definition unable to gain information about organized opposition, they 
can still use elections to monitor the competence and compliance of lower-level party 
officials, and thereby help autocrats discipline party cadres and alleviate principal-agent 
problems. They show that leaders in Vietnam gather this information by sending centrally 
nominated candidates to compete against local candidates in provincial elections, and 
assessing their respective electoral performance.   
Finally, authoritarian elections can serve a deterrence purpose. Geddes (2006) argues that 
dictators create parties – made up of individuals with a vested interest in the regime’s 
survival – in order to counterbalance threats posed by other members of the ruling elite or 
by the military: because military officers usually avoid interventions they believe would be 
opposed by popular protests, and because parties make it easier for the dictator to mobilize 
mass opposition to attempted coups, the existence of a party deters potential coup plotters 
from intervention. Winning elections with overwhelming majorities, in turn, simply helps 
dictators demonstrate the strength of the party: elections, she argues, “help to persuade 
potential challengers that the dictator’s party is the only game in town and that there is no 
point in trying to organize an opposition movement” (Geddes 2006, 5). She consistently 
finds that authoritarian regimes that rely on a party and hold regular elections tend to last 
longer than those without them. Magaloni (2006) makes a similar point about the PRI in 
Mexico: by winning elections with large margins of victory, the PRI was able to deter 
dissatisfied politicians from defecting and to avoid intra-elite splits. These ideas have 
received further empirical support in a recent study showing that coups occur more often 
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after authoritarian elections in which the support for the incumbent has dropped 
significantly (Wig and Rød 2014).  
One interesting implication of this latter approach to authoritarian elections is that electoral 
outcomes do not have to be credible in order to perform their function: on the contrary, the 
incumbent’s very ability to mobilize voters in elections without real stake is a way to 
signal his strength. Supermajorities, or, in the case of uncontested elections, high electoral 
turnout demonstrate that the dictator has full control over the press and the security 
apparatus, and that he is able to monitor citizens and punish those who abstain or vote 
against him. Consequently, as I shall argue below, large margins of victory do not only 
deter members of the ruling coalition from defecting, but also opposition members from 
rebelling.  
By contrast, the two former approaches imply that elections have to be relatively 
competitive in order to fulfill their purpose: gathering knowledge about the incumbent’s 
extent of mass support, identifying opposition strongholds, or coopting potential 
challengers require opposition parties (or at least some of them) to be free to organize 
autonomously and to compete in elections without being subject to significant amounts of 
repression. Obviously, uncontested elections cannot perform these functions. One of the 
most striking findings that emerge from Magaloni’s (2006) study of the PRI rule in Mexico 
and Lust-Okar’s (2006) analysis of elections in Jordan is that most elections in these 
countries are held without significant fraud and perform their function precisely because 
they are competitive. There is hence a sheer incompatibility between the different 
functions assigned to authoritarian elections: while signaling strength requires the 
incumbent to be able to secure large margins of victory (which, in turn, requires 
dramatically limiting the extent of real competition), garnering information about the 
opposition involves at least some degree of contestation. Which of these strategies is the 
most effective remains to date an open question.  
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7.2. ELECTION OUTCOMES AND REBELLION: THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Chacon et al.’s (2011) study raises an interesting paradox in Przeworski’s (1999) original 
formulation of his theory of minimal democracy: if public support for opposition parties 
amounts to public support for the incumbent, then opposition parties are admittedly more 
likely to win the next election, but they are also more likely to prevail in an armed 
confrontation should they choose this option. If, by contrast, the balance of power is 
asymmetric, opposition parties are better off not rebelling even though they do not have 
any reasonable chance of attaining political power.  
There are some reasons to believe that incumbents run a lesser risk of rebellion if they 
manage to demonstrate the regime’s strength by securing large margins of victory in 
elections. According to Kuran (1989, 1995), citizens submitted to an authoritarian 
government tend to misrepresent their feelings about the regime – even if they truly dislike 
it – as long as the opposition appears weak. The mechanism is self-reinforcing: the more 
unshakable the regime appears, the more reluctant citizens are to express their discontent 
publicly, and the more likely they are to manifest overt support for the incumbent. Regimes 
based on “preference falsification” are susceptible to crumble as soon as a protest is 
initiated, since more and more people then have an incentive to jump on the revolutionary 
bandwagon (see also Tullock 2005 [1974]); yet, these regimes tend to last relatively long, 
and their breakdown typically takes everyone by surprise.109  
In light of this approach, the stabilizing role of weakly competitive elections becomes 
obvious: if it is the public expression of discontent that weakens regimes, unpopular 
incumbents are better off hiding information about the extent of their support, and inciting 
voters to misrepresent their true preferences. This might also explain why some autocrats 
run in uncontested elections or claim margins of victory that are not remotely credible (i.e., 
why holding sham elections better serves incumbents’ purposes than holding no election at 
all). As already noted, the incumbent’s ability to mobilize voters in such elections 
demonstrates the regime’s full control on the citizenry: high electoral turnout and broad 
margins of victory signal not only voters’ passive acquiescence, but also their readiness to 
                                                 
109 Kuran’s (1989) initial study was mainly devoted to the East European revolutions, but the Arab Spring 
could be considered another obvious example of “revolutionary surprise.” 
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express active support for the regime.110 Conversely, if elections serve communication 
purposes, holding no elections at all might be interpreted as a sign of weakness, or as 
evidence that the incumbent either has lost the ability to mobilize voters or is reluctant to 
publicly display his extent of public support.  
By contrast, close election outcomes publicly signal that a significant part of the citizenry 
has withdrawn its support from the incumbent. Consider, for example, the “colored 
revolutions” in post-communist countries. The popular uprisings that overthrew the 
Serbian, Georgian, Ukrainian, and Kyrgyz authoritarian regimes from 2003 to 2005 all 
broke out as a result of fraudulent elections (see Tucker 2007; Tudoroiu 2007; Kalandadze 
and Orenstein 2009). According to Tucker (2007), these protests occurred precisely 
because the amount of electoral fraud committed by these regimes solved the collective 
action problem faced by citizens. The striking pattern is that these elections were, in fact, 
not only contested but also fairly competitive in terms of outcomes: in Serbia in 2004, the 
main opposition party claimed 48.2% of the votes by official counts (Tucker 2005, 537). In 
Ukraine in 2004, both the incumbent and the opposition leader received about 40% of the 
votes in the first round of the presidential election, and results were similarly close in the 
second round (Tucker 2005, 538). One observer of the 2005 legislative elections in 
Kyrgyzstan commented: “Ironically, the parliamentary elections that ultimately led to 
Akayev’s downfall were probably the freest and fairest that Central Asia has yet seen” 
(Radnitz 2006, 134). But maybe this is not so ironic after all: the conclusion that post-
election protests are more likely to break out after relatively competitive elections might be 
unwarranted, but the idea would be worth exploring.111 If, as Przeworski (1999) puts it, 
voting is “flexing muscles,” it is perhaps not so surprising that these protests broke out 
after opposition parties had the opportunity to publicly display their public support. 
To illustrate the point, Table 7.1. reports the percentage of the votes won by the incumbent 
or his party in the cases of (successful or failed) “electoral revolutions” analyzed in 
Kalandadze and Orenstein’s (2009) study on authoritarian elections.112 The percentage of 
                                                 
110 In Londregan and Vindigni’s (2008) framework, such elections are a means to alleviate the consequences 
of “optimistic biases,” i.e. the fact that both the incumbent and his opponents tend to overestimate their 
own strength, hence making conflict more likely.   
111 To the best of my knowledge, no empirical study has systematically investigated the relationship between 
the competitiveness of elections and the occurrence of street protests. 
112 I was not able to find the results of the 1996 local elections in Serbia, the 2004 parliamentary elections in 
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votes won by the incumbent or his party in these cases ranges from a stunningly low 21% 
in the Georgian 2004 parliamentary elections to 84.4% in the 2006 presidential elections in 
Belarus. In spite of this variability, however, most cases are clustered between 40% and 
60% – results that would be deemed fairly normal in any established democracy – and in 6 
out of 14 elections, the incumbent did not manage to secure the absolute majority of the 
votes. In one of these cases (the 2001 presidential elections in Madagascar), the incumbent 
even claimed fewer votes than his challenger. In regard to these patterns, Lukashenko’s 
overwhelming electoral victories are rather the exception than the rule, and do not even 
amount to the performances of Turkmen president Berdimuhamedov (97% of the vote)113 
or Kazakhstani president Nazarbayev (96% of the vote) in the 2012 and 2011 elections – 
none of which, needless to say, were reported in Kalandadze and Orenstein’s (2009) 
analysis of electoral revolutions. On the whole, this anecdotal evidence suggests that 
opposition parties are more likely to protest election outcomes when they believe they 
were close to winning them.  
To sum up, we should expect rebellion to be ceteris paribus less likely to break out when 
the government’s party enjoys overwhelming electoral support. Yet, if rebellion requires 
both motive and opportunity, as Collier and Hoeffler (2004, 563) put it, this hypothesis 
offers only a partial explanation for why opposition groups revolt: a more complete theory 
of rebellion would require incorporating motives into the general picture. In other words, if 
relative power parity were the only explanation for rebellion, we should observe recurring 
civil wars in most democracies instead of peaceful alternations in power.  
One reason why this is not the case is that, in a typical democracy, opposition parties are 
allowed to sit in the legislature and exert some influence on policies – and, in the case of 
parliamentary democracies, can even remove the chief executive from office – and can 
reasonably expect that the incumbent will relinquish power in case they win the next 
elections. But the extent to which opposition parties are granted effective political power 
varies from one political system from another: to begin with, electoral systems are more or 
less proportional, which means that the influence of opposition parties during the 
incumbent’s term varies greatly from one democracy to another. This variation is even 
                                                                                                                                                   
Belarus, and the 2005 elections in Kyrgyzstan. 
113 Berdimuhamedov’s predecessor Niyazov did even better (he managed to win 98.3% of the votes in the 
1990 election, and 99.5% of the votes in the 1992 election) but he ran uncontested. 
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higher when nondemocratic systems are considered. In some countries, such as Myanmar 
until recently, only a certain share of the seats in the legislature is up for election, the rest 
of the seats being reserved for appointees. Some other countries hold free and fair 
elections, but opposition parties are prevented from taking office in case they win: 
Incumbents refuse to step down, close the legislature, and cancel election results. These are 
extreme cases, but they are nevertheless not infrequent (see Alvarez et al. 1996). In other 
words, political parties’ electoral support only imperfectly predicts their political power: 
while the relationship between parties’ electoral support and their probability of prevailing 
in a civil war can be assumed to be independent from the type of political system, the 
relationship between electoral support and political power is not a constant. Therefore, a 
more complete theory of rebellion requires taking these sources of variation into account 
as well. 
 
Table 7.1. Elections outcomes and electoral revolutions, 1991-2005 
 
Country  Year  Type Results 1st round Results 2nd round 
Armenia 1996 Presidential 51.3 N.A.  
Armenia 2003 Presidential 49.48 67.45 
Azerbaijan 2000 Parliamentary 62.3 N.A. 
Azerbaijan 2003 Presidential 75.38 N.A. 
Azerbaijan 2005 Parliamentary 62 N.A. 
Belarus 2001 Presidential 77.4 N.A. 
Belarus 2006 Presidential 84.4 N.A.  
Ethiopia 2005 Parliamentary 59.8 N.A. 
Georgia 2003 Parliamentary 21.3 N.A. 
Madagascar 2001 Presidential 40.61 N.A. 
Peru 2000 Parliamentary 42.2 N.A. 
Peru 2000 Presidential 49.9 74.3 
Togo 2005 Presidential 60.15 N.A. 
Ukraine 2004 Presidential 39.26 49.46 
(Sources: Kalandadze and Orenstein 2009; Wikipedia.org) 
 
 
Such an approach would solve the paradox raised by Chacon et al.’s (2011) study. Chacon 
182 
et al. show that, in situations in which electoral support is evenly balanced between 
incumbent and opposition, conflict is more likely to break out because both parties have a 
sufficiently high chance of winning. They interpret this as evidence that Przeworski’s 
(1999) original hypothesis – that parties will choose to comply if they anticipate that they 
have a chance of winning the next elections – is flawed. Yet, because their own empirical 
analysis is focused on one single case (namely Colombia), variations between political 
systems are held constant: the fact that, everything else being equal, parties are more likely 
to opt for violence when they enjoy widespread support does not contradict Przeworski’s 
hypothesis, because the extent to which the share of votes parties obtain in elections 
predicts their probability of doing well under current institutions varies from one political 
system to another. In other words, Chacon et al. (2011) demonstrate that opportunities are 
decisive when motives are held constant; they do not demonstrate that motives are 
irrelevant. 
The argument I put forward is that the extent to which electoral support impacts civil 
conflict depends on each party’s political power under current institutions; conversely, the 
risk that opposition parties rebel when they are durably excluded from power depends on 
their level of support. If opposition parties are represented in the legislature and can expect 
the incumbent to yield office in case he loses the next elections, they will not rebel because 
they will lack the motive to do so. If, by contrast, they are not represented but do not enjoy 
strong electoral support either, they have a motive to rebel but lack the opportunity to do 
so. I expect conflict to be most likely to break out in situations where opposition parties are 
allowed to display their strength – i.e., to participate in relatively competitive elections – 
but are prevented from taking office or sitting in the parliament.  
The outbreak of the Algerian civil war in the aftermath of the 1991 legislative elections 
exemplifies this logic. Since independence, Algeria was ruled formally by a single party 
(the FLN) and de facto by the military (Pierre and Quandt 1995; Mortimer 1996; Viorst 
1997). In 1988, the economic crisis induced by the fall of oil prices led to a first episode of 
social unrest, which was sparked by sharp price increases but conveyed a distinctly 
religious tone. The then-President Chadli Benjedid reacted by initiating a series of political 
reforms, among which the abolishment of the single-party system, the legalization of 
opposition parties, and the organization of the first multiparty elections since 
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independence. Apparently convinced by the polls that the FLN would retain its majority 
(Mortimer 1996, 21), the government authorized the main Islamist opposition party (the 
FIS, officially founded in 1989) to run first in the municipal, and then in the legislative 
elections held in December 1991. Yet, the military badly underestimated the electoral 
potential of the Islamists, who won twice as many votes as the FLN in the first round of 
the legislative elections (Quandt 2002, 16). The incumbents also believed that the electoral 
system – a top-two runoff system similar to the French one – would help them secure a 
large majority in the new National Assembly, but instead, given the dispersion of the non-
Islamist and non-FLN votes, this system only bolstered the FIS’ electoral advantage: of 
430 seats in the parliament, the FIS won 188 in the first round and led in 140 of 
outstanding contests, and it appeared likely to secure a two-thirds majority in the new 
parliament (see Pierre and Quandt 1995, 135; Mortimer 1996, 25; Viorst 1997, 92). 
It appears in hindsight that the military had been willing to let the FIS enter the parliament 
in order to channel contestation and curb mass dissent, but only under the condition that it 
remained a minority force (Mortimer 1996, 21): in January 1992, faced with the prospect 
of a crushing electoral defeat, the military reacted by canceling the second round of the 
elections, declaring a state of emergency, banning the FIS and arresting its members, and – 
apparently suspecting that he had made a deal with the Islamists (Pierre and Quandt 1995, 
135) – overthrowing Benjedid. Soon after the coup, FIS supporters who managed to escape 
arrest formed themselves into several armed groups and launched an armed rebellion 
against the FLN: by then, Algeria was on its way to civil war.  
Whether or not these aborted elections were the ultimate cause of the Algerian civil war, 
they clearly triggered the rebellion. This makes it an instructive case for several reasons. 
First, there was a lot at stake in these elections: the 1989 Constitution not only gave the 
National Assembly the right of initiative, but also enabled it to dismiss the Prime Minister 
by voting a motion of censure.114 Allowing the FIS to sit in the legislature would have thus 
clearly decreased its incentives to challenge the regime violently. Second, even though the 
President could not be dismissed by the parliament, the same Constitution stated that he 
was to be elected by direct universal suffrage (Art. 71). Since the 1991 legislative elections 
                                                 
114 Articles 135 to 137. See https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Algeria_2008.pdf (accessed May 
7, 2015) and http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/local_algeria.pdf (accessed May 7, 2015). The 
new regime was semi-presidential. 
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were the first ones the regime authorized, they were an occasion to observe the 
incumbent’s true intentions: by canceling the second round of the legislative elections, the 
FLN not only deprived its main opponent of any legal way to pursue its demands, but also 
clearly signaled that it was not willing to yield office if the opposition won the presidential 
elections. Third, a more cynical way of interpreting the events would be to suppose that, if 
the FLN had somehow managed to secure more votes, prevented the FIS from 
participating in the elections, or not held any elections at all, the war could have been 
avoided.  
I thus test the following hypotheses:  
 
H1: Rebellion becomes ceteris paribus less likely as the incumbent’s share of votes 
increases. 
H2: Rebellion becomes ceteris paribus less likely as the ruling party’s share of seats in the 
parliament decreases. 
 
 
7.3. EMPIRICS: PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION OUTCOMES AND DOMESTIC 
CONFLICT   
 
7.3.1. Data and methods 
 
Data on the dependent variable (civil conflict outbreak) are drawn from the UCDP/PRIO 
Armed Conflict Dataset. The measure is the same as in Chapter 5: the variable takes on the 
value of 1 if a new civil conflict breaks out in the country-year, and subsequent conflict 
years as well as instances of coups are coded 0.  
Data on the two independent variables (i.e., the share of the votes government parties115 
won at the last parliamentary election, and their share of seats in the legislature) are drawn 
                                                 
115 I use the share of votes and share of seats of the government party rather than the ones of the largest 
opposition party for theoretical reasons: In authoritarian regimes, the opposition is often fragmented (see, 
e.g., Lust-Okar 2004), which artificially deflates the opposition's electoral outcomes and misrepresents 
the real balance of forces. Yet, even if opposition parties are fragmented, they can still exert some 
influence in the legislature if the government's party does not obtain the absolute majority of the seats, 
because they can collectively veto laws or (in parliamentary and semi-presidential regimes) remove the 
chief executive from office. 
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from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001), and are available from 1975 
onward. For each country-year, the outcomes of the last parliamentary election are 
reported: in election years, the outcomes reported are those of the previous election.  
Table 7.2. displays descriptive statistics: the share of votes won by the incumbent’s party is 
reported in the first row. The second row displays the share of seats of the chief executive’s 
party in the legislature. Both variables display a high variation and range from less than 
10% to their maximal value 100%. Unsurprisingly, the share of seats in the legislature 
obtained by the chief executive’s party tends to be higher on average than its share of votes 
(64% vs. 72%).  
The theoretical expectations and the formulation of the hypotheses would require including 
the share of votes and the share of seats of government parties in the same model. Yet, both 
variables are obviously highly correlated (0.93). To avoid introducing unnecessary 
multicollinearity in the models, I compute the difference between both variables (hereafter 
SE-VO) and use it as independent variable. SE-VO theoretically ranges from -100 to 100: 
Positive values indicate that the government parties are overrepresented in the legislature 
(relative to their vote share), negative values indicate that opposition parties are 
overrepresented. Scores close to zero indicate that the share of seats of the government 
party closely matches its share of votes. I therefore expect a positive relationship between 
SE-VO and armed conflict outbreak. Descriptive statistics on SE-VO are displayed in the 
last row of Table 7.2.  
 
 
Table 7.2. Parliamentary election outcomes, 1975-2008 
 
 Mean  Std. deviation Min.  Max. N 
% votes  64.30 23.90 2.23 100 3,075 
% seats 72.41 22.44 9.28 100 4,303 
SE-VO 6.71 9.01 - 32.86 54.28 3,065 
(Source: Database of Political Institutions) 
 
The mean of SE-VO is – as expected – positive, but relatively low: On average, the share 
of seats of government parties only exceeds its share of votes by about 7 percentage points. 
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Yet, SE-VO also exhibits a high variance, and ranges from -32.86 (Central African 
Republic, 2006-2008) to 54.28 (Nicaragua, 1993-1994).116 
Finally, the empirical analysis includes a small set of control variables (see Table 7.3. for 
the descriptive statistics): I control for per capita income using data from the Maddison 
Project Database (Bolt & van Zanden, 2013), population using data from Ross (2013), and 
ethnic fractionalization using data from the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (Cederman, 
Wimmer & Min 2010). I also add a cold war dummy which takes on the value of 1 from 
1946 to 1990, and a variable measuring the time since the last incidence of an intrastate 
armed conflict, build from the UCDP/PRIO data. I use logit analysis, with robust standard 
errors clustered by country. Next section presents and discusses the results.  
 
 
Table 7.3. Descriptive statistics: GDP per capita, population, and ethnic 
fractionalization, 1975-2008 
 
 Mean  Std. deviation Min.  Max.  Observations 
ln(GDP/cap.) 8.06 1.12 5.33 10.45 4,927 
ln(Population) 15.99 1.56 12.05 21.00 5,121 
ELF 0.42 0.31 0 1 4,261 
(Sources: Maddison Project database; Cederman et al. 2010; Ross 2013). 
 
 
7.3.2. Results 
 
Results of the logistic regression can be seen in Table 7.4. below. Model 1 displays the 
impact of SE-VO on the risk of civil conflict onset: as expected, the effect of the variable 
is positive. The magnitude of the effect is moderate (for each one-unit increase of the 
variable, the odds that a country experiences an intrastate armed conflict increase by 
approximately 3%) but nevertheless non-negligible given that SE-VO ranges from -32 to 
54. The effect is significant at the 5% level: So far, this result corroborates theoretical 
                                                 
116 With regard to the Central African Republic, the DPI reports 80.94% of the votes in favor of the chief 
executive's party, and 48.08% of the seats in the legislature. The Nicaraguan ruling party won 40.84% of 
the votes and obtained 95.12% of the seats in the legislature, according to the same data source. 
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expectations. 
In Models 2 and 3, I replace SE-VO with the share of seats of government parties and their 
share of votes, respectively. Neither of these variables has any discernible impact on its 
own, though: as expected, when analyzed separately, neither the electoral support for 
government parties nor the extent of their control on political institutions has any effect on 
the risk of intrastate armed conflict. 
On the whole, control variables behave consistently across the three models (with the 
exception of peace duration, which is only significant in Model 2) and corroborate prior 
findings: intrastate armed conflicts are more likely in highly populated, ethnically 
heterogeneous countries, and tend to occur more frequently since the end of the Cold War. 
Yet, although GDP per capita displays the expected sign, it fails to attain statistical 
significance in all three models.   
 
 
Table 7.4. Parliamentary election outcomes and civil conflict onset, 1975-2005 
(logistic regression, reporting odds ratios) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
Peace duration a 0.991 (0.008) 0.973*** (0.008) 0.990 (0.008) 
SE-VO 1.028** (0.014)   
% seats  1.006 (0.007)  
% votes   1.003 (0.006) 
ELF 5.219*** (2.793) 4.281*** (1.906) 4.726*** (2.457) 
GDP/capita a, b 0.769 (0.126) 0.914 (0.133) 0.795 (0.128) 
Population a, b 1.618*** (0.134) 1.453*** (0.141) 1.634*** (0.147) 
Cold War 0.507** (0.156) 0.590** (0.133) 0.497** (0.154) 
Constant 3.80e-05*** (6.72e-05) 7.26e-05*** (0.000) 2.79e-05*** (5.46e-05) 
Countries 137 150 137 
Observations 2,508 3,491 2,517 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*p < 10%; **p < 5%; ***p < 1%. 
a Lagged one year; b Log 
 
 
I now check for the sensitivity of the results reported in Table 7.4., Model 1. I first run a 
probit model, a fixed effects logit model, and a rare event logit model (not displayed here). 
In the probit and rare event logit models, the independent variable of interest remains 
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statistically significant and positively related to the outbreak of intrastate armed conflict. 
When country and year fixed effects are included, estimates regarding SE-VO actually 
improve substantially: the variable is now significant at the 1% level and is found to 
increase the odds of civil conflict onset by a factor of 1.13 when it increases by one-unit 
(which means that, for each additional percentage point of difference between the share of 
votes and the share of seats of the government party, the risk of conflict increases by 13%). 
Note, however, that a large number of observations have been excluded from the analysis 
because of multicollinearity and perfect prediction of the 0 outcome: there are only 717 
observations (42 countries) left in the model. All in all, however, these results indicate that 
the main findings are robust to a number of alternative model specifications.  
I then check whether the results are entirely driven by a small number of cases that display 
extreme values on both independent variables: I rerun the model after excluding cases in 
which the government party controls more than 80% of the seats in the parliament, and 
cases in which it received fewer than 20% of the votes. In both cases, results remain 
unaffected. Interestingly, however, SE-VO loses its significance either when the 
government party does not have the absolute majority of the seats in the parliament or 
when its share of votes exceeds 35%. This indicates that, when the government party either 
enjoys widespread electoral support or does not monopolize seats in the parliament, the 
discrepancy between political power and electoral support does not matter: conflicts 
simply do not happen in these cases. 
Finally, I investigate whether these findings pertain to all types of intrastate armed conflict 
or only to a subset of these: I rerun the model first with conflicts over government, and 
then with territorial conflicts as dependent variables. Results are displayed in Table 7.5.  
Unexpectedly, SE-VO has no discernible effect on intrastate conflicts over government 
(Model 4): the change in the odds is negligible and the variable fails by far to attain 
statistical significance. By contrast, SE-VO has a strongly significant and relatively high 
effect on the risk of territorial conflict: each one-unit increase of SE-VO increases the risk 
of territorial conflict by roughly 5%, and the variable is significant at the 1% level. Why 
election outcomes have a stronger impact on territorial conflicts than on conflicts over 
government is rather mysterious. Yet, this finding lends some empirical support to the idea 
that territorial conflicts are not solely caused by cultural factors, and that they can be 
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avoided by a better system of representation.   
Results regarding control variables are less surprising. What foremost seems to predict the 
onset of intrastate conflicts over government is poverty (see Collier and Hoeffler 2004): a 
one-unit increase in the log of GDP per capita almost halves the risk of civil conflict 
outbreak in Model 4. These conflicts are also influenced by large populations and a high 
ethnic fractionalization. Yet, both population and ELF display a stronger impact on 
conflicts over territory (Model 5): a one-unit increase in the natural log of population 
almost doubles the risk of territorial conflict, and when ELF increases from 0 to 1 (i.e., 
from its minimal to its maximal value), the odds of a country experiencing a territorial 
conflict increase by a factor of 14. By contrast, GDP per capita does not seem to impact the 
onset of territorial conflict. 
 
 
Table 7.5. Parliamentary elections outcomes and the onset of conflicts over 
government and territory, 1975-2005 (logistic regression, reporting odds ratios) 
 
 (4) (5) 
 Government Territory 
   
Peace duration a 1.002 (0.012) 0.977* (0.013) 
SE-VO 1.010 (0.0213) 1.051*** (0.016) 
ELF 3.017* (1.846) 14.05** (15.18) 
GDP/capita a, b 0.566*** (0.108) 1.309 (0.390) 
Population a, b 1.328** (0.156) 1.995*** (0.306) 
Cold War 0.553 (0.251) 0.412** (0.176) 
Constant 0.008** (0.020) 3.15e-09*** (1.06e-08) 
Countries 137 137 
Observations 2,508 2,508 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*p < 10%; **p < 5%; ***p < 1%. 
a Lagged one year; b Log 
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7.4. CONCLUSION 
 
There is a persistent debate regarding the impact of electoral competition on the stability of 
political regimes. On the one hand, if the incumbent’s party repeatedly wins elections by 
large margins of victory, opposition parties – knowing that they do not have any fair 
chance of attaining political power by legal means – face a strong incentive to rebel. On 
the other hand, when electoral support is evenly distributed between ruling party and 
opposition parties, the latter’s chance of prevailing in a civil war clearly improve. When 
and why, then, do opposition parties rebel?  
My findings lend support to both views. Opposition parties are deterred from rebelling 
when the incumbent wins elections by large margins, and they are incited to comply when 
they know the incumbent would relinquish power if they won the next elections. In short, 
rebellion does not occur when the political influence opposition groups are granted under 
the current institutions roughly corresponds to their level of electoral support. If this is not 
the case, opposition parties are better off rebelling than complying and conflict will ensue.  
In a certain way, these results support some of the arguments that have been made about 
“hybrid” or “anocratic” regimes (see, e.g., Muller and Weede 1990; Hegre et al. 2001; 
Regan and Henderson 2002; Regan and Bell 2010): prior research has characterized these 
regimes as inherently unstable because they allow opposition groups to mobilize popular 
support without giving them the possibility to pursue their demands in a regular, 
institutional way. Although the “anocracy hypothesis” has been seriously challenged in 
recent years (see Vreeland 2008; Regan and Bell 2010), there seems to be some truth in the 
underlying argument that democracies are generally able to decrease the desirability of 
rebellion and autocracies to increase its costs or limit the opposition’s opportunities to 
challenge the regime. 
Finally, these findings shed light on how and why elections can contribute to the stability 
of political regimes. In particular, for authoritarian elections to perform their stabilizing 
function, incumbents must carefully decide how free and fair these elections should be, 
how much competition they want to allow, and to which extent they are ready to grant 
opposition parties a real political influence in case these perform well at the polls. In this 
regard, the worst possible strategy consists in allowing opposition parties to display their 
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electoral strength while depriving them of any real possibility to gain political influence. 
At the same time, however, these findings beg further questions, to the extent that, while 
cases of huge disproportionality between parties’ share of votes and their share of seats are 
clearly destabilizing, they are not exceptional. Thus, one interesting avenue for future 
research would be to investigate whether these cases always result from a political 
miscalculation – as in the Algerian case discussed above – or whether they convey some 
strategic benefits that outweigh the associated risks.  
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8 
 
Revisiting the moral hazard in authoritarian repression: 
The role of the military  
 
 
 
 
“You can do anything with bayonets except sit on them.” 
Thomas Hardy. 
 
 
 
A gap between qualitative and quantitative scholarship on the military’s participation in 
domestic repression has appeared in recent years. While recent qualitative scholarship has 
widely acknowledged that the military’s support for authoritarian regimes should not be 
taken for granted and that defections are by no means rare (D’Anieri 2006; Hall 2010; 
Barany 2011, 2013; Pion-Berlin et al. 2014), this idea is still relatively absent from cross-
national comparative studies on the topic: with a few exceptions (e.g., Geddes 1999), many 
authoritative works on political transitions tend either to treat the military as a passive 
agent of the ruling elite or not to address the question at all (e.g., Boix 2003; Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2006). This sometimes even pertains to studies that explicitly deal with the 
impact of repression on the political survival of dictators (e.g., Escriba-Folch 2013a) or on 
the regime’s prospects for democratization (e.g., Albertus and Menaldo 2012). The few 
authors who have devoted attention to the role of the military in political transitions have 
been primarily concerned with what McMahon and Slantchev (2015) label the 
“guardianship dilemma,” i.e., the fact that incumbents’ reliance on coercion gives the 
armed forces sufficient power to impose their own preferences and possibly overthrow the 
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current regime (Acemoglu et al. 2008; Besley and Robinson 2009; Svolik 2012). Some 
studies have more directly tackled the issue of the moral hazard in state repression, but they 
mostly deal with situations in which a lack of political control on repressive agents results 
in more severe human rights violations (see, e.g., Butler et al. 2007; Conrad and Moore 
2010; Cingranelli et al. 2014).  
Thus, our understanding of the military’s attitudes toward domestic repression remains so 
far fragmented. This issue is nevertheless fundamental. State repression is often thought of 
as one of the most important “pillars” (Gerschewski 2013) on which autocrats rely to 
maintain their rule: Yet, whether repression “works” or not – that is, whether it is an 
effective way of ensuring the regime’s survival in the last resort – is still an open question. 
Shifting the focus toward the agents in charge of carrying out repression thus represents an 
important first step toward understanding how authoritarian regimes break down, because 
when the incumbent has lost popular support and mass dissent breaks out, the armed forces 
are the last bulwark against the regime’s downfall. Knowing whether or not military 
officers are likely to refuse to obey orders to repress and turn against the incumbent is thus 
crucial for understanding dynamics of regime transition and leadership changes in 
dictatorships.  
The basic idea I put forward is that what makes repression especially risky is a potential 
mismatch between the preferences of incumbents and the preferences of the military: the 
moral hazard in state repression arises from the fact that, while repression is an attractive 
option for incumbents who have lost popular support, the agents in charge of carrying it out 
– that is, members of the armed forces – are generally hostile to it. Yet, this idea is at odds 
with one dominant assumption in the quantitative literature on state repression, that 
militaries tend to favor the use of force over peaceful conflict resolution, either because 
they do not know other ways of reacting to political conflicts or because they have an 
incentive to push for repressive policies in order to increase their own influence on the 
political system (see Davenport 2007b, 487). Furthermore, if military officers are indeed 
reluctant to carry out domestic repression, it becomes quite mysterious why military 
dictators tend to make a more extensive use of coercion than civilian autocrats (Poe et al. 
1995; Davenport 2007b).  
In the following sections of this chapter, I will empirically analyze two aspects of the 
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problem sketched above. I will first examine whether state repression – conceived here as 
physical integrity rights violations perpetrated by state actors – affects coup risk: this will 
be, to the best of my knowledge, the first cross-national statistical analysis on this topic. 
Second, I will test whether systems in which the influence of the military on politics is 
maximized – that is, military dictatorships – are more coercive than regimes ruled by 
civilians.  
The chapter is organized as follows. Next section will review prior works on the role of the 
military in state repression. Section 8.2 will discuss some theoretical expectations and 
present the working hypotheses. Section 8.3 will deal with some general issues in the 
measurement of state repression, and will discuss the consequences of these measurement 
issues for the study of regime type and repression. In Section 8.4, I then proceed to test my 
hypotheses. Section 8.5 concludes.  
 
 
8.1. WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT THE MILITARY’S ATTITUDE TOWARD 
DOMESTIC REPRESSION? 
 
Early analysts of civil-military relations have repeatedly emphasized the deep reluctance of 
military officers to participate in domestic repression. For example, Needler (1975, 70) 
mentions the desire to maintain good relations with the civilian population as one of the 
core institutional interests of the military and notes that governments’ attempts to use the 
military as a repression force has often led to their overthrow. Finer (2009 [1962], 27) 
notes that this is one of the reasons why professionalization may sometimes lead to military 
intervention:117 As he sums up, for professional soldiers, “the foreigner is the enemy, not a 
fellow national.” Nordlinger (1977) has a more cynical interpretation – “officers see 
themselves as professional and heroic managers of violence,” he says, and using force 
against their fellow citizens “impugns their professional standing, martial qualities, and 
heroic image” (p. 54-5) – but also stresses officers’ aversion to be used to coerce domestic 
opponents.  
These considerations are relatively absent from the recent quantitative scholarship on both 
                                                 
117 Military intervention refers here to military intervention in domestic politics, not to, e.g., foreign military 
intervention in civil wars. 
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repression and military coups (for a notable exception, see Geddes 2006). On the one hand, 
the military’s involvement in domestic repression is practically never mentioned as a 
possible determinant of military intervention in cross-national comparative analyses of 
coups, even when these studies include the current regime’s legitimacy in their list of 
determinants (e.g., Belkin and Schofer 2003). On the other hand, while numerous studies 
have investigated the effectiveness of repression, these studies were either concerned with 
the impact of repression on mass dissent (see, e.g., Lichbach 1987; Gupta et al. 1993; 
Moore 1998; Regan and Norton 2005; Carey 2006; Davenport et al. 2008; Bell et al. 2013; 
Young 2013) or with its consequences for broader issues such as dictators’ survival in 
office (e.g., Escriba-Folch 2013a) or democratization (e.g., Albertus and Menaldo 2012). In 
most of these studies, the interests and preferences of the agents in charge of carrying out 
repression is still the unknown in the equation. 
Some other studies have devoted more attention to principal-agent issues in domestic 
repression. First, Acemoglu et al. (2008) as well as Svolik (2012) argue that states that 
overly rely on repression face a moral hazard: the very material resources and institutional 
autonomy that allow the regime’s repressive agents to participate in internal repression also 
provide them with leverage they can exploit for their own benefit, and enable them to turn 
against the regime itself. Second, some empirical studies have investigated how agency 
loss might lead to increased levels of state-sponsored violence (see, e.g., Butler et al. 2007; 
Bohara et al. 2008; Englehart 2009; Conrad and Moore 2010; Cingranelli et al. 2014). 
While these works explicitly take the preferences of repressive agents into account, these 
agents are either assumed to act by pure opportunism or to have a stronger preference for 
violence than their principals.  
A relatively straightforward way of identifying the military’s preferences regarding the use 
of domestic repression is to observe how it behaves once in power. Two cross-national 
comparative studies (Poe et al. 1999; Davenport 2007b) have investigated whether 
military-led regimes are systematically more prone to repression than civilian ones: both 
find it to be the case. The explanations offered are somewhat different: Poe et al. state that 
“political leaders with direct control of the instruments of coercion (...) will face fewer 
barriers than other leaders if they choose to act repressively”118 (Poe et al. 1999, 293) while 
                                                 
118 The argument is not entirely clear, however. The sentence seems to imply that the most serious “barrier” 
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Davenport’s (2007b) argument relies on the idea of “coercive expertise”: in short, actors 
who are familiar with coercion are more likely to use it out of habit, and less likely to 
pursue alternative strategies that would decrease their own influence on the decision-
making process. In spite of these divergences, both studies directly link the use of 
repression to the preferences of the military.  
As already noted, these works contrast sharply with early research on military coups, but 
also with more recent qualitative scholarship: a growing body of qualitative, case studies-
based research on military behavior during political crises has developed in recent years, 
based on the finding that revolutions usually do not succeed without the active support (or 
at least the neutrality) of the military. Indeed, such defections are by no means exceptional: 
the military’s refusal to repress protesters and the withdrawal of its support for the 
government – if not its active support for the revolution – has been the ultimate cause of 
the regime’s demise in cases as various as Venezuela in 1958 (Karl 1987), Romania in 
1989 (Barany 1997; Watts 2001; Hall 2010), Mali in 1991 (Turrittin 1991; Moestrup 1999), 
or Indonesia in 1998 (Lee 2005, 2009). More recently, the Arab Spring has highlighted the 
crucial role played by the military for the survival or breakdown of a regime in 
revolutionary situations. In all of the countries in which mass unrest broke out, the 
incumbent ordered his army to repress the protests; the outcome of the protests in each 
country ultimately depended on whether generals accepted or refused to carry out the order 
(Barany 2011). For instance, in Tunisia and Egypt, the army backed the protesters, and the 
regime fell; in Libya, the army split and civil war ensued; in Bahrain, where the army 
supported the regime, the revolution failed (see also Nepstad 2013; Croissant 2013a). 
D’Anieri (2006) makes a similar point about the role of the security forces (including the 
military) in determining the outcome of the “colored revolutions” in post-communist 
countries: revolutions failed wherever the security forces remained loyal to the regime, and 
succeeded in cases where they not only refused from repressing demonstrations, but also 
refrained from taking preemptive measures and even sometimes assisted the protesters.  
For these reasons, qualitative research has become increasingly concerned with the factors 
that may lead the military to defect from the regime. Possible causes of defections include 
                                                                                                                                                    
leaders could face if they choose to repress is resistance from the military itself. But if the military is 
willing to resist orders to repress when it is not in power, why should it repress more than civilians when 
it directly rules the country? 
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the military’s own grievances (Karl 1987, Barany 2013, Pion-Berlin et al. 2014), its lack of 
internal cohesion (Lee 2005, 2009; Barany 2011, 2013; Lehrke 2014), its treatment under 
the current regime and/or the extent to which it would be better off under another regime 
(Lee 2009; Lutterbeck 2013; Nepstad 2013), or the relative domestic or foreign support for 
the regime and the opponents (Barany 2011, 2013; Nepstad 2013). Most of these 
approaches are either related to the military’s self-interest in the breakdown of the regime – 
thus viewing the defection as an elite-driven, top-down process – or to its inability to react 
to the threat in an effective way because of specific organizational dysfunctions (e.g., Lee 
2005, Lehrke 2014). However, some studies also specifically stress the military’s 
reluctance to be used to coerce domestic opponents. In their comparative analysis of cases 
of military disobedience in face of mass unrest, Pion-Berlin et al. (2014) argue that the 
military ethos (i.e., the military’s perception of its role and duty) had a decisive influence 
on the decision to follow or disobey orders to repress the protests: militaries that professed 
a duty to the people rather than to the regime and felt that internal security tasks were not 
part of their professional obligations were more likely to refuse orders (see also Lutterbeck 
2013). Nepstad (2013) similarly stresses the moral conflicts that may arise when troops are 
ordered to fire at nonviolent protesters, and the way opponents can exploit these moral 
dilemmas to encourage loyalty shifts. The impact of such factors has been regularly 
confirmed by individual case studies: for example, Taylor (2001, 2003) attributes the 
Russian military’s repeated refusal to get involved in domestic repression to its deep 
commitment to the norm of civilian supremacy and its reluctance to fulfill internal security 
tasks. Hall (2010) provides a thorough account of the Romanian military’s behavior during 
the uprisings that ultimately led to Ceaușescu’s downfall in 1989: after soldiers repeatedly 
refused to carry out the order to suppress demonstrations by force – and even, in some 
cases, joined the protests – the army’s high command rapidly decided to withdraw, and 
ultimately turned against the regime. In Hall’s account, the defection process unfolded 
bottom-up rather than top-down: because the army’s rank-and-file were conscripted, had 
strong ties with the population and share the same concerns as protesters, they rapidly 
proved unable to carry out their task and the high command had no choice but to take them 
off the streets.  
To sum up, prior research has either focused on the impact of coercive capacities on the 
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risk of military intervention (Svolik 2012) or on the extent to which the military’s 
unwillingness to repress may lead to defections (e.g., Pion-Berlin et al. 2014) or military 
arbitrations119 (e.g. Hall 2010, Barany 2011, 2013), whereas the impact of the use of 
repression on the risk of military intervention has been comparatively neglected.120 
Likewise, coups as a consequence of coercion have been widely overlooked by large-N 
studies on the repression-dissent nexus. I attempt to fill this gap by providing a theoretical 
account on why, even in the absence of serious challenges to the regime’s authority, the 
risk of coup increases when the army gets involved in domestic repression.  
 
 
8.2. THE MORAL HAZARD IN STATE REPRESSION REVISITED 
 
8.2.1. Agency loss: Understanding when and why the military resists orders to repress  
 
In line with prior research (Butler et al. 2007; Conrad and Moore 2010; Acemoglu et al. 
2008; Svolik 2012), I conceive the relationship between the ruling elite and the military as 
a principal-agent relationship. However, I depart from these works to the extent that I do 
not assume that repressive agents have a systematic preference for more repression, or that 
they are primarily interested in maximizing their own influence on domestic politics. As 
discussed above, when the military is ordered to carry out regime maintenance tasks, it can 
either obey orders, disobey by remaining neutral, or back the opponents and overthrow the 
government. With regard to repression, the military’s preferences can also diverge from 
those of the ruling elite: when ordered to repress opponents, the military can repress more 
than asked, but it can also repress less. Conventional wisdom suggests that the military 
often has a preference for more repression, because bargaining does not belong to its 
organizational culture and because it enjoys a comparative advantage in repression: 
because the use of violence is a part of the role of the army, it is often viewed as its default 
                                                 
119 I borrow Taylor’s (2001) useful distinction between military intervention and military arbitration. Whereas 
military interventions refer to an independent decision taken by the military to attempt to unseat the 
executive by force, military arbitration occurs when the state's or the government's authority is seriously 
challenged and the army is forced to choose whose orders to obey. 
120 A notable exception is Finer (2009 [1962], 27), who views the military's reluctance to be used to repress 
protests as one of the reasons why, contrary to one commonly held belief, military professionalization 
may actually lead to interventions. 
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mode of reaction (see e.g. Davenport 2007b; Fjelde 2010, 200). However, the military’s 
collective identity as an actor specialized in the use of violence says nothing about the 
content of its preferences when it comes to the actual use of force: the only implication that 
can be drawn is that, military officers being the ones that are in charge of carrying out 
repression, their preferences may diverge strongly from those of the principal, because they 
might have different information about their own coercive capacity or hold different beliefs 
about the necessity or the feasibility of coercive action. Furthermore, the military itself can 
be affected by its own internal principal-agent problems: regardless of high-ranking 
officers’ own preferences, their ability to effectively carry out orders to repress ultimately 
depends on middle-level officers’ and recruits’ readiness to obey, because it is in their 
interest to maintain the cohesion of the military and to avoid a complete breakdown of the 
chain of command.  
The workers strike in Poland in 1970 illustrates the internal problems the military may face 
when it gets involved in domestic repression.121 In December 1970, workers at the 
shipyards in the region of Gdansk went on strike to protest against changes in the prices of 
consumer goods. The government quickly sent the army to support internal security forces 
and bring back order. However, the protests escalated rapidly and spread throughout the 
country after the army opened fire at workers in Gdynia. The crisis ultimately resulted in 
45 deaths and more than 1000 wounded.  
Although the strike was successfully repressed and order was re-established a few days 
later, the incident had important consequences for both the military and the regime. The 
violence against the civilian population jeopardized the internal cohesion of the military 
and profoundly demoralized military units involved in the crisis: even if the military chain 
of command did not break down during the events, there is evidence that several army 
units refused to use their weapons despite orders, and that some others had to be withdrawn 
from the operations because of their unwillingness to fire at strikers. Some officers also 
publicly protested against the military’s involvement in the repression of the strike. In the 
long term, the events cast doubts on the military’s effectiveness in carrying out repression: 
as the regime faced renewed unrest in 1976, party leaders refrained from sending the army 
to maintain order and opted for policy concessions instead. The then Defense Minister 
                                                 
121 For a thorough discussion of the events and the military’s involvement in the crisis, see Fajfer (1993). 
201 
Jaruzelski reportedly justified this decision by saying that “Polish soldiers would never fire 
at Polish workers” (Fajfer 1993, 225). From the perspective of the regime, the events 
provoked a deep crisis within the party apparatus and ultimately led to First Secretary 
Gomulka’s resignation in December 1970. Although the military did not directly challenge 
the authority of the regime or the party during the crisis, the withdrawal of the military’s 
support for Gomulka was decisive for the leadership change. 
The Polish example illustrates why, under certain circumstances, the military high 
command may be strongly opposed to the military’s involvement in domestic repression. 
This preference is not necessarily motivated by purely altruistic reasons, however: as stated 
above, the military high command may have its own preferences regarding the use of 
repression, but its decision to carry it out is ultimately dependent on whether middle-level 
officers and rank and files are willing to perform the task, and whether the military’s 
involvement in domestic repression is susceptible to jeopardize its internal cohesion. The 
decision to intervene or not is subject to the same type of constraints. High-ranking officers 
may have a vested interest in the survival of the regime and prefer not to intervene; 
however, as soon as one part of the military signals its intention to defect, they often have 
no choice but to go along with the plotters. For example, there is some evidence that the 
1960 military coup in Turkey was partly caused by the use made of the army to repress 
protests (Harris 2011, 4; Finer 2009 [1962], 27; Göktepe 2000, 144-145). The coup was 
initially staged by junior officers – mostly opposition sympathizers – without active 
involvement from the military high command. General Gürsel, who later assumed the 
function of head of state, was subsequently chosen to lead the coup – mainly because he 
was popular throughout the armed forces – but did not take an active part in its preparation. 
Other high-ranking officers were recruited on a later stage, in spite of their initial loyalty to 
the regime, because coup plotters wanted to preserve the façade of a cohesive, united 
military.122  
The reasons why even loyal members of the military might want to go along with coup 
plotters for the sake of the military’s unity are detailed in Geddes’ (1999) analysis of 
military interventions. First, as stated above, officers are always worse off when the 
military splits. Second, when a coup is staged, they are also always worse off if they 
                                                 
122 For a detailed account of the coup, see Göktepe (2000). 
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remain passive, regardless of the outcome of the intervention: if the coup fails, the 
government is likely to respond with coup-proofing measures that would further weaken 
the military; if the coup succeeds, officers who remained loyal to the regime run the risk to 
be punished for their defection (Geddes 1999, 126-8; see also Tullock 1987).  
 
8.2.2. Some expectations 
 
To sum up, the argument presented here departs from prior research inasmuch as it 
concerns military intervention rather than arbitration, and relates to repression itself rather 
than its causes (e.g., domestic turmoil) or its externalities (e.g., resource endowment or 
coercive capacities). I hypothesize that the actual use of repression increases the likelihood 
of a military coup. As noted above, this hypothesis contradicts two commonly held beliefs 
about the military’s preferences about repression and intervention: first, that coup plotters 
act by greed or opportunism; second, that the military intervenes when it perceives the 
current government as too weak or unable to maintain order in the face of mass unrest (see, 
e.g., Nordlinger 1977). The empirical analysis should help decide between those 
contradictory expectations: if the military has more interest in repression than its 
principals, the effect of repression on military coups should be negative. If military 
interventions are motivated by greed or opportunism, this effect should be nonexistent. If, 
however, the military prefers to avoid being involved in domestic repression, this effect 
should be positive, even after controlling for coercive capacities and domestic instability.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Repression increases the risk of a military coup.  
 
A positive relationship between repression and coups would provide tentative evidence that 
the military on the whole is not systematically more prone to coercion than civilian leaders. 
One problem with this idea is that it is flatly contradicted by the finding that regimes led by 
military officers tend to be more coercive than civilian autocracies (Poe et al. 1999; 
Davenport 2007b). Yet, the studies by Poe et al. (1999) and Davenport (2007b) both suffer 
from methodological problems that cast some doubts on the validity of this finding: both 
are restricted to a relatively short period of time (1976 to 1993 and 1976 to 1996, 
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respectively) and rely on the same measure of state repression, namely the Political Terror 
Scale (Poe and Tate 1994; Wood and Gibney 2010). While the Political Terror Scale offers 
some advantages in terms of scope and coverage, one of its drawbacks is that it also 
measures abuses perpetrated by non-state actors, which makes its use problematic for the 
purposes of assessing the impact of domestic institutions on state terror. I thus re-examine 
the relationship between military rule and coercion with another measure of physical 
integrity rights violations: I expect no systematic difference between military dictatorships 
and other types of dictatorships. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Military regimes do not repress more than other authoritarian regimes. 
 
Another potential issue is that, even if a relationship between coercion and coups can be 
identified, there are at least two alternative hypotheses that could explain this empirical 
association. First, as Acemoglu et al. (2008) and Svolik (2012) have pointed out, 
heightened repression means higher resource endowment for the military and thus better 
opportunities to attain power. Second, the primary motivation of coup plotters could be a 
desire to avoid being prosecuted for participating in coercion in case the regime breaks 
down. Ruling out these alternative hypotheses is no easy task, since the motivations of 
coup plotters cannot be gauged directly. Yet, a further, more indirect test could make it 
possible to decide between the three options: the hypothesis I put forward implies that 
every ruler runs a higher risk of being overthrown if he overly relies on repression, 
regardless of the type of regime. By contrast, the first alternative hypothesis – that coercion 
increases the military’s opportunity to attain power – implies that repression should 
increase coup risk when the military is not already in power, that is, in regimes led by 
civilian leaders: if the armed forces are in power, it can be reasonably assumed that they 
already enjoy full control of the political system and that repression does not change 
anything about it. Finally, the second alternative hypothesis – that military officers want to 
avoid prosecution – implies, on the contrary, that repression should increase coup risk only 
if the country is ruled by the armed forces (the idea being that military members who 
participated in domestic repression are less likely to be prosecuted if they can plausibly 
claim that they did not issue the order). While this final test would not settle the question in 
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a definitive way, it would at least provide some preliminary support for one of these 
potential mechanisms.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Repression always increases coup risk, regardless of whether the regime is a 
military dictatorship or a civilian regime.  
 
Next sections discuss available measures of state repression and present the data and 
methods. 
 
 
8.3. MEASURING STATE REPRESSION  
 
8.3.1. Cross-national data on state repression: The Cingranelli and Richards Physical 
Integrity Rights index and the Political Terror Scale 
 
Two comprehensive large-N datasets on physical integrity rights violations are currently 
available. The first one is the Political Terror Scale (hereafter PTS), which covers more 
than 180 countries from 1976 to present and measures the levels of state-sponsored 
political violence that a country experiences in a particular year (Wood and Gibney 2010). 
“State terror” is defined as “violations of physical or personal integrity rights carried out by 
a state (…) and includes abuses such as extrajudicial killings, torture or similar physical 
abuse, disappearances, and political imprisonment” (ibid., 369).123 These dimensions of 
personal integrity rights violations are aggregated into a single scale that ranges from 1 
(very low number of abuses) to 5 (very high number of abuses).124 The coding is based on 
                                                 
123 Because of the vagueness of this formulation, doubt remain whether state terror is limited to this list of 
human rights violations or can include other types of violence. 
124 Levels of state terror are defined as follows. Level 1: “Countries . . . under a secure rule of law, people are 
not imprisoned for their views, and torture is rare or exceptional... Political murders are extremely rare”; 
Level 2: “There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, a few 
persons are affected; torture and beating are exceptional... Political murder is rare”; Level 3: There is 
extensive political imprisonment... Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. 
Unlimited detention, with or without trial, for political views is accepted”; Level 4: “The practices of 
Level 3 are expanded to larger numbers. Murders, disappearances, and torture are part of life… In spite of 
its generality, on this level terror affects primarily those who interest themselves in politics or ideas”; 
Level 5: “The terrors of Level 4 have been extended to the whole population... The leaders of these 
societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological 
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two annual sources: the US Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices and the Amnesty International Annual Report.  
The second one is the physical integrity rights index of the Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) 
Human Rights Data Project (Cingranelli and Richards 2010), which covers more than 190 
countries from 1981 to present. Physical integrity rights are defined as “the rights not to be 
tortured, extrajudicially killed, disappeared, or imprisoned for political beliefs” (ibid., 397). 
Each of these types of physical integrity rights violations is first coded on an ordinal scale 
that ranges from 0 (meaning that this practice occurred frequently in the country-year) to 2 
(no instance of this practice). When numeric estimates are available, the coding is based on 
the frequency of each type of violations (a score of 2 would indicate no violation at all, a 
score of 1 would indicate up to 49 cases of violations, and 0 would indicate more than 50 
cases of violation).125 The four indicators are then added into an index that ranges from 0 
(no respect for any of these rights) to 8 (full respect for all of these rights) (ibid., 407). 
.  
8.3.2. Physical integrity rights violations and political regime type: Some descriptive 
patterns 
 
The striking pattern of physical integrity rights data is there volatile character: contrary to 
most attributes of political regimes, physical integrity rights protection and abuses are 
inherently dynamic phenomena. Even though democracies tend to make a lesser use of 
repression, state violence is not a structural feature of political regime type, and, 
consistently with what Davenport (2007a) labels as “the law of coercive responsiveness” 
(see also Earl 2011), physical integrity rights performance displays strong within-country 
variations over time and is only weakly related to regime type: in short, states commit 
physical integrity rights abuses when confronted to threats, and tend not to commit them 
otherwise. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
goals” (Woods and Gibney 2010, 373). 
125 It is not very clear, however, whether this coding scheme is systematically applied as long as numeric 
estimates are available (see Cingranelli and Richards 2010, 401-2). 
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 Figure 8.1. CIRI scores by Polity score 
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To illustrate this point, Figures 8.1 and 8.2 display the distribution of CIRI and PTS scores 
according to countries’ scores on the Polity IV democracy index.126 As can be seen in 
Figure 8.1, the distribution of CIRI physical integrity rights score is characterized by a high 
dispersion within each regime category. Furthermore, the mean CIRI score does not seem 
to increase along with Polity scores: the mean fluctuates randomly around the middle of the 
CIRI scale until the highest Polity values (9 and 10) are reached. Judging by the 
distribution of higher and lower CIRI scores by Polity values, highly autocratic regimes are 
not necessarily the most repressive, and democracies sometimes exhibit a bad physical 
integrity rights performance: some relatively open systems (e.g., Spain, Brazil or Turkey) 
consistently obtain lower scores than strongly authoritarian regimes such as Qatar or 
Oman. This lends some support to the idea that repression is a tool that can be used 
                                                 
126 To avoid confusing transitioning or occupied countries or failed states with anocracies, I use the first 
combined Polity index (POLITY) instead of the revised Polity index (POLITY2) in which standardized 
authority scores (-88, -77 and -66) are coded 0. These values are recoded as missing here. 
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independently from regime type, depending on the context. 
 
 
Figure 8.2. PTS scores by Polity score 
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The distribution of PTS scores (Figure 8.2) displays the same patterns. On average, stable 
autocracies (from -10 to -5) do not perform worse than anocracies (from -5 to 5) or even 
some democracies. With regard to the latter, the mean PTS score tends to be somewhat 
lower than in nondemocracies, but the median remains the same until countries reach the 
score of 9 on the Polity scale. Furthermore, some countries rated 9 or 10 on the Polity 
index still reach the highest score of 5 on the PTS, whereas some of the least democratic 
systems get the best possible score of 1. On the whole, PTS scores vary strongly within, 
but not across categories: the mean remains relatively stable between the Polity scores of -
10 and -8,127 and the median, maximal or minimal value of the PTS do not vary in a 
                                                 
127 Oddly enough, both indices indicate that physical integrity rights performance tends to worsen by the 
middle of the Polity scale: countries rated 1 get a median score of 4 on the PTS (indicating widespread 
abuses) and a quite bad median score of 2 on the CIRI physical integrity rights index. 
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predictable way as countries move from one Polity score to another.  
Furthermore, many country scores display considerable fluctuations over time, which seem 
to be completely independent from regime type. For example, Zimbabwe’s CIRI score 
changed 13 times between 1990 and 2008, and Turkmenistan’s 12 times within the same 
time span. Within four years, Bhutan’s CIRI score increased by 5 points (from 1 in 1992 to 
6 in 1996) and Chile improved its score by 6 points (reaching its minimal score of 2 in 
1998 and its maximal score of 8 in 2002). None of these countries has undergone a 
significant regime change in the period under consideration, and in the three 
nondemocratic countries, no alternation in power has taken place. In sum, these patterns 
cast some doubt on the idea that physical integrity rights protection is structurally 
dependent on political regime type.   
 
 
8.3.3. Some problems with the use of the PTS in cross-country analyses of state 
repression 
 
The CIRI physical integrity rights index and the PTS are very similar in their content and 
scope: both are ordinal scales based on annual country reports by the US State Department 
and Amnesty International; both measure the same specific phenomenon, i.e., actual 
physical integrity rights violations carried out by state actors (instead of, for example, 
general political repression including civil liberties restrictions, or general human rights 
conditions including violence carried out by non-state actors) and include the same 
components. The main differences arise from their respective coding procedures, i.e., how 
each project deals with the issue of transforming inherently qualitative source materials – 
in which accurate numeric estimates of casualties are seldom available – into numerical, 
single-dimensional scales.  
For example, while the CIRI index is exclusively based on the frequency of physical 
integrity rights violations, the PTS authors attempt to take several dimensions of state 
violence into account in their coding: first, the type of violence committed (with the 
implication that some types of violence – e.g., killings – should have more weight in the 
overall score than others – e.g., imprisonment); second, the frequency with which the state 
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perpetrates human rights abuses; and third, the share of the population targeted for abuse, 
i.e., the extent to which violence is selective or indiscriminate (Wood and Gibney 2010, 
374). The distinction between the second and the third dimension (which are referred to as 
“intensity” and “range”, respectively) is especially important because, as the authors argue, 
the mere frequency of violence says nothing about whether it is targeted at political 
activists or whether the government is indiscriminately torturing and killing apolitical 
citizens (ibid., 379). Because the CIRI index does not take such information into account, 
no distinction can be made between specific patterns of coercive behavior and their 
ethical128 as well as practical consequences (given the fact, for instance, that indiscriminate 
violence is supposedly more likely to backfire than targeted coercion).  
Yet, even if such information is per se valuable, the question remains how selectivity is 
observed and how exactly this criterion affects the overall score of a country on the scale. 
The same goes for the dimension the PTS authors refer to as “scope” (i.e., the severity of 
abuses carried out by the state): although it is strongly implied by the descriptions of each 
level of state terror that instances of specific types of human rights violations would 
automatically move a country toward the highest values of the scale129 (see also Wood and 
Gibney 2010, 377), there is no information about how exactly each type of abuse 
influences the overall score. Furthermore, if the concept to be measured is inherently 
multidimensional, conflating these dimensions into a single scale may not be a sound 
                                                 
128 An extensive discussion on the normative implications of giving higher scores to states that repress 
indiscriminately would be far beyond the scope of this analysis. However, it is somewhat regrettable that 
the authors do not provide a clear theoretical justification for this coding decision. In fact, Wood and 
Gibney (2010, 379) deny that this decision was based on normative considerations; however, states that 
selectively use violence against opponents still receive better scores than those that repress 
indiscriminately, regardless of the frequency or the type of violence carried out. The unfortunate 
implication is that (assuming that political activity is the criterion that determines whether repression can 
be considered as “selective”) torturing and killing apolitical citizens seems somehow more “serious” than 
torturing and killing political activists. Given the fact that the distinction between “apolitical citizens” and 
“political opponents” is itself very blurry and depends on what kind of political activities are allowed in 
the first place, it also implies that extremely restrictive states are more likely to get a better score on the 
PTS because they are more likely to be considered selective in their use of repression. Lastly, it is not 
clear what “selectivity” exactly means, and according to which criteria it would be more “acceptable” for 
a state to target its victims: for example, repression of political opponents (based on political engagement) 
is treated as selective violence, whereas ethnic cleansing or genocide (based on ethnicity) is apparently 
not (ibid., 374). Even though they do not clearly violate common sense, such decisions should be 
discussed more extensively. 
129 This would mean, for example, that extensive political emprisonment would dictate a score of 3 whereas 
widespread extrajudicial killings would dictate a score of 5 (barring other violations, and assuming that 
the frequency of abuse is the same in both cases). 
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choice since it violates one requirement of social sciences methodology, that variables 
should be unidimensional (for a further discussion, see McCormick and Mitchell 1997).  
The most serious issue, however, is that, while the CIRI index is explicitly restricted to 
physical integrity rights violations perpetrated by the state or its agents, the PTS also takes 
terror from non-state actors into account (Cingranelli and Richards 2010, 405-7). This 
broader focus is not necessarily problematic per se, but including abuses perpetrated by 
non-state actors in measures of state violence can lead to serious biases when the question 
is whether some regime types repress more than others: theories linking regime type to 
physical integrity rights violations would not only need to address the question of why 
some states perpetrate more abuses than others, but also why terror from non-state actors is 
more widespread under some regimes. The two most comprehensive analyses on 
authoritarian regime type and repression to date (Poe et al. 1999; Davenport 2007b) both 
rely on the PTS but do not include such a discussion. Both studies find military 
dictatorships to engage more extensively in physical integrity rights violations and rely on 
the “coercive expertise” hypothesis to explain this empirical relationship, but this finding 
could actually simply result from the fact that military dictatorships tend to emerge in 
countries that are already plagued by domestic turmoil (see, e.g., Acemoglu et al. 2008, 
Svolik 2012; see also Chapter 4) and in which human rights conditions are generally bad. 
Thus, the question arises whether there is actually a regime effect in instances of human 
right abuses.  
Since the CIRI index is based on a more reliable coding and more transparent aggregation 
rules, I will use it as my primary source for the empirical analysis, and check for the 
robustness of the results with the PTS if the empirical analysis lends preliminary support 
for my hypotheses (if the tests I perform with the CIRI data do not yield any significant 
result, I consider the hypothesis to be plainly rejected).  
 
8.3.4. A modified version of the CIRI physical integrity rights index 
 
Although the CIRI composite index of physical integrity rights is more reliable than the 
PTS, it is not free from methodological problems either. Most of these problems are due to 
the aggregation rule: for example, as Wood and Gibney (2010, 377) remark, summing 
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instances of abuses without taking casualties into account can artificially decrease130 the 
overall score (e.g., a state that imprisons, tortures and kills one individual gets the same 
score as one that imprisons one person, tortures another and kills a third one). The matter is 
further complicated by data truncation issues, that is, the fact that each subcomponent 
index only comprises three possible scores, and that in each one of them, the category of 
the “worst offenders” is probably the most heterogeneous one because there is no upper 
bound to the number of abuses. Because this is true of each subcomponent, and because the 
scores are then summed without being weighted, a state in which one single type of abuse 
(e.g., extrajudicial killing) is reported can possibly get one of the highest (best) scores on 
the overall scale, even if the number of victims is considerable: thus, the additive rule can 
also result in artificially high scores on the overall scale (ibid., 387-91). A related concern 
is that this apparently simple aggregation rule can lead to a misleading picture of the 
overall physical integrity rights practices because it does not take the mutual dependence 
relationships between types of abuses (including possible substitution effects)131 into 
account (see Fariss and Schnakenberg 2014).  
However, since the CIRI project provides data on each subcomponent, problems due to 
aggregation rules are easy to solve. I thus transform the physical integrity rights index into 
a multiplicative index ranging from 0 (worst score) to 2 (best score). The underlying 
principle is that no country can reach the highest score as long as it gets scores lower than 2 
in one (or several) of the subcomponents: a score of 1 in at least one of the subcomponents 
would automatically move the country from the best to the middle category of the overall 
index, and a score of 0 in one subcomponent would automatically place the country in the 
category of the worst performers (regardless of how well it performs otherwise). Thus, a 
score of 2 means that no physical integrity right violation occurred in the country-year; a 
score of 1 means that abuses occurred but none of those was widespread; a score of 0 
means that at least one type of violation was widespread.  
Table 8.1. gives an overview of the distribution of the original and the modified physical 
integrity rights indices.  
                                                 
130 Recall that low scores on the CIRI index indicate bad human rights performance. 
131 Substitution means that, if two repressive strategies can be used to achieve the same goal, the extensive 
use of one tactic may reduce the need to resort to the second one. For example, since extrajudicial killings 
and political imprisonment can both be used to neutralize opponents, widespread killings may reduce the 
instances of political imprisonment (Fariss and Schnakenberg 2014). 
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Table 8.1. Distribution of original and modified CIRI physical integrity rights scores, 
1981-2008 
CIRI physical integrity rights index Modified physical integrity rights index 
Score Frequency Percent Cum. Score Frequency Percent Cum.  
0 221 5.49 5.49 0 2,201 54.67 54.67 
1 241 5.99 11.48 1 1,341 33.31 87.98 
2 316 7.85 19.32 2 484 12.02 100 
3 382 9.49 28.81     
4 584 14.51 43.32     
5 598 14.85 58.17     
6 562 13.96 72.13     
7 638 15.85 87.98     
8 484 12.02 100     
Total  4,026 100  Total 4,026 100  
(Source: Cingranelli and Richards 2010) 
 
 
8.4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS  
 
8.4.1. State repression and military coups  
 
Testing Hypothesis 1 requires undertaking a further modification of the physical integrity 
rights index: I use a variable that measures whether physical integrity rights conditions 
have improved or worsened compared to the previous year. I first compute the difference 
between the values of the physical integrity rights index in a given year and its values in 
the previous year: the resulting variable ranges between -2 (strong decrease in physical 
integrity rights performance) and 2 (strong increase in physical integrity rights 
performance). I then dichotomize the variable and code it 1 when the physical integrity 
rights performance has decreased, 0 otherwise. Positive values represent about 12.5% of 
the cases.  
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This transformation is justified by several reasons. First, the original variable is ordinal 
(i.e., the intervals between the scores are not necessarily equal, and a country that obtains a 
score of 2 cannot be said to perform twice as good as a country that obtains a score of 1), 
which means that it cannot be included in a regression model as it is. One possibility would 
be to dichotomize the original variable. However, deciding whether scores of 1 should be 
treated as “low” or “high” levels of repression would necessarily be somewhat arbitrary.132 
By contrast, measuring whether human rights conditions improve or worsen provides a 
clear, theoretically grounded cutoff point.  
The second reason is theoretical rather than practical. Contrary to other political 
institutions – that can be expected to impact the probability of a coup without necessarily 
impacting its timing – repression cannot be regarded as a structural precondition that 
facilitates or hinders coups: it should rather be conceived as a triggering factor, not as an 
underlying prerequisite for military intervention. In other words, coercion is supposed to 
impact not only the likelihood of coups but also their timing: if coercion really is a 
proximate cause, coups should be expected to occur immediately after the onset of state 
terror, not five or twenty years later (the point being that, if repression correlates with 
coups regardless of how long it has been used, there is something wrong with the theory).  
Table 8.2. displays the descriptive statistics on the new variable. Original physical integrity 
rights scores are displayed in the left column: changes of score from one year to another 
account for more than 60% of the cases, and dramatic changes of two points and more 
occurred in roughly 20% of the cases. The right column displays changes in the modified 
physical integrity rights index: The variance is strongly reduced since the new scale only 
comprises three points instead of nine. However, the variation of countries’ scores from 
one year to another is still non-negligible: changes account for almost 25% of the cases. 
These cases are evenly shared between improvement (about 11.5% of the observations) and 
deterioration (about 12.5%) of physical integrity rights performance.  
 
 
 
                                                 
132 Treating the index as a factor variable would be somewhat tricky given the small proportion of 2 and the 
distribution of the dependent variables. 
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Table 8.2. Change of physical integrity rights scores (1981-2008) 
Variable Original CIRI score Modified CIRI score 
No change 
Increase in CIRI score: 
One point 
Two points and more 
Total 
 
Decrease of CIRI score: 
One point 
Two points and more 
Total 
40.10% 
 
19.40 
9.90 
30.30 
 
 
20.05 
10.55 
30.60 
75.77% 
 
11.43 
0.23 
11.66 
 
 
12.23 
0.34 
12.57 
(Source: Cingranelli and Richards 2010) 
 
I test Hypothesis 1 using logistic regression. The independent variable of interest is the 
variable measuring increases133 in repression levels, and described in the previous section. 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if at least one coup 
attempt was reported in the country-year, 0 otherwise (see Chapters 4 and 5).  
 
Table 8.3. Coup attempts, 1981-2008 
Frequency Percent  Observations 
135 3.14 4,297 
(Source: Powell and Thyne 2011) 
 
The model also includes a short list of control variables, all of which are potentially related 
to both the dependent and independent variables and whose omission might therefore bias 
the results: I include, first, GDP per capita (see, e.g., Londregan and Poole 1990 for the 
relationship between economic development and coups; Davenport 2007a for the 
relationship between economic development and state terror); I also include a Cold War 
dummy, since both repression and coups appear to be less prevalent since 1990 (see 
Davenport 2007b). In addition, to ensure that the effects of heightened repression on coups 
                                                 
133 Note that, while the transformed CIRI physical integrity right index measures physical integrity rights 
performance (i.e., low scores indicate the worst performers), the binary variable measuring changes in the 
repression levels is coded 1 when human rights performance worsens. Thus, ideally, the original index 
would have a negative, and the dummy variable a positive effect on coup risk. 
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are not due to the effects of higher resource endowments (Svolik 2012), I control for 
change in military expenditures per soldier. Data on military expenditures and military 
personnel are taken from the Correlates of War CINC subcomponents dataset, version 4.0 
(Singer et al. 1972; Singer 1987). 
I then add three further controls to address some potential statistical issues. First, since 
CIRI scores are partly based on a count of instances of physical integrity rights violations, I 
include the natural log of population in the model to correct for the fact that populous 
countries are more likely to cross the 50 cases threshold. Second, countries’ previous 
scores on the modified CIRI physical integrity rights index are included in the model to 
address the data truncation issue: when a country already reached the worst possible score 
in the previous year, their score cannot decrease any further, hence resulting in a bias in 
favor of the worst performers. Since countries’ scores on the physical integrity rights index 
are reported one year prior to the change values and the independent variable is lagged one 
year, the index is itself lagged two years. Note that the variable’s coefficient cannot be 
interpreted in a substantial way.  
 
Table 8.4. Summary statistics on control variables (1981-2008) 
 Mean Standard deviation Observations 
(ln) Population 16.03 1.54 4,289 
Ln (GDP/capita) 8.087 1.13 4,125 
∆ Exp./soldier (USD) 1,418.80 50,526.1 3,773 
(Sources: Maddison project database; COW National Material Capabilities dataset; Ross 2013) 
 
Finally, I also include a variable recording the number of years since the last instance of 
coups, in order to address time-dependence issues. Standard errors are clustered by 
countries. The results of the logistic regression are reported in Table 8.5. below. 
Model 1 displays the basic results. Most variables impact coup risk in the expected way: 
coup risk decreases along with the level of economic development and the number of years 
since the last coup instance, and was somewhat higher in the Cold War period. Change in 
military expenditures per soldier has a slightly positive, marginally significant effect on 
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coup risk.134 
 
Table 8.5. Impact of increased repression levels on military coups, 1981-2008 (logistic 
regression, reporting odds ratios) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
   
Peace duration (coups) a 0.950*** (0.011) 1.062* (0.036) 
∆ Repression (CIRI) a, d 3.499*** (1.283) 5.006*** (2.049) 
Repression (CIRI) b 0.593* (0.168) 0.471** (0.176) 
GDP/capita a, c 0.615*** (0.097) 0.082*** (0.054) 
Population a, c 0.917 (0.094) 0.035 (0.104) 
Cold War d 1.764** (0.420) 0.167 (0.343) 
∆ Exp./soldier a 1.000* (1.42e-05) 1.000 (2.63e-05) 
Constant 11.47 (25.30) 3.059e+32 (1.866e+34) 
Country fixed effects   YES 
Year fixed effects   YES 
Countries 157 49 
Observations 3,373 1,096 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.  
a Lagged one year; b Lagged two years; c Log; d Dichotomous 
 
 
Most importantly, however, estimates displayed in Model 1 lend support to Hypothesis 1: 
increased repression levels positively and significantly impact the risk of military coup, 
and the variable is significant at the 1% level. Furthermore, the magnitude of the effect is 
substantial: military coups are about 3.5 times as likely to occur by increased repression 
levels. So far, Hypothesis 1 is supported. 
Model 2 includes country and year fixed effects. The estimated effect of repression on 
military coups is even larger, coup risk increasing by a factor of 5 when physical integrity 
rights conditions have worsened. Moreover, the variable is now significant at the 0.001 
level. Judging by the results regarding control variables, these estimates may not be 
completely reliable. For example, Model 2 predicts a (weak but still significant) positive 
                                                 
134 Additional tests reveal that the current level of expenditures per soldier does not impact the dependent 
variable. I also attempted to replace these variables with alternative measures of resource endowment or 
coercive capacity. Military expenditures (both in absolute terms and standardized with population) do not 
impact coups either. Including or removing these variables does not impact the findings regarding 
repression 
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effect of peace duration on coup risk. GDP per capita displays an astonishingly low odds 
ratio of approximately 0.08 in the model (which means that for each one-unit increase in 
GDP, coup risk is divided by more than ten); and the sample is reduced to 49 countries 
instead of 157 because of the low variance of the dependent variable. However, since the 
results regarding repression remain relatively stable across estimates, there is still some 
confidence about their validity: Hypothesis 1 is so far confirmed.  
I also perform additional tests (not reported) using rare-event logit (King and Zeng 2001) 
to correct for the high proportion of zeroes in the dependent variable: the results remain 
basically unaltered. I then check whether the results are sensitive to the specification of the 
independent variable: I thus reconstruct the dummy measuring increased repression levels 
using the additive CIRI physical integrity rights index. As expected, the magnitude of the 
effect decreases substantially, but the variable remains statistically significant. I also run a 
test using PTS135 data, after transforming the index in a similar way:136 the variable is 
likewise positively and significantly related to coup risk. Finally, removing statistically 
insignificant variables from Model 1, or adding controls for interstate and intrastate armed 
conflict does not impact the main results: on the whole, there is strong support for 
Hypothesis 1.  
 
8.4.2. Regime type and state repression  
 
To test Hypothesis 2, I use the modified CIRI index (ranging from 0 to 2) as my dependent 
variable. To measure my independent variables – regime type – I use Cheibub et al.’s 
(2010) data: the model thus includes five dummy variables measuring democracy, military 
dictatorship, civilian autocracy, monarchy, and party dictatorship, respectively. While I do 
not expect any significant difference to arise between authoritarian regimes, I still expect 
democracies to be on average less likely to use repression than autocracies (Poe and Tate 
1994; Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Davenport 2007a).  
                                                 
135 Note that the PTS codes the Amnesty International and the US Department reports on two separate scales. 
I conduct the empirical analysis using the Amnesty International scale, and fill missing values with scores 
from the US Department scale. 
136 Positive values (i.e., cases in which one country's rating is worse than in the previous year) comprise about 
17.5% of the observations. Since the PTS does not provide disaggregated data on subcomponents, I could 
not transform the index into a multiplicative one: The independent variable I use for the empirical analysis 
therefore measures changes in the value of the original index. 
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I control for three potential confounders. First, GDP per capita is notoriously associated 
with both regime type (see Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; 
Boix and Stokes 2003) and repression (see Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport 2007a). Second, 
I add controls for ongoing internal and external conflicts: both types of conflict have been 
repeatedly found to make state repression more likely (see, e.g., Poe and Tate 1994; 
Davenport 2007a; Hafner-Burton 2014; Hill and Jones 2014) and, at the same time, the 
occurrence of such conflicts is not independent from regime type. In particular, countries 
under military dictatorship are more likely to experience intrastate armed conflict (Fjelde 
2010) and to be involved in international conflicts (Sechser 2004; Lai and Slater 2006; 
Weeks 2012). I thus include a control for ongoing intrastate armed conflicts using data 
from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset,137 and a dummy variable that takes on the 
value of 1 if a country is involved in a militarized interstate dispute that reaches a hostility 
level of at least 4 on the Correlates of War coding scheme.138  
 
Table 8.6. Ongoing intrastate and interstate conflicts by regime type, 1981-2008 
  Democracy  Monarchy Civilian 
autocracy  
Party 
regime 
Military 
dictatorship 
Sample  
Intrastate 
armed conflict 
Frequency 278 14 240 42 169 743 
Percent  14.34 4.84 27.15 13.17 22.35 17.75 
Interstate 
armed conflict 
Frequency 406 33 240 91 221 991 
Percent  20.65 11.26 26.37 28.00 26.72 22.93 
(Sources: UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset; Correlates of War project; Cheibub et al. 2010) 
 
Additionally, I include a control for regime duration and the dependent variable lagged by 
one year. Dynamic models with lagged dependent variables are somewhat severe, but the 
practice is relatively common in the quantitative literature on repression (see, e.g., Poe and 
Tate 1994; Poe et al. 1999; Davenport 1995).  
Since the dependent variable is trichotomous, I use multinomial regression. Standard errors 
                                                 
137 Coups are excluded from the list (see Chapter 4). 
138 The COW project distinguishes militarized interstate disputes according to their hostility level: Disputes 
coded 1 involve no militarized action, disputes coded 2 involve the threat of force, and disputes coded 3 
involve the display of force. Only disputes coded 4 or 5 involve the actual use of military force: A 
hostility level of 4 indicates a conflict that result in less than 1,000 battle-related deaths per year, while a 
hostility level of 5 indicates full-scale war. 
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are clustered by country. Results – with military regimes as the reference category – are 
reported in Table 8.7. below. The base outcome is 0, indicating the worst possible scores on 
the dependent variable: thus, positive relative risk ratios (above 1) indicate that a variable 
is associated with a better human rights performance, while negative relative risk ratios 
(below 1) indicate a comparatively worse performance. The first column reports the impact 
of independent variables on each country’s probability to move from a score of 0 to a score 
of 1; in the second column, the outcome is a score of 2.  
 
Table 8.7. The impact of regime type on state repression, 1981-2008 (multinomial 
regression, reporting relative risk ratios) 
 Reference category: military dictatorships 
   
 Outcome: CIRI=1 Outcome: CIRI=2 
   
CIRI=1 (t-1) 9.290*** (1.324) 32.82*** (11.75) 
CIRI=2 (t-1) 30.83*** (9.696) 869.6*** (455.5) 
Democracy a 1.787*** (0.325) 2.537** (1.011) 
Civilian autocracy a 1.064 (0.211) 0.905 (0.442) 
Party regime a 1.036 (0.276) 1.109 (0.715) 
Monarchy a 0.723 (0.201) 0.594 (0.350) 
Regime duration a 1.005 (0.005) 1.005 (0.007) 
GDP/capita a, b 1.259*** (0.104) 2.363*** (0.411) 
Population a, b 0.723*** (0.044) 0.631*** (0.053) 
Ongoing MID a 0.697** (0.108) 0.611* (0.160) 
Ongoing intrastate conflict a 0.395*** (0.087) 0.303* (0.210) 
Constant 5.531 (6.278) 0.008*** (0.014) 
Countries  159 159 
Observations 3,571 3,571 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.  
a Lagged one year; b Log 
 
Unsurprisingly, the most powerful predictor of a country’s score in a given year is the score 
it reached in the previous year: countries that received a score above 0 in the previous year 
are on the whole very unlikely to receive a score of 0 in the current year. For example, as 
can be seen in Column 2, countries that received a score of 2 in the previous year are 870 
times less likely to move from a score of 2 to a score of 0 than countries with lower scores 
in the preceding years. This is by far the highest coefficient (the relative risk ratios in 
Column 1 are somewhat less impressive), but this indicates that, when the small 
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fluctuations that appeared on the original CIRI index are put aside and a more conservative 
measure is adopted, human right performance is actually relatively stable over time.  
Results regarding control variables are also in line with expectations: GDP per capita has a 
positive and non-negligible effect on the dependent variable, the coefficient being 
significant at the 1% level in both columns. By contrast, large populations and the 
occurrence of either interstate or intrastate armed conflict reduce the probability that a 
country reaches a score of 1 or 2 on the modified CIRI index. Regime duration has no 
discernible impact on the dependent variable.  
Turning to the independent variables of interest, it appears that democracies are somewhat 
more likely than military dictatorships to reach a score of 1 instead of 0, and much more 
likely to reach a score of 2: the corresponding relative risk ratios are 1.8 and 2.5, 
respectively. This result is expected and broadly consistent with prior research (see Poe and 
Tate 1994; Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Davenport 2007a; Hill and Jones 2014). Yet, 
democracies are the only regime that is consistently correlated with better human rights 
performance compared to military dictatorships: none of the other regime dummies reach 
statistical significance. Results reported in both columns indicate that party regimes and 
civilian autocracies actually behave very similarly to military dictatorships: the associated 
relative risks ratios are in both cases very close to 1. Monarchies seem to be less prone to 
repression than military dictatorships, but the variable falls short of statistical significance.  
Are these findings due to the specification of the dependent variable? This could be the 
case, given the fact that the coding scheme I used strongly reduces the variance of the 
original CIRI index. Moreover, most of this reduction of variance occurred at the lower end 
of the index – that is: on the autocracies’ side – because a score of 0 in any of the 
subcomponents of the CIRI index results in the country receiving a score of 0 on the 
overall index. In other words, the resulting index is severely truncated. This could mask 
important variations within the subgroup of autocracies, because this coding scheme makes 
it more probable that they all reach the same score: countries that commit some physical 
integrity rights violations become indistinguishable from those that engage in widespread 
repression in a systematic manner.   
I therefore create a new variable, which is a slight modification of the original CIRI 
physical integrity rights index. I recode the original variable in the following way (see 
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Table 8.8. for the descriptive statistics): 
(1) The values of 0, 1, and 2 are recoded 0; 
(2) The values of 3, 4, and 5 are recoded 1; 
(3) The values of 6, 7, and 8 are recoded 2.  
 
Table 8.8. Modified CIRI index, 1981-2008 (descriptive statistics) 
Score Frequency Percent  Cum. 
0 778 19.32 19.32 
1 1,564 38.85 58.17 
2 1,684 41.83 100 
Total 4,026 100  
(Source: Cingranelli and Richards 2010) 
 
The resulting index differs widely from the previous one: while only 12% of the 
observations reached the value of 2 on the first modified CIRI index, this value represents 
approximately 42% of the cases with the new index. Furthermore, more than half of the 
observations took on the value of 0 on the previous index, while this score represents less 
than the fifth of the cases with the new variable. Since the resulting variable reflects 
variations at the lower end of the CIRI index more precisely, it might be more appropriate 
for analyzing the effects of authoritarian regime type on physical integrity rights. I thus 
rerun the previous model while only replacing the dependent variable. Results can be seen 
in Table 8.9.  
Again, the most powerful predictors are the lagged dependent variables. Results regarding 
control variables do not differ greatly from those of the previous model. With regard to 
regime type, the only changes worth noting is that democracy loses its statistical 
significance in the first column (that is, if a country becomes democratic, its probability of 
increasing its score from 0 to 1 does not systematically change) and that monarchy now has 
a positive and significant impact on the probability that a country gets a score of 1 or 2 
instead of 0. This effect is quite large: monarchies are four times as likely as military 
dictatorships (the reference category) to increase their score from 0 to 1, and more than 
twice as likely to receive a score of 2. Interestingly, the relative risk ratios associated with 
monarchy are substantially higher than those associated with democracy in the first 
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column, and almost as high in the second column.  
 
Table 8.9. The impact of regime type on state repression, 1981-2008 (robustness 
check) 
 Reference category: military dictatorships 
   
 Outcome: CIRI=1 Outcome: CIRI=2 
   
CIRI=1 (t-1) 7.589*** (1.339) 45.57*** (22.55) 
CIRI=2 (t-1) 265.8*** (274.2) 16.205*** (20.979) 
Democracy a 1.338 (0.280) 2.912*** (0.828) 
Civilian autocracy a 1.053 (0.196) 1.207 (0.342) 
Party regime a 1.184 (0.284) 1.400 (0.519) 
Monarchy a 4.149*** (1.923) 2.449** (1.047) 
Regime duration a 0.995 (0.008) 1.004 (0.008) 
GDP/capita a, b 1.184* (0.116) 1.923*** (0.250) 
Population a, b 0.778*** (0.041) 0.525*** (0.043) 
Ongoing MID a 0.894 (0.133) 0.639** (0.135) 
Ongoing intrastate conflict a 0.347*** (0.059) 0.185*** (0.086) 
Constant 13.71** (14.22) 4.650 (7.279) 
Countries 159 159 
Observations 3,571 3,571 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.  
a Lagged one year; b Log 
 
These new findings notwithstanding, the main results remain on the whole unaltered: 
judging by the size of the coefficients and the levels of statistical significance, neither party 
regimes nor civilian autocracies appear to differ systematically from military dictatorships 
with regard to their use of repression. Military dictatorships are more likely to violate 
physical integrity rights than democracies and monarchies, but no more and no less than 
non-institutionalized regimes. 
As a final test, I investigate whether these findings hold with logistic regression. Recall that 
both dependent variables built from the CIRI scale can take on the values of 0, 1, and 2. I 
thus dichotomize them in two ways: each variable is coded 1 either when the original 
variable was coded 1 or 2 (0 otherwise) or only when the original variable was coded 2. In 
short, these two coding procedures correspond to a more or less encompassing definition of 
good human rights performance: this allows me to test whether military dictatorships are 
systematically more likely to be in the group of the worst performers, or systematically less 
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likely to be in the group of best performers. I then run four models with each of the 
resulting combinations as the dependent variable. Interestingly, results concerning 
democracies and monarchies vary strongly according to the specification of the dependent 
variable: when a less restrictive definition of good human rights performance is adopted, 
monarchies are the most likely (judging by the odds ratios) to display a good overall 
performance; however, they are still less likely than democracies to achieve the best scores 
on the CIRI scale. Putting aside these variations, the estimated effect of authoritarian 
regime type is generally insensitive to the specification of the dependent variable: neither 
party regimes nor civilian autocracies perform better than military dictatorships in any of 
the four models. Finally, none of these results change substantively when country and year 
fixed effects are included in the models.  
 
 
8.4.3. Repression and coups in military and civilian regimes 
 
We now turn to Hypothesis 3. To test whether repression has a different impact on coup 
risk according to whether the military is in power or not, I split my sample into two 
subgroups, namely military and non-military (civilian) regimes. I then rerun Model 1 (see 
Section 8.4.1.) for each subsample.  
The results (displayed in Table 8.10.) support Hypothesis 3: although the baseline 
probability of a coup differs largely in both samples, the effect of repression on coups is 
roughly similar in both models, with odds ratios slightly above 3. Actually, repression is 
even the only variable that is consistently associated with a higher coup risk in both 
models: most of the control variables fall short of statistical significance, even though they 
impact the dependent variable in the expected way. Although consistently negative, the 
effect of GDP per capita is never significant. Past coups impact the risk of renewed coup 
attempts, but only in the case of civilian regimes. Population, Cold War, and military 
expenditures have virtually no effect on the dependent variable. Finally, ongoing armed 
conflicts have – as expected – a positive impact on coup risk. 
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Table 8.10. The impact of repression on military coups by regime type, 1981-2008 
(logistic regression, reporting odds ratios) 
 Civilian regimes Military regimes 
   
Peace duration (coups) a 0.953*** (0.014) 0.991 (0.028) 
∆ Repression (CIRI) a, d 3.425** (1.851) 3.043** (1.631) 
Repression (CIRI) b 0.677 (0.383) 1.055 (0.509) 
GDP/capita a, c 0.738 (0.181) 0.593 (0.257) 
Population a, c 0.913 (0.116) 0.866 (0.219) 
Cold War d 1.958 (0.803) 1.052 (0.431) 
Exp./soldier a 1.000 (2.09e-05) 1.000 (2.90e-05) 
Ongoing intrastate conflict a 1.149 (0.607) 2.209 (1.156) 
Constant 1.683 (5.234) 27.05 (133.1) 
Countries 149 57 
Observations 2,698 598 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.  
a Lagged one year; b Lagged two years; c Log; d Dichotomous 
 
 
To address statistical issues arising from the low number of observations left in the sample 
of military regimes (there are only about 600 valid observations, restricted to 57 countries), 
I run another model (not reported here) with interaction terms: I interact repression with 
military regimes first and then with civilian regimes. Neither of the interaction terms 
attains statistical significance, and in both models, only one of the constitutive terms 
(namely repression) is significantly and positively related to coups. Thus, the impact of 
repression on coups does not depend on regime type: Hypothesis 3 is confirmed as well.  
 
 
8.5. CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter, I examined how the military is likely to react to increased repression levels, 
whether military dictatorships are more likely to violate physical integrity rights, and 
whether the influence of state repression on coup risk is constant across regime types. My 
results all point to a general conclusion: it is simply not true that military officers are more 
likely to use repression or to push for coercive policies than civilian leaders.  
To begin with, I do not find that military regimes are more likely to use repression than 
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other non-institutionalized regimes. Military regimes behave in the same way as all other 
regimes in which the chief executive is not constrained by voters: they use repression as a 
response to specific threats. To put it in technical terms, when threats are held constant, I 
do not uncover any marginal effect of authoritarian regime type.  
This finding is preliminary and still needs further confirmation. Results regarding the 
impact of regime type on repression appear to be highly data-sensitive: results obtained 
with the CIRI index are different from those obtained with the PTS data (see Poe et al. 
1999; Davenport 2007b), and although there are compelling theoretical justifications for 
using the former instead of the latter, some statistical properties of the CIRI data could 
mask important variations within the group of the most repressive regimes. In a nutshell: it 
could well be that military dictatorships are on average exactly as repressive as civilian-led 
dictatorships, but that they are more likely to practice the most extreme forms of state 
terror.  
Yet, even if it were the case, the conclusion that widespread repression is a consequence of 
the military’s preferences and beliefs about the legitimacy and effectiveness of violence – 
because military officers’ specific training and organizational culture lead them to favor the 
use of force as a means of solving political conflicts – would still be unwarranted. One key 
finding presented in this chapter is that a degradation of physical integrity rights conditions 
increases the risk that the military defects from the regime and topples the incumbent. 
While this finding constitutes only indirect evidence that military officers rebel against 
orders to repress because they fundamentally dislike violence, it is nevertheless consistent 
with an observation regularly made by early analysts of civil-military relations, that 
professional soldiers rarely consider domestic repression as being part of their duties and 
that they are generally reluctant to carry it out themselves. Moreover, the fact that the 
impact of state terror on coup risk is independent from regime type constitutes some 
tentative evidence that this empirical association is not due to competing factors, such as 
increased opportunities to seize power or the desire to avoid reprisals upon regime 
transition.  
Two further findings deserve to be mentioned. First, the empirical analysis confirms the 
expectation that democracies tend to be internally more peaceful: they are systematically 
less likely to practice state repression than non-democratic regimes. This result is not really 
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surprising, but it is not entirely trivial either: recall that Cheibub et al.’s (2010) measure of 
democracy is based on a minimal and purely procedural definition, and does not include 
any component directly related to human rights protection. This finding indicates that 
competitive elections alone, because they allow voters to punish elected officials, generate 
a strong incentive for leaders not to commit human rights violations.  
Second, I find tentative evidence that monarchies are somewhat less likely to use 
repression than non-institutionalized autocracies. This finding is rather mysterious and 
would need further confirmation, but could constitute an avenue for future research.  
Finally, the findings presented here complement past research on the destabilizing effects 
of state repression: while the fact that repression can backfire because it leads opposition 
groups to switch from peaceful to violent tactics is now well-documented (see, e.g., 
Lichbach 1987; Moore 1998), defections of the armed forces have received only scant 
attention in cross-national analyses of regime transitions. A task future research will have 
to confront will be to identify the factors that may explain the variations in the military’s 
behavior in times of crisis – that is, why the military sometimes chooses to support the 
incumbent and sometimes decides to defect from the regime.  
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9 
Coup risk, regime type, and international conflicts:  
Why are military dictatorships more likely to initiate militarized 
interstate disputes? 
 
 
 
“War is too important to be left to the generals.” 
Georges Clemenceau. 
 
 
 
Idi Amin – Uganda’s president from 1971 to 1979 – managed to stay in office for eight 
years in spite of intense domestic opposition, only to lose power as a consequence of a lost 
war against neighboring Tanzania. The war lasted from October 1978 to April 1979 and 
was quickly won by the Tanzanian military: the Ugandan army, poorly trained, ill-
disciplined, plagued by ethnic divisions and weakened by repeated purges (Ravenhill 1974; 
Gertzel 1980; Brett 1995), proved unable to mount effective resistance. The Ugandan-
Tanzanian war represents an interesting case, not only because of its outcome – irregular 
leadership changes resulting from foreign invasion are rather infrequent but by no means 
exceptional (see Goemans et al. 2009a; Svolik 2012) – but because it was provoked by 
Amin’s decision to annex a portion of the Tanzanian territory, thereby prompting Tanzanian 
                                                 
 A more recent version of this chapter appeared as: Panel, Sophie. 2017. Regime instability, leader’s 
affiliation, and organizational culture: Why are military dictatorships more likely to initiate militarized 
interstate disputes? Security Studies 26 (2): 333-358. 
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president Nyerere’s decision to invade Uganda and remove Amin from power. Why, then, 
did Amin initiate a war he probably knew he could not win? 
At first glance, Amin’s aggression was motivated by the enduring rivalry between Uganda 
and Tanzania. Relations between both countries were always tense: Nyerere not only 
refused to recognize Amin’s government following his 1971 coup but also granted political 
asylum to Uganda’s ousted president Obote. Furthermore, Tanzania harbored a large 
community of Ugandan opponents, some of them organized in guerilla movements that 
unsuccessfully attempted to invade Uganda and oust Amin in 1972 (Gertzel 1980). The 
conflict between Uganda and Tanzania thus remained latent for eight years until it finally 
escalated in 1978. Yet, the timing of the attack on Tanzania tells a different story: it was 
launched shortly after a mutiny of the Ugandan army, to which Amin reacted by using 
potentially dissident army units to invade the north-western part of Tanzania (Khadiagala 
1993; Brett 1995). Is this timing a mere coincidence, or was the Ugandan-Tanzanian 
conflict a diversionary war? Although it would be difficult to identify one single cause for 
the events that ultimately led to Amin’s downfall, several facts are consistent with the latter 
interpretation. First, dissension in the Ugandan army – taking the form of periodic coups 
and assassination attempts – was a permanent issue, and probably one of the most 
important threats to Amin’s rule (Brett 1995). Second, although Ugandan exiles 
represented a long-term problem, the threat was less acute in the short run: Ugandan 
opponents abroad were divided along ethnic, political and ideological lines, did not enjoy 
military support from Tanzania until 1978, and proved unable to establish an organization 
capable of overthrowing Amin (Gertzel 1980; Brett 1995). Finally, if the Ugandan-
Tanzanian conflict was primarily caused by tensions between the two countries, it is 
difficult to explain why Amin did not attack Tanzania upon the failed invasion of 1972 but 
did it six years later for no apparent reason. The mutiny of 1978 constitutes by contrast an 
immediate cause for the outbreak of the war to the extent that it directly threatened Amin, 
thus forcing him to resort to extreme measures in order to divert attention and insulate 
himself from the threat. The strategy was risky and ultimately backfired, but it was 
probably Amin’s only way of getting rid of dissidents within its own military in a definitive 
manner.  
Is Amin’s Uganda a unique case, or is it representative of a more general empirical 
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association between domestic political instability and interstate conflicts? Recent research 
on international conflicts actually suggests that such strategies are not exceptional, and that 
many international wars have domestic roots (e.g., Miller and Elgün 2011; Powell 2014b). 
This chapter builds on this literature and analyzes the relationship between a specific form 
of political instability – namely coup risk – and the initiation of militarized interstate 
disputes (MIDs). More specifically, I argue that dictators do not initiate international wars 
when they lose public support – as elected leaders do – but rather when they face a high 
risk of being overthrown by their own militaries. I further argue that this causal 
relationship explains the recurring finding that military dictatorships are more likely to 
initiate international conflicts than any other regime type (Sechser 2004; Lai and Slater 
2006; Weeks 2012).  
Next section presents a short overview of current debates on military dictatorships and 
their conflict behavior, and specifies the general argument developed in this chapter. 
Section 9.2. reviews the literature on the initiation of international conflicts by 
dictatorships. Section 9.3. presents the hypotheses. Sections 9.4. and 9.5. are devoted to the 
empirical analysis. Section 9.6. concludes.  
 
 
9.1. OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM 
 
As shown in Chapter 8, military dictatorships’ supposed inability to settle political conflicts 
in a peaceful way is a recurring theme in the literature on authoritarian regimes (see, e.g., 
Nordlinger 1977; more recently, Davenport 2007b; Fjelde 2010). The international 
relations literature is not an exception to this trend, and the idea that military officers have 
been socialized to favor the use of force over peaceful conflict resolution pervades recent 
scholarship on international conflicts (see, e.g., Sechser 2004; Weeks 2012). There is 
probably some truth in this assertion: a large number of cross-national, quantitative studies 
have found military dictatorships to be more likely to initiate militarized interstate disputes 
than authoritarian regimes led by civilians (Sechser 2004; Lai and Slater 2006; Weeks 
2012).  
Table 9.1. presents the results of a simple logit model on the relationship between regime 
230 
type and the initiation of militarized interstate disputes, using data from the COW 
project.139 The model is kept parsimonious and includes only a small set of control 
variables, namely a control for time-dependence, a count of each country’s land and sea 
borders (also drawn from COW data), and the COW’s National Material Capabilities 
(CINC) dataset. All independent variables are lagged by one year, and standard errors are 
clustered by country. Military dictatorships are the reference category. 
 
 
Table 9.1. Regime type and the initiation of militarized interstate disputes, 1946-2008 
(logistic regression, displaying odds ratios) 
 
 Reference: military dictatorship 
  
Past MIDs 0.916*** (0.009) 
CINC 3,507*** (3,744) 
Total borders 1.084*** (0.017) 
Democracy  0.566*** (0.102) 
Civilian autocracy 0.747** (0.109) 
Party regime 0.551*** (0.103) 
Monarchy 0.518*** (0.117) 
Constant 0.214*** (0.0417) 
Countries  169 
Observations 7,549 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The results are unambiguous: all regime dummies differ significantly from the baseline and 
exhibit negative coefficients.140 Odds ratios associated with democracy, party dictatorship 
                                                 
139 The COW project distinguishes militarized interstate disputes according to their hostility level: disputes 
coded 1 involve no militarized action, disputes coded 2 involve the threat of force, and disputes coded 3 
involve the display of force. Only disputes coded 4 or 5 involve the actual use of military force: A 
hostility level of 4 indicates a conflict that result in less than 1,000 battle-related deaths per year, while a 
hostility level of 5 indicates full-scale war (Jones et al. 1996; Kenwick et al. 2013). The dependent 
variable used here is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the country initiated a dispute 
reaching a level of 4 or 5, 0 otherwise. Only the first year of the dispute is reported and ongoing dispute 
years are coded 0. Multiple conflict initiations within the same calendar year are collapsed into a single 
value. 
140 After changing the reference category, I do not find any systematic difference between the four other 
regime types: civilian autocracies appear to be slightly more likely to initiate a MID than democracies and 
party regimes, but the effect is only marginally significant. I do not find any trace of a monadic 
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and monarchy indicate that military dictatorships – the reference – are almost twice as 
likely to initiate a MID than these three regimes. The effect of civilian autocracy is 
somewhat weaker, but still non-negligible (civilian autocracies being about 75% as likely 
to initiate a MID as military dictatorships). These findings point to a clear tendency – 
military dictatorships are more belligerent than any other regime – and confirm results 
uncovered by prior research. 
Most researchers agree on the fact that the source of this variation between regime types is 
domestic: military regimes tend to respond to internal crises by initiating external conflicts, 
in a desperate attempt to rally support. Classical examples include the Falklands war of 
1982, initiated by the Argentine junta (Miller and Elgün 2011), or the war in Cyprus 
initiated by the Greek military dictatorship in 1974 (Lai and Slater 2006; Sirin 2011). But 
besides this relative agreement, the relatively sparse literature on military dictatorships and 
international conflicts has not yet come to a consensus about what exactly makes these 
regimes more belligerent than their civilian-led counterparts. For example, Lai and Slater 
(2006) extend the classical argument about diversionary wars and locate the source of 
military regimes’ conflict behavior in their inherent instability: lacking a strong party 
infrastructure that would help them enhance social control, enforce policies and secure 
their tenure, dictators backed by the military often have no choice but to resort to 
“extreme” measures – such as the initiation of an interstate conflict – to avoid being 
violently removed from power. By contrast, Weeks (2012) views the military’s 
organizational culture as the primary cause of military regimes’ aggressive foreign policy: 
military officers, she argues, “have been selected for, and socialized to hold, specific 
beliefs about the utility and the appropriateness of military force as an instrument of 
politics” (Weeks 2012, 333; see also Sechser 2004). She consistently finds that, while 
powerful civilian domestic audiences – e.g., party elites – reduce the risk of conflict 
initiation, any combination of personalism and/or military influence makes states more 
belligerent.  
Why, then, are military dictatorships more likely to initiate MIDs than civilian-led 
autocracies? The ideal-typical military dictatorship displays three features that are all 
possibly related to the initiation of MIDs. First, the effective head of government is a 
                                                                                                                                                    
democratic peace. 
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member of the armed forces (Cheibub et al. 2010). Second, the military as an organization 
either rules directly via a junta or at least “decides who will rule and exercises some 
influence on policy” (Geddes 1999, 21). This distinction is not trivial: there are numerous 
examples of leaders (e.g., Idi Amin in Uganda) who have a background in the armed forces 
and accessed power with the active support of the army, but managed to free themselves 
from any influence from the military. Depending on whether classifications are based on a 
broad or restrictive definition of military rule, such dictatorships can either be labeled as 
military or personalist. This distinction between collective military rule and personal, 
military-based rule is increasingly acknowledged by researchers, as reflected by the 
growing popularity of the junta/strongman dichotomy in the recent literature on 
authoritarian regimes and MID initiation. Yet, to complicate matters, a large share of 
personalist dictators are former members of the military (Geddes et al. 2014, 158); 
furthermore, as Lai and Slater (2006) convincingly argue, personalist dictators are always – 
to some extent – dependent on the armed forces to maintain their rule, and, conversely, 
military-based dictatorships are systematically more likely to become personalized than 
party-based ones (p. 119; see also Tullock 1987; Acemoglu et al. 2009). Further confusion 
arises from the fact that personalist dictatorships – like military regimes – also display a 
comparatively high propensity to conflict initiation (Peceny and Butler 2004; Weeks 2012): 
there is still disagreement on whether their conflict behavior is due to their small winning 
coalition (Peceny and Butler 2004) or the lack of constraints on the chief executive (Weeks 
2012), or whether personalization is simply an epiphenomenon of military influence (Lai 
and Slater 2006).  
The third typical feature of military regimes is their mode of accessing and maintaining 
political power, namely the “actual or threatened use of military force” (Hadenius and 
Teorell 2007a, 146). In other words, military dictatorships are typically established through 
military coups, and military dictators – precisely because they primarily depend on the 
military to stay in office, and cannot easily engage in coup-proofing strategies – run a high 
risk of being overthrown by members of their own ruling coalition (Svolik 2012). This 
partly explains the short tenure of military leaders, and the fact that many of them are 
removed from office through irregular and often violent ways (see descriptive statistics 
section below) and subsequently replaced by another military officer (Cheibub et al. 2010, 
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86). 
All of these three institutional features are potentially related to the initiation of militarized 
interstate disputes: first, military leaders – regardless of whether their ruling coalition is 
made up of other officers or civilian elites – may be more likely to initiate MIDs, either 
because their prior military background impacts their attitudes toward the use of force 
(Horowitz and Stam 2014) or because individuals who view the use of force as appropriate 
are more likely to enter the military in the first place. Second, regimes in which the military 
has a strong influence on foreign policy can be expected to behave differently from those 
in which foreign policy decisions are exclusively taken by civilians: except for the most 
serious conflicts that involve mass conscription, the military has to bear the costs of 
military intervention; thus, in most conflict situations, its preferences are susceptible to 
diverge strongly from those of the civilian population and elites. Third, a number of studies 
find political instability – and particularly coup risk – to be positively related to the 
initiation of MIDs (Belkin and Schofer 2005; Miller and Elgün 2011; Powell 2014b).  
The aim of the chapter is not to assess the validity of previous findings regarding military 
dictatorships’ conflict behavior, but rather to find out which of these three regime features 
accounts for the empirical regularity uncovered by prior research. To do so, I exploit the 
distribution of military influence, coup risk, and leader affiliation within and across regime 
categories: as discussed above, even if these features are typical of military dictatorships, 
they can be present in regimes that are not military dictatorships. Conversely, some 
military dictatorships may lack one or two of these three features: for example, the military 
junta that ruled Brazil from 1964 to 1985 was arguably more stable than, for example, 
Amin’s government. In other words, political instability and military involvement in 
domestic politics – the two key variables investigated here – often tend to go hand in hand 
(see Chapter 4) but they correlate only imperfectly: this imperfect correlation makes it 
possible to disentangle their respective effects.  
 
 
9.2. STATE OF THE ARTS: DOMESTIC SOURCES OF INTERSTATE CONFLICTS  
 
Theories on domestic causes of international conflict are generally subsumed under the 
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umbrella concept of “diversion theories,” i.e., theories that predict that leaders who face a 
high risk of being removed from office are more likely to initiate interstate conflicts. This 
can happen for several, theoretically distinct reasons: leaders either attempt to distract 
voters’ attention away from domestic issues, or to shift the blame for domestic problems 
onto foreign rivals, or to appeal to national identities to promote “rally round the flag” 
effects and enhance in-group cohesion (Sirin 2011). Somewhat differently, the “gambling 
for resurrection” hypothesis predicts that leaders get involved in international conflict 
when a military defeat would not increase their risk of losing office whereas victory would 
certainly decrease it (Chiozza and Goemans 2003). This incentive increases along with the 
leader’s risk of being punished after leaving office: not only the risk of being removed 
from power affects his foreign policy behavior, but also the consequences of losing office 
(Goemans 2008). 
On the whole, cross-national studies on interstate war did not find strong evidence for 
diversionary behavior.141 Furthermore, recent research has cast doubt on whether theories 
of diversionary wars can be applied to dictatorships. First, as Dassel and Reinhardt (1999) 
note, these theories rely on the rather unrealistic assumption that any leader can unilaterally 
order its military to fight wars, regardless of the organization’s own preferences. This is 
probably not true of most dictatorships: since the typical dictator does not rule by consent 
but rather by force, he is to some extent dependent on his armed forces to secure his rule, 
which provides the military with some leverage and influence on policies (Svolik 2012). In 
particular, conflicts of interest between the dictator and the military regarding the use of 
force abroad can easily lead to the regime’s demise.142 Second, the incentives to stage a 
diversionary war to distract voters’ attention away from domestic issues are probably not 
the same for a dictator as for a democratically elected leader. On the one hand, a dictator’s 
seat is not contested as often as an elected leader’s seat, since he does not have to 
periodically run for re-election (Chiozza and Goemans 2003; Goemans 2008); on the other 
hand, his political survival does not primarily depend on its popularity among the whole 
public, but rather on the support of a small elite coalition. Thus, a dictator’s foreign policy 
                                                 
141 For a recent review and a discussion of the quantitative literature on diversion, see Miller and Elgün 
(2011). 
142 The 1974 coup that ultimately led to the Carnations Revolution in Portugal is an example of such conflicts 
of interests. 
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is probably oriented toward members of this coalition (see Weeks 2012) or potential 
challengers (see Belkin and Schofer 2005) rather than the whole public. As a consequence, 
empirical studies on diversion regularly find that, while classical indicators of mass 
discontent (such as slow economic growth) are related to the initiation of interstate conflict 
by democratically elected leaders, such incentives are not sufficient for dictators: if 
anything, autocrats only react to serious challenges to their rule, such as violent protests or 
intrastate armed conflicts (Davies 2002; Sirin 2011; for an exception, see Miller 1999; for 
an alternative formulation of the theory, see Dassel and Reinhardt 1999). Yet, even this 
mechanism is contested: Gleditsch et al. (2008) find that externalization of civil conflict is 
indeed a pervasive phenomenon, but occurs for reasons mostly unrelated to diversion.  
Finally, if democratically elected leaders react to public discontent by engaging in 
aggressive foreign policy behavior, this is primary because they lack any alternative way to 
maintain social control. This is not true of dictatorships since they can manage mass 
dissent with repression. As Gelpi (1997) argues, whereas repression is a costly option for 
leaders who must run for re-election, autocrats tend to favor it over diversion, because it is 
both less risky on the short run and more effective, on the long run, than short-lived rally 
effects. He consistently finds that conflict initiation is positively related to civil unrest in 
democracies, but negatively in dictatorships (see also Davies 2014).  
More recent research on the conflict behavior of authoritarian regimes departs from 
classical theories of diversion and either switches the analytical focus from the mass public 
to the dictator’s ruling coalition or brings the military back in analyses of potential threats 
to the dictator’s rule. For example, scholars have recently begun to argue that political 
instability in the form of coup risk may constitute a stronger incentive to divert than 
declining support for the dictator or mass unrest – mainly because coups represent the most 
frequent irregular way leaders lose office (Miller and Elgün 2011; Powell 2014b). When 
confronted with a high risk of being deposed by their own armed forces, autocrats initiate 
wars abroad either to divide the military by hindering coordination between different 
branches of the army or exacerbating inter-branch rivalries (Belkin and Schofer 2005), to 
“gamble for resurrection” (Miller and Elgün 2011, 200), or simply to “keep the generals 
busy and out of the capital” (Lai and Slater 2006, 121). This is consistent with one 
emerging finding in the interstate conflict literature, that involvement in external war 
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enhances civilian control of the military and decreases coup risk (Desch 2001; Arbatli and 
Arbatli 2014; McMahon and Slantchev 2015). Powell (2014b) demonstrates that political 
instability increases the risk that a dictatorship initiates a MID unless the dictator can take 
coup-proofing measures as an alternative. Dassel and Reinhardt (1999) bring a different 
argument on the relationship between political instability and use of force abroad: 
according to them, what previous works have interpreted as diversionary violence initiated 
by the incumbent was in fact often initiated by the military itself. Domestic strife, they 
contend, does not lead to external conflict unless it directly threatens the military’s 
corporate interests: in those cases, the military has an incentive to use force abroad in the 
hope of provoking a rally effect, or because a war would leave civilian leaders no choice 
but to cede greater political autonomy and material resources to the armed forces.   
Fewer studies on the conflict behavior of authoritarian regimes have attempted to assess 
the impact of the military’s organizational culture on MID initiation. A notable exception is 
a study by Sechser (2004), who finds that states lacking strong civilian control of the 
military are more likely to initiate MIDs than average. He attributes this pattern to the 
military’s parochial interests and to perception biases – such as, e.g., an overestimation of 
both the probability and the advantage of war – that are widespread within the armed 
forces. In a somewhat different way, Horowitz and Stam (2014) analyze the impact of 
leaders’ past experience in the military on their propensity to initiate wars abroad. They 
find that leaders with experience in the military but no combat experience are more prone 
to use force, whereas leaders with combat experience exhibit a greater aversion to risk. Yet, 
this is only true of elected leaders: in authoritarian (especially military) regimes, leaders 
with combat experience tend to display a more aggressive behavior, because in such 
regimes, individuals who react to experiencing war by becoming more risk acceptant are 
also more likely to be selected as leaders. Interestingly, the same pattern holds true for 
regimes led by former guerilla leaders. 
A different but related research agenda examines the relationship between authoritarian 
regime types – based on Geddes’ (1999) regimes classification – and interstate conflict. 
While the majority of works have focused on the personalism dimension and institutional 
constraints on dictators (e.g. Peceny et al. 2002; Peceny and Beer 2003; Peceny and Butler 
2004; Reiter and Stam 2003; Pickering and Kisangani 2010), another emerging consensus 
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is that, on the whole, military regimes tend to be more belligerent than civilian 
dictatorships. Lai and Slater (2006) conducted the first cross-national quantitative analysis 
on military dictatorships’ conflict behavior and found these to be more likely to initiate 
MIDs than civilian autocracies, regardless of their degree of personalization. These 
findings were mostly corroborated in a subsequent study by Weeks (2012).  
Both contributions rely on broadly similar conceptualizations (i.e. the quadripartite 
classification of dictatorships into “strongmen,” “bosses,” “machines” and “juntas” 
regimes) but come to slightly different results: Lai and Slater (2006) find that all types of 
military regimes display a comparatively high likelihood to initiate MIDs, whereas in 
Weeks’ (2012) contribution, only party-based dictatorships emerge as a relatively peaceful 
regime type. This difference in findings can partly be explained by the fact that both 
articles focus their analytic lens on different institutional traits. Weeks contends that 
military officers’ socialization and specific beliefs about the use of force are the primary 
cause of conflict initiation, and does not devote much attention to military regimes’ 
vulnerability to coups. Neither does she control for coup risk in her empirical analysis. By 
contrast, military dictatorships’ vulnerability to both elite splits and mass unrest is one of 
the main causes underlying their conflict behavior in Lai and Slater’s contribution. Yet, 
regime classifications are not particularly appropriate measures of political instability. 
Furthermore, Lai and Slater locate the source of military regime’s instability in the absence 
of political institutions – especially parties – that would help them maintain social control 
and elite cohesion, thereby ignoring the fact that military “strongmen” frequently create 
political parties to rally supporters (Geddes et al. 2014, 158). Thus, which causal 
mechanism underlies military regimes’ tendency to provoke interstate conflicts is still 
subject to discussion.    
The major flaw in both contributions is that their respective approaches rely on rigid 
classifications, thus overlooking variations within and similarities across regime types. For 
example, political instability, legitimacy issues and coup risk are no defining features of a 
particular regime, even if these traits happen to add up in military dictatorships. 
Furthermore, the military’s influence on politics is an attribute that can vary both within 
and across regime types: the military can veto foreign policy decisions even when it is not 
formally part of the ruling coalition and when the dictator is a civilian (Dassel and 
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Reinhardt 1999). Similarly, a dictator with a military background can coexist with a 
relatively strong or autonomous military that is not part of his ruling coalition, but whose 
support is crucial for his survival and that may turn against him as soon as its interests are 
threatened (e.g., the Indonesian military under Suharto; see Lee 2005). Thus, more specific 
measures are needed to assess the relative impact of the leader’s affiliation to the military, 
the vulnerability of the regime, and the military’s own preferences. These issues are 
addressed in the following sections.  
 
 
9.3. POLITICAL INSTABILITY, LEADERS’ AFFILIATION, AND MILITARY 
INFLUENCE ON POLITICS: UNPACKING MILITARY DICTATORSHIPS 
 
9.3.1. The impact of domestic instability on the initiation of interstate conflicts 
 
In line with previous research on the conflict behavior of dictatorships (e.g., Belkin and 
Schofer 2005; Miller and Elgün 2011; Powell 2014b), I expect coup risk to be one of the 
most powerful domestic factors driving diversionary wars. While economic crises (and 
other factors triggering mass discontent) may lead democratically elected leaders to initiate 
interstate conflicts, these incentives are probably not sufficient for dictators, whose 
political survivor does not depend on the approval of the voters. In order to stay in office, 
dictators must instead adapt their policies to the preferences of their ruling coalition 
(Weeks 2012) or attempt to divert or weaken their potential challengers. One of the most 
serious threats to the dictator’s rule is the coup d’état: coups are both more frequent and 
more likely to succeed than, for example, revolutions or civil wars. Indeed, the 
overwhelming majority of dictators who lose office in an irregular manner are removed by 
a coup launched by members of the ruling elite, often with the active support of the 
military (Svolik 2012; Kendall-Taylor and Frantz 2014). I argue that the main objective of 
dictators who initiate interstate wars is not to distract their potential challengers’ attention 
from domestic issues, but to deprive them of the potential support of the military (or, when 
the potential challenge comes from the military itself, to insulate themselves from the 
threat).  
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Most works on political instability and interstate conflict either focus on mass challenges to 
the regime, or treat mass unrest and elite unrest as identical phenomena. For example, 
Mansfield and Snyder (1995, 2002, 2005) argue that states that undergo a transition to 
democracy (i.e., those that first experience political competition while still lacking strong 
institutions to regulate mass participation) are more prone to war, because competing elite 
groups have an incentive to mobilize mass support through nationalist appeals. Davies 
(2002) and Sirin (2011) find that violent domestic strife leads incumbents to provoke 
interstate conflicts in the hope of rallying mass support. Lai and Slater (2006) make a 
similar point by arguing that instability is the primary cause of military regimes’ higher 
propensity to initiate MIDs: they posit that military regimes are vulnerable to challenges 
from both masses and members of the ruling elite, without yet undertaking a clear-cut 
distinction between both mechanisms. However, in spite of their popularity, theories 
linking mass unrest to the initiation of MIDs lack empirical support (see Gleditsch et al. 
2008) and suffer from a number of flaws that have already been extensively discussed in 
the literature. First, since initiating a war abroad is a risky strategy, the dictator must face a 
serious threat of losing office (Powell 2014b); yet, few dictators are removed from office as 
a result of a revolt (Svolik 2012). Second, as Dassel and Reinhardt (1999) convincingly 
argue, states plagued by civil strife are precisely the ones in which the military has the 
most influence on politics (and is therefore able to veto any foreign policy decision), 
because of the dictator’s reliance on his armed forces to maintain order. Third, since the 
military can hardly be used simultaneously for internal repression and external wars, mass 
unrest should lower rather than increase the dictator’s incentives to allocate his military 
resources abroad (Andreski 1980).  
By contrast, the mechanisms driving the diversionary use of force become clear when the 
main threat to the dictator’s rule comes either from dissident factions of the ruling elite or 
from the military itself. First, by withdrawing potentially dissident factions of the armed 
forces from the country, the dictator can effectively prevent them from overthrowing him 
or backing up his challengers (Tullock 1987). Second, planning an intervention abroad 
diverts military officers’ attention away from domestic issues (Lai and Slater 2006, 121). 
Third, by promoting rally effects, the dictator can increase his own popularity and deter the 
military from staging a coup (Arbatli and Arbatli 2014). Fourth, as Belkin and Schofer 
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(2005) have demonstrated, interstate conflicts tend to weaken the military by exacerbating 
internal divisions and rivalries and by impeding coordination between different branches. 
Fifth, involvement in an interstate war enables the dictators to credibly commit to making 
money transfers and political concessions to the military: in the absence of serious security 
issues, the risk that the dictator reneges on his promises increases, which creates incentives 
for the military to take preemptive measures (Arbatli and Arbatli 2014). Finally, a military 
defeat can deprive the military from public support, thus preventing it from taking over the 
state. In sum, interstate conflicts reduce both the military’s willingness and its capacity to 
stage coups, hence helping vulnerable dictators insulate themselves from threats coming 
from their own armed forces. Therefore, we should observe that, as coup risk increases, so 
does the dictator’s incentive to initiate a MID.  
 
H1: Vulnerable dictators are more likely to initiate a militarized interstate dispute.  
 
9.3.2. Ruling out alternative explanations 
 
As already discussed, high coup risk is not the only specific feature of military 
dictatorships, and there are at least two other factors that may account for their aggressive 
foreign policy: military regimes’ propensity to initiate interstate conflicts might either 
result from the central position of the military within the political system, or from the fact 
that they are ruled by a leader with a background in the armed forces.  
Let us first examine the first potential confounder, namely the influence of the military on 
politics: can the military’s specific preferences regarding the use of armed force account 
for military regimes’ aggressive foreign policy? While common sense suggests that 
military and civilian elites think differently about the costs and benefits of violence, the 
literature is divided between theories of “military conservatism,” which hold that 
professional soldiers are generally more reluctant to initiate wars than civilian elites, and 
theories of “militarism,” which hold that military officers have a comparative advantage in 
the use of force and hold specific beliefs that lead them to favor open conflict over 
negotiation (for a review of the different arguments, see Sechser 2004). On the whole, the 
empirical literature provides support for both approaches, although recent scholarship on 
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conflict initiation by dictatorships rather tends to emphasize the second one (Sechser 2004; 
Weeks 2012). Both theories are not fundamentally incompatible, though: military officers 
may favor open conflict over negotiation as long as their organizational interests are not 
directly threatened (e.g., when they perceive the potential costs of the conflict as low or the 
probability of winning as high). By contrast, they should be more hesitant than civilians to 
initiate conflicts they evaluate as costly or impossible to win: in most cases, it is the 
military that has to bear the costs of war. 
Precisely because the stakes of international war are higher for the military than for civilian 
elites, I adopt the widespread assumption that the military’s preferences regarding the use 
of force diverge strongly from those of dictators. Yet, I depart from previous research in the 
sense that I expect military officers to have a more cautious attitude toward armed conflict 
than authoritarian elites in general. While I do not contest the argument that civilian control 
over the military reduces states’ propensity to initiate conflicts abroad as long as the regime 
is democratic – that is, if leaders are otherwise constrained by both their electorate and 
horizontal accountability institutions, and cannot unilaterally provoke international wars – I 
argue that this argument is flawed when applied to dictatorships. In most nondemocratic 
regimes, the military is one of the few actors who can effectively constrain the leader: in 
those regimes, the fact that the military is submitted to strong civilian control and lacks 
autonomy or influence on policies is not necessarily good news. Although I do not contend 
that the military has a systematic preference for peace, I argue that the consequences of 
military influence (i.e., whether military influence increases or decreases the risk of 
conflict initiation) should be evaluated relative to regimes’ baseline risk of initiating a 
conflict. In other words, while military influence may increase the risk of MID initiation 
when the leader is moderate or constrained by other actors (i.e. in democracies), it should 
reduce dictators’ propensity to engage in external conflicts, especially when those display 
an otherwise high conflict risk. While democracies tend to avoid initiating wars they 
cannot win, that could result in too many casualties or that may drag on for too long (see 
Reiter and Stam 2002), dictators are notoriously less risk averse: when they have nothing 
to lose, leaders may initiate conflicts regardless of the costs or probability of winning, as 
the Ugandan-Tanzanian war discussed in the introduction exemplifies. In such cases, a 
powerful military should reduce the risk that a dictatorship initiates an interstate conflict. 
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H2: The influence of the military on domestic politics reduces dictators’ propensity to 
initiate interstate armed conflicts.  
 
A second potential confounding factor is the military background of the dictator himself. 
Most existing works on the conflict behavior of military leaders do not operate a systematic 
distinction between the perceptions and preferences of the military as a whole and those of 
military dictators. Yet, while the military as an organization and leaders with a background 
in the armed forces may share the same beliefs about the effectiveness and desirability of 
armed conflict, the risk aversion hypothesis should only apply to military officers who are 
directly exposed to the costs and consequences of war, which is not the case of the leader. 
Thus, the preferences of the military regarding wars can diverge from those of the dictator 
even if he is himself a member of the armed forces. In empirical terms, this implies that, 
when the influence of the whole military on policies is held constant, the marginal effect of 
the leader’s identity on MID initiation should be positive.  
There is another, slightly different reason why we should expect military dictators to be 
more likely to favor aggressive foreign policies. Horowitz and Stam (2014) argue that the 
process through which leaders are selected into office can vary considerably from one 
regime to another and consequently affect the likelihood that incumbents generally favor 
violence over peaceful conflict settlement: in military regimes, individuals who self-select 
into leadership positions are generally more likely to display extremely aggressive 
attitudes, because risk acceptance and propensity to violence are requisites to access 
political power (Horowitz and Stam 2014, 535). While this holds true for most 
dictatorships – in which leadership is a risky business in general – selection biases in favor 
of aggressive individuals should be especially strong in military regimes, given that these 
regimes are frequently established through violent means: while a non-negligible 
proportion of civilian leaders access power through regular means (typical examples 
include elections or hereditary succession), most military leaders either access power via a 
coup or are selected for succession by a group of military officers (see descriptive statistics 
section below), who are themselves more likely to favor risk-acceptant behaviors. Thus, 
even if the dictator himself accessed power through nonviolent means, a military leader is 
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more likely to display a comparatively high propensity to violence because such attitudes 
are what got him co-opted by the junta in the first place.  
 
H3: Leaders with a background in the armed forces are more likely to initiate militarized 
interstate disputes.  
 
 
9.4. RESEARCH DESIGN AND VARIABLES MEASUREMENT 
 
I test my hypotheses on a time-series cross-sectional dataset that covers more than 100 
nondemocratic countries. For reasons related to data availability, democracies are excluded 
from the analysis (see section 9.4.2. below). Data on the dependent and the independent 
variables are available from 1946 to 2010 and from 1975 to 2008, respectively. Since my 
hypotheses are monadic, I use the country-year as my unit of analysis.  
I use logistic regression on a dummy variable that measures whether each state initiated a 
MID in a given year. To address time-dependence issues, I add a variable that records the 
years since the last time the country initiated a MID, and use robust standard errors 
clustered by country. 
Detailed information on variables measurement and descriptive statistics are provided 
below. 
 
9.4.1. Dependent variable 
 
To measure my dependent variable, I rely on the Militarized Interstate Disputes dataset 
from the Correlates of War (COW) project (Palmer et al. forthcoming). MIDs are classified 
into five categories according to their intensity level: only Levels 4 and 5 involve the actual 
use of military force. Since my hypotheses relate to actual militarized action, I thus exclude 
the lower levels – that is, Level 1 (no military action), Level 2 (threat to use force) and 
Level 3 (display of military force): for diversion to be effective (Hypothesis 1), the military 
has to be effectively (i.e., physically) deployed abroad. Hypothesis 2 states that the military 
has an incentive to oppose wars, but says nothing about the military’s preferences about 
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lower-scale conflicts. Only the “military leader” variable can be to some extent expected to 
have a constant impact across all hostility levels.  
Thus, the dependent variable takes on the value of 1 if the MID reaches a hostility level of 
at least 4 (use of force) and the country is listed on the initiators side (Side A), 0 otherwise. 
Only the first year of the dispute is reported: ongoing dispute years are coded 0. If the 
country initiated several MIDs within the same calendar year, I collapse these into a single 
value. For the period from 1981 to 2006, 471 MIDs initiations, including 16 wars (Level 5) 
were reported, for a total of 4,322 observations. 
 
9.4.2. Independent variables 
 
The first independent variable of interest simply measures whether the country is ruled by a 
military officer or a civilian dictator. The dummy variable takes on the value of 1 if the 
chief executive is a military officer, 0 otherwise, and is drawn from the Database of 
Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001). I expect this variable to affect positively states’ 
propensity to initiate MIDs.  
Measuring coup risk is somewhat trickier. One of the few consensual measures of coup risk 
is the one developed by Belkin and Schofer (2003), which has been subsequently used in 
quantitative studies on coup risk and conflict initiation (Belkin and Schofer 2005; Powell 
2014b). However, their assessment of coup risk relies on an index that includes 
components only loosely related to coups, such as INGOs membership or the degree of 
competitiveness and regulation of participation in the political system. I therefore turn to an 
alternative measure, based on Svolik’s (2012) data on ruling coalitions and leadership 
change in dictatorships. The dataset includes a variable (“entry”) that records the manner 
each leader assumed office.143 To measure coup risk, I create a dummy variable that takes 
on the value of 1 if the leader accessed power by regular means (i.e. elections, consensus, 
or hereditary succession), 0 otherwise.144 I expect the variable to have a negative effect on 
                                                 
143 Svolik’s original data are in leader-year format. Since I have a country-year dataset, for each country-year 
in which several leaders were reported, I selected only the leader in office on the First January in order to 
avoid reverse causation issues. The DPI similarly reports leaders who were in office on the First January. 
144 Irregular entry includes entry types labeled as “civil war”, “coup”, “foreign”, “independence”, “revolt”, 
“interim”, and “other”.  The results are not sensitive to the removal of “interim” and “other” from the 
category of irregular entries. 
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conflict initiation. This measure presents two advantages. First, it is a more precise 
measure of a dictator’s risk of being removed from office in an irregular way, and makes it 
possible to test directly whether conflict initiation results from the preferences of 
authoritarian elites coalitions (Weeks 2012), from unilateral decisions of the military 
(Dassel and Reinhardt 1999), or – as I expect – from the leader’s own sense of insecurity. 
Second, the measure does not systematically overlap with the military’s veto power (which 
would be an alternative explanation for unstable regimes’ propensity to initiate MIDs), 
since a non-negligible part of military leaders accessed power through regular ways (see 
descriptive statistics section below) and, conversely, the military is not systematically 
involved in irregular entries.  
To assess whether the military is a powerful actor and can exert some influence on foreign 
policy decisions, I use a variable – also drawn from Svolik’s (2012) leaders and ruling 
coalitions data – that measures whether the military was actively involved in the leader’s 
entry into office. This variable is intended to reflect ex ante constraints from the military on 
the dictator: irrespective of the leader’s affiliation and regardless of whether the military is 
part of the ruling coalition or not, it can at least be expected that the dictator is to some 
extent sensitive to the military’s preferences, and that the military has a say in foreign 
policy decisions. Thus, this measure of military influence is broader than standard 
measures based on regime type or civilian control over the military (see, e.g., Sechser 
2004; Lai and Slater 2006; Weeks 2012), while still allowing me to distinguish dictators 
who can compel their militaries to fight wars from those who cannot.145 Note also that 
military influence is conceptually as well as empirically distinct from coup risk (see 
descriptive statistics section below): military influence means that the military can obtain 
some policy concessions from the leader, without necessarily representing a direct threat to 
his rule.  
 
 
 
                                                 
145 As noted above, one of the strongest cases against diversion theories in Dassel and Reinhardt’s (1999) 
study is that previous research in this field is mostly based on the untenable assumption that every dictator 
can unilaterally order its military to fight wars. Yet, their own article is itself based on a premise – that no 
dictator has this capacity – that is also somewhat unrealistic.     
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9.4.3. Control variables 
 
I use control variables that are standard in the interstate conflict literature. First, I include a 
count of the total number of contiguous borders of each state by land, based on the Direct 
Continuity dataset from the COW project (Stinnett et al. 2002). I then control for military 
capabilities using countries’ scores on the Composite Index of National Capabilities 
(CINC) from the COW project (Singer et al. 1972), and for country size using World Bank 
data. I further control for GDP per capita, since it can affect both regime instability, regime 
type and conflict behavior. Data are taken from the Maddison Project Database (Bolt and 
van Zanden 2013).  
I then add several control variables that are potentially correlated with both regime type 
and foreign policy behavior. I first include a variable that records the number of years the 
leader has already been in office: past research suggests that the risk of losing office 
decreases throughout the leader’s tenure (Bienen and van de Walle 1989; 1992) and that the 
average tenure of the chief executive is shorter in military regimes than in civilian regimes 
(McKinlay and Cohan 1975). Second, I control for intrastate armed conflicts,146 using data 
from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Harbom and 
Wallensteen 2010). The variable takes on the value of 1 when an armed conflict resulting 
in at least 25 battle-related deaths is reported in the country-year, 0 otherwise.147 Domestic 
strife has regularly been found to be a robust predictor of the initiation of interstate 
conflicts (Dassel and Reinhardt 1999; Davies 2002; Cirin 2011); thus, the relationship 
between regime type and external conflict behavior could possibly be driven by the fact 
that military dictatorships tend to experience more intrastate armed conflicts (see Fjelde 
2010). Furthermore, controlling for intrastate armed conflict makes it possible to undertake 
a distinction between two different mechanisms that can both explain why unstable 
dictatorships initiate more MIDs: if diversionary conflicts are initiated in response to mass 
unrest and coup risk is only an epiphenomenon of instability, the effect of coup risk should 
vanish once armed conflicts are controlled for. By contrast, if coup risk remained a 
                                                 
146 I do not include classical indicators of mass discontent (e.g., slow growth): as argued above, dictatorships 
are not bound to their electorate as democracies are, and I do not expect dictators to run the risk of losing 
a war unless the risk of losing office becomes really serious. 
147 To avoid confusing armed conflicts and military coups, I drop every country-year in which both a coup 
and an ongoing armed conflict are reported (see Chapter 4). 
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significant predictor of MID initiation after controlling for armed conflict, this would 
indicate that the incumbent’s foreign policy behavior is not necessarily oriented toward the 
voters.  
I then control for coup-proofing measures, measured as the annual change in military 
expenditures per soldier (see Powell 2014b). Data on military personnel and military 
expenditures are taken from the National Material Capabilities dataset from the COW 
project (Singer et al. 1972). The omission of this variable could bias the results to the 
extent that the financial endowment of the military is related both to military influence on 
policies and to conflict initiation: on the one hand, Powell (2014b) argues that coup-
proofing and diversion are substitutable strategies in dictatorships, and consistently finds 
that autocrats’ propensity to initiate MIDs decrease as the financial endowment of their 
military increases. On the other hand, research also suggests that the leader’s ability to 
implement coup-proofing measures partially depends on regime type (Pilster and Böhmelt 
2012): even though there is to date no clear evidence that military-backed regimes spend 
more on their militaries than other regime types (see, e.g., McKinlay and Cohan 1975; 
1976), it can be assumed that – unlike civilian autocracies – they are at least limited in their 
ability to decrease the armed forces’ budget. Therefore, to the extent that military influence 
actually reduces the risk that a state initiates interstate conflicts, this relationship could 
simply result from the fact that the military’s financial endowment is higher when military 
influence on policies is high, resulting in a lower coup risk. Since countries with weak 
militaries are ceteris paribus less likely to initiate MIDs, I also add a measure of military 
expenditures per soldier.  
For a similar reason, I also control for repression: military dictatorships have been found to 
be internally more repressive (Poe et al. 1999; Davenport 2007b), and there is some 
evidence that repression – as an alternative to diversion – negatively affects the risk that a 
state initiates a MID (Gelpi 1997; Davies 2014). If military dictatorships tend to use both 
internal and external violence to deal with instability, omitting this variable could mask 
important statistical trends. To measure state repression, I use the physical integrity rights 
index from the Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) data project (Cingranelli and Richards 
2010). The index ranges from 0 to 8, low values indicating widespread physical integrity 
rights violations (such as political imprisonment, torture or extrajudicial killings) and high 
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values good human rights performance.  
 
Table 9.2. Summary statistics on control variables, 1975-2006 
 Mean  Standard deviation Observations 
CINC  0.01 0.02 4,842 
Leader’s tenure 11.19 9.29 2,758 
Land borders 3.56 2.42 4,842 
(ln) Country size 12.18 1.86 4,796 
(ln) GDP/capita  8.04 1.11 4,617 
Phys. integrity rights 4.75 2.33 3,706 
Exp./soldier (USD) 25,613.98 66,771.45 4,517 
∆ exp./soldier 1,334.02 46,845.54 4,404 
 
 
9.4.4. Descriptive statistics 
 
This section presents an overview of the distribution of the independent variables (military 
leader, military influence, and coup risk).  
From 1975 to 2008, 90 military dictators and 165 civilian dictators assumed office, 
representing respectively about 35% and 65% of the country-years. Roughly 50% of all 
dictators from the sample accessed office in a regular way, i.e. either by elections, 
hereditary succession or consensus. The military participated in the entry of 98 out of 255 
dictators. Although the sample is evenly shared between regular and irregular entries, the 
distribution of the variable varies greatly between the categories of military and civilian 
leaders. Entry modes of civilian and military leaders are detailed in Table 9.3.  
The modal entry type for military dictators is the coup d’état (60% of the sample), followed 
by consensus (about one quarter of the sample). By contrast, only 20% of civilian dictators 
accessed power via a coup. The most common entry type is consensus (roughly one third 
of the sample), followed by elections (25% of the sample). On the whole, military leaders 
are much more likely to have accessed power by force than civilian leaders, although a 
substantial part of the latter (about 35%) entered office through irregular means.  
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Table 9.3. Entry mode of military and civilian dictators, 1975-2008 
 
 Military Civilian 
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent  
Election 5 5.56 42 25.45 
Consensus 21 23.33 54 32.73 
Succession   10 6.06 
Total: regular entry 26 28.89 106 64.24 
Civil war 5 5.56 5 3.03 
Coup  54 60.00 33 20.00 
Revolt   1 0.61 
Foreign 1 1.11 4 2.42 
Interim 3 3.33 11 6.67 
Other 1 1.11 5 3.03 
Total: irregular entry 64 71.11 59 35.76 
Total 90 100 165 100 
(Sources: Svolik 2012; Database of Political Institutions) 
 
 
As can be seen in Table 9.4, irregular entry strongly increases the risk of an irregular exit 
(see also Goemans et al. 2009a).  
 
Table 9.4. Entry type and exit type in dictatorships, 1975-2008 
 
 Regular exit Irregular exit Other  Total  
  Freq.  Percent Freq.  Percent Freq.  Percent Freq.  Percent 
Regular entry 68 31.19 39 17.89 1 0.46 108 49.54 
Irregular entry 24 11.01 70 32.11 16 7.34 110 50.46 
Total  96 42.20 109 50.00 17 7.80 218 100 
(Source: Svolik 2012) 
 
 
On the whole, roughly 50% of the dictators accessed power by force, and exactly 50% of 
the sample is comprised of dictators who lost office by force. Yet, the two modal categories 
are made up of dictators who either accessed office by force and lost it by force (70 cases) 
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or accessed power in a regular way and lost office in a regular way (68 cases). Taken 
together, both categories represent about two thirds of the sample. Of the 110 dictators who 
accessed power in an irregular way, only 24 managed to exit office without violence; 
conversely, from the 108 dictators who accessed power by regular means, only 39 lost 
office irregularly.  
Thus, previous findings on military dictatorships and the initiation of MIDs may result 
from the fact that many military dictators, having accessed power in an irregular way, fear 
a violent removal from office: compared to civilian dictators, military leaders are more 
likely to have entered power irregularly, and irregular entry is strongly related to irregular 
exit. Yet, since entry mode and military leader are only imperfectly correlated, their 
respective effects can be empirically parsed out: if Hypothesis 1 is valid, the way the leader 
assumed office should impact the risk of conflict initiation regardless of the leader’s 
affiliation (i.e., all dictators who fear for their seat should be more likely to initiate a MID, 
regardless of whether they are military or civilian).  
Table 9.5. displays a comparison of the military’s involvement in the entry of military and 
civilian leaders, respectively.  
 
Table 9.5. Military participation in civilian leaders’ and military leaders’ entry, 1975-
2008 
 
 Military leader  Civilian leader  Total 
Military involvement: 
Yes 
No 
Total 
 
68 
22 
90 
 
30 
135 
165 
 
98 
157 
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(Sources: Svolik 2012; Database of Political Institutions) 
 
 
The military was overtly involved in the entry of 98 out of 255 dictators, most of whom 
were military officers. Yet, 30 out of the 98 military-backed dictators are civilian leaders. 
Furthermore, 22 out of 90 military leaders accessed office without active support from the 
military. Again, since the leader’s affiliation and the support from the military are only 
imperfectly correlated, the effects of both factors can be distinguished: if Hypothesis 3 is 
valid, military leaders should be more likely to initiate MIDs, but for reasons unrelated to 
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the preferences of the whole military. If Hypothesis 2 is valid, the military’s influence on 
policies should be negatively related to conflict initiation, regardless of whether the 
dictator is military or civilian.  
 
 
9.5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
 
I begin with a simple model that includes only the independent variables of interest148 and 
a variable that reports the number of years passed since the last time the country initiated a 
MID, in order to minimize temporal dependence issues. Results are displayed in Table 9.6, 
Model 1. 
Consistently with Hypothesis 1, leaders who accessed office in a regular way are 
substantively less likely to initiate a MID. Their odds of initiating a MID is about 59% as 
high as those of leaders who seized power irregularly. The variable is significant at the 1% 
level. Regimes led by a military officer appear to be more likely to initiate a MID. 
However, the effect is not statistically significant: so far, Hypothesis 3 is not supported. 
Finally, the influence of the military seems to reduce the risk that the leader initiates a 
MID: leaders supported by the military are about 65% as likely to initiate a MID as other 
dictators. The variable is significant at the 10% level. In sum, preliminary estimations lend 
some support to Hypotheses 1 and 2.  
Model 2 includes all appropriate controls.149 The effect of coup risk remains large and 
strongly significant: the regular entry dummy reduces the estimated risk of conflict 
initiation by more than half.150 Military influence also strongly decreases the likelihood 
that a country initiates a MID, military-backed autocrats being only 40% as likely to get 
involved in a MID as autocrats who are free from military control. The variable is 
                                                 
148 VIF tests as well as correlations matrices indicate that multicollinearity is not a concern. 
149 Since the CIRI data are only available from 1981 onward, the sample size shrinks substantially. 
Nevertheless, when the variable is removed from the model, results concerning military influence and 
irregular entry hold up, both in terms of magnitude and statistical significance. The only notable change is 
that the military leader variable becomes marginally significant when physical integrity rights are not 
controlled for. Yet, the effect is not robust to alternative specifications. 
150 Results regarding coup risk are robust to alternative measurements of the variable. Including “interim” and 
“other” in the category of regular entries or replacing the variable with a dummy indicating whether the 
leader entered office via a coup do not substantially alter the results. When the impact of each entry mode 
is analyzed, it appears that elections and hereditary succession strongly decrease the risk of MID 
initiation, whereas leaders who seized power through coup or a rebellion are especially likely to initiate 
interstate conflicts.     
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significant at the 1% level. So far, Hypotheses 1 and 2 are supported. Yet, the military 
leader dummy still fails to attain conventional levels of statistical significance: Hypothesis 
3 can be rejected.  
 
Table 9.6. Determinants of militarized interstate disputes, 1975-2006 (logistic 
regression, reporting odds ratios) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Basic model Full model Coup risk Military 
leader  
Military 
influence  
Coup risk + 
mil. influence  
       
Peace duration a 0.896*** 0.950*** 0.944*** 0.943*** 0.942*** 0.948*** 
 (0.013) (0.0150) (0.0152) (0.0155) (0.0153) (0.0148) 
Military leader 1.415 1.533  1.336   
 (0.327) (0.436)  (0.290)   
Military influence  0.653* 0.417***   0.906 0.519*** 
 (0.152) (0.104)   (0.166) (0.124) 
Regular entry  0.588*** 0.473*** 0.653**   0.437*** 
 (0.118) (0.108) (0.110)   (0.0923) 
Country size b  1.144 1.100 1.076 1.093 1.151* 
  (0.0959) (0.0960) (0.0924) (0.0915) (0.0958) 
Exp./soldier a  1.000** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000** 
  (3.03e-07) (2.61e-07) (2.46e-07) (2.40e-07) (2.76e-07) 
∆ Exp./soldier a  .999 .999 .999 .999 .999 
  (2.68e-07) (2.55e-07) (2.42e-07) (2.59e-07) (2.75e-07) 
Armed conflict a  2.344*** 2.345*** 2.421*** 2.389*** 2.291*** 
  (0.496) (0.509) (0.516) (0.516) (0.488) 
CINC a  0.596 5.974 18.65 8.931 0.442 
  (1.754) (16.82) (53.27) (24.56) (1.282) 
Leader’s tenure  0.984 0.988 0.989 0.991 0.985 
  (0.0104) (0.0119) (0.0118) (0.0121) (0.0109) 
Contiguity (land)  1.054 1.046 1.049 1.039 1.045 
  (0.0434) (0.0431) (0.0435) (0.0422) (0.0427) 
GDP/capita a, b  1.205 1.164 1.124 1.072 1.177 
  (0.172) (0.162) (0.171) (0.156) (0.160) 
Phys. integrity rights a  0.813*** 0.836*** 0.833*** 0.830*** 0.819*** 
  (0.0457) (0.0463) (0.0463) (0.0454) (0.0446) 
Constant 0.440*** 0.0234** 0.0361* 0.0428* 0.0622 0.0310** 
 (0.096) (0.0390) (0.0613) (0.0764) (0.106) (0.0493) 
Countries 124 109 109 109 109 109 
Observations 2,856 1,535 1,536 1,535 1,536 1,536 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a Lagged one year  b Log 
 
 
 
On the whole, control variables have the expected sign. Peace years have a consistently 
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negative and strongly significant effect on the dependent variable (Models 1 and 2). As can 
be seen in Model 2, larger countries tend to initiate more MIDs, but the effect is neither 
strong nor statistically significant. Military expenditures are positively correlated with MID 
initiation. As expected, change of expenditures per soldier decreases the country’s 
probability of initiating a MID, but the variable fails to pass the 10% significance 
threshold. Leader duration also has the expected sign but falls short of statistical 
significance.  
Two interesting results can be observed. First, interstate armed conflict strongly and 
significantly increases the risk of MID initiation, regardless of whether coup risk is 
controlled for. Conversely, coup risk remains statistically significant even after armed 
conflict is included in the model. Thus, both types of contestation impact external conflict 
independently from each other: this suggests that there are several causal relationships 
between domestic political instability and interstate conflicts, and that both mechanisms 
should be distinguished and investigated separately. 
Second, physical integrity rights have a strong, negative and statistically significant effect 
on the likelihood that a country initiates a MID in the following year. In other words: 
repression is positively related to the risk of conflict initiation. Although this finding could 
result from reverse causation issues,151 it indicates at least that both strategies are neither 
incompatible (Andreski 1980) nor substitutable (Gelpi 1997).  
I then assess the impact of each independent variable (military leader, military influence, 
and coup risk) separately. Results reported in Model 3 show the influence of coup risk on 
MID initiation: consistently with Hypothesis 1, leaders who accessed power by regular 
means are substantively less likely to initiate a MID. Their odds of initiating a MID is 
about 65% as high as those of leaders who accessed office by irregular means. The variable 
is significant at the 5% level.  
As can be seen in Model 4, regimes led by a military officer appear to be more likely to 
initiate a MID. However, the effect is not statistically significant: so far, Hypothesis 3 is 
not supported.  
The influence of the military seems to reduce the risk that a leader initiates a MID: this 
lends support to Hypothesis 2. The effect appears to be weak and statistically insignificant 
                                                 
151 Note, however, that the effect of the variable remains significant when it is lagged up to seven years. 
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in Model 5; however, the variable attains significance and grows in magnitude as soon as 
the leader’s entry mode is controlled for. In Model 6, military entry appears to reduce the 
risk of interstate conflict by half.  
On the whole, control variables have the expected sign and their effects remain stable 
across models. Peace years have a consistently negative and strongly significant effect on 
the dependent variable. Larger countries tend to initiate more MIDs, but the effect is rather 
weak and the variable is only marginally significant in Model 3. Military expenditures are 
positively correlated with MID initiation. As expected, change of expenditures per soldier 
decreases the country’s probability of initiating a MID, but the variable systematically fails 
to pass the 10% significance threshold. Leader duration also has the expected sign but falls 
short of statistical significance in all models.  
I then perform several robustness checks. First, to check whether the main results are 
sensitive to the inclusion or removal of insignificant controls, I run a more parsimonious 
version of the full model, that only includes the control variables that were significant in 
Model 2. Results are displayed in Table 9.7., Model 7.  
Regular entry and military influence still have a strong, negative and statistically 
significant effect on the dependent variable, although the magnitude of these effects 
decreases slightly. With regard to military leaders, the variable is again positively 
correlated with the initiation of MIDs but statistically insignificant. The estimations also 
show that results regarding control variables are consistent across models: intrastate armed 
conflict, repression, and expenditures per soldier still increase the risk that a country 
initiates a MID, while peace years remain negatively correlated to the dependent variable. 
All variables in the model are statistically significant.  
Second, I check for the robustness of the findings by including country fixed effects 
(Model 8) and country and year fixed effects (Model 9). In order maximize the number of 
observations, I only include control variables that were significant in previous models. 
Although fixed effects models are conservative, results concerning military influence and 
coup risk remain basically unaltered, dictators being about three times as likely to initiate 
MIDs when they are not constrained by their militaries, and more than twice as likely to 
engage in interstate conflict when coup risk is high.  
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Table 9.7. Determinants of militarized interstate disputes, 1981-2006 (fixed effects 
logit, reporting odds ratios) 
 
 (7) (8) (9) 
    
Peace duration a 0.938*** (0.0128) 1.089*** (0.0211) 1.084*** (0.0214) 
Military leader  1.231 (0.309) 2.140* (0.952) 2.082 (0.936) 
Military influence 0.494*** (0.122) 0.328** (0.143) 0.336** (0.151) 
Regular entry 0.586** (0.134) 0.420** (0.155) 0.482* (0.189) 
Exp./soldier a 1.000** (4.32e-07) 1.000 (9.77e-07) 1.000 (1.01e-06) 
Armed conflict a 2.348*** (0.423) 3.902*** (1.182) 3.933*** (1.227) 
Phys. integrity rights a 0.810*** (0.0408) 0.893 (0.0641) 0.858** (0.0653) 
Constant 0.585* (0.170) 0.0277*** (0.0296) 0.0363*** (0.0424) 
Country FE . YES YES 
Year FE . . YES 
Countries 115 64 64 
Observations 1,751 1,065 1,065 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a Lagged one year   
 
Results of fixed effects models have to be interpreted cautiously when the dependent 
variable entails a large proportion of zeroes: since the dependent variable does not vary in 
several countries and years, a large number of observations (almost 700) are lost and the 
sample is now restricted to 64 countries. Furthermore, some results cast doubt on the 
overall reliability of the estimates: peace years are now positively and significantly related 
to MID initiation. The physical integrity rights variable loses significance in Model 8, and 
in the same model, the military leader dummy passes the 10% level significance threshold; 
however, these results vanish in Model 9. In spite of these anomalies, results regarding 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 remain consistent across several specifications, which lends credence 
to the validity of the findings.  
 
 
9.6. CONCLUSION 
 
The results of the empirical analysis strongly confirm previous findings on coup risk and 
MID initiation (Belkin and Schofer 2005; Miller and Elgün 2011; Powell 2014b): dictators’ 
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propensity to initiate interstate conflicts increases along with their risk of being violently 
removed from power. This is probably the main causal mechanism that underlies the 
empirical relationship between military regimes and interstate conflict: military leaders 
display a higher propensity to initiate interstate conflicts than their civilian counterparts, 
but the variable regularly fails to attain statistical significance; moreover, once leader 
identity and coup risk are controlled for, military influence on policies has a strong, 
negative effect on the probability of initiating a MID. These results are robust across 
several model specifications.  
Thus, the empirical analysis discussed here solves a paradox while contributing to a 
persistent debate on the military’s preferences about the use of force: the “military 
conservatism” thesis is perfectly compatible with the recurring finding that military 
dictatorships tend to initiate wars more often than authoritarian regimes led by civilians. 
While I do not contest the finding itself, I argue that it may be wrong to use this 
observation to draw inferences about the military’s preferences and beliefs: military 
regimes are more belligerent because they run a higher coup risk, and in spite of the whole 
military’s preferences. To the extent that previous research has uncovered a relationship 
between military influence and conflict initiation, my findings indicate that it is probably 
spurious: for example, neither Sechser (2004) nor Weeks (2012) did control for coup risk. 
My results are also at odds with Dassel and Reinhardt’s (1999) argument, that diversionary 
wars are initiated by the military itself: states’ propensity to initiate MIDs actually 
decreases as the military’s influence on policies increases.  
My findings also have broader implications for theories of diversionary wars in general. 
First, domestic factors matter: internal instability is a determinant of the use of violence 
abroad. Second, while I find evidence for diversion, my results suggest that the 
mechanisms driving the initiation of interstate conflicts differ across political regimes. 
Unlike democratically elected leaders, dictators are not bound to the voters: thus, they have 
to orient their strategies toward potential challengers from their inner circle. This is 
consistent with some patterns uncovered by the empirical analysis: the fact that repression 
does not reduce the likelihood that a state initiates a MID indicates that both strategies are 
not substitutable (i.e., that they are targeted at different groups). Similarly, the fact that civil 
unrest and coup risk both lead to MID initiation suggests that both factors impact foreign 
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policy through independent, theoretically distinct paths.  
Finally, these findings highlight the need for precise measures of political variables: while 
regime classifications are useful shortcuts, they are not always appropriate to test 
hypotheses about specific causal relationships. Conflating distinct institutional features into 
a single measure can result in misleading findings, particularly when the phenomena under 
investigation are different analytically and in their consequences.  
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10 
Conclusion: Out of the violence trap? 
 
The aim of this dissertation was to analyze the relationships between political regime type 
and violent conflicts. Considering the results as a whole, there are some good news and 
some bad news.  
The bad news is that, in a nutshell, violence tends to breed violence: violent conflicts are 
not only enduring but also tend to beget other forms of conflicts through spillover effects. 
This general observation is not exactly new: for example, the impact of domestic turmoil 
on interstate conflicts (e.g., Dassel and Reinhardt 1999; Gleditsch et al. 2008) and the 
effect of state violence on rebellion (Moore 1998; Bell et al. 2013) have already been 
extensively discussed in the literature, and the relationship between coup risk and interstate 
conflicts has recently gained attention as well (Miller and Elgün 2011; Powell 2014b). Yet, 
the present work contributes to this research in two ways. From an empirical point of view, 
to the general observation that violent conflicts fuel each other, I add two new findings: 
first, Chapter 4 shows that a high risk of civil war and a moderate risk of interstate war 
make military coups more likely; second, as discussed in Chapter 8, widespread violations 
of physical integrity rights also increase coup risk. I also confirm one of the emerging 
findings of the international relations literature: coup risk increases leaders’ propensity to 
initiate interstate conflicts (Chapter 9). Now, from an analytical point of view, the 
theoretical framework developed here makes it possible to organize this heterogeneous set 
of empirical findings – which have been treated so far in relative isolation from each other 
and remain to date fragmented – in a coherent way. One of the key themes developed in the 
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third part of this dissertation is that states do not react to threats coming from opposition 
groups and to those originating from the military in a similar manner: the typical response 
to mass dissent is repression, while the initiation of diversionary wars can be thought of as 
the incumbent’s reaction to coup risk. Likewise, as shown in Chapter 4, internal and 
external security threats do not impact coup risk in the same way.  
The good news is that specific institutional arrangements can alleviate at least some of the 
conflicts mentioned above. I find that two regimes are consistently less prone to violence. 
First, democracies are less likely to experience civil war (Chapter 5) and less likely to 
repress human rights to physical integrity (Chapter 8). This latter result is not trivial, since 
the measure of democracy I use does not include any indicator related to human rights 
protection: democracies achieve this better human rights performance through electoral 
accountability alone. Electoral competition also explains why democracies are less likely to 
experience civil war: because of procedures that allow for regular alternations in power, 
and because large groups – that is, those that could pose the most serious challenges to the 
state’s authority – are precisely the ones that benefit the most from electoral competition, 
democracy generates strong incentives for everyone to abide by the rules instead of 
resorting to violence (Przeworski 1999). Chapter 7 brings a further confirmation to these 
results, as it demonstrates that civil war sometimes breaks out as a response to a mismatch 
between the numerical strength and the political influence of the main political groups.  
Second, because hereditary succession represents a durable solution to succession 
problems and reduces the uncertainty that characterizes the relationships between the 
leader and his ruling coalition, monarchies are able to moderate power struggles and avoid 
coups (Chapter 5). Moreover, although they do not protect physical integrity rights as well 
as democracies do, monarchies are less likely to engage in widespread repression than 
other non-democratic regimes (Chapter 8) and they also experience fewer civil wars than 
non-institutionalized regimes (Chapter 5). Finally, I find tentative evidence that leaders 
who attained power by rule of hereditary succession are less likely to initiate international 
conflicts (Chapter 9). Given the small number of monarchies in the post-World War II 
period and the peculiarities of these countries, these results have to be considered with 
caution. Yet, the fact that the effect of monarchy on civil war also holds for the 19th century 
lends some credibility to the overall validity of the findings: the “monarchic peace” effect 
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at least seems to go beyond mere regional effects.  
Thus, consistently with theoretical expectations, regimes that rely on formal, binding 
procedures for selecting the effective leader (that is, competitive elections in the case of 
democracies, and hereditary succession in the case of monarchies) are more peaceful in 
two respects: they experience less violence and they commit less violence. But what about 
regimes that lack such institutions? One key expectation of the dissertation was that, in 
non-institutionalized regimes, the identity of the leader and the type of organization on 
which he relies to maintain his rule would affect the regime’s propensity to initiate or 
experience violent conflicts – since prior research indicates that authoritarian regimes differ 
systematically in their conflict proneness, civilian regimes (especially party-based ones) 
being both internally and externally more peaceful than military dictatorships (see, e.g., 
Peceny et al. 2002; Lai and Slater 2006; Davenport 2007b; Fjelde 2010; Weeks 2012). Are 
these expectations borne out? 
The answer is a (very) partial “yes.” To begin, I find strong evidence that military 
dictatorships are more vulnerable to coups than any other non-institutionalized regime, 
especially party-based regimes (Chapter 5). This high coup risk certainly results from the 
distinctive characteristics of the military – contrary to civilian party cadres, military 
officers rarely share common policy objectives and often disagree about the nature and 
objectives of the regime, which makes military governments especially prone to internal 
splits and policy disputes – but might also be partly driven by the particularly toxic 
environment in which military dictatorships emerge (see Chapter 4).  
Is that all? Prior research suggests that the effects of military government go well beyond 
internal factionalism: the idea that military officers are more inclined to use force than 
civilians is a recurring theme in the literature. A military career, so the argument goes, 
generates specific perception biases, military officers becoming more likely to view the use 
of force as both effective and legitimate, and to favor it over more peaceful ways of solving 
conflicts (see, e.g., Nordlinger 1977; Sechser 2004; Davenport 2007b; Fjelde 2010; Weeks 
2012). A first consequence is that military dictatorships have been found to experience 
more civil wars (Fjelde 2010) and to commit more physical integrity rights violations (Poe 
et al. 1999; Davenport 2007b) than other types of dictatorship. Yet, I was not able to 
replicate any of these results. In fact, the discussions in Chapters 5 and 8 indicate that these 
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findings were mainly due to measurement errors in the dependent variables: after 
correcting for these errors, I do not uncover any empirical association between military 
dictatorship, on the one hand, and civil war and repression, on the other hand. Moreover, 
one of the key findings in Chapter 8 is that state repression actually increases the risk that 
the military turns against the incumbent and launches a coup. This result is consistent with 
early research on military coups – many authors such as Finer (1962), Needler (1975), and 
Nordlinger (1977) have consistently stressed military officers’ deep reluctance to carry out 
domestic repression – but at odds with the increasingly widespread assumption that 
military officers systematically favor overt terror over peaceful conflict resolution.  
Thus, on the whole, I do not find that civilian-led and military-led dictatorships differ 
systematically in their way of dealing with domestic conflicts. I do find, however, that 
military dictatorships are more likely to initiate militarized interstate disputes than any 
other regime (Chapter 9). Yet, this correlation is essentially a by-product of coup risk: after 
controlling for coup risk, I find that the influence of the military on domestic politics has a 
negative effect on the probability that a country initiates an interstate conflict. The fact that 
the effective leader is himself a military officer has no effect at all. Again, these results 
speak clearly against the widespread assumption that the use of violence is the military’s 
natural modus operandi.   
Thus, on the whole, authoritarian regime type has less explanatory power than previously 
assumed. But then again, this does not mean that political institutions cannot alleviate 
political conflicts: on the contrary, my findings point to a clear divide between political 
regimes in which institutions are binding and self-enforcing and those that lack such 
institutions. If anything, what the present work demonstrates is that the rules of the game 
matter more than the identity of those who play it.  
Several qualifications must be added to these general conclusions. First, the present work 
suffers from some limitations from a theoretical point of view: although institutionalization 
has a strong explanatory power and explains much of the variation in political regimes’ 
behavior, its effects are sometimes unexpected and rather surprising. For example, while 
the fact that monarchies are relatively immune to coups is perfectly consistent with the 
theoretical framework developed in Chapter 3, it is not so clear why they experience so few 
civil wars, and why they are systematically less repressive than non-institutionalized 
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dictatorships. One possible explanation is that stability and instability at the elite level have 
repercussions on the state’s ability to deal with conflicts between elites and citizens, but 
understanding how coup risk and conflict risk reinforce each other would require further 
research. Conversely, one of the key expectations formulated in Chapter 3 is not borne out: 
in spite of the institutionalization of leadership selection, democracies are not immune to 
military coups. This expectation was the result of an attempt to endogenize coup risk: the 
fact that democracies do not experience fewer coups than non-institutionalized regimes 
demonstrates that the military’s decision to overthrow a government is not necessarily 
related to system instability, and that other, exogenous factors might better account for the 
cross-national variations in coup risk. 
A related issue is that the empirical category of non-institutionalized regimes possibly 
includes some institutionalized ones. The hypotheses as well as the definition and 
measurement of regime variables are based on the assumption that only competitive 
elections and hereditary succession can be viewed as binding, self-enforcing institutions. 
But this assumption may be incorrect: theoretically speaking, competitive elections and 
hereditary succession do not exhaust all possibilities, and there might well be other regimes 
that are based on self-enforcing rules for selecting and replacing the effective leader, that 
my measures of regime type did not adequately capture. For example, the central finding of 
Chapter 6 is that gerontocracy brings about peace: aging dictators experience fewer 
rebellions than younger ones, regardless of their respective tenure in office. Due to the lack 
of data, I could not investigate all possible implications of this finding, but it may 
constitute an indication that the seniority principle – as applied in many bureaucratic 
organizations such as the military – is a self-enforcing rule, because it creates natural limits 
to incumbency but also tends to produce leaders who have already accumulated effective 
power within the organization. Thus, one possible direction for future research would be to 
compare party or military regimes that implement this principle consistently with regimes 
that rely on a similar type of organization but lack such a rule, and test whether they differ 
systematically in their stability and their behavior.  
The remaining limitations are rather practical than theoretical: institutionalization brings 
about peace, but not every institution is self-enforcing, and rules that are self-enforcing are 
typically difficult to establish (see Chapter 3). With regard to democracy, holding the first 
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competitive election is a risky gamble for incumbents, even if peaceful alternation in power 
becomes self-stabilizing on the long run (Przeworski 2015). The same is true of 
monarchies: although their institutional setup makes them more stable on the long run, 
establishing hereditary succession as a rule requires that the current leader is powerful 
enough to force his will upon his allies (Brownlee 2007). Finally, no policy 
recommendation can be drawn from the findings sketched above: as Hume (2000 [1738]) 
reminded us centuries ago, prescriptive statements cannot be logically derived from 
descriptive ones. The fact that monarchies are more peaceful than other autocratic regimes 
does not necessarily make them more desirable.  
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